

European integration and the problem of the state: universality, particularity, and exemplarity in the crafting of the European Union

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The European Union is often presented as an entity that has ‘moved beyond’ the model of organising political life along the way of the modern sovereign state. This paper questions this understanding by engaging a set of texts that could be understood as exemplary of the EU’s official discourse of Europe: EU’s failed Constitutional Treaty and Javier Solana’s collected speeches. A paradox is herein identified: the values that are said to sustain Europe’s identity and upon which Europe is founded are simultaneously presented as distinctly European *and* universal. It is suggested that Europe is being crafted in a pendular oscillation between particularising and universalising the values upon which Europe allegedly rests. By drawing on critical International Relations theory, the paper suggests that this very contradictory oscillation between particularising and universalising Europe’s values to an important extent mirrors modern statecraft. One should therefore think twice before announcing the construction of the European Union as something qualitatively different from, or ‘gentler’ than, modern statecraft.

Journal of International Relations and Development (2014) **17**, 339–366.

doi:10.1057/jird.2013.8; published online 19 April 2013

Keywords: deconstruction; EU foreign policy; European Constitutional Treaty; European integration; the state

Whatever other disagreements there are in the proliferating literatures on European integration, there is wide-ranging consensus on one question: the European Union is not a state. Jan Zielonka expresses this received wisdom, writing that ‘the use of statist terms and analogies [in the study of the EU] is quite misleading because the Union is anything but a state ... [a]nd the Union is a very different kind of international actor than any of the states we know from history’ (Zielonka 2006: 2–3). Instead, it is commonplace to present the European Union as the most important contemporary instance of an entity that has ‘moved beyond’ the model of organising political life along the lines of the modern sovereign state. What is more, this allegedly novel entity has been



widely celebrated in almost all quarters and varieties of ideological persuasion. Cosmopolitan theorist David Held, for example, laments that the EU suffers from ‘something of an identity crisis’ despite ‘all its extraordinary innovation and progress’ (Held 2006: 163). And at the dawn of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in February 2003, Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida jointly called for the development of a European common foreign policy, a pan-European identity, and argued that the European Union ‘offers itself as a form of “governance beyond the nation-state” which could set a precedent in the postnational constellation’ (Habermas and Derrida 2003: 294).

From John Ruggie’s (1993) notion of ‘multiperspectival polity’ to Jan Zielonka’s (2006) ‘neo-medieval empire’, scholars have indeed exceeded one another in fanciful designations of the European Union. Few scholars have questioned the fundamental novelty of the EU vis-à-vis the modern state. However, more than a decade ago Robert Walker (2000: 27) suggested that ‘[t]he modern sovereign state affirms an account of politics in a geographical territory. Europe names an alternative geographical territory and invites a reproduction of state sovereignty on a larger scale’. And in a more empirical vein, anthropologist Cris Shore has demonstrated how the European Commission has sought to construct a common European identity (2000) and a European citizenship (2004), questioning whether the European Union has transcended the constitutive practices of the nation state. More recently, Rainer Hülse (2006) examined the German discourse on EU enlargement in the 1990s and found that European identity was constructed much like a traditional modern national identity, with clear boundaries of differentiation between self and other, and, again much like the modern state, invoking cultural rather than civic sources of identity.¹

This paper also seeks to address the EU’s alleged novelty in relation to the modern state, and it does so by engaging two prominent discourses of legitimization of European integration, which emanate from those empowered to speak in the name of the European Union. The paper addresses two major questions. First, to what extent may the overarching logics involved in European community building be said to break with modern statecraft? Second, what are the ethical implications, here understood as a problem of how Europe is crafted in relation to difference, involved in the crafting of the European Union?² This paper critically explores the crafting of Europe by engaging some of the EU’s legitimization discourses involved in such practices. I understand such discourses as practices of ontologising ‘Europe’.³ By this I mean that they seek to give a secure content to Europe, so as to place Europe on a stable foundation. Those legitimization discourses, hence, are not understood as describing or referring to an already existing referent, but as performative of such a referent. That is, they partake in the *enactment* of Europe (for a similar understanding of Europe, see Diez 2001a).



I start by situating the investigation at hand in the literature on European integration and the state, arguing that the problematic of the state has been central to the project of European integration from its very inception. After the end of the Second World War, the nation state as the organising principle of global politics had become increasingly questioned. European integration constituted an attempt to transcend the modern state, to many associated with nationalism, militarism, and ultimately an important source of global violence. By drawing on some of the critical scholarship on the modern state in International Relations (IR) theory, I contend that the modern Westphalian state was inscribed within a certain normative horizon, and to examine the crafting of the European Union, European integration discourse needs to be read against the background of this normative horizon, something that has hitherto not been done in European integration studies.

In the following two sections of the paper, I offer a close reading of two legitimisation discourses of the European Union: the failed Constitutional Treaty and Javier Solana's collected speeches. I argue that one may in those discourses identify two major gestures, each with its own distinct risks, between which the crafting of Europe continuously oscillates. The first gesture is one of *particularising Europe*. I understand this as practices of attempting to impose clear boundaries of differentiation around Europe. The Europe enacted is here understood as planting a new flag, claiming a piece of land, imposing its law upon this territory, and conjuring up its own distinctive identity; in other words, producing a new centre of sovereignty from which political and social life as well as various others of Europe may be arranged. The second gesture is one of *universalising Europe*. Here, the particularising gestures are resisted and Europe is understood as identical to the rest of the world. Or, at least, 'beneath' layers of whatever passes as culture, tradition, and history, there is no essential difference between Europe and its others. In this paper, I suggest that Europe is crafted in a pendular oscillation between its paradoxical claim to being both particular and yet also universal.

