

# GLOBALIZATION AND SECURITY:

## MIGRATION AND EVOLVING CONCEPTIONS OF SECURITY IN STATECRAFT AND SCHOLARSHIP

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The pace of technological change is so fast that sometimes it seems the world will be completely different from one day to the next.

Bill Gates

DOES GLOBALIZATION SHAPE the way states define their security interests? Few would question that we live in an era of extraordinary change—technological, economic, social, and political—but scholars disagree whether globalization is something truly new or simply the continuation of a process underway for centuries.<sup>1</sup> Even skeptics, however, concede that, although the capitalist world-system has been globalizing for hundreds of years, the speed and degree of that globalization have increased tremendously in recent decades.<sup>2</sup> Even before George H. W. Bush popularized the term “new world order,” there was a growing sense that globalization’s effects were

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1. Cf. Christopher Chase-Dunn, “Technology and the Changing Logic of World-Systems,” in *Transcending the State-Global Divide: A Neostructural Agenda in International Relations*, ed. Ronen Palan and Barry Gills (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994), 85–106; James N. Rosenau, *Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Saskia Sassen, *Globalization and Its Discontents* (New York: New Press, 1998); Giovanni Arrighi, “Globalization, State Sovereignty, and the ‘Endless’ Accumulation of Capital,” in *States and Sovereignty in the Global Economy*, ed. David A. Smith, Dorothy J. Solinger, and Steven C. Topik (New York: Routledge, 1999), 53–73; Immanuel Wallerstein, “States? Sovereignty? The Dilemmas of Capitalists in an Age of Transition,” in Smith, Solinger, and Topik, *States and Sovereignty*, 20–33; Manuel Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000); Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, “Globalization: What’s New? What’s Not? (And So What?),” *Foreign Policy*, no. 118 (spring 2000): 104–19; James Mittelman, *The Globalization Syndrome* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); and Geoffrey Garrett, “The Causes of Globalization,” *Comparative Political Studies* 33, nos. 6/7 (August/September 2000): 941–91.

2. Chase-Dunn, “Technology,” 181.

fundamentally changing the world order and international politics. Yet what is the nature of that change?

To understand this new world order, contemporary changes must be studied in historical context—with an eye not so much on pivotal turning points, but on the dynamic process of incremental change. Globalization has established a complex matrix of cause-and-effect relationships whose resulting political impulses can best be understood by reconsidering static concepts of security.<sup>3</sup> International relations theorists have noted the rise of trading states and the emergence of complex interdependence—two developments strongly linked to globalization that have fundamentally altered the structural environment—which in turn affects state interests.<sup>4</sup> I argue that trading-state grand strategy has compounded the scope and pace of globalization and has prompted new security issues and objectives.<sup>5</sup> In particular, not only has the emergence of trading states made control over trade and capital flows an essential component of state grand strategy, but migration has emerged as a key issue in the construction of a contemporary security paradigm. Migration now rests at the nexus of three essential elements of the contemporary security dilemma: (1) the production and accumulation of economic power; (2) the changing nature of war, especially between combatants with highly disproportionate power and resources; and (3) growing concerns regarding social identities and the potential effect that threats to national identity have on governmental legitimacy in a system of nation-states (see figure 1).


In illustrating the process that has brought migration to this pivotal position, I presume an international system of egoistic states operating under anarchy. I begin by examining the geopolitical, technological, economic, and ideational factors that contributed to the scope and pace of globalization in the late twentieth century and discuss how these factors affect traditional security paradigms and the assumptions on which they are built. In the following section, I present a genealogy of perspectives on security to illustrate how

3. I am not concerned here with whether my thesis challenges how “security studies” defines itself. Rather, I take the term “security” at face value and place it in the context of a changing world, attempting to show how these changes shape ideas and interests, as well as state behavior and political strategy. Cf. Sean M. Lynn-Jones, “International Security Studies after the Cold War: An Agenda for the Future,” Working Paper (Cambridge: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, December 1991); and Stephen M. Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” *International Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (1991): 211–39.

4. Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State* (New York: Basic Books, 1986); and Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 2nd ed. (New York: HarperCollins, 1989).

5. See Rosecrance, *Trading State*. Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984) defines grand strategy as a state’s theory for creating security through military and diplomatic means (p. 13). I use the term more broadly to refer to the state’s strategy for maximizing gains along each of three dimensions of security—military, material, and societal. It represents the constellation of the balance between competing dimensions.

Figure 1  
MIGRATION: AT THE NEXUS OF THREE DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY



changing structural and ideational environments shape security interests and the grand strategies employed to realize them. From this evolutionary perspective, the link between grand strategy, increased pressures for the movement of global factor and trade flows, and globalization more generally becomes clearer. Trading-state grand strategy emphasizes the strong economic gains resulting from such movement, but increasing levels of international migration have heightened sensitivity to demographic change in receiving states, especially when flows have continued despite state efforts to curtail them. This has led to a divergence in security interests between developed and developing states. Whereas developed states have witnessed the rise of an identity-centered security interest in response to global migration, developing states have witnessed the rise of a concomitant “expatriate politics.”<sup>6</sup> Moreover, rising frustrations regarding the unequal gains of globalization have allowed the emergence of

6. On identity and security, see Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, and Pierre Lemaitre, eds., *Identity, Migration, and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (New York: St. Martin's, 1993); Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds., *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997); Christopher Rudolph, “National Security and International Migration” (University of California, Los Angeles, 2003); and Myron Weiner and Sharon Stanton Russell, eds., *Demography and National Security* (New York: Berghahn, 2001). On the rise of expatriate politics, see Wayne A. Cornelius and Thomas Espenshade, “The International

terrorism as a “weapon of the weak,” and migration has emerged as a potentially crucial element in global terrorism. Each of these factors represents a salient element of a multifaceted security challenge facing international society. I conclude by suggesting that accurate models of world politics must move beyond traditional security paradigms, acknowledging the interrelationships between the economic, political, and societal dimensions of state grand strategy. Considerable literatures discuss each of these dimensions, but few have attempted to sketch an integrated theoretical landscape that allows us to see the proverbial forest, not just trees.

### EVOLVING NOTIONS OF SECURITY

SECURITY HAS BEEN the cornerstone of the study of international relations—its *raison d'être*.<sup>7</sup> Presumably, by understanding the factors that contribute to the existence of cooperation or conflict—war or peace—the study of international relations can make some contribution to global well-being. Realists suggest that, in a Hobbesian world, survival lies at the core of all action.<sup>8</sup> Although the Peace of Westphalia (1648) demarcated lines of sovereignty among states and gave form to our current international system, it guaranteed neither systemic stability nor state survival. Thus states have been forced to engage in what some scholars have characterized as “an inherently open-ended, competitive, and risk laden power struggle.”<sup>9</sup> Given this scenario, security is commonly defined as “a condition in which the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a country are guaranteed.”<sup>10</sup> In the volatile global environment, security emerged as the primary function of the state, since it is a prerequisite to establishing systems of governance that provide for the needs of the governed. The difficulty of establishing and maintaining security in the early period of state formation

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Migration of the Highly Skilled: ‘High-Tech Braceros’ in the Global Labor Market,” in *The International Migration of the Highly Skilled*, ed. Wayne A. Cornelius, Thomas Espenshade, and Idean Salehyan (La Jolla: Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, University of California, San Diego, 2001), 3–19; and Laurie Brand, “States and Their Expatriates: Explaining the Development of Tunisian and Moroccan Emigration-Related Institutions” (paper presented at the Center for International Studies, University of Southern California, 27 February 2002).

7. Cf. Lynn-Jones, “International Security Studies”; and Walt, “Renaissance of Security Studies.”

8. Robert G. Gilpin, “The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism,” in *Neorealism and Its Critics*, ed. Robert Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 301–21.

