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## The European Union's visibility and coherence at the United Nations General Assembly

Spyros Blavoukos<sup>a\*</sup>, Dimitris Bourantonis<sup>a</sup>, Ioannis Galariotis<sup>b</sup> and Maria Gianniou<sup>c</sup>

<sup>a</sup>*Department of International and European Economic Studies, Athens University of Economics and Business, Athens, Greece;* <sup>b</sup>*Department of Political and Social Sciences, European University Institute, Florence, Italy;* <sup>c</sup>*Department of International and European Economic Studies, Athens University of Economics and Business, Athens, Greece*

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The Lisbon Treaty brought about significant changes regarding the EU's external representation system with new institutional structures set forward to enhance the role of the EU as a unified global actor. In this article, we focus on the UN General Assembly examining whether the coherence and visibility of the EU has increased in the post-Lisbon era. We operationalize and measure both concepts on the basis of oral interventions made by EU and EU member-states' representatives in the Plenary and in the six Committees over a period of six UNGA sessions. Our analysis is based on verbatim records, official EU/UN documentation and 41 semi-structured interviews with officials in New York and Brussels. We find a smooth and by and large successful transition from the Council Presidency-based system to the EU Delegation-based system of representation that enhances the EU visibility in the UNGA. We also posit that after a period of adjustment and overcoming of intra-EU institutional hurdles, the EU coherence has increased overall. Both our findings testify to the gradual but unmistakable positive effect of the Lisbon changes on the EU foreign policy system at least as far as the UN General Assembly is concerned.

**Keywords:** coherence; EU external representation; UN General Assembly; visibility

### Introduction

The adoption of the Lisbon Treaty brought about significant institutional changes regarding the European Union (EU)'s external representation system. Apart from the fact that the EU acquired a legal personality, it is now the High Representative and the President of the European Council, rather than the country holding the Rotating Presidency of the Council, that speak for the Union in world affairs. At the same time, the European External Action Service (EEAS) was launched to support the EU foreign policy-making process, not least by taking over representation tasks through the EU Delegations that were based on the previously existing Commission Delegations.

On the one hand, the introduction of the new Lisbon arrangements was an opportunity for the EU to reinforce its visibility and coherence in diverse multilateral bodies and international organizations. On the other hand, these innovations created problems in the existing structures and

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\*Corresponding author. E-mail: sblavo@aueb.gr

modalities of the EU external representation in various international *fora*. The most notable case concerns the representation of the EU at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). In line with the Lisbon Treaty's stipulations, the EU Delegation (EUDel) in New York that emerged after the merging of the Commission Delegation and the Council Liaison Office took over the role of the Council Presidency as the leading representative body in the workings of the UNGA's sessions. This transformation created uncertainty regarding the representation of the EU at the UNGA because it exposed the EU to the risk of losing its right to speak among the representatives of the major geographical groups in accordance with customary processes relating to the order of the speakers (Serrano de Haro, 2012). Within this context, the endorsement of the Resolution 65/276 (Res 65/276), voted on 3 May 2011, enabled the EU to kill two birds with one stone: ensure coherence, by entrusting representation to an EU institutional body – and not to a different EU member-state every six months – and provide visibility by granting speaking rights to the EU at the same level as in the pre-Lisbon era.

The aim of this article is to evaluate the EU's visibility and coherence at the UNGA in the light of the new Lisbon institutional architecture, especially after the EU was granted the “enhanced observer” status with the Res 65/276. In contrast to most of the studies that approach the EU's role in the UNGA by looking at the voting records of the EU member-states, we base our analysis on the EU oral interventions in the UNGA. This methodological innovation shifts attention at the pre-voting stage in UNGA deliberations in an attempt to cast light on the EU formal engagement within the UNGA prior to voting. In this vein, we have looked at the verbatim records of all the UNGA's Plenary and Main Committees' meetings for six consecutive UNGA sessions, from 2009 to 2015 (64th to 69th sessions). Our data were complemented with official EU and UN documentation, as well as 41 semi-structured interviews with officials in New York and Brussels.<sup>1</sup>

In the next section, we discuss and elaborate on the notions of visibility and coherence and their operationalization for the needs of our analysis. Following that, we present our data, assessing the transition from a system of EU representation based on the Rotating Presidency to a system based on the EUDel at New York and the effect of this transition on the visibility and coherence of the EU. Our concluding section summarizes our findings and proposes further research tasks.