Further, against the background presented in the first section, I go on to suggest that this oscillation reveals that Europe is crafted in a manner akin to that of the modern state: in a constant movement and mediation between the universal and the particular. Hence, I contend, the crafting of Europe involves similar ethical risks to those of the modern state: either to *expel* (the particularising gesture) or to *interiorise* (the universalising gesture) difference. In the penultimate section of the paper, I tease out the discursive strategy of *exemplarity* as a way of reconciling the universal with the particular by introducing a dimension of *time*. The theme of exemplarity is brought out when the EU's foreign policy discourse is examined where the European subject is constituted in relation to various others. The temptation is here to render Europe *the good example*: the privileged bearer of the universal values allegedly found in



Europe, but not yet fully realised in other places. I conclude that it is premature to speak of Europe as qualitatively different from the modern state, or, as more apologetic strands of EU literature tend to, as a 'gentler' form of entity and international actor.⁴

The paper engages in deconstructive textual analysis, and brings some themes primarily from Jacques Derrida to bear on European integration studies. While numerous studies have engaged various aspects of European integration employing discourse analysis as a general methodological framework (e.g. Diez 2001b; Hansen 2006; Braun 2008; Rogers 2009; and for an overview see Waever 2009), fewer studies have so far taken a deconstructive approach (e.g. Derrida 1992; Hansen and Williams 1999; Diez 2001a; Stavrakakis 2005; Stern 2011). One should not overstate the differences between discourse analysis and deconstructive textual analysis, since the former owes a considerable theoretical debt to the latter. Both approaches understand language as *differential* rather than *referential*. Thus, discourse does not *represent*, that is stand in for something 'beneath', 'beyond', or 'outside' itself, but is constitutive of subjects, objects, and modes of conduct (e.g. Laclau and Mouffe 1985). Hence, rather than attempting to causally link discourse to some extra-discursive realm, the study of discourse becomes an important endeavour in itself. However, deconstructive approaches to European integration are more interested in engaging the paradoxes involved in the constitution of a European subject and identity (Waever 2009: 173–6). Finally, deconstructive analysis is often undertaken out of a concern for the ethical implications of foundationalist tropes in subject formation (e.g. Critchley 1992).

Finally, the choice of texts under consideration in this paper needs to be carefully justified. The Constitutional Treaty, despite its failure to be ratified, is arguably the EU's most authoritative attempt to give the signifier of Europe a determinate content and place Europe on a stable foundation. Therefore, I have chosen to engage the Constitutional Treaty rather than the EU's most recent treaty revision, the Treaty of Lisbon. The Constitutional Treaty could thus be seen as a *hegemonising articulation* of community building, spelling out the dominant understanding of the EU's self. However, the constitution of Europe is of course not a one-shot event. Figuratively, a Constitution must be resigned every day to reinvent its signers perpetually, so that people start thinking of it as normal, commonsensical, and therefore inevitable. Therefore, I turn to foreign policy to examine how this community is discursively enacted. Ever since the 1980s, critical work in IR has emphasised how foreign policy functions simultaneously to affirm, constitute, and consolidate stories of (national/domestic) self and (foreign) other.⁵ In such work, foreign policy is understood as *productive* of political community, and *not*, as David Campbell once put it, 'the external deployment of instrumental reason on behalf of an unproblematic internal identity situated in an anarchic realm of



necessity' (Campbell 1998: 37). On such an understanding, states are performed through boundary-drawing identity discourses. I have systematically gone through all speeches made by Javier Solana between 1999 and 2008, published on his official website. By reading a large number of speeches spanning about a decade, I wish to convey a sense of the performative nature of crafting Europe. I make no attempt to trace temporal shifts in this discourse (for such an attempt, see Rogers 2009), since I am primarily interested in more abstract rhetorical figures, unlikely to change over such a relatively short amount of time. Finally, unlike the Constitutional Treaty, which is an articulation of EU's self for internal audiences, Solana's collected speeches exemplify community building when the EU attempts to describe itself in relation to various others.

European Integration and the Question of State Violence

The question of the state's propensity to violence has been central to the project of European integration from its inception. Discourses promoting European integration gained prominence during the Second World War and would in the 1950s emerge as an institutionalised response and proposed solution to the tremendously bloody history of the European continent. The 'Europe' of the early European movement and the theorists of European integration, the so-called neo-functionalists, started out as a *negative signifier*. What 'Europe' sought to negate was the traditional construal of the nation state, which was understood to be intimately associated with nationalism, militarism, and ultimately a normative order that made the two world wars, and even the Holocaust, possible (Spiering and Wintle 2011). 'Europe' assumed the form of a *promise* of organising political life beyond the state, hence radically breaking with the violent European past. Ernest B. Haas, arguably the first major theorist of European integration, entitled his magnum opus *Beyond the State*, a title indicative of this analytical disposition that rested upon a normative anti-statism (Haas 1964).⁶

Although Haas's neofunctionalism would fall out of favour, a major analytical premise of neofunctionalism remained in European integration studies: that the European Union and its predecessors cannot be considered a state. And although there are a vast number of different interpretations of what the EU *is*, there is, as Stefano Bartolini more recently wrote, almost perfect agreement that the EU is not a state. Rather, the EU is widely believed to be different from any other political arrangement (Bartolini 2005: xiii).⁷ Therefore if the EU represents a novel way of organising political life, wherein lies this novelty? Jan Zielonka summarises the conventional wisdom in this regard: the EU 'has no effective monopoly over the legitimate means of coercion. It has no clearly defined centre of authority. Its territory is not fixed. Its geographical,



administrative, economic, and cultural borders diverge. And the Union is a very different kind of international actor than any of the states we know from history' (Zielonka 2006: 2–3). When considering the basic attributes of the state, thus, it seems perfectly reasonable to assert that the EU is a rather different political arrangement than the modern state.

A few authors have sought to problematise this consensus. Rob Walker, for example, has highlighted the difficulties in thinking about European integration in ways not beholden to a statist imagination: 'if Europe is not appropriately conceived as a modern state, or a republic, or a polis writ large, then it is far from clear what it means to think about Europe as a site of political life at all' (Walker 2000: 21). Few writers have empirically sought to substantiate Walker's hesitance by examining the discursive practices of European institutions themselves. The most sustained attempt to do so has been undertaken by Cris Shore, who in a series of writings has demonstrated that the European Commission has been engaged in rather traditional nation-building practices:

Despite the EC's claim to be forging a new entity that 'transcends' the nation-state, the new Europe is being constructed on precisely the same symbolic terrain as the old nation-states themselves. Flags, anthems, passports, trophies, maps and coins all serve as icons for evoking the presence of the emergent state, only instead of 'national sovereignty', it is the legitimacy of EC institutions that is being emphasized and endorsed. (Shore 1996: 481; see also Shore 2000)

To Shore, the introduction of a European citizenship by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 would further cast doubt on the notion of a 'post-national' European Union. Here, Shore in particular questioned Habermas's (2001) notion of a 'constitutional patriotism' to sustain a post-national state, that is that citizenship may be decoupled from identity and culture and instead linked solely to rights and institutions. Focusing less on legal questions, Shore argued that one should understand European citizenship as 'an identity-marker for "branding" those who belong to the *polis* and are subject to its laws, and those who are aliens or "*extracomunitari*" and do not' (Shore 2004: 28). And if one does that, it seems rather clear that the EU is in the process not of challenging the constitutive practices of the state, but rather seeking to emulate those at a larger scale.

