HOW A SMALL STATE EXPANDS

GRAND STRATEGY AND GREECE'S TERRITORIAL EXPANSION IN THE BALKANS AND ASIA MINOR

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EFSTATHIOS T. FAKIOLAS

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To Tassos and Tassoula

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PROLOGUE

The book is about grand strategies with which a small state creates and directs power to obtain security. By and large, grand strategy relates, on the one hand, to expansion, which denotes the acquisition of territories and the advance of demands; and on the other, to consolidation, which concerns the preservation of the *status quo* and the denial of unwelcome demands. Approached from this angle, I focus on the interplay between systemic and domestic structural imperatives, and their reciprocal relationship with grand strategy and territorial enlargement. The case of Greece between 1909 and 1920 is selected to provide the evidence. Throughout these years, Greek grand strategy was dominated by expansion and consolidation, covering an eleven-year period of war and peace from the *Goudi* 'military revolution' through W.W.I to the 1920 Sèvres Treaty which created a greater Greece of 'the two continents and the five seas'. At the centre of the inquiry stands the problem of how such a small state as Greece proved itself able to acquire and shield territorial gains.

The topic has scarcely received the attention it deserves. In addition to the reluctance that the literature on Greek affairs of the years under discussion shows to investigating strategic issues, the central aspect is that the theme of grand strategy is overlooked in the field of small states. Much of the contemporary work on strategy, too, is split into two schools of thought: one that emphasises the impact of the international system and the other that locates the driving forces of strategy at the level of state. Rather than studying international and domestic factors in isolation, I join those few scholars who seek an external-internal synthesis. My objective is to use the insights of this debate in order to sharpen our understanding of small states. The question that informs my research is whether grand strategy matters to small states. I argue that it is through grand strategy that the interplay of the international system and the state's domestic structure affords small states partnership value and autonomy of action in achieving ends in view. Hence, grand strategy matters through the response to structural imperatives to small states in pursuing and attaining the enlargement of their territorially ordered rule.

To elaborate the argument, I develop a theoretical framework. This invokes categories and propositions intended to relate structural conditions to the making of grand strategy; and then acts as a lens through which I perform assessment of the evidence. Part One, therefore, challenges the established scholarship and presents the tools by which I go about my analysis. In the rest of the pages I discuss the case study, while Conclusion summarises the findings and highlights limitations.

Some caution is appropriate. This study is not an account of the day-by-day decision-making process or strategy implementation. It does not test hypotheses against experience; this task requires the comparison of many case studies. Neither is it an attempt to probe the plausibility of the small state theory in the light of some strands of thought. Nor does it seek to fit the argument in with any particular paradigm. This is not to say that my inquiry moves in a theoretical vacuum. Rather, it is a theoretical exercise, which, reflecting on the relationship of agency and structure, builds a framework of analysis which I apply to identify the links that connect structural imperatives with Greece's grand strategy and territorial enlargement in the period concerned. Thus, neglected aspects of small state grand strategy are expected to emerge most clearly.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This is a book that argues against the logic pervading most of the theoretical *problematique* and empirical investigation on small states. Contrary to the prevailing view in the international relations scholarship, it argues that grand strategy matters to small states. This argument was originally shaped and fully developed in a thesis for a doctorate degree in the Department of War Studies at King's College London. Natural as it is, in writing this book as a doctoral dissertation project, I benefited enormously from the knowledge, encouragement and resources of others. May I take here the opportunity to place on record by name their kindness and invaluable help.

First, I am particularly glad to begin acknowledgements with my academic supervisor. Words cannot adequately express my great debt of gratitude to Jan Willem Honig for his systematic guidance and constant readiness to discuss with me numerous theoretical issues or problems of research, style, and content in my work. Jan provided constructive criticism and made incisive suggestions on how to refine my thinking on the subject matter and achieve a better articulation of my argument. He demanded the high standards of scholarship; his unfailing insistence upon clarity and simplicity was intensely pressing but wise and rewarding as it prompted me to give the best of which I was capable. What is surely more, I truly thank Jan for his practical and moral support at moments when the obligation to do my military service and matters of my personal life put the completion of this intellectual enterprise at stake. Put it quite simply, his open-mindedness, understanding and interest enabled me to firmly keep going and find the way when the aim and the path did not seem clear. And of course I owe special thanks to Andrew Williams and Spyros Economides for the time they took to scrutinize the manuscript and share useful ideas and perspectives during the defense of this project.