### Seeking visibility and coherence at the UNGA

From the early academic analyses of the EU foreign policy that referred to issues of international presence and actorness (Allen & Smith, 1990; Bretherton & Vogler, 2006) to the more recent studies that focus on the EU effectiveness and performance (Blavoukos, 2015; Jørgensen et al., 2011; Oberthür & Groen, 2015), visibility and coherence have always constituted an unequivocal component of the EU external action. This is not only an academic obsession but it is also reflected in official EU documents, in which the EU's intention to convey an image of a single-minded coherent actor is undeniable and visibility and coherence are indispensable components of effectiveness (European Commission, 2006).<sup>2</sup>

Coherence is conceptualized as the ability to reach a common position and to present it with a single voice, not necessarily though with a single mouth (Conceição-Heldt & Meunier, 2014, p. 964). In the literature, coherence has been widely associated with the ability of the EU to be – or not – effective. Yet, even though coherence is necessary, it is not sufficient for the EU to be portrayed as a global actor (Van Schaik, 2013). Visibility captures the degree to which the EU's policies, actions and official positions are clearly discernible and the EU can be seen and identified as a distinctive international actor. Critics aim, however, at deconstructing the causal relation between coherence, visibility and effectiveness pointing out that speaking with a “single voice” does not necessarily result in being more effective and influential (Conceição-

Heldt, 2014; Delreux, 2014; Macaj & Nicolaïdis, 2014; Panke, 2014). This self-imposed emphasis on coherence that is a preoccupation widely reflected in EU Treaties and other official documentation raises the bar for the EU as a diplomatic actor and may turn out to be counter-productive (Marangoni & Raube, 2014, p. 476), especially considering the still existing rooted division of competences between EU stakeholders (Carta, 2013).

The UNGA constitutes the most important international deliberative forum that attracts world attention. It is an ideal setting for the EU to provide its international credentials and air its aspirations for greater engagement in world affairs as a single political entity. In that respect, both notions of visibility and coherence obtain a particular significance for the EU.<sup>3</sup> The provisions of the Lisbon Treaty changed the EU standing in the UNGA. Previously, the country holding the Council Rotating Presidency would take the floor and speak on behalf of the EU member-states at an early stage of any discussion. Post-Lisbon, the new EU external representation arrangements meant that the EU spokesperson would be among the last in the list of speakers, as entailed by the enshrined observer status that the European Community enjoyed already since 1974. This suggested practically that the EU would be unable to set the tone in the discussions expressing its collective views, a potentially severe blow to the EU's visibility (Serrano de Haro, 2012, pp. 8–11). For this reason, the EU's main preoccupation became to maintain a high and discernible level of representation at the UNGA.<sup>4</sup>

However, the EU's quest for enhanced observer status triggered reactions from several UN members. The first attempt to pass what came through eventually as Resolution 65/276 failed in September 2010. The EU was criticized for behaving too arrogantly, in an almost neo-colonial way, and being over-confident for the eventual success of its venture without having prepared the ground adequately.<sup>5</sup> The EU failed to foresee the negative reaction of many small and medium-sized UNGA members.<sup>6</sup> Smaller states feared that not only would the EU gain an extra voice through its enhanced observer status, but that UNGA politics would utterly be dominated by regional organizations compromising, in the long-run, the intergovernmental character of the UNGA architecture (Wouters et al., 2011, p. 6). Consequently, EU demands could, in the future, constitute the basis for other regional organizations to put forward similar requests (Grevi, 2011, p. 3). Critics focused mainly on the over-optimistic and too EU-focused content of the first draft, which had to be drastically revised before it was re-introduced for debate.<sup>7</sup> The second draft marked a shift to pragmatism for the EU taking into consideration the concerns of its most vocal opponents and accommodating their demands. The EU's diplomatic campaign was much better orchestrated and closer to the realities and requirements of the UNGA intergovernmental negotiating dynamics (Guimarães, 2015).<sup>8</sup> As a result, the revised text was adopted by an overwhelming majority of 180 votes and two abstentions (Syria and Zimbabwe).