What has been lacking so far and what this paper seeks to provide is an engagement of European integration discourse against an understanding of the modern state found in the writings of critical scholarship in IR. Such an engagement may come to nuance the widespread assumption in European integration studies that the EU qualitatively differs from the modern state. And by doing so, it may be possible to find a way to engage the problem of



state violence to which European integration was once proposed as a response. The critical understanding of the Western state found in the writings of Rob Walker (1993, 2010), Richard Ashley (1988, 1989), and Inayatullah and Blaney (2004) squarely places the emphasis on the violent dynamics inherent in the crafting of the modern state.

In the writings of Rob Walker and Richard Ashley, the modern Westphalian state emerged as a precarious solution to the conundrum of how to reconcile particular claims of a rather quarrelsome group of European rulers to all embody the universal.⁸ The modern state that emerges with the peace of Westphalia ending the Thirty Years War stems from an agreement that, ironically, a *particular* sovereign has the right to be the head of his *universal* religion and associated system of metaphysics within the particularity of his state, if in return the sovereign — contradicting the very notion of the universality of one's own state — recognises that beyond his own space reside spaces in which the sovereign's universal pretensions must make a halt (Ashley 1989; Walker 1993, 2010). Therefore, what emerges then is a mutual recognition that several sovereigns are caught up in the same paradoxical situation. The Westphalian system of states — which is essentially a specific form of organising space into fixed and mutually exclusive containers (Ruggie 1993) — might thus be described as a collection of particularities that are mutually recognised as entitled to the universal within their borders.⁹ *Arguably, if anything could be deemed as common to the European experience of the state, it would be this very contradiction itself.*

As Mathias Albert and Lothar Brock (2001: 44) have put it, the modern Westphalian state 'provides a pragmatic solution to normative paradoxes that are difficult to reconcile in modern thinking and practice'. And the normative structure of Westphalia 'is demarcated by the positions of cosmopolitanism and communitarianism' (*ibid.*: 33). The modern European state could thus be understood as the institutionalisation of a constant mediation between the particular and the universal. The 'normative cohesion' of the Westphalian system of states, as Albert and Brock call it, was precariously achieved by the modern state, which precisely provided a response to the paradox of how to reconcile the universal with the particular:

[Modernisation] inscribed the fundamental tension into the modern normative world order: the tension between Kantian universalism on the one hand, and the de facto normative integration of the Westphalian order via the nexus of orders, borders, and identities on the other. Though ethical norms are about universality, this universality is never achievable universally. If this is the case, why then not confine this universality to state boundaries and create a particularistic universe inside territorial markers? (*ibid.*: 45)

On this understanding, modern Europe has always been a history about the particularity of the universal and that universality compacted into the particular. One may therefore suggest that the state inscribed in the Westphalian states system depends on two fundamental gestures, each pushing in opposing directions: a *universalising* and a *particularising* gesture, that is the poles of cosmopolitanism and communitarianism, respectively. And to critical authors in IR, this insight has important ethical implications. To be more precise, it matters for how difference is being treated in the constitution of particularistic communities, each having universalistic pretensions. Few writers have brought out this insight better than Inayatullah and Blaney (2004). It is important to emphasise that in the traditional interpretation of the Westphalian order, the states system is a *solution* to the problem of difference. However, in Inayatullah and Blaney's interpretation it rather lays the foundation for a lingering suspicion of difference, and is thus implicated in the root of much violence in the Western tradition: namely, attempts to reduce otherness to sameness (Critchley 1992; see also Tully 1995). While the universal normative order was perpetually deferred and the international system was constructed as a realm of violence and disorder, the problem of difference did not disappear but was instead projected onto the domestic realm (Inayatullah and Blaney 2004: 32). Write Inayatullah and Blaney:

The bounded political community constructs (and is constructed by) the other. Beyond its boundaries, the other lurks as a perpetual threat in the form of other states, antagonistic groups, imported goods, and alien ideas. The other also appears as difference within, vitiating the presumed but rarely achieved 'sameness'. Internal others are managed or governed by some combination of hierarchy, eradication by assimilation or expulsion, and tolerance. External others are left to suffer or prosper according to their own means, interdicted at border crossings, balanced and deterred, or, in appropriate cases subjected to coercion or conquest. (*ibid.*: 44)

Two contradictory movements thus define the crafting of the modern state, both of which carry their own ethical risks. One is the universalising gesture, which tends towards de-bordering and the uprooting of local claims to identification in favour of allegedly universal ones. While a universalising ethos is radically inclusive, the potential violence therein lies in an ethos that refuses to accept and respect difference, an ethos that believes that it can read the whole world on its own terms. In its more benevolent guises it takes expression in the discourse of human rights and certain cosmopolitan dispositions. In its more sinister and problematic guises, it underpins discourses of imperialism, colonialism, and developmentalism (Badie 2000). In the particularising gesture, by contrast, the state is firmly bordered. On this narration, life is by necessity rooted in *particular* places, and embedded within historically and



geographically *particular* systems of intelligibility — ‘cultures’, ‘structures of meaning’, ‘life forms’, or ‘language games’. To the extent that ‘the state’ is seen as a ‘container’ of a particular system of intelligibility, it may justifiably expel as properly *not* belonging within its orbit any difference that refuses to be assimilated and may seek to turn the domestic realm into ‘empires of uniformity’ (Tully 1995). Human responsibility is thus *territorialised* and *particularised*, and only under certain circumstances should hospitality be extended to the foreigner. The state, then, ‘is the domain where difference is translated into uniformity, while IR remains eternally a site of potentially dangerous, but one would hope manageable, confrontations with others’ (Inayatullah and Blaney 2004: 23). In the following two sections, I read European integration discourse against this understanding of the modern state and seek to show how such a reading may provide critical insights into the contemporary crafting of the European Union.

Bounding Europe: The Constitutional Treaty

In the examination of the discursive crafting of Europe, I will begin by considering the European Constitutional Treaty, which was signed in 2004. Although not ratified and finally abandoned in 2007, it remains the most prominent attempt to articulate a foundation for the European Union. Most commentators perceive the idea of bestowing the EU with a Constitutional Treaty as emerging for two broad reasons. First, at the turn of the century, the EU was about to enlarge to include an additional 12 countries, mostly from eastern and central Europe. The members at the time wanted to make sure that the EU’s institutions would continue to work after the enlargement. Second, and more profoundly, since the 1992 Maastricht Treaty euroscepticism had been on the rise across virtually all of the EU member states. Unprecedented levels of popular opposition to the European project could be witnessed, even in countries whose populations traditionally had been highly supportive of European integration. A Constitution, then, was expected somehow to remedy the increasingly apparent, and for the Union’s advocates exceedingly troublesome, lack of popular legitimacy (Burca 2004). For its advocates, bestowing a Constitutional Treaty upon the EU represented the moment where a truly united European political community would be established and recognised as such. The Constitutional Treaty thereby sought to do what all constitutions attempt: authoritatively to ontologise a community so as to place it on a stable foundation.