9. Gianfranco Poggi, *The Development of the Modern State* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978), 60.

10. Steven L. Spiegel and Fred L. Wehling, *World Politics in a New Era*, 2nd ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1999), 492.

is evident: most early efforts to build states in Europe failed.<sup>11</sup> Consequently, self-preservation emerged as a function of power, and the energies of the state focused primarily on military organization and preparation for war.<sup>12</sup>

The cold war and the development of nuclear weapons increased this preoccupation with arms production and military affairs among both policymakers and academicians and served to reinforce the realist view regarding security. Thus, scholarship addressing security issues developed along a path distinct from that examining economic processes, with the realist paradigm prioritizing military affairs in considerations of power and state security over the past half-century.<sup>13</sup> The “golden age” of security studies generally ignored those who recognized the importance of economic factors in security affairs, from classical writers to modern theorists such as E. H. Carr, Jacob Viner, and Albert Hirschmann. Yet as Carr rightly reminded us, “military and economic weapons are merely different instruments of power.”<sup>14</sup> Even in a world dominated by cold war realpolitik, significant economic changes emerged. In response, whereas security studies generally saw stasis and maintained a strong dichotomy between “high” (that is, military) and “low” (that is, economic) politics, the emerging field of international political economy (IPE) focused on systemic changes occurring in international economics.<sup>15</sup>

In documenting the rise of trading states during the modern era, Richard Rosecrance identified long-term changes that favored a global trading system over one based on the accumulation of power via territorial conquest.<sup>16</sup> He argues that security in the trading-state world, while by no means rendering

11. Hendrik Spruyt, *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); and Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of Nation States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).

12. Otto Hintze, “Military Organization and the Organization of the State,” in *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze*, ed. Felix Gilbert (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 180–215; and W. H. McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000* (New York: Basic Books, 1982).

13. Michael Mastanduno, “Economics and Security in Statecraft and Scholarship,” in *Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics*, ed. Peter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), 185–214; and Beverly Crawford, “Hawks, Doves, but No Owls: International Economic Interdependence and the Construction of the New Security Dilemma,” in *On Security*, ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 149–86.

14. E. H. Carr, *Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), 119.

15. Cf. Richard N. Cooper, *The Economics of Interdependence* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968); Susan Strange, “International Economics and International Relations: A Case of Mutual Neglect,” *International Affairs* 46, no. 2 (1970): 304–15; Robert O. Keohane, “Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond” in Keohane, *Neorealism and Its Critics*, 158–203; and Richard N. Cooper, *Economic Policy in an Interdependent World* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986).

16. Rosecrance, *Trading State*.

military affairs useless, is being recast in response to long-term changes in the nature of warfare and to lessons learned from the great empires of the past. As warfare has become increasingly costly, complicated, and destructive,<sup>17</sup> conquering and maintaining vast territorial empires has become less attractive to those states with imperial or hegemonic designs.<sup>18</sup> Moreover, the development of increasingly sophisticated weaponry and the exponential growth in its destructive capacity have made wars of territorial expansion not only more costly, but also more dangerous, both economically and politically.<sup>19</sup> Public sensitivity to casualties during conflict has grown increasingly acute, as shown by the U.S. experience in Vietnam. More recently, public reaction to U.S. casualties during the humanitarian intervention in Somalia in 1993 suggests that these political sensitivities are not abating, even in cases in which the overall number of casualties is low when taken in historical perspective. Casualties are no longer faceless statistics; they are increasingly identified by name in national media outlets, as during the U.S. military action in Afghanistan in 2001–2 and the Iraq war in 2003. Internationally, norms regarding modern laws of war place increasing emphasis on legitimacy in the use of force. States deemed not to be engaging in a “just war” increasingly risk being ostracized by the international community—an outcome that can have deleterious economic and political effects.

Although these trends shaped the convergence of economic and military aspects of grand strategy, they do not necessarily explain the continuing trend toward globalization or the sharp intensification of such processes since 1945. The proximate causes of this intensification lie in the political, historical, and ideational context of the postwar period—factors not properly acknowledged by scholars until the 1970s, though clearly influential in the statecraft of the period. These factors include the dynamics of the cold war, the process of decolonization, lessons from the interwar period, and a resurgence of classical

17. See Hans Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Knopf, 1948).

18. Cf. Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (London: Unwin-Hyman, 1988); Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); Charles Kupchan, *The Vulnerability of Empire* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994); Richard N. Rosecrance, “Overextension, Vulnerability, and Conflict: The ‘Goldilocks Problem’ in International Strategy,” *International Security* 19, no. 4 (1995): 145–63; and Chalmers Johnson, *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire* (New York: Metropolitan, 2000).

19. Cf. John Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (New York: Basic Books, 1989); Thomas C. Schelling, “The Role of Nuclear Weapons,” in *Turning Point: The Gulf War and U.S. Military Strategy*, ed. L. Benjamin Ederington and Michael J. Mazarr (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 105–15; and Nina Tannenwald, “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use,” *International Organization* 53, no. 3 (spring 1999): 433–68.

economics. A hegemonic order and rapid advances in technological innovation combined with these factors to drive processes of globalization.<sup>20</sup>

Although the cold war's emergent arms race prompted a preoccupation with military issues among security scholars,<sup>21</sup> it presented conditions that elevated economics to the realm of "high politics" among statesmen. Two dimensions were most salient. First, the military-political threats of the cold war were not defined simply in terms of military invasion; economic weakness was seen as an incubator for political unrest and potential communist insurgency. The Marshall Plan and the prominence of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) in the postwar international economic regime both point to economic development as a central component of security after the Second World War. Moreover, the process of decolonization that accompanied the early cold war helped make economic growth a central component of state and global security, as independence risked producing economic and political instability. Last, and most obvious, the cold war arms race created conditions in which security could be maximized only if the accumulation of material resources could also be maximized. The only task, then, was to determine the most appropriate means of maximizing economic power.

Charles Kindleberger's seminal book *The World in Depression* documented how the global economic and political collapse during the interwar period provided the impetus for a new postwar conventional wisdom regarding economic strategy.<sup>22</sup> Isolationism and protectionism were identified as factors contributing to a downward spiral of economic depression, political instability, resurgent nationalism, and ultimately, world conflict. Such lessons provided fertile ground for the adoption of a Ricardian strategy for the accumulation of material power in the emerging postwar world order and took the form of the Bretton Woods monetary regime and that of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Following Ricardian principles of comparative advantage, proponents argue that liberal trade policies and laissez-faire treatment of international factor flows is a Pareto-improving endeavor, one that promises to create a "rising tide that will lift all boats" in both developed and developing nations, though perhaps not evenly.<sup>23</sup> For large, powerful states, the

20. Robert Gilpin, *The Challenge of Global Capitalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

21. Mastanduno, "Economics and Security."

22. Charles Kindleberger, *The World in Depression, 1929–39* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).

23. David Ricardo, *Works* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955); Paul R. Krugman and Anthony J. Venables, "Globalization and the Inequality of Nations," working paper no. 5098 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1995); and Paul R. Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld, *International Economics* (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1997).

contemporary economic environment encourages states to plumb the world market rather than attempt to secure resources through military conquest.<sup>24</sup> Smaller states face similar pressures for openness and engagement. The increase in the number of developing states after 1945 added pressure to those states to engage in trade to gain the material power needed for security. Given their limited natural resources, autarky was not a realistic option for most of these states. Under these conditions, states of all sizes face considerable pressure to trade in order to sustain an independent national existence—in other words, security.

If changing ideas and interests specific to the postwar period provided the incentives to adopt a more comprehensive view of security that included a global economic component, the international structure and advances in technology provided the means to achieve such objectives. Although not a global hegemony, the bipolar distribution of power during the cold war established two distinct spheres, each with internal hegemonic influence.<sup>25</sup> In the West, the United States was able to create and maintain a generally open economic structure by providing stability and offering incentives to other states to embrace openness by giving them access to its large domestic market in the form of asymmetric tariff bargains.<sup>26</sup> In addition, the United States provided the confidence required for a stable international monetary system, and the strength of its currency offered the liquidity necessary for an increasingly open system, especially when external shocks threatened global stability. Once effective regimes were established to maintain the order created under U.S. hegemony, the relative decline in American dominance during the 1970s did not derail the moves toward global openness developed under its leadership.<sup>27</sup>

The more open system established under U.S. hegemony contributed in three ways to the technological revolution that enhanced the speed and scope of globalization. First, the creation of a truly global market created strong financial incentives for research and development of new technologies, product designs, and production techniques. Second, this global market created a strongly

24. Rosecrance, *Trading State*, 46.

25. Arthur A. Stein, "The Hegemon's Dilemma," *International Organization* 38, no. 2 (spring 1984): 355–86.

26. Stephen D. Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade," *World Politics* 28, no. 3 (April 1976): 322–23. See also Robert O. Keohane, "The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967–1977," in *Change in the International System*, ed. Ole R. Holsti, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alexander George (Boulder: Westview, 1980), 131–62; Robert G. Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Bruce M. Russett, "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony," *International Organization* 39, no. 2 (spring 1985): 207–31; and David A. Lake, *Power, Protection and Free Trade* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988).

27. Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).



competitive environment conducive to innovation. As James Mittelman put it, “competition has become the mother of inventions.”<sup>28</sup> Innovation is increasingly considered to be a prerequisite to establishing or maintaining a country’s comparative advantage, and to a state’s ability to compete effectively in the global marketplace. Third, the openness established by trading states created a dynamic environment in which ideas and expertise—knowledge and human capital—flow freely. This type of idea sharing contributed to innovations that would otherwise have been impossible and often results in achievements that are greater than the sum of the individual inputs.<sup>29</sup> In an important sense, the relationship between trading-state grand strategy and technological developments are interrelated. Trading-state grand strategy creates the conditions necessary for innovation and development to thrive. At the same time, innovations developed during the information technology (IT) revolution have created conditions that make trading-state openness the dominant strategy of states and have facilitated international transactions.

The IT revolution has provided the incentive and the means to transform the dominant production model from the Fordist mass-production paradigm of the 1950s to one based on flexible production and capital- and technology-intensive operations.<sup>30</sup> In addition, access to information and markets, coupled with significant decreases in transportation costs,<sup>31</sup> has increased pressure for the removal of barriers to trade and cross-border flows, creating a “virtualization of economic activity.”<sup>32</sup> Since Bretton Woods, tariffs have dropped steadily and significantly, especially among advanced industrial states, spurring increased world trade: during the 1990s, world trade grew at over three times the rate of global output.<sup>33</sup>

This growth in trade flows may be impressive, but an even more significant expansion has taken place in international capital markets, as shown in figure 2.<sup>34</sup> Facilitated by the deregulation of domestic financial markets, the liberalization of capital flows, and advanced IT hardware and communications

28. Mittelman, *Globalization Syndrome*, 16.

29. Castells, *Network Society*.

30. Cf. David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1990); Castells, *Network Society*; and Mittelman, *Globalization Syndrome*.


31. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), *The Future of the Global Economy* (Paris: OECD, 1999), 119.

32. Saskia Sassen, *Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 21–22.

33. OECD, *Global Economy*; World Bank, *World Development Report* (Washington: World Bank, 1999); and World Trade Organization (WTO), *International Trade Statistics* (Geneva: WTO, 2000).

34. John Gerard Ruggie, *At Home Abroad, Abroad at Home: International Liberalization and Domestic Stability in the New World Economy* (Florence: European Union Institute, 1995); and Benjamin J. Cohen, *The Geography of Money* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).

Figure 2  
GROWTH IN TRADE AND CAPITAL FLOWS, 1970–95 (1980 = 1)



Source: Manuel Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 107.

devices, the foreign exchange market's daily turnover rate grew from \$15 billion in 1970 to \$1.5 trillion in 1998.<sup>35</sup> Continuing trends suggest that these flows continue to grow at an exponential rate.

Of course, the trading-state system as it currently exists does not represent a global commitment to a pure *laissez-faire* approach. Basing economic policy purely on a strategy of total specialization and comparative advantage in most cases would entail the abandonment of whole industrial sectors, resulting in significant economic dislocations.<sup>36</sup> Such dislocations may threaten the domestic political alignments necessary to continue open trade and maintain a trading-state grand strategy.<sup>37</sup> As a result, governments tend to "encourage an international division of labor which, while multilateral in form and reflecting *some* notion of comparative advantage (and therefore gains from trade), ... [promises] to minimize the socially disruptive domestic adjustment costs as well as any national economic and political vulnerabilities that might accrue from international functional differentiation."<sup>38</sup> This is the basis of what John Ruggie has referred to as "embedded liberalism."

35. Sassen, *Losing Control*, 40; and Mittelman, *Globalization Syndrome*, 21.

36. Paul R. Krugman, *Geography and Trade* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991).

37. Cf. Judith Goldstein, "The Political Economy of Trade: Institutions of Protection," *American Political Science Review* 80, no. 1 (winter 1986): 161–84; Ronald Rogowski, *Commerce and Coalitions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); and Etel Solingen, *Regional Orders at Century's Dawn* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).

38. John Gerard Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," in *International Regimes*, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 215.

Nevertheless, even given the political sensitivities to domestic economic dislocation, the dominant paradigm emerging in the twentieth century is one in which power—and hence, security—is increasingly a function of a state’s ability to effectively manage flows across international borders and is less dependent on the accumulation of stocks, including extensive land holdings.<sup>39</sup> Although this is an important insight in terms of contemporary world politics (especially among advanced industrial “trading states”), this is not the end of the story. Considerable evidence supports notions of the dominance of a trading-state grand strategy, but we must recognize that the proliferation of trading-state openness has set in motion other political processes that affect the construction of security interests.

#### THE POLITICAL EFFECTS OF TRADING-STATE GRAND STRATEGY

TRADING-STATE globalization has resulted in several trends with significant security implications. The most significant of these trends is the persistent (and perhaps growing) economic disparity between developed nations (the North) and developing nations (the South).<sup>40</sup> As mentioned above, the globalization of markets offers gains superior to those of autarky to all nations, yet those gains are not distributed evenly.<sup>41</sup> The significance for “losers” in global economic interactions is relatively obvious: failure in the global market weakens the material (and political) power of the state. Increasingly, however, these trends figure in the security interests of the “winners” in the global economy. A report released by the Central Intelligence Agency’s National Intelligence Council in 2000 suggested that the greatest threat to the United States will likely be related to the growth of the IT economy and the resultant disparity between developed and developing nations—a process that fuels frustrated expectations, inequities, and heightened communal tensions.<sup>42</sup> In the following sections I will suggest how North-South inequality, global economic transformations, and trading-state grand strategy have created new security challenges within the traditional power paradigm and also have created new security objectives.

39. Richard Rosecrance, *Rise of the Virtual State: Wealth and Power in the Coming Century* (New York: Basic Books, 1999).

40. United Nations (UN), *International Conference on Population and Development: Program of Action* (New York: UN, 1994).

41. Krugman and Venables, “Globalization and Inequality”; and World Bank, *World Development Report*.

42. National Intelligence Council (NIC), *Global Trends 2015* (Washington: NIC, 2000).

Figure 3 outlines the cause-and-effect matrix that shapes the contemporary security environment and illustrates how migration has emerged as an increasingly central element of security. What is important to note in figure 3 is that the emergence of trading-state grand strategy—although a significant development in contemporary world politics—is but one step in an increasingly complex and fluid security paradigm. Tracing the effects of trading state-led globalization shows that not only have these processes contributed to inequality between North and South, but that this inequality has created distinct—and often opposing—security interests between these groups. The following sections explain the causal linkages and the political tensions that have emerged, especially within the past half-century.