### Identifying the EU's visibility and coherence post-Lisbon

Our analysis is based on a data set that gathers all EU oral interventions in the UNGA bodies, that is, in the Plenary and the six main Committees for six consecutive UNGA sessions (64th, 65th, 66th, 67th, 68th and 69th). The reliance on oral interventions rather than voting behaviour constitutes a methodological novelty, notwithstanding a few issues especially the subjectivity of assessing the content of statements that are occasionally very vaguely worded. The six sessions provide an adequate time frame to study provisionally the effect of the Lisbon Treaty; at this stage we set out to identify trends at the EU external representation in the UNGA in the last six years and not to compare it with the pre-Lisbon era. At the same time, the chosen period enables us to assess exploratively the critical juncture of the Resolution 65/276. Since we focus solely on the post-Lisbon era, the Treaty-defined EU legal competences remain constant and hence we do not have to control for any Treaty-induced changes. Furthermore, over this period, the six main

Committees and the Plenary have dealt by and large with a recurrent thematology and the EU priorities and deriving common positions have not changed practically. In that respect, any identified trend should not be accounted for by reference to the evolving EU legal competences and the changing content of the UNGA or EU agenda.

The “EU oral interventions” capture the official positions expressed orally during the meetings of the UNGA bodies by the EU institutions and/or EU member-states. These interventions have been grouped in four different clusters pertinent for our analysis: (1) Rotating Presidency interventions (X) still relevant in the post-Lisbon era albeit with a diminishing trend; (2) EUDel interventions (Y); (3) interventions by EU member-states that align officially their statements with the common EU positions, express their own views in conformity with the common EU positions or take the floor as EU representatives as a result of intra-EU burden-sharing or on the basis of their expertise on a given topic (Z);<sup>9</sup> and (4) other interventions by EU member-states (W). The latter kind of interventions occur in the lack of an EU common position in which case EU member-states have the possibility to express their national positions.<sup>10</sup>

Based on this typology, Table 1 presents the outcomes of our empirical research. Overall, not surprisingly, our data show a substantial decline of the number of interventions made by the Council Presidency, from 132 during the 64th session to only 32 during the 69th session. At the same time, we identify an increase in the number of interventions made by the EUDel, from only three during the 64th session to 82 during the 69th. This trend clearly reflects the Lisbon institutional changes. Interventions by EU member-states officially supporting the EU position are quite high (994), which is an indication that national delegations still pursue their own national diplomatic visibility in the UNGA context and take the floor often without adding something substantial to the common EU position but rather just to “wave the flag” or because the issue under discussion is one of the long nurtured national “pet issues”.<sup>11</sup> Such national diplomatic interests account also for the small increase of Presidency statements after the 66th session. Active EU Presidencies with an interest or expertise in specific thematic areas seek to make themselves heard in the UNGA deliberations. Oral interventions in disarray with the EU single actor image are most often encountered within the 1st Committee, whereas in the 3rd and 4th Committees the EU emerges more clearly as a single actor.