In this section, I seek to demonstrate how the Constitution attempts to establish Europe as a community of values. A Constitution should primarily be understood as a particularising practice, in the sense of it seeking to enact a territorially bounded identity. However, while the Constitutional Treaty seeks



to establish a particular political community, the transcendental signified intended to bestow stability and permanence upon Europe is to be found in the *universality* of those values. The Constitutional Treaty expresses one of the defining gestures of modern statecraft: the universal is compacted into a particular. However, the appeal to universality comes at a high price. A deconstructive reading of the treaty reveals that the drive to universalise values on the European continent may well be understood as central to the conflictual history of Europe.

The paradoxical nature of a constitution has been examined by Jacques Derrida in a short piece on the U.S. Declaration of Independence (Derrida 2002; see also Honig 1991), a reading that well lends its extension to the European Constitutional Treaty. Derrida (2002: 47) starts by asking *who* signs the document that founds a community, and notices that such an act of signing does not describe but ‘performs and accomplishes something’. Just like Thomas Jefferson, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, who was appointed to chair the body responsible for drafting the Constitutional Treaty, *wrote* but did not *sign*. Giscard was appointed by the European Council and thus wrote on behalf of the Council. And just like Jefferson, Giscard was not even responsible for writing in the productive meaning of the word, only for drawing up, akin to when a secretary draws up a draft document. Giscard then submitted the draft to another set of representatives, namely representatives for the European peoples. Are they the ultimate signers then? Analogously, as Derrida notes, ‘they sign for themselves but also “for” others. *By right, the signer is the people*’ (*ibid.*: 49, emphasis in the original). So what happens in the act of signing?

The ‘we’ of the Declaration speaks ‘in the name of the people’. But these people do not exist. They do *not* exist as an entity, the entity does *not* exist *before* this declaration, not *as such*. If it gives birth to itself, as free and independent subject, as possible signer, this can hold only in the act of the signature. The signature invents the signer. (*ibid.*, emphasis in the original)

Unlike the U.S. Declaration of Independence, various national peoples in Europe already ‘exist’. However, those national peoples are constituted as *European* peoples in the very moment of signing. The signers, the various *European peoples* did not exist before the signing of the constitution *as such*, hence ‘the signer can only authorize him- or herself to sign once he or she has come to an end ... in a sort of fabulous retroactivity’ (*ibid.*: 50). However, since the not-yet-existing people was able to give itself the right to sign its coming to being, *it must always and already have possessed such a right*. At this point, Derrida refers to John Austin’s (1962) well-known distinction: the signing of a constitution requires both a performative and a constative element. It is the constative element, that is the element that presents itself as a constative utterance, that invokes that which guarantees the performative element.



Contained in the constative element, something else, 'another subjectivity', is lurking behind the scenes, 'in order to guarantee it, this production of signature' (Derrida 2002: 52). At the last instance of an act of foundation, according to Derrida, there is a gap that must be filled and anchored in something. An act of foundation always has to make recourse to something external to the act itself. Who or what, then, guarantees the righteousness of the European peoples?

The first article of the European Constitution begins with a performative declaration: 'Reflecting the will of the citizens and States of Europe to build a common future, this Constitution establishes the European Union, on which the Member States confer competences to attain objectives they have in common' (Art I-1.1). Hence, the European Union is brought into existence. Throughout the Constitution, the importance of values is emphasised. The Union is founded 'on *the values* of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities' (Art I-2, my emphasis). Further, its *aim* 'is to promote peace, its values and the well-being' of the European peoples (*ibid.*). It is these values that determine whether a country may become an EU member: 'The Union shall be open to all European States which respect its values and are committed to promoting them together' (Art. I-1.2). And, the Union's external relations 'shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement' (Art III-292.1).

The search for an absolute, which could function as an anchor for the Europe that is being constituted, is intimately linked with these values that are stressed throughout the Constitution. Interestingly in this context, one of the most heated debates regarding the Constitution concerned whether the preamble should include an explicit reference to Christianity (Olsen 2004). The secularist countries prevailed, but instead of an appeal to Christianity, we find something that is structurally very similar, namely an appeal to the *universality* of the values upon which Europe would be founded. Such an appeal is found in the preamble to the Constitution:

DRAWING INSPIRATION from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law.

A similar appeal is to be found in the preamble to the bill of rights that the Constitution incorporates under its second article:

Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity.



The appeal to the universality of its values, presented as a constative utterance, provides the countersignature to the constitution of the European Union. Arguably, those ‘universal’ values secure the founding of the Union. As Sophia Näsström (2003: 817) notices, the function of appealing to a universal in whatever guise it may take has always been to *transcend and arrest the contingences of time*. Indeed, it is the universality of those values that functions as a countersignature to the Europe that is being established.

Let us further explore the nature of the supposedly universal values in the Constitutional Treaty. Consider the first lines of the preamble:

DRAWING INSPIRATION from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law, BELIEVING that Europe, reunited after bitter experiences, intends to continue along the path of civilisation, progress and prosperity, for the good of all its inhabitants, including the weakest and most deprived; that it wishes to remain a continent open to culture, learning and social progress; and that it wishes to deepen the democratic and transparent nature of its public life, and to strive for peace, justice and solidarity throughout the world, CONVINCED that, while remaining proud of their own national identities and history, the peoples of Europe are determined to transcend their former divisions and, united ever more closely, to forge a common destiny.

Europe’s ‘cultural, religious and humanist inheritance’ is here posited as the ultimate source of the values upon which Europe is to be founded — serving as a foundation both to overcome Europe’s ‘ancient divisions’ and ‘to forge a common destiny’. There is a peculiar dialectic at work between ‘Europe’ and ‘its peoples’ in this process: ‘the peoples of Europe are determined to transcend their former divisions’. However, what is of more consequence and as J. Peter Burgess (2007: 190–1) notices, the universality to which the text appeals is unstable. Europe’s ‘cultural, religious and humanist’ past is the source of the universal values that Europe rests upon and that guide ‘us’ in overcoming Europe’s divisions. However, at the same time Europe’s past is precisely one of divisions and conflict, which must be transcended, in order to make Europe safe for its universal values, which paradoxically were present already in the past, so that Europe can unite. Ultimately and rather peculiarly then, it turns out that the major condition of possibility of *Europe-as-a-unified-whole*, namely Europe’s past resting on a set of universal values, coincides with its major condition of impossibility since this source simultaneously contains all that which has *always* torn Europe apart.