#### EVOLVING ECONOMIC CHALLENGES IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL STATES

If the production and accumulation of material power is a fundamental requirement for security—as it has long been considered by both statesmen and analysts—understanding transformations in the forms of power is a prerequisite to defining security interests and developing an appropriate strategy to pursue such interests. Among highly developed nations, one of the most significant economic transformations of the late twentieth century has been the growing importance of services and skilled labor as components of a country's gross domestic product (GDP). In an increasingly skill-driven world economy, knowledge is an ever more important component of state power.<sup>43</sup>


A 1999 report of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development surmised that “the movement toward an economy and society where knowledge is highly valued is more or less inevitable.”<sup>44</sup> In advanced industrial states, the proportion of GDP that is generated by services—especially those of high value—has steadily increased over the past half-century. In the United States, the percentage of GDP generated by services increased from under 60 percent in 1960 to about 70 percent by 1990, with most focused in high-value categories.<sup>45</sup> In 2001, the percentage of U.S. GDP attributed to services reached 80 percent. In contrast, since 1960 the percentage of U.S. GDP attributed to industry (manufacturing) decreased from 35 percent to its current level of 18 percent. The increasing demand for highly skilled labor in the emergent service sector has led to increased wage disparity for skilled labor between North

43. Castells, *Network Society*.

44. OECD, *Global Economy*, 108.

45. Rosecrance, *Virtual State*, 11.

Figure 3  
A PROCESS MATRIX OF GLOBALIZATION AND SECURITY



and South, as well as within countries.<sup>46</sup> It has also set in motion a “global war for talent” among advanced industrial states, while developing states have emerged as primary exporters of largely unskilled labor.<sup>47</sup> The Labor Department recently forecast that the United States would need 1.7 million computer technicians during the decade ending in 2008 and suggests that demand will continue to increase over time. Demand is not necessarily limited to highly skilled migration, however. The increasing return to high-skilled labor in advanced industrial countries creates incentives for restructuring the domestic labor market toward those careers in which returns are higher. Yet such movement creates needs for fundamental low-skilled work, such as domestic labor, though recruitment of such labor has not been a priority for most states—in fact, it has been quite the opposite.<sup>48</sup>

In addition to the transformation from a Fordist production-based economy, demographic trends in advanced industrial countries also contribute to the intensity of demand for foreign labor. Low fertility rates among populations in most advanced industrial countries (averaging about 1.7) not only decrease the pool of available labor, but also change the age composition of the population over time, creating strong economic demands to support social welfare.<sup>49</sup> Taken together, these trends have made the effective management of migration a crucial element of the state’s quest for material power via economic growth.<sup>50</sup>

Historical perspectives of the economic gains achieved from migration further illustrate its importance to the production and accumulation of material power. In their analysis of nineteenth-century trade and migration in the Atlantic economy, Timothy Hatton and Jeffrey Williamson found that gains

46. Adrian Wood, *North-South Trade, Employment, and Inequality* (New York: Clarendon, 1994).

47. James Mittelman characterizes this as an emerging new global division of labor, in which developing countries increasingly focus on manufacturing and exporting unskilled labor to developed states, where domestic labor has shifted toward the high-skill sectors. Should such economic processes become institutionalized over time, a new type of dependency may emerge for developing states, with labor becoming a new type of primary goods export. See Mittelman, *Globalization Syndrome*, chap. 2. On the “global war for talent,” see Cornelius and Espenshade, “International Migration of the Highly-Skilled,” 7.

48. Wayne A. Cornelius, *The Role of Immigrant Labor in the U.S. and Japanese Economies* (La Jolla: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1998); and Wayne A. Cornelius, Philip L. Martin, and James F. Hollifield, eds., *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994).

49. Michael S. Teitelbaum and Jay Winter, *A Question of Numbers: High Migration, Low Fertility, and the Politics of National Identity* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998).

50. Ironically, few textbooks in the field of international political economy dedicate a section to the subject of migration as they do for production, trade, and monetary policy. See, for example, Robert Gilpin, *Global Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); and Jeffrey A. Frieden and David A. Lake, eds., *International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth*, 4th ed. (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2000).

from migration were higher than gains from trade in goods.<sup>51</sup> Commenting on their research findings, Ronald Rogowski pointed out that, when comparing gains in historical perspective, “it really looks like the ‘bigger bang’ was received in that period from migration—by quite a long shot—than from trade in goods.”<sup>52</sup> Moreover, whereas the dominant economic perspective on the relationship between migration and trade has long viewed the two as substitutes,<sup>53</sup> more recent analyses of the empirical evidence suggest that migration and trade are, in fact, complements.<sup>54</sup> Scholars of international political economy have long pointed to the importance of trade for the accumulation of material economic power. If migration complements trade, then it must be considered a necessary condition to achieve maximum gains through trade, especially in situations of total specialization or where locational economies of scale exist.<sup>55</sup>

From a purely material interest, it would seem that the challenge migration presents to the security of advanced industrial states is one that is based on the ability of these countries to attract foreign labor, both high- and low-skilled, since it is an increasingly important facet of material power. Yet although many advanced industrial countries have recently initiated efforts to recruit highly skilled migrants, or have at least begun to discuss enacting such policies, policies have been generally hostile to liberalization over the past thirty years.<sup>56</sup> Such positions seem puzzling considering the importance of increasing the state’s power. Clearly, a purely trading-state logic—even one that takes economic transformations into account—is unable to capture fully the political dynamics that shape the security environment among advanced industrial states and resultant grand strategy. This lacuna reveals that although the inclusion of IPE perspectives in security analysis provides a more comprehensive picture of international politics and statecraft, the evolution of security issues creates new dimensions that analysts must address.

51. Timothy J. Hatton and Jeffrey G. Williamson, *The Age of Mass Migration* (New York: Routledge, 1998).

52. Ronald Rogowski, “Commentary on ‘Migration as International Trade,’” in “Reconsidering Immigration in an Integrating World,” ed. Christopher Rudolph, special issue, *UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs* 3, no. 2 (fall/winter 1998): 416.

53. Cf. Heckscher-Ohlin theory in Krugman and Obstfeld, *International Economics*; and Robert A. Mundell, “International Trade and Factor Mobility,” *American Economic Review* 47, no. 3 (June 1957): 321–35.

54. Kevin H. O’Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson, *Globalization and History: The Evolution of a Nineteenth-Century Atlantic Economy* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999); and William J. Collins, Kevin O’Rourke, and Jeffrey G. Williamson, “Were Trade and Factor Mobility Substitutes in History?” in *Migration: The Controversies and the Evidence*, ed. Riccardo Faini, Jaime de Melo, and Klaus F. Zimmermann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 227–60.

55. Rogowski, “Commentary.”

56. Cornelius, Espenshade, and Salehyan, *International Migration*; and Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield, *Controlling Immigration*.

## EVOLVING ECONOMIC CHALLENGES IN DEVELOPING STATES

Consideration of migration as a security issue may be a relatively novel development among advanced industrial states, but that is certainly not the case among developing nations. Indeed, much of contemporary global migration is between developing countries—primarily in the form of internally displaced persons and refugees. Precisely because of the weakness of the state and the economy in many developing countries, large inflows of refugees can be particularly destabilizing—both politically and economically. Such inflows can place an extreme burden on scarce resources, increase domestic tensions over the allocation of those resources, incite ethnic tensions, change majority-minority relationships within society, and serve as a conduit through which civil wars in one country spread to neighboring states.<sup>57</sup> Although such South-South migration represents a clear challenge to developing states,<sup>58</sup> it is somewhat outside the scope of this article, which seeks to highlight tensions arising from differing interests between North and South.

Whereas economic growth among advanced industrial states is increasingly linked with the success of the service sector and the availability of skilled labor, developing states increasingly must address demographic challenges facing their efforts to industrialize and modernize, as well as the need for capital inflows and foreign investment. Large populations combined with low GDP make it difficult for developing states to cultivate the material power necessary to maximize security and reduce dependence on developed states. This predicament has long vexed policymakers in developing countries. In the 1960s, modernization theorists suggested that until the disparity between population size and economic capacity is addressed—most likely through a demographic transition—development and growth would be extremely difficult for these countries.<sup>59</sup> When large populations coincide with economies unable to generate an adequate supply of jobs, the result is high levels of unemployment and generally low wages.<sup>60</sup> Moreover, the maintenance of a

57. Cf. Sarah Kenyon Lischer, "Collateral Damage: Humanitarian Assistance as a Cause of Conflict," *International Security* 28, no. 1 (summer 2003): 79–109; and Astri Suhrke, "The 'High Politics' of Population Movements: Migration, State, and Civil Society in Southeast Asia," and Gabriel Sheffer, "Ethnic Diasporas: A Threat to Their Hosts?" both in *International Migration and Security*, ed. Myron Weiner (Boulder: Westview, 1993), 179–200, 263–85.