A grateful acknowledgement is also due to several scholars, colleagues and friends who willingly read or debated and criticized the points I raised in earlier versions of various chapters. I extend my appreciation to Rossetos and Tassos Fakiolas, Alexis Heraclides, Marilena Koppa, Harry Papasotiriou, Procopis Papastratis and Panayotis Tsakonas, as well as to Ioannis Armakolas and Constantinos Laoutides, for their insightful comments, which informed my thoughts and saved me from errors in fact and interpretation. A further word of appreciation must be made of certain other scholars who open-handedly answered my queries or helped me in other way: Thanasis Diamantopoulos, Helen Gardikas-Katsiadakis, Athanasios Platias, Alkis Rigos, Charalambos Tsardanidis and Thanos Veremis. But above all else, to Constantine Arvanitopoulos and, certainly, to Harry and Marilena I wish to mention my immense debts, without whom my academic expectations would probably not have been

sustained. For virtually pushing me to stay on track along academia, I am honestly indebted to Constantinos Hazakis and Nikolaos Tzifakis, whose trusted friendship and inspiration I have the luxury and the pleasure to enjoy. Here, too, for the very warm welcome I want to thank the head and the other 'founding member-colleagues' of my new academic home, the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Peloponnese; though not to list them all for, on that occasion and spot, they know it might be superfluous to do so.

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I was extremely privileged of the four-year financial support I received from the NATO Science Fellowship program. In addition to this funding, my research was facilitated, among others, by a research grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and a research award from the British International Studies Association.

I could not close this record without reference to a few individuals of my wider family. Undeniably my deep appreciation is forever due to my uncle Michael and aunt Giescie who generously rendered their love and support over the too many years before and during the completion course of this work. I must also confess my sincere thankfulness to outstanding Loukia and my uncle Dimitris, as well as to the two wonderful and beloved to me Krystalia and George Priovolos. My sister Michaela is warmly mentioned for sustaining my energy and motivation, and I wish I could reciprocate by helping her to calmly find her way in this world after the so many doc-and-post-doc years at Cambridge.

Last but not least I pay tribute to my wife Eirini not only for her unselfish partnership and devotion but also and above all for its unique gift, our two sons Anastasios and Constantinos-Marios. Most of all, never the less, my tribute goes to my parents for their care, patience, respect, and uninterrupted generosity: to Tassos who, probably as a result of the 'perversion' of its academic profession, has been the first to inspire my knowledge curiosity about international relations and history but, always as a mentor father, without failing to show me the long way up to the faint light at the final edge of the university studies tunnel; and to Tassoula who, as a mother and not merely in her capacity as an orthopedic surgeon, has been all the day and at all times out there for all sorts of assistance. As a least sample of gratitude I would like to dedicate this book to them both.

On a final note, I must state clearly that the advice offered by, and the conversations that I had with, the people mentioned above are by no means responsible for the contents of the book. Neither does the argument advanced here reflect the views of the institutions from which I profited research materials and backing. Suffice to say that whatever grammatical pitfalls, ambiguous phraseology, factual inaccuracies, and research shortcomings remain are entirely of my own.

E.T.F.

CALENDAR AND GLOSSARY

In the years with which I am concerned, the Greeks used the Julian calendar. This was thirteen days behind the Gregorian calendar of the West. Throughout the text of the book, all dates are listed according to the Gregorian system. In footnotes, the dates of unpublished primary material are cited as they originally appear. But in the case of Greek sources, when only Julian dates are given, each cited date is followed by the Gregorian date in brackets.