What is common to all the three sources of inspiration for Europe’s constitutional project — culture, religion, and humanism — is that within them, one



finds powerful drives towards unity and identity, all with universalising aspirations, which have historically torn Europe apart. The drafters may argue that European integration is designed and pursued in order to overcome the drive to fragmentation and difference, starting from the premise that it was Europe's *diversity* that ultimately caused war. However, if one follows through on the critical understanding of the state introduced in the first section, one may argue that it was rather the drive towards unity and identity, examples of which we find under the labels of culture (think of the many nationalisms in Europe), religion (think of Europe's religious wars), and humanism (think with Adorno and Horkheimer of the totalitarian dimensions of the Enlightenment project) that caused conflict within Europe. To follow through on the interpretation of the state presented above, then, conflict has ensued as a result of various particularisms presenting themselves as universalisms, claims that have always been resisted and that eventually resulted in two total wars in the 20th century. The real risk of European integration, then, is that it merely replicates all the previous (bloody and violent) attempts to European identity: attempts to eliminate the differences within Europe in the name of achieving European unity. Hence, within the turgid narratives of a shared European culture lies the dynamic that has always produced so much violence in Europe.

The desire for identity in the Constitution perhaps most explicitly reveals itself in the reference to a European *reunification* made in the preamble. European integration and ultimately European unity will presumably take Europe back to a mythical state that predates all conflict that tore it apart. The ultimate promise of European integration, then, is a return to its origin as complete, full, and self-identical — Europe is re-collected, and *Europe will finally (again) be Europe*. And following Derrida, this mirrors the second step in what one may call the distinctive double-gesture of Western metaphysics, namely 'the enterprise of returning "strategically", ideally, to an origin or to a "priority" held to be simple, intact, normal, pure, standard, self-identical, in order *then* to think in terms of derivation, complication, deterioration, accident, etc' (Derrida 1988: 93). In the context of European community building, a major implication of the desire for identity and re-collection lies in how difference is treated. That which may threaten the re-collection of Europe then risks either being *excluded* (rendered non-European) or *assimilated* (subsumed and cleansed of what could not effectively pass as European). This is a powerful quasi-Hegelian motif, where European history strives to reduce otherness to sameness, and, according to Inayatullah and Blaney, it is at the very root of the ontological, epistemological, and physical violence in the West.

We have thus seen how the Constitutional Treaty attempts to establish Europe as a community of values by linking it to a transcendental signified



in the shape of a set of universal values. And, already within the constitution, we notice the problematic nature of those values. The Constitutional Treaty reveals that the conflicting logics of universalism and particularism, which in the first section I argued was a defining characteristic of the modern state, have not been overcome in the crafting of the European Union. Instead, the particular/universal dynamic is displaced from the domestic level onto the European level. This leaves the essential tension still intact: since the values that Europe embodies are deemed to be universal, the imperial temptation will remain, but this time at a larger geographical level. The next section will clarify the basic narrative underpinning of European imperialism and will show that it lingers on within the EU's foreign policy discourse by showing how Europe is rendered the *exemplary* community: the privileged bearer of the universal values that Europe supposedly exhibits. At the same time, and as most comprehensively dealt with by Shore, the new domestic space of Europe will exhibit a drive towards sameness and homogeneity, which may sit uneasily with the multicultural realities on the European continent (Shore 2000).

The question(s) of the EU's borders: universality, particularity, and exemplarity

The emergence of the EU as an international actor following the end of the Cold War was an important element in the constitution of the European Union. The establishment of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the Maastricht Treaty from 1992 allowed the EU more opportunities to articulate an identity and thus performatively to enact a vision of itself. Moreover, the creation of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in 1999, which further enhanced the CFSP by adding military capabilities to the EU, could also be understood as constructing and promoting a European identity. Such an identity, much like the identity articulated in the Constitutional Treaty, performs a foundation for the European Union. Indeed, as Stephanie Anderson has argued, 'One key objective consistently overlooked in analyses of ESDP is its importance to the EU's nation- or identity-building project that is so essential to further integration' (Anderson 2008: 5). The Treaty of Amsterdam created the position of High Representative for the CFSP, charged with the task of representing the EU globally. As first and former High Representative of EU's foreign and security policy, Javier Solana has by virtue of his office for a decade been structurally expected to 'fill in' the subject position of an important structuring node that articulates and links many discourses into a somewhat coherent semantic network.



Particularising Europe

Javier Solana, like the Constitutional Treaty, consistently insists that Europe is 'above all a community built on a set of principles and a set of values' (Solana 1999b).¹⁰ For the first time in history, claims Solana, is it possible for Europeans to consolidate a lasting peace on the European continent not on the basis of a balance of power but 'on the voluntary acceptance of and commitment to a set of values that inspires our civilisation' (Solana 2002b). As a consequence of this community allegedly founded on common values, the EU's foreign policy is most fundamentally about 'the *defence* and promotion of the *values* which are at the *heart* of European history and civilisation' (Solana 2000h), and ought to reflect 'the values and principles which have forged our identity as European' (Solana 1999a). Hence, Solana insists that European foreign policy must not limit itself to a defence of Europe's economic interests, but that a 'comprehensive foreign policy is a statement of values as well as interests, an expression of identity, and a decision to promote them abroad' (Solana 2002b).

Importantly, and analogously to the Europe inscribed in the Constitution, there have to be values that are at the heart, that is, at the transhistorical centre of Europe, exclusively European, and upon which the European community can be securely founded and *fended off* from the rest of the world. Europe is being particularised, which just like the Constitutional Treaty differentiates Europe by means of appealing to a set of values. If European values were simply universal values, they would not be able to ground effectively a peculiarly European mode of subjectivity, that is, we would quite simply not be able to distinguish Europe from non-Europe. A problem with the emphasis on the particularity of values is that it risks turning the EU into an imperial power, attempting to impose *its* unique and particular values on others. When the particularity of those values is emphasised the resulting foreign policy can at times be seen as rather menacing, as in Solana's remark that 'Europeans want *their* values [...] promoted around the world' (Solana 2006a) or in his insistence that the development of ESDP 'is crucial if Europe is to [...] maintain those values on which it is based' (Solana 2001a). In other words, according to Solana, Europeans want *their* values not only to be defended at home but also advanced abroad, and need a common security and defence policy, that is, a military component in the form of the ESDP, to do so.