58. Weiner, *International Migration*.

59. Cf. Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, eds., *The Politics of Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960); Lucian Pye, *Communications and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); David Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965); Dankwart Rostow, *A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1967); and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

60. Geoffrey McNicoll, "On Population Growth and Revisionism: Further Questions," *Population and Development Review* 21, no. 2 (June 1995): 307–40.



system of subsistence agriculture and the economy's reliance on the export of raw materials serves to maintain a cycle of poverty in many developing nations. Given these conditions, individuals have long turned to migration as a means of bettering their living situation. In many countries, such processes have become an integral part of the culture, as is the case with Mexico. Only recently, however, have policymakers in developing states begun to recognize the benefits of managing these emigration dynamics.

For developing states, emigration represents an effective safety valve for unemployment pressures, one that is both quick and highly elastic. The option of migration is especially important to these states given the socio-political dynamics at play as developing states attempt to navigate the process of industrialization. Free-trade industrialization can create significant domestic economic and social dislocations as new economic sectors rise (manufacturing) and others decline (agriculture).<sup>61</sup> Increasing capital mobility and transformations in the agricultural sector, which result from free-trade regimes, are a principal determinant in international labor mobility from developing countries.<sup>62</sup> During this transition, agricultural workers increasingly migrate from the countryside to the cities in search of better wages and opportunities.<sup>63</sup> This rural-to-urban migration is consistent with the two-sector model of development proposed by Arthur Lewis in the 1950s.<sup>64</sup> One fundamental assumption of this model is that surplus labor in the rural sector will migrate commensurate with job creation in the industrial sector. Because job creation from industrialization is rarely perfectly commensurate with initial levels of domestic (rural-to-urban) migration, however, these processes can increase urban unemployment, which can lead to increasing political instability. In such an unstable environment, international emigration provides a safety valve for unemployment pressures, at least in the short run, and allows industrialization to proceed more smoothly by reducing domestic political instability. Philip Martin calls this dynamic the "migration hump," wherein openness and industrialization lead to increased

61. Wayne A. Cornelius and David Myhre, eds., *The Transformation of Rural Mexico: Reforming the Ejido Sector* (La Jolla: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1998).

62. See Saskia Sassen, *The Mobility of Labour and Capital* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Georges P. Tapinos, *Development Assistance Strategies and Emigration Pressure in Europe and Africa* (Washington: Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development, 1990); and Philip L. Martin, "Economic Integration and Migration: The Case of NAFTA," in Rudolph, "Reconsidering Immigration in an Integrating World."

63. Martin, "Economic Integration." See also Michael P. Todaro, "A Model of Labor Migration and Urban Unemployment in Less Developed Countries," *American Economic Review* 59 (March 1969): 138–48; and John R. Harris and Michael P. Todaro, "Migration, Unemployment, and Development: A Two-Sector Analysis," *American Economic Review* 60 (March 1970): 126–42.

64. See W. Arthur Lewis, "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor," *Manchester School* 22 (May 1954): 139–91. Cf. John C. H. Fei and Gustav Ranis, *Development of the Labor Surplus Economy: Theory and Policy* (Homewood, Ill.: Irwin, 1964).

levels of international migration in the short run, even though job creation and subsequent equalization of real wages may serve to reduce income disparities—and thus migration pressures—in the long run.<sup>65</sup>

In addition to serving as a safety valve for unemployment pressures in developing states, emigration is also highly desirable for the purposes of generating hard currency inflows in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI) and migrant remittances. Weak states, high levels of unemployment, and unstable currencies make FDI in developing states more risky. By reducing unemployment pressures that foster economic and political instability, emigration can help attract foreign capital inflows by making investment seem less risky. Migration can also generate capital inflows directly in the form of migrant remittances. Remittances represent a higher return to labor than can be earned in the migrant-sending country, can serve as a credit in the balance of payments, and can also serve as a source of savings.<sup>66</sup> Recent estimates suggest that global migrant remittances processed through official channels have surpassed \$100 billion annually, of which developing states account for roughly 60 percent.<sup>67</sup> Research by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) shows that migrant remittances to developing countries have increased dramatically in recent years, roughly doubling during the 1990s (see figure 4).<sup>68</sup> Moreover, not only have levels of migrant remittances been approximately 20 percent higher than levels of official development assistance (which continues to decline in real terms), they are considered a more consistent source of capital than private flows or FDI, since migrants' decisions to send money are not based on volatile market conditions facing developing states.<sup>69</sup> As striking as these figures appear, there is reason to believe that these numbers may be significantly higher: remittances are generally underreported because available statistics reflect only those flows processed through official channels, including banks and other financial institutions. As policymakers in developing states have become more aware of the economic gains available from migrant remittances, they have

65. As the Stolper-Samuelson model of factor price equalization would predict. See Martin, "Economic Integration."


66. Charles P. Kindleberger, *Europe's Postwar Growth* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 92.

67. Michael P. Todaro and Stephen C. Smith, *Economic Development*, 8th ed. (New York: Addison-Wesley, 2003), 94; Peter Gammeltoft, "Remittances and Other Financial Flows to Developing Countries," Centre for Development Research (CDR) working paper 02.11 (Copenhagen: CDR, August 2002); Philip L. Martin, "Trade, Aid, and Migration," *International Migration Review* 26, no. 1 (spring 1992): 162–72; and Sharon Stanton Russell, "Migrant Remittances and Development," *International Migration* 30, nos. 3–4 (1992): 267–87.

68. International Monetary Fund (IMF), *IMF Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook 2000* (Washington: IMF, 2000).

69. Gammeltoft, "Remittances and Other Financial Flows," 2.

Figure 4  
TOTAL MIGRANT REMITTANCES TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1988–99  
(IN \$U.S. BILLIONS)



Source: International Monetary Fund, *IMF Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook 2000* (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 2000).

increasingly sought to maintain close ties with their émigrés and have even begun to establish emigrant-focused institutions to facilitate contact between expatriates and their home country.<sup>70</sup>

Clearly migration is gaining increasing prominence in the politico-economic strategies of developing states. In fact, Mexican president Vicente Fox has maintained that migration is among his administration's top foreign policy issues. Yet even though one would expect similar interests in a managed system among advanced industrial states, policy trends among these countries have often run an opposite course over the past quarter-century. Although the disparate preferences between developed and developing states would seem at first glance to be complementary, migration has generally been a source of conflict and disagreement rather than cooperation between sending (developing) and receiving (developed) countries. As mentioned above, such incongruities suggest that new variables must be identified.

70. Brand, "States and Their Expatriates."

## SECURITY AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

EVEN THOSE WORKING within the realist paradigm admit that simple differentials in material power are not sufficient to explain the security interests of contemporary states or the resulting political behavior and policy outcomes. Initial recognition among international relations scholars that security needed to be reexamined in light of what appeared to be a rapidly changing international environment began in the early 1980s and intensified with the end of the cold war.<sup>71</sup> As the cold war's domination of world politics declined, scholars increasingly recognized that their rationalist assumptions often did not jibe with the contemporary actions of states. Among the developments that scholars confronted was the emerging salience of identity. Alex Wendt has suggested that "rationalism has many uses and virtues, but its conceptual tool kit is not designed to explain identities and interests, the reproduction and/or transformation of which is a key determinant of structural change."<sup>72</sup> International relations scholars have, until quite recently, generally ignored issues of culture and identity.<sup>73</sup> Admittedly, both are elusive subjects for empirical study, yet the impact of these issues on relations within and among states has become increasingly evident to pundit and layman alike. In their most virulent manifestation, culture and identity lie at the core of the rise of ethno-nationalist violence and wartime atrocities in places such as the Balkans, Chechnya, the Middle East, and many African states.<sup>74</sup> Even in multicultural states, issues of culture and identity have proven to be extremely volatile and divisive. With constructivism's challenge to the realist and neo-liberal assumptions regarding the primacy of material rationalism,<sup>75</sup> the door has been opened for the (re)introduction of culture and identity as important variables in the study of world politics. Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach have gone so far as to suggest that the emerging salience of identity warrants a complete revision of traditional ways of thinking about international

71. Cf. Barry Buzan, *People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations* (London: Wheatsheaf, 1983); Richard Ullman, "Redefining Security," *International Organization* 8, no. 1 (winter 1983) 129–53; and Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

72. Alexander Wendt, "Identity and Structural Change in International Politics," in *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, ed. Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997), 62.