### *From the Delegation of the Council Presidency to the EUDel in New York*

Our first research objective is to examine how the transition from a representation mode focused on the Rotating Council Presidency to a system based on the EUDel as envisaged in the Lisbon Treaty became effective. In Figure 1, we present the oral interventions made by the representatives of the Rotating Presidency and the EUDel in New York. The dashed line depicts the oral interventions from the Rotating Presidency, while the continuous line depicts the EUDel’s ones. The Rotating Presidency was the principal representative of the EU at the UNGA before the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in December 2009. With the introduction of the institutional changes of the Lisbon Treaty, we observe a gradual replacement of the Rotating Presidency by the EUDel in New York. During the transition period, that started from the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009 and lasted up to the adoption of the Res 65/276 in May 2011, there was a duality of the EU representation among the two institutional actors, which immensely helped the EU to transmit the experience stemming from the officials of the Presidency to the representatives of the EUDel (Serrano de Haro, 2012, pp. 9–12).<sup>12</sup> After the adoption of the Res 65/276 in May 2011, we notice a steep decline of the number of Rotating Presidency’s oral interventions with the main representation tasks taken over by the EUDel as illustrated by the increased number of EUDel’s oral interventions.

Table 1. EU Oral Interventions in the UNGA (64th-69th session)

EU oral interventions		64th session	65th session	66th session	67th session	68th session	69th session	Total
Rotating Presidency (X)	1st Committee	9	7	2	1	1	1	21
	2nd Committee	22	26	5	2	3	3	61
	3rd Committee	40	27	7	15	19	18	126
	4th Committee	12	14	0	0	0	2	28
	5th Committee	27	22	3	3	2	3	60
	6th Committee	6	11	0	0	0	0	17
	Plenary	16	15	6	4	5	5	51
	Total	132	122	23	25	30	32	364
EUDel (Y)	1st Committee	0	0	1	4	7	6	18
	2nd Committee	1	0	9	16	14	12	52
	3rd Committee	0	8	16	17	16	10	67
	4th Committee	0	0	6	8	7	8	29
	5th Committee	0	1	13	21	26	27	88
	6th Committee	2	1	4	8	8	10	33
	Plenary	0	6	13	10	15	9	53
	Total	3	16	62	84	93	82	340
EU member-states interventions (Z)	1st Committee	16	8	13	70	35	38	180
	2nd Committee	4	6	9	14	11	4	48
	3rd Committee	38	33	41	46	63	46	267
	4th Committee	12	12	12	8	12	6	62
	5th Committee	1	1	11	5	1	3	22
	6th Committee	64	74	75	43	60	13	329
	Plenary	12	15	10	11	13	25	86
	Total	147	149	171	197	195	135	994
EU member-states interventions (W)	1st Committee	24	38	56	54	29	15	216
	2nd Committee	3	7	19	18	13	3	63
	3rd Committee	0	2	2	3	1	0	8
	4th Committee	0	1	2	2	0	5	10
	5th Committee	0	3	17	19	3	1	43
	6th Committee	3	2	3	3	4	4	19
	Plenary	19	37	22	23	22	4	127
	Total	49	90	121	122	72	32	486




Figure 1. Council Presidency and EUDel oral interventions at the UNGA.

This replacement is an offspring of both the Lisbon Treaty and the passing of Resolution 65/276. However, we cannot distinguish their effect and attribute the magnitude of change to the former or the latter factor. After all, as discussed in the previous section, the Resolution per se is inexorably linked with the Lisbon Treaty since it came forward as a necessity to introduce the Lisbon Treaties changes without undermining the existing *acquis* of EU rights in the UNGA.