Solana goes to some length in his attempt to spell out the values on which Europe is allegedly founded, and a tension between the universality and particularity of European values runs as a red thread throughout. The values defining Europe are sometimes presented as uniquely European, as when these values are portrayed as a source of respect for Europe from other



countries: Europe is respected for *its* values (Solana 2000a, h). Speaking under the subheading of ‘back to Europe’s essence’, which Solana advocates as a way out of the crisis after the failure to ratify the Constitutional Treaty, he claims (2005) that:

I believe that our continent does have a particular identity. True, discussions on European identity often degenerate into platitudes and guff. Europe’s identity is hard to pin down. And of course we share many values with others, notably in North America. Even so, I believe there is a European identity.

It is worthwhile to notice that this speech, where the particularity of European identity is stressed, is delivered in a time of perceived crisis of the European project of community building. Solana appeals to the particularity of European values to stress the commonalities of Europe, and explicitly advocates a return to the ‘essence of Europe’ to remind ‘ourselves’ about ‘our’ common project of community building as ‘destiny’. Here, Solana very clearly engages in the double gesture of Western metaphysics, desiring a return to the origin of Europe — Europe’s essence — as a way out of the crisis of Europe.

Universalising Europe

However, at other times Solana simply equates European with universal values. Speaking in a Swedish town laying out the broad priorities of EU’s foreign policy, Solana claims (2002e) that:

The values rooted in our common texts *are common to all*. They are shared also with those who cannot be in Helsingborg — the victims of conflict whether in the Balkans, in the Middle East, on the Horn of Africa and in Central Africa. Our purpose is to enable these values to flourish and find expression where *they already have deep roots*.

Here, there is clearly no difference to be drawn between the values that Europe wants to promote and the values already in place in distant localities. These values already inhabit the whole world, and Europe’s task is to cultivate them for the rest of the planet’s peoples, to water their ‘deep roots’ so that they may grow and flourish. The ambiguity about the status of the values upon which the EU is founded and that the EU’s foreign policy should reflect, is sometimes found within the same speech. In one speech, Solana (1999a) first asserts that the EU’s foreign policy should reflect ‘the values and principles which have forged *our identity as Europeans*’ and then he immediately goes on to claim, ‘[i]t is essential that Europe’s foreign policy is based on those values and *universal* principles. A key element of this must be the promotion and protection of human rights anywhere in the world’. One finds a similar tension

in what is probably Solana's most sustained reflection on the status of the values that allegedly define Europe:

I believe there is a core set of values, convictions and experiences that together form a composite European identity. And there are, by now, enough elements of a European model on how to organise our societies and interact with the wider world. We all feel it when we travel around the world. What are the elements? I would say compassion with those who suffer, peace and reconciliation through integration; a strong attachment to human rights, democracy and the rule of law; a spirit of compromise, plus a commitment to promote in a pragmatic way rule-based international system. But also a sense that history and culture are central to how the world works and therefore how we should engage with it. (Solana 2006b, cp Solana 2006c, 2007)

However, immediately after having spelled out a rather substantive definition of European values as proper to Europe, and appealing to identity as a necessary pre-condition for community, that is having *particularised* Europe, Solana immediately goes on to recognise that '[o]nce again these elements are *not unique to Europe*. And I don't want us to define ourselves negatively, against "the other". But we probably do feel more strongly about these values than others' (Solana 2006b).

Thus, when further examining the values upon which Europe is founded, one encounters a paradox. On the one hand, the particularity of the values of Europe are emphasised in an attempt to differentiate Europe from other communities, that is to bound Europe's self. However, in order to legitimise European intervention abroad in defence of this community of values and, most plausibly, construct Europe as an inclusive community, the universal nature of those values is instead emphasised. Using the all-too-familiar language of *realpolitik*, if Solana did not make this equation he would run the risk of rapidly approaching the imperial pole — Europe as simply imposing *its* values on others. An appeal to universality, while it may be beneficial in the promotion of human rights, is not without its own risks. It conjures up Europe's not very distant colonial past. One of the biggest risks of the insistence of the universality of Europe's values is brought to the fore when we consider the link between universality and exemplarity.

Europe as the exemplary community

The practice of the good example is about inscribing a particular in the name of the universal *within a certain body*. As Derrida explicates: the value of universality is 'always linked to the value of exemplarity that inscribes the universal in the proper body of singularity [...] whether this singularity



be individual, social, national, state, federal, confederal' (Derrida 1992: 72). How does this play out? Derrida has devoted considerable attention to what has been called *the problem of exemplarity* (Naas 1992). In Derrida's writings, the notion of an example — traditionally understood as an instance of the universal — takes two meanings at the same time; 'an undistinguished sample and a teleological model' (Naas 1992: xv) between which the notion of an example oscillates. The first meaning is that of a *sample*; that is one undistinguished sample among many others, akin to the notion of a sample from a population in statistics. This understanding of an example presupposes the existence of a certain norm, which is present and universal in regard to all possible samples. The ex(s)amples are simply mirror images of this pre-existing norm. However, on the second understanding of an example, it always either *exceeds* or *falls short of* some norm. The example in this second sense is often understood as the essentially good example, carrying beyond itself and setting an example for others to follow, becoming the bearer of the uncertain and ambiguous norm that it is (merely) supposed to exemplify (Derrida 1994: 34). Therefore, the example in this second sense functions to stabilise and give content to a norm that is not already unambiguously in place.

In the traditional philosophical discourse on the idea of Europe, one finds an oscillation between the two meanings of the example, as one community among others — a community that observes the law already in place — and as the essentially good example; Europe as the bearer of the law that it sometimes must depart from and violate in order to lay down. The traditional discourse on Europe found in thinkers as diverse as Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, and Valéry has often subscribed to the idea of Europe as the good example, '[t]he idea of an advanced point of exemplarity [...] [as] the idea of the European idea, its eidos, the idea of beginning and telos' (Derrida 1992: 25). This is what one may call the missionary impulse of Europe, a Europe that never ceases 'to make advances on the other: to induce, seduce, produce, and conduce, to spread out, to cultivate, to love or to violate, to colonize, and to colonize itself' (*ibid.*: 49).