73. Lapid and Kratochwil, *Return of Culture*.

74. Cf. Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); and Michael Ignatieff, *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism* (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 1994).

75. Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

society.<sup>76</sup> They write, “In our view, we should conceive of global politics as involving a world of ‘polities’ rather than states and focus on the relationships among authority, identities, and ideology.”<sup>77</sup> How identity and culture figure prominently in the contemporary rise of ethno-nationalist conflicts—especially among small or developing nations—has been addressed by those scholars studying the causes and consequences of such identity-related violence.<sup>78</sup> How these issues figure into the security interests of advanced industrial states, as well as among these states and between developed and developing states—has received much less attention from international relations theorists.

Much attention has been given to a hypothesized global struggle between the cultures of the West versus “the rest,” yet the salience of identity in world politics is not necessarily limited to some grand clash between civilizations.<sup>79</sup> Societal tensions are most often manifest in the dynamics of domestic politics generated by transborder flows. Although concerns have been raised by certain countries (especially China and those Muslim countries with more fundamentalist regimes) regarding the transmission of culture through trade and capital movements, the most volatile threat to notions of stable identity comes with the movement of people. Social fears about a loss of national identity may be most acute in countries where identity is based on perceived familial or blood ties (ethnonationalism), but they are by no means limited to them.<sup>80</sup>

Under what conditions is demographic change a security threat? Myron Weiner and Michael Teitelbaum have noted that if one segment of a given population—in terms of a socially defined category such as race, ethnicity, or religious affiliation—grows more rapidly than another, such changes may shift domestic political power balances.<sup>81</sup> They may also fundamentally challenge a polity’s conception of national identity and long-held beliefs regarding the

76. Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, *Politics: Authorities, Identities, and Change* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1996); and Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, “The Past as Prelude to the Future? Identity and Loyalties in Global Politics,” in *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, ed. Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997), 21–44. Cf. Mathias Albert et al., *Identities, Borders, Orders* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001).

77. Ferguson and Mansbach, “Past as Prelude,” 21. See also Ferguson and Mansbach, *Politics*.

78. David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, eds., *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).

79. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Touchstone, 1996).

80. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*; Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1990); and Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

81. Myron Weiner and Michael S. Teitelbaum, *Political Demography, Demographic Engineering* (New York: Berghahn, 2001).

traditional bases of socio-political community. Weiner and Teitelbaum add that these factors can “become problematic in political or security terms when they are unusually rapid or are driven by forces seen as unlawful or illegitimate”<sup>82</sup>—in other words, when such processes are seen to violate a polity’s sense of communal or “societal sovereignty.”<sup>83</sup> Mass migration is the most viable means of initiating rapid demographic and social change that can in turn create perceptions of threat and bring identity issues to the forefront of the political agenda in receiving states.

Advanced industrial states—which are a highly desirable destination for migrants because of their higher relative wages, superior living conditions, and social and political stability—perceive migration as being a greater threat to their societies than do developing nations (which are largely migrant-sending countries). Levels of migration since the Second World War have been very high, though not unprecedented when compared with nineteenth-century levels of international migration.<sup>84</sup> This has led some scholars to dismiss the “migration threat” as nothing really new.<sup>85</sup> Indeed, the volume of migration today may not be unprecedented, but societal insecurities have been prompted more by qualitative changes in migration patterns rather than by the sheer volume of movement. Four qualitative changes most relevant to societal threat perception include, though are not necessarily limited to, (1) changing patterns of international migration; (2) the increasing diversity of migration flows; (3) changing migrant preferences regarding assimilation and integration; and (4) a cycle of threat that is created when government policies are seen as ineffectual in stopping unwanted migration.<sup>86</sup>

Nineteenth-century migration flowed primarily from more developed (European) states to less developed colonies. In addition, receiving states were generally characterized by low population density and rapidly growing cities, both of which served to increase the migrant-absorbing capacity of these locales. Ethno-culturally, the predominance of European migration increased the homogeneity of population flows and reduced the degree of cultural demographic change that such migration might otherwise create. Since the Second World War, these patterns have reversed. Economic migration flows generally move from South to North, and the composition of these flows is increasingly

82. *Ibid.*, 22.

83. Christopher Rudolph, “Sovereignty and Territorial Borders in a Global Age” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, 27–31 August 2003).

84. Hatton and Williamson, *Age of Mass Migration*.

85. Stephen D. Krasner, *Sovereignty* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

86. Rudolph, “National Security and International Migration.”

diverse in terms of race, ethnicity, culture, and religious background. In addition, migrant preferences regarding assimilation have moved from the “melting pot” paradigm to one based on “segmented assimilation.”<sup>87</sup> In many instances, failures of assimilation, driven either by stringent citizenship laws in the receiving country or by immigrants’ preferences for retaining the social identity of their country of origin, have made the condition of “semi-settlement” much more common and politically problematic.<sup>88</sup>

Ironically, while economic transformations resulting from the transition to a system of trading states have placed migration near the center of efforts to accumulate material power, these same processes (and the concomitant rise of North-South inequality) have established the conditions necessary for increased societal insecurities. One way trading-state grand strategy created societal insecurities via migration was through a naïve attempt to manage migration using the same logic applied to trade and capital flows. Between 1945 and the late 1960s, international labor recruitment programs were established by many advanced industrial states, including the United States, Germany, and France. Initially hailed as an important factor in Europe’s postwar “economic miracle,”<sup>89</sup> the changing patterns of migration associated with labor recruitment soon led to political sensitivities and to the eventual demise of such programs.<sup>90</sup> Over time, labor market conditions necessitated recruitment from sending states whose populations were perceived to be more ethnically and culturally different from receiving societies. Once migration pathways have been established, however, they tend over time to become both stronger and larger in scope, making it increasingly difficult for states to curb flows once they have been established.<sup>91</sup> The combination of changing ethnocultural demographics and the increasing difficulty of limiting migration to levels desired by the general public leads to a cycle of threat perception. “New migration” trends create demand for increased levels of closure and state control.<sup>92</sup> Yet because the widespread use of social networks by today’s migrants makes

87. Alejandro Portes, “Children of Immigrants: Segmented Assimilation and Its Determinants,” in *The Economic Sociology of Immigration*, ed. Alejandro Portes (New York: Russell Sage, 1995), 248–80.

88. Martin O. Heisler, “Contextualizing Global Migration: Sketching the Socio-Political Landscape in Europe,” in Rudolph, “Reconsidering Immigration in an Integrating World.”

89. Charles P. Kindleberger, *Europe’s Postwar Growth: The Role of Labor Supply* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967); and James F. Hollifield, *Immigrants, Markets, and States: The Political Economy of Postwar Europe* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).

90. Rudolph, “National Security and International Migration.”

91. Douglas S. Massey et al., eds., *Worlds in Motion: Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millennium* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998).

92. Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield, *Controlling Immigration*; and Joel S. Fetzer, *Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the United States, France, and Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

controlling flows more difficult, and because closure is inconsistent with the macroeconomic objectives of the state, resultant policies often fall short of public expectations. This, in turn, leads to increasing perceptions of threat and demands for even higher levels of control—perpetuating the threat perception cycle.

What are the implications of these trends, and what are the benefits of a “securitized” perspective of international migration?<sup>93</sup> Contrary to the conventional wisdom, evidence drawn from major trading states over the past half-century suggests that state behavior regarding global migration is not simply the product of domestic interest groups and collective action.<sup>94</sup> The state plays a key role in policy development—seeking a policy equilibrium that maximizes aggregate gains in terms of the trade-offs between various facets of security.<sup>95</sup> Policy can then be modeled as a function of both existing security factors (military/material) and emerging factors (national identity). When we use this framework, not only can we see more clearly what types of threats generate political action and state response, but we also gain new insights into long-term shifts in state grand strategy (policy equilibrium).