### EU visibility

We operationalize the EU's visibility at the UNGA as the sum of oral interventions made by the Rotating Presidency (X), the EUDel (Y) and the EU member-states aligning their statements, either formally or not, with the EU joint positions or taking the floor as EU representatives as a result of intra-EU burden-sharing or on the basis of their expertise on a given topic (Z):

$$\text{EU visibility} = X + Y + Z$$

Do all three categories weigh equally to the EU visibility? In other words, is the EUDel associated more (less) with the EU or considered to be a less (more) valid EU spokesperson than the Council Presidency or an individual member-state? This is alluded to by the majority of our interviewees, who argued that the EU's visibility has an upwards trend correlated with the increasing number of EUDel interventions (Y) over the years.<sup>13</sup> This suggests that the three clusters do not weigh equally in the minds of many diplomats in the field. However, the exact attributed weight is very much subject to personal judgement and hence for reasons of methodological parsimony we have opted for treating the three categories on an equal footing. Our analysis is based on facts (numbers of taking the floor by all actors that may "speak for Europe") and not on individual perceptions that would have to take into consideration idiosyncratic features of the interviewees, not least their understanding of the complex EU *modus operandi*.

In Figure 2, we present the results of our empirical investigation that point to four discernible phases. In the first phase, from early December 2009 when the Lisbon Treaty entered into force to the adoption of the Res 65/276 in May 2011, the oral interventions of the EU remain by and large constant in numbers. On the one hand, this entails that the EU organs were adequately prepared to redress effectively any negative repercussions of the new Lisbon Treaty provisions concerning the external representation of the EU at the UNGA.<sup>14</sup> On the other hand, it seems that the new Lisbon arrangements failed in the short term to boost the EU visibility as they did not seem to have any positive impact on the frequency of the EU oral interventions at UNGA meetings. This should be attributed to a large extent to the relative temporal lag in rendering the European External Action






Figure 2. EU visibility at the UNGA.

Service (EEAS) fully operational and more generally the time required for any institutional innovation to settle in and deliver on its objectives.

In the second phase, shortly after the adoption of the Res 65/276, the EU oral interventions shrank in number. This was particularly true for the 66th session, despite the fact that the EU had ensured its objective to speak among the first slots in the speakers list during UNGA meetings. This downward trend reflects the intra-EU tensions among the member-states regarding the external representation of the EU and the exact application of the Resolution rights. More specifically, the United Kingdom raised doubts regarding the competences of some EU organs to represent the Union as a whole in its external relations. The UK expressed the view that the issues of the EU external relations comprise competences of the EU member-states (and only of them). The issue was settled with the adoption of “general agreements” as regards the external representation of the Union in the international organizations (Wessel & Van Vooren, 2013, pp. 1352–1353).<sup>15</sup>

This intra-EU division did not help the EU to fully capitalize immediately on the potential of the Resolution. Only in the third phase, from the 67th session onwards, did the number of the EU oral interventions increase compared to the previous sessions. The 69th session reverses this trend again signalling the beginning of the fourth phase, in which the number of total EU oral interventions fall again. However, casting a closer glimpse at the data set, this reduction is mainly due to the significantly curtailed number of interventions by EU member-states aligning their statements, either formally or not, with the EU joint positions (Z). If this trend pursues in the following years, we expect a qualitative shift in the diplomatic representation of EU member-states in the UNGA with fewer EU member-states taking the floor to formally reinstate their support for the official EU position.

Has the EU visibility in the UNGA increased in the period under examination? It is hard to support such a claim based on the number of oral interventions as we have identified and measured them for the needs of our research. However, our interviews clearly suggest that adopting a more nuanced operationalization that differentiates between the weight of each cluster of interventions does lead to the conclusion of increased visibility for the EU in the post-Lisbon era.

### *EU coherence*

The basic goal of the EU via the adoption of the Res 65/276 was to reduce the number of interventions from EU member-states by enhancing the single voice of the Union within the UNGA organs. This objective was clearly articulated by Mr Csaba Körösi, the Head of the Hungarian Presidency of the EU, during the UNGA meeting on the Res 65/276, who noted that:






Figure 3. EU coherence at the UNGA.