When reading Solana's speeches, one finds a similar oscillation between Europe as one example of regional integration among others, and as *the good example*, as providing the exemplary model of integration: 'Over the last forty years, the European Union has become one of the most sophisticated and advanced examples of regional integration in the world' (1999b, cp 2000b, 2001a). At other times, the EU is simply presented as the best model, the exemplary of regional integration: 'There is no better example of regional integration than the European Union. It has stood the test of time' (2001b). Therefore whereas the model of regional integration that the EU instantiates sometimes simply offers '*a model ... for peace through regional integration*'

(2000g), it is most frequently presented as the only model, the exemplary model, that other regions ought to follow:

The European Union can be an example to the region of what can be achieved through co-operation and integration. [...] We are better placed than anyone else to help, and we have a direct interest in doing so. (Solana 2000e)

When speaking of Africa, Solana (2000f) notices that it has ‘chosen a similar path’ to that of Europe and notes ‘with satisfaction that the European Union has served as inspiration and a model’ (2002a). And Europe’s exemplarity leads to ‘a need for Europe’ in the world:

Everywhere I hear foreign contacts tell me of their need for Europe. Yes, there is a need for Europe around the world! [...] Yes, the magnetic force of the European model is stronger than ever! Yes, Europe today is the main vector of peace and democracy right across the world. How many regions and countries admire the Franco-German reconciliation? This is no messianic posturing on my part but a statement of fact [...]: Europe is the most extensive and most developed model for political integration based on law and freedom. [...] [T]he world needs Europe. (2005a)

It is not enough simply to embody the good example for others to look up to, admire, and try to imitate to the best of their abilities. In the early years of Solana’s incumbency, before the military component of the CFSP, the ESDP, had materialised, he repeatedly stresses that Europe’s exemplarity can no longer passively assert itself:

But it is no longer enough for Europe to remain a force for peace through example. The Union is also a community built on a set of principles and values. [...] There is in particular increasing concern to support democracy and human rights in developing countries. I am convinced of the need for the European Union, together with those who share our values, to be forthright in defending these values and in upholding the basic principles on which Europe is founded. (Solana 2000a; see also Solana 2000c, d)

Here, one finds a peculiar link between exemplarity and responsibility. As Solana puts it, ‘It is my belief that because of our size and interests, because of our history *and values*, we have an obligation to take our share of responsibilities in this global age’ (2002b). Europe is indeed even ‘being called upon’ to assume its responsibilities (Solana 2002e), and not just in the sense, which Solana often refers to, that there is an external ‘demand for Europe’ (Solana 2002c; cp. Solana 2002d), but because of the exemplarity of the values that Europe embodies. Responsibility for the world then becomes something that imposes itself upon Europe: it is not ‘only a matter of choice [but] ... a question



of responsibility' (Solana 2004). Interestingly, this is not so far from an important strand in U.S. foreign policy discourse that, as Ernest Lee Tuveson argued, holds that 'history has put a special responsibility on the American people to spread the blessings, liberty, democracy, and equality to others throughout the earth, and to defeat, if necessary by force, the sinister powers of darkness' (Tuveson 1980: vii).

When read through the logic of exemplarity, eurocentrism with its monological mode of relating to the other comes to the fore. Europe as the good example will have difficulties learning from the other, and will rather assume its burden to act as the great Educator, with all its colonially charged traces. European exemplarity risks vitiating Solana's laudable claim that the dialogue between the EU and Africa should be pursued on the 'basis of dialogue of equals' (Solana 2002a). And, radiating its exemplarity from the city on the hill is no longer enough, as this is not *responsible* behaviour. European foreign policy ultimately becomes a vehicle through which Europe may assume the responsibilities imposed upon it by its exemplarity. This is eurocentrism properly speaking, understood with Ernesto Laclau (1996: 34) as the equating of the universality of certain values, norms, and principles with the *institutions* thought to embody those values. The problem thus is not the notion of universality itself but that the practice of exemplarity re-inscribes those universal values within the European body, rendering Europe responsible for their global implementation.

Importantly, the practice of exemplarity introduces a notion of time in an attempt to bridge the contradiction between universality and particularity.¹¹ Time appears in the guise of 'progress' or 'development', and operates by deploying the binaries of surface/depth and accident/essence. Progress or development is understood as the movement towards the obliteration of that which is merely an accidental surface phenomenon and the simultaneous bringing to the surface of that which Europe already exemplifies. On this logic, other countries and continents may *appear* different from Europe, but underneath those illusory appearances they are the same. Europe *appears* different and is an exemplar because it is the most advanced and developed locality in terms of this movement towards the surfacing of a deep essence common to all humankind. Thus, in Europe, values supersede and keep control of accidents. However, outside of Europe that gets reversed: accidents supersede and keep those values repressed. What is yet to progress are those cases in which historical accident and surface appearances give rise to superficial differences, but only because that which is essential to all humans has not yet been brought to the surface. Thus Europe and non-Europe are *the same* in essence. The difference lies in that Europe, being more progressive, has brought to the surface that human essence and is now exemplifying it, whereas Europe's others have not yet managed to do so.



The historical significance of this narrative structure should be fairly obvious. The logic of exemplarity then becomes a potential basis for a euro-centric notion of responsibility, which is indeed *the* colonial notion of responsibility. Europe may on this logic in some instances act with force and violence towards various others precisely because of their failure to follow Europe's example — which is after all alleged to be universal and truly in line with their innermost but repressed wills. Europe's leaders for their part, though, can be forgiven for that violence: were Europe's others to develop, that is were their essence to come to the surface, they would have wanted this violence and perceived it as assistance in the emancipation of their deepest levels of selves. The point is not to claim that the EU engages in imperial activities abroad. Nor is it to claim that the EU should refrain from engaging in foreign policy activities altogether. It is rather to point out and acknowledge that the basic narrative structure that underpinned imperialism and colonialism remains in place (Stern 2011), and thus to call for more critical introspection whenever European intervention abroad is contemplated. It is, in the final analysis, a call to situate the development of the ESDP against the background of Europe's troubled history of colonialism, without succumbing to an often highly irresponsible quietism.

Concluding Remarks

In this paper, I have examined two prominent discourses that attempt to articulate a foundation for the European Union against an understanding of the modern state as found in critical IR scholarship. If we see the modern state having emerged as a response to Europe's troubled history, and as most fundamentally about reconciling particular claims to embody the universal, then we can see that the crafting of the European Union demonstrates a similar tension. I argued that one might in the examined texts identify two major gestures between which the crafting of Europe continuously oscillates. The first gesture is one of *particularising Europe*. On this gesture, clear boundaries of differentiation are imposed upon Europe; Europe is bordered, identified, and ordered. The second gesture is one of *universalising Europe*. Here, the particularising gestures are resisted and Europe is understood as identical to the rest of the world. Or, at least, 'beneath' layers of whatever passes as culture, tradition, and history, there is *no essential difference* between Europe and its others. One may therefore suggest that Europe is being crafted in a pendular oscillation between its paradoxical claim to being both particular and yet also universal. And when understood against a critical understanding of statecraft, this oscillation reveals that the European Union is crafted in a way akin to that of the modern state: in a constant movement and mediation between the universal and the particular.