For example, consider three major periods of the cold war: the early period of escalating tensions, the establishment of *détente*, and the sudden emergence of the post-cold war “new world order.” In the cases of the United States and the larger European states, early post-Second World War policies regarding migration generally followed the trading-state logic applied to trade and capital. Labor was actively recruited from abroad in increasing numbers, with those states that took the most aggressive measures enjoying the highest economic returns.<sup>96</sup> Moreover, in the United States, liberal migration policy was also used as a tool of cold war foreign policy—specifically in the differential treatment afforded to refugees from Warsaw Pact countries. As military threats declined with the emergence of *détente* and migration sources became more ethnically and culturally distant from the native population, perceptions of threats to societal security increased and government policies established increasing degrees of closure. Although policies of closure and control respond to societal

93. Myron Wiener offered a security framework for migration a decade ago, but he distinguished it from an IPE perspective. I believe a comprehensive framework should be created, since the various dimensions—economic, military, and social—are highly interrelated. See Christopher Rudolph, “Security and the Political Economy of International Migration,” *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 4 (fall 2003) 603–20.

94. On domestic sources of immigration policy, cf. Gary Freeman, “Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal States,” *International Migration Review* 26, no. 4 (winter 1995) 881–913; and Jeannette Money, *Fences and Neighbors: The Political Geography of Immigration Control* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).

95. Rudolph, “Security and Political Economy.”

96. Kindleberger, *Europe's Postwar Growth*.



insecurities, they create tension with the economic interests of the state. Even though societal pressures for closure in response to heightened perceptions of insecurity increased after the cold war ended, states became increasingly savvy in their ability to respond to fears without necessarily shutting down flows. Much of this was done through the use of highly symbolic policies of closure. In the United States, such policies came in the form of fortification of the border with Mexico, while in Europe they centered on creating a sense of closure on Europe's peripheral borders while maintaining openness within the European Union.<sup>97</sup> Using the security paradigm not only gives us a better sense of how changing environments shape policy development, but also can show us how the state changes its environment in service of the national interest.

For advanced industrial states, learning how to manage the competing security interests revolving around the issue of migration is still very much a "work in progress." Although material interests push advanced industrial states toward the establishment of a new international migration regime or may even signal the emergence of "migration states," the political volatility of such efforts renders such interests problematic. This difficulty is compounded when developing states create policies that confound the ability of developed states to craft an effective political equilibrium between competing dimensions of security.<sup>98</sup> Societal insecurities are generally mitigated in receiving states by the ability of new migrants to assimilate into the host society. France, for example, has made "control and assimilation" the core element of its drives to mitigate social tensions that have been exacerbated by postwar immigration.<sup>99</sup> As mentioned above, however, maintaining connections with their expatriate communities abroad offers significant material incentives for developing states, primarily in the form of hard currency remittances. Developing states have a strong interest in ensuring that their emigrants maintain a strong emotional bond with their home country and that this attachment remains a significant part of the migrant's personal and social identity. To this end, developing states have established bureaucratic agencies to maintain connections with expatriates and have actively supported dual citizenship regimes.<sup>100</sup> The political dynamics of this clash of interests between North and

97. Wayne A. Cornelius, "Appearances and Realities: Controlling Illegal Immigration in the United States," in *Temporary Workers or Future Citizens?* ed. Myron Weiner and Wayne A. Cornelius (London: Macmillan, 1998), 384–427; Peter Andreas, *Border Games* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000); and Rudolph, "Security and Political Economy."

98. Rudolph, "National Security and International Migration."

99. Maxim Silverman, *Deconstructing the Nation* (London: Routledge, 1992).

100. Peter H. Schuck, "Plural Citizenships," in *Immigration and Citizenship in the 21st Century*, ed. Noah M. J. Pickus (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), 149–91; and Rey Koslowski, *Migrants and Citizens* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000).

South are still in their formative stages, yet they will no doubt affect bilateral relationships between sending and receiving states. They will also likely shape the larger political relationship between developed and developing states.

#### GLOBAL TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

IDENTITY IS NOT the only emergent security objective to gain prominence in contemporary world politics. Since 11 September 2001, the world has become more aware of another dimension of security in which migration will likely play a significant role. Prior to September 11, those few scholars who examined the potential security implications of global migration paid little heed to the role migration could play in the delivery of weapons of mass destruction.<sup>101</sup> Yet, as the events in New York City and Washington, D.C., made painfully clear, migration presents a clear and present military threat to any state unable rigorously to control the entry and exit of people across its borders. All nineteen of the September 11 terrorists were foreign nationals who used loopholes in U.S. immigration and border policy to infiltrate the country and execute their missions. Events have alerted the public to this migration-terrorism link, but few have recognized that this emerging dynamic also can be linked to the processes of globalization articulated above.

September 11 may represent the culmination of trends in globalization with security implications. As with the rise of societal insecurities amid increases in global migration, what appears at first blush to be a distinct turning point is, in fact, directly related to ongoing processes of globalization. Understanding the rise of this new security threat requires a macroscopic perspective and a keen sense of evolutionary processes at play. While September 11 prompts many to place blame on the fanaticism of a few prominent madmen—of which Osama bin Laden seems to be the most notorious—such despots are toothless without the proper socio-economic and political environments.

Consider the combined effects of trading-state grand strategy forwarded under U.S. hegemony with global trends in the distribution of wealth that have resulted from such policies. The United States and its Western allies constituted the “big three” of the postwar economy: a large percentage of global trade over the past half-century has centered on these key players, as has the lion’s share of FDI and portfolio investment, trends that have allowed

101. Cf. Weiner, *International Migration*; and Myron Weiner, *The Global Migration Crisis* (New York: HarperCollins, 1995).

these countries significant advantages in the global economy. Further fueled by exceptions to the principles of openness and reciprocity that discriminated against developing-country exports—including the 1974 Multi-Fiber Arrangement and barriers to “tropical products”—perceptions of a “stacked deck” accompanied developing-country frustrations with the growing disparity in the distribution of global wealth. Hegemonic leadership that facilitated a more globalized international economic order included dominance in the design and management of institutions created to manage international economic interactions, such as the World Bank, the IMF, and GATT.<sup>102</sup> In addition to domination of the institutions of globalization, the deployment of U.S. military forces around the globe, considered by policymakers as a “general good” that provides the stability necessary for global openness to prosper, has served as yet another spur for global frustrations.<sup>103</sup>

The mirroring of global disparities of wealth at the national level for many countries around the world has compounded this sense of frustration.<sup>104</sup> This combination has not only fueled political instability in many developing countries, but has created the conditions under which international economic intervention has spawned antagonism rather than appreciation. The World Bank’s structural adjustment lending programs and IMF stabilization programs that provide the capital necessary to address balance-of-payments crises have imposed conditions that, among other things, require recipient countries to adopt austerity programs to balance their budgets. Most of the cost of these measures falls on the increasingly larger poor segment of the population, and the resultant public anger is levied not only at the national governments that accept such conditionality, but also against the powerful nations seen to be the “puppet masters” of the international economic institutions.<sup>105</sup> Some critics even argue that such conditionality creates a system of “international peonage” manipulated by rich, powerful countries, and this sentiment seems to be gaining acceptance among populations who perceive themselves to be both economically and politically disenfranchised.<sup>106</sup>

102. Robert Gilpin, *The Challenge of Global Capitalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

103. James R. Blaker, *United States Overseas Basing* (New York: Praeger, 1990); and C. T. Sanders, *America’s Overseas Garrisons* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

104. UN, *International Conference on Population and Development*.

105. James L. Dietz, “Debt and Development: The Future in Latin America,” *Journal of Economic Issues* 20 (December 1986): 1029–51; Dani Rodrik, “The Limits of Trade Policy Reform in Developing Countries,” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 6, no. 1 (winter 1992): 85–105; and Lance Taylor, “The Revival of the Liberal Creed and the IMF and the World Bank in a Globalized Economy,” *World Development* 25 (February 1997): 145–52.