The goal of the draft resolution is to provide a more orderly framework for the coordinated action of EU member States at the United Nations. The outcome would be that, in general, the number of interventions from EU member States would be diminished and more space would be freed up for delegations from other regions. (A/65/PV.88, p. 4)

In Figure 3, we attempt to evaluate whether or not the EU has achieved this goal, operationalizing coherence as the percentage of other oral interventions by EU member-states ( $W$ ) over the total EU interventions ( $X+Y+Z$ ):

$$\frac{W}{X + Y + Z}$$

Two phases are easily discernible in the six sessions of our study. In the first phase that extends until the 66th session, EU member-states express their own views with an increasing frequency due to the intra-EU political and institutional complications regarding the competences of some EU organs to speak for the Union as a whole in its external relations.

From the 67th session onwards, though, this trend is reversed. This second phase is very closely linked with the Res 65/275; besides its external impact vis-à-vis the EU's mode of representation in the UNGA, the Resolution has also facilitated substantially the coordination role of the EUDel in New York providing an official platform on which the EUDel can bring closer the diverse member-states' interests and preferences.<sup>16</sup>

Coordination processes pre-existed the Lisbon Treaty; however the change of coordinator from the Council Presidency to the EUDel has had an impact on the coherence of the EU in the UNGA.<sup>17</sup> In that respect, the EUDel exhibited a very steep learning curve. With more resources in its hands and working closely with member-states' missions, the EUDel at New York began to play an increased role in intra-EU local coordination acting no longer within the margins "of the switching priorities of the rotating presidencies" but on the basis of much looser negotiating directives of Brussels framed as "EU priorities for UNGA" (Gstöhl, 2012, p. 159). Hence, especially after the adoption of the Res 65/275, the EU's goal as regards coherence has been achieved to a great extent. This is substantiated by our interviewees, who also shared the view that the biggest effect of the Res 65/276 did not stem from the granted "enhanced observer status" per se but rather from its boosting to the EUDel political status that helped reduce the number of other interventions by member-states' delegations.<sup>18</sup>

## Conclusions

Has the Lisbon Treaty had any effect on the EU engagement in the UNGA politics? We argue that the transition from the Council Presidency to the EUDel in New York was smooth and successful. From the 66th session onwards, the EU Delegation intervenes in increasing numbers voicing the common agreed positions of the Union, while, at the same time, the Council Presidency's declarations decline constantly. Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty and the Res 65/276 seem to contribute to a more coherent EU presence in the UNGA, forming a conducive intra-EU institutional environment that paves the way for a more concrete vocal European action.

Nevertheless, the EU's external action depends not only on its institutional setting but also on its internal frictions and antagonisms. This was highlighted by post-Lisbon disagreements between member-states regarding representation competences. This internal quarrel certainly had repercussions on the Union's presence at the UNGA. As our data suggest, EU oral interventions declined in the 66th session and member-states followed their own national channels of communicating their positions. Still, even though these developments highlighted the limits of the EU common action, they did not cause an irreversible damage to the EU coherence in the UNGA. After a period of internal political osmosis and appropriate accommodation of EU member-states' concerns, the EU has managed to reduce the divergent internal voices and strengthen the EU single voice. To this goal, much of the credit goes to the EUDel in New York.

Overall, the institutionalization of the EU foreign policy in the post-Lisbon, post-Resolution 65/276 environment has increased the coherence of the EU as a single actor in the UNGA. However, it is difficult to project this finding to other multilateral diplomatic fora, even within the UN setting, not least because the "enhanced observer status" remains confined to the New York deliberations with little application in other environments. The EU diplomatic machinery makes systematic efforts to broaden the application scope of the Resolution in other fora functioning under the UNGA aegis but with little success so far due to the existing non-conducive international political environment.<sup>19</sup> Still, the Resolution constitutes a diplomatic precedent for the EU and there is an ongoing mapping exercise in the EEAS as to which other multilateral fora it could be replicated in.<sup>20</sup>

The next step in our research is to juxtapose and compare EU oral interventions with EU member-states' voting patterns, looking at discrepancies between verbal expression of positions and political action. Such an analysis will increase our understanding of the coordination process and gaps therein. More importantly, it will bring to the surface issues of generic oral interventions that testify to a superficial rhetorical EU coherence in contrast to divergent preferences among EU member-states revealed in the course of voting. Putting together oral interventions and voting will offer a more holistic approach vis-à-vis the EU engagement in the UNGA.