The obvious risk of the particularising practices is that such practices perpetually have to create various constitutive outsides, which will be cast as not properly belonging to Europe. Perhaps the most well-known political manifestation of the particularising gesture is nationalism, which is precisely what European integration wanted to get away from, since national socialism can be understood as an extreme form of nationalism (Probst 2003). In fact, Europe's past is replete with conflict brought about and exacerbated by Europe's petty and manifold nationalisms. Thus, if European integration merely reproduced the particularising gestures of the state at a higher level, and conjured up a European nationalism, the many well-known problems of nationalism would still remain. Solidarity is in the nationalist script primarily cast as something one owns to a particular in-group, whereas various others are deemed to have a lesser moral standing. In contemporary times, this is most obviously an issue for migration into the EU and the extent to which migrants will be deemed as others against an idealised version of a bounded European identity.

However, at the same time Europe's bloody colonial past ought to serve as a constant reminder of the continent's failure to acknowledge boundaries of differentiation at all — that is the risks of the universalising gesture. The problem here, postcolonial literatures have taught us, was not so much *exclusion* as practices of differential *inclusion* (e.g. Chakrabarty 2000). The colonial other was most often treated as a would-be, but never quite, European. In some distant and always ultimately deferred future, having been lifted up to the level of the European, history would affirm the essential identity between Europe and her others. In Kiplingesque lore, it was Europe's historical burden to domesticate the whole world and make it safe for the universal values exemplified by Europe to prosper therein — a logic no doubt highly forgiving of the innumerable violences committed by European countries in other peoples' lands. As I made clear in the discussion of Solana's foreign policy discourse on Europe, the universalising gesture always risks slipping into the idea of European exemplarity, where universal values are attached to specific agents. This should make us more alert to developments in the ESDP and the projection of power outside of EU's geographical borders. And neither does the universalising gesture mean that the necessity of a constitutive outside in subject formation has disappeared. Most often, the constitutive outsides to a universalising subject are forms of otherness deemed to be 'backwards' or 'regressive', to be found either in distant localities, or carried by elements deemed 'foreign' at home.

Ultimately then, on this reading, the crafting of Europe between the particular and the universal closely resembles what is arguably a central feature of the crafting of the modern European state. One should therefore think twice before announcing the construction of the European Union as something



qualitatively new and different — let alone better, or more fundamentally ethical — than modern statecraft. In fact, the crafting of the European Union is plagued by the same ethical dilemmas as those involved in crafting the modern state, and it is ultimately animated by a similar desire either to expel or to interiorise difference. The EU does not necessarily have to turn into an imperial power. Nor will it necessarily tend towards an internal ‘empire of uniformity’ (Tully 1995), threatening the multicultural realities on the European continent. But it is important to acknowledge the ethical risks inherent in modern statecraft: to seek to turn others into mirror images of oneself and to turn oneself into an empire of uniformity, in which difference is rather harshly assimilated. Taking this point seriously could impel us to start exploring new and innovative ways of organising social and political life on the European continent. Most importantly, such inquiry would reconnect European integration studies with the critical spirit that inspired European integration in the first place: an acknowledgement of the profound linkages between the modern state and violence, coupled with a desire to think of non-violent ways to organise political, social, and economic life. Such, I would like to finish by suggesting, would be the formidable tasks of a genuinely critical approach to European integration.

Acknowledgements

For extensive comments and discussion, I am indebted to Leonardo E. Figueroa-Helland, Richard K. Ashley, Roxanne L. Doty, Jessica Auchter, Brian Blanchard as well as two anonymous reviewers. On earlier versions of this project, I also acknowledge feedback from discussants and panellists at ISA 2008, ISA-North East 2008, ISA 2010, and members of a workshop on interpretive and relational research methodologies at ISA-North East 2008. Among those, I particularly extend my thanks to William Wolfgram, Jennifer Mitzen, Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, Rosemary Shinko, Renee Marlin-Bennett, Amy Skonieczny, and Thomas Diez. The usual disclaimer applies.

Notes

- 1 For works concerned with various dimensions of European identity, see i.a. Neumann (1998, 1999); Waever (1998); Cederman (2001); Rumelili (2004, 2007); and several of the pieces in Båtora and Mokre (2011).
- 2 I am throughout the paper using ‘crafting’ instead of ‘writing’, to avoid any confusion about narrowly associating the enactment of Europe only with linguistic practices. In addition, since the texts I examine use ‘Europe’ and ‘the European Union’ interchangeably, so do I.
- 3 Throughout the paper, ‘Europe’ is textually understood as a contested signifier whose bounds and referents must always be put in quotation marks. However, for stylistic reasons I will not always do so. To place a concept within quotation marks or *under erasure* means to resist essentialising the concept. It is also to recognise the necessity of provisionally retaining it in order to be able to examine the discursive field in which it is deployed (see Spivak’s preface to *Of Grammatology* in Derrida 1976: xiv).



- 4 Many contributions to the debate on 'normative power Europe' would here qualify. See Manners (2002) and Sjursen (2006). For a critique, see Diez (2005) and Manners' (2006) response. A more theoretical form of arguing for the novelty of the EU is to argue that the EU's constitutive outside resides solely in its own past, and that the EU does not (any longer) engage in inscribing otherness in spatial entities. For a convincing argument about the impossibility of decoupling spatial and temporal forms of othering, see Prozorov (2011).
- 5 For pioneering works see Ashley (1987), Campbell (1998), and Doty (1996). In the context of Europe, see Neumann (1999).
- 6 Reflecting on the achievements of neo-functionalism towards the end of his life, Haas indeed characterised his thought as an attempt to reflect upon 'how human collectivities can move beyond the nation state' (Haas 2001: 24).
- 7 An important exception is found in Bartolini's work, who writes that the EU 'can be defined as a state-formation attempt that is characterized to date by limited administrative capabilities, by strong regulatory powers in selected fields, by very weak fiscal capabilities, and by strong jurisdictional capabilities that have grown from the early spheres of competences. *From the historical point of view, there is nothing exceptional or new in this configuration of subsystemic differentiation*' (2005: xiii, my emphasis).
- 8 For the following discussion, I am indebted to Rick Ashley and Leo E. Figueroa-Helland.
- 9 For how the Westphalian international system differs from two Asian systems, see Ringmar (2012).
- 10 Throughout the text, all emphases in Solana's speeches are inserted by the author.
- 11 Thanks to Rick Ashley for elaborating on this point.

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