106. See, for example, Cheryl Payer, *The Debt Trap: The IMF and the Third World* (New York: Monthly Review, 1994).

What globalization gives us is a system characterized by rising political tensions and a disproportionate distribution of power—fertile ground for the rise of extremist leaders and the use of terrorism. Alienation, frustration, and anger about poverty and the presence of foreign troops have given members of the political fringe around the globe the means to cast their own domestic political agendas within a larger “civilizational” or religious struggle—one in which martyrdom is offered as a reward to the righteous.<sup>107</sup> U.S. policymakers have been reluctant to acknowledge the connection between trading-state globalization and the rise of terrorism as a security threat, but the international community has begun to pay more attention. Han Seung-soo, President of the UN General Assembly, suggested, “Terrorism [can] only be eliminated if conditions creating a fertile breeding ground for terrorism, such as poverty and marginalization, [are] removed.”<sup>108</sup> Because of the tremendous differential in power and available resources, those who seek to pursue this political struggle must find a means of leveling the playing field. Marwan Bishara has noted that, “when people feel so inferior militarily and economically, they adopt asymmetric means—not the usual means—to achieve what they want.”<sup>109</sup> The end result is “blowback” in the form of international terrorism.<sup>110</sup>

Has global terrorism supplanted migration as a key element of security after September 11? No. In fact, the rise of terrorism provides yet another reason for migration to occupy a more central position in security scholarship and statecraft. In addition to creating economic, political, and social conditions that make terrorism a more appealing political weapon for the extremely weak, growing awareness among leaders of terrorist groups about migration and border policies of advanced industrial states has increased emphasis on using migration as a vehicle for terrorism. As one pundit recently remarked, “There is almost no way to stop determined suicidal maniacs. All they need is a passport and a plane ticket.”<sup>111</sup> The specter of a vast global network of “terrorist aliens” represents a formidable challenge to statecraft and forges a strong link between migration and homeland defense. So acute is this new sense of threat from terrorism executed via migration that a National Intelligence Estimate released in January 2002 suggests that, for the first time, the United

107. Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).

108. UN Press Release GA/9971, 16 November 2001.

109. Andrew Johnston, “Disparities of Wealth are Seen as Fuel for Terrorism,” *International Herald Tribune*, 20 December 2001, 1.

110. Johnson, *Blowback*.

111. Renan R. Lurie, “Suicide Bombing Is Contagious,” *Los Angeles Times*, 15 March 2002, B17.

States is “more likely to be attacked with [weapons of mass destruction] using non-missile means” than with conventional weapons systems.<sup>112</sup>

How will this perception of threat affect policy? Terrorist organizers appear to have realized that the level of government clampdown necessary to screen rigorously all visa applicants or to achieve 100 percent control of land borders is economically infeasible, both in terms of the direct cost of implementing such policies and programs, and perhaps more important, in terms of the opportunity cost resulting from a slowing of transborder mobility. Moreover, because weapons of mass destruction need not be large and may be easily concealed (or as new “weapons” of mass destruction are devised, as was the case with September 11), migration represents an inexpensive and reliable system for delivering them. The clear and present danger that unscreened migration presents to homeland security suggests that the continued use of a pure trading-state grand strategy skewed toward economic interests must be reconsidered, and the practice of simply “finessing” security interests through largely symbolic policy is no longer a viable policy option. Policy is also complicated by the fact that terrorism can be exported without the movement of people. Such “virtual migration” may entail the mobilization of immigrant or diaspora communities abroad, or the recruitment of new operatives who are already citizens of the target nation and may be sympathetic to a terrorist organization’s cause. In the current climate of insecurity over Islamic militancy and the exportation of terrorism, there is growing concern over aims to recruit “blue-eyed Muslims”—those whose physical features and country of citizenship fall outside of the security profile used by homeland security officers.

Terrorism has emerged as one of the most significant threats to state security and global stability in the wake of September 11. Moreover, because migration represents the most likely vehicle by which weapons of mass destruction can be delivered by terrorists to their targets, migration and border policy must be considered integral to the contemporary security paradigm. This is especially true given the importance of migration in the production of material power and wealth, as discussed above. Addressing the terrorist threat without dismantling the economic gains offered by trading-state openness is a challenge that will likely dominate the construction of security policy in all advanced industrial states.

112. Bob Drogin, “Missiles Not Biggest Threat, Report Says,” *Los Angeles Times*, 12 January 2002, A7.

## RECONSIDERING SECURITY FOR A NEW ERA

THE CHANGING international environment has prompted scholars of international relations to reassess existing paradigms and to question long-held assumptions. Beginning around thirty years ago, such challenges were framed in terms of reintroducing the consideration of economic processes into models of security, since such functions were central to a necessary condition for security: the production and accumulation of material power. More recently, focus has turned to nonmaterial security objectives, as it has become more and more evident not only that identity, culture, and “ways of life” are increasingly threatened in contemporary world politics, but that these elements represent new referent objects of security. Indeed, some have suggested that in order to address the increasing salience of these issues, international relations scholars must pay increasing attention to issues of identity, borders, and orders.<sup>113</sup> Unfortunately, many of these same reconceptualizations—such as those that challenge material rationalism as the basis of security—suffer from the same analytical myopia that plagues extant theories. If one examines trends in international relations scholarship over time, however, one begins to see that world politics and statecraft are not necessarily based on a stable and static system that requires revolutionary “shocks” in order to produce change. Rather, scholarship reflects a dynamic process of international politics, a dense matrix of cause-and-effect relationships that continually reformulate how interests are defined and how best to achieve revised objectives. I have attempted to present such a fluid conceptualization of security here.

Often lost when considering security is the fact that security has both external and internal dimensions. As Kenneth Waltz put it, “Which is more precarious: the life of a state among states, or of a government in relation to its subjects?”<sup>114</sup> Certainly, both are integral components of security in any meaningful sense. Military threats or the inability to accumulate material power can threaten the existence of a state, whereas challenges to national identity threaten the cohesion of a polity and cast into question the “nation” that is represented by a state government. The challenge for academia has been identifying where these two elements of security intersect and how the various logics of security—both external and internal—shape the grand strategy of the contemporary state. Given the changes described

113. Albert et al., *Identities, Borders, Orders*.

114. Kenneth N. Waltz, “Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power,” in Keohane, *Neorealism and Its Critics*, 99.

above, it should be clear that migration is located in just such a central domain.

Migration has long been considered peripheral to international relations scholarship, especially security studies. It belonged, after all, in the domain of “low politics.” Even among IPE scholars who gradually found a voice in the security discourse, questions of the politics of capital and trade received the bulk of academic attention, while questions of migration (from an international perspective) were addressed by a largely marginalized (in international relations) interdisciplinary group of scholars.

I have argued that the increasing salience of economic factors in the construction and maintenance of state security is only one element of the evolving nature of security. Trading-state globalization has brought about structural and ideational changes that have, in turn, prompted states continually to reconsider their security objectives. In this process, migration has emerged as a core issue in the construction of security. Migration lies at the nexus of three core elements of the contemporary security paradigm: the pursuit of material power, the defense of national identities, and in the evolution of “military” (terrorist) threats.

What is gained by adopting a multifaceted, dynamic model of security as outlined here? Barry Buzan has suggested that “security agendas in the [new world order] will be very much set by how states respond to the cost-benefits of openness and closure.”<sup>115</sup> At first glance, this statement does not seem particularly problematic. As I have tried to articulate here, however, the matrix of these various “costs” and “benefits” is complex and is often characterized by dimensions with directly opposing interests. Statesmen and scholars too often tend to reduce their scope in order to increase a sense of clarity (parsimony) when addressing global challenges or analytical puzzles. Although this approach may simplify situational assessments and provide more manageable response options to policymakers (and reduce explanatory variables among scholars), it is important to recognize the theoretical and practical costs of such decisions. Developing scholarly models that can accurately describe this dense system of causes and effects, interests and agendas, is a necessary step if international relations scholarship is to make any significant contributions to the practice of statecraft. In general, recognizing the fluidity of the international environment allows us to recognize that new threats continually supplant old threats, and that there are often close connections between various facets of security, both external and internal. Creating models of security based on such

115. Barry Buzan, “Security, the State, the ‘New World Order,’ and Beyond,” in Lipschutz, *On Security*, 204.

a framework may provide scholars and statesmen with a better understanding of the long-term effects of policy decisions in each of security's various facets. More specifically, because global migration affects all three aspects of security present in contemporary international society, a closer look at how the processes and politics of migration shape the contemporary security agendas of both developed and developing states seems long overdue.