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### Notes on contributors

Spyros Blavoukos is Assistant Professor at the Department of International and European Economic Studies, at the Athens University of Economics and Business. His publications focus on the external relations of the EU and issues of European political economy.

Dimitris Bourantonis is Professor at the Department of International and European Economic Studies, at the Athens University of Economics and Business. His main research interests are International Organizations, European Union External Relations, International Relations and Diplomatic History.

Ioannis Galariotis is Max Weber Fellow at European University Institute (2015–2016). Previously, he was post-doctoral research fellow at Athens University of Economics and Business. His main research interests are International Relations theory and European Union External Relations.

Maria Gianniou is post-doctoral research fellow at Athens University of Economics and Business. Her work, focusing on the EU's external action in the Arab–Israeli conflict and its involvement in the wider Mediterranean area, has been presented in various international conferences and published in several collective volumes and peer-reviewed journals.

### Notes

1. We conducted two rounds of interviews: the first round took place in New York in April and May 2014 and the second one in Brussels in October and November 2014. In total, the authors conducted 41 interviews with officials from the EUDel in New York and diplomats from the EU member-states' and third countries' missions as well as with officials from the EEAS and national diplomats from EU member-states' missions in Brussels.
2. Interview no. 6, diplomat of an EU member-state, 1 May 2014, New York.
3. Interview no. 2, diplomat of an EU member-state, 28 April 2014, New York.
4. Interview no. 25, diplomat of an EU member-state, 12 May 2014, New York.
5. Interview no. 8, diplomat of a non-EU member-state, 2 May 2014, New York; interview no. 10, diplomat of a non-EU member-state, 6 May 2014, New York.
6. Interview no. 14, diplomat of an EU member-state, 7 May 2014, New York.
7. Interview no. 10, diplomat of a non-EU member-state, 6 May 2014, New York; interview no. 19, diplomat of an EU member-state, 9 May 2014, New York.
8. Interview no. 15, diplomat of an EU member-state, 7 May 2014, New York.
9. A number of countries outside the EU that align themselves with EU statements could also be incorporated in this component of the analysis. However, we focus exclusively on EU member-states interventions for reasons of methodological parsimony.
10. National interventions may also occur after voting explaining the rationale of an EU member-state vote. In case of a vote in line with the other EU partners, such a national intervention is classified in our data set in cluster Z. However, other post-voting national interventions may occur in cases of agreed EU common positions very generically worded followed by a split in the voting behaviour of member-states. Such interventions are classified in cluster W.
11. Interview no. 13, EU official, 7 May 2014, New York.
12. Interview no. 24, diplomat of an EU member-state, 12 May 2014, New York.
13. Indicatively, interview no. 16, diplomat of an EU member-state, 7 May 2014, New York; interview no. 20, diplomat of an EU member-state, 9 May 2014, New York; interview no. 26, diplomat of an EU member-state, 30 October 2014, Brussels; interview no. 28, diplomat of an EU member-state, 31 October 2014, Brussels.
14. Interview no. 31, EU official, 4 November 2014, Brussels.
15. Interview no. 34, EU official, 5 November 2014, Brussels.
16. Interview no. 25, diplomat of an EU member-state, 12 May 2014, New York.
17. Interview no. 13, EU official, 7 May 2014, New York.
18. Interview no. 15, diplomat of an EU member-state, 7 May 2014, New York; interview no. 25, diplomat of an EU member-state, 12 May 2014, New York; interview no. 34, EU official, 5 November 2014, Brussels.
19. Interview no. 31, EU official, European External Action Service, 4 November 2014, Brussels.
20. Interview no. 36, EU official, European External Action Service, 5 November 2014, Brussels.

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