Also, I use the Greek version of place-names as they were well known at the time. For instance, unless otherwise stated in brackets, I prefer the spellings Constantinople and Smyrna rather than Istabul and Izmir respectively. I make an exception only in the case of the use of two variant names of the same place, that is Salonica and Thessaloniki. I use the former, a name that was commonly referred to before and during the Balkan wars, largely in Parts One to Three and the latter, a name that was prevailing after the establishment of Venizelos's provisional, so-called Thessaloniki government, in Part Four.

Finally, a short note on the glossary of the format for citation of Greek bibliography is appropriate. As regards the G.M.F.A. and V.A. unpublished documents, I use their Greek classification and reference number. Also, names appear in transliteration and months in English. As for the secondary sources, I cite authors and the name of the journals and publishers in transliteration, places in English, and titles of books and articles in Greek with an English translation in brackets.

ABBREVIATIONS

A.G.M.F.A.: Archives of Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens
A.W.S.: Admiralty War Staff (British)
C.E.I.P.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C.
***Γ.Ε.Σ./Δ.Ι.Σ.*:** Γενικό Επιτελείο Στρατού/Διεύθυνση Ιστορίας Στρατού (General Staff of Army/Direction of Army History)
D.I.: Department of Information (British)
D.M.O.: Director of Military Operations (British)
D.O.T.: Department of Overseas Trade (British)
***Ε.Ε.Λ.Ι.Α.*:** Εταιρεία Ελληνικού Λογοτεχνικού και Ιστορικού Αρχείου (Company of the Hellenic Literary and Historical Archives Society)
F.O.: Foreign Office (British)
G.C.L: Greek Consulate in Larnaka, Cyprus
G.E.: Greek Embassy
G.M.A.: Greek Ministry of Army
G.M.D.: Greek Ministry of Defence
G.M.F.A.: Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs
G.M.N.: Greek Ministry of the Navy
G.P.O.: General Post Office (British)
G.S.A.: General Staff of Army (Greek)
G.S.I.: General Staff Intelligence (British)
G.S.N.: General Staff of the Navy (Greek)
I.B.: Intelligence Bureau (British)
O.M.F.A.: Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs
U.S.A.: United States of America
V.A.: Venizelos Archive
W.C.: War Committee (British)
W.D.: War Department (British)
W.O.: War Office (British)
W.T.I.D.: War Trade Intelligence Department (British)
W.W.I: World War I
W.W.II: World War II

PART I
THE THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION: SMALL STATES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

The contention that small states scarcely have a future can be traced at least as far back as Joseph Chamberlain's 1902 statement that 'the days are for great Empires and not for little states'.[1] Likewise, distinguished scholars like E. H. Carr believed that 'the alleged "dictatorship of the Great Powers"...is a fact which constitutes something like "a law of nature in international politics"'.[2] Others, questioning the usefulness of the concept of small state as an analytical tool for explaining world politics, venture that small states threaten the stability of the international system.[3] Encapsulating a view widely held in the discipline of international relations, only great powers merit concern.

Smallness is gauged in the Darwinian terms of survival.[4] It is the size that determines small state behaviour, which takes the forms of subordination and dependence.[5] Small states are marked 'by their military weakness in relation to the strength of others'.[6] The strategies they choose fall between isolation and accommodation.[7] Also, they can play the role of the 'international good citizen'.[8] Essentially, the distribution of power in the international system hardly allows room for defiance. What really matters to a small state is loyalty and alliance diplomacy. Small states have no choice but to comply with great power

1 Quoted in Amery, J. (1951). The Life of Joseph Chamberlain: Vol. IV. At the Height of his Power, 1901-1903. London: Macmillan, p. 405.

2 Carr, E. H. (1945). The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (second edition). New York: Harper & Row, p. 105.

3 Baehr, P. R. (1975). Small States: A Tool for Analysis? World Politics, XXVII (3), pp. 456-466; Woolf, L. (1943). The Future of the Small State. Political Quarterly, XIV (3), pp. 209-224. Compare to Toje, A. (2008) who finds the concept analytically useful for understanding the role of the European Union in world politics, in The European Union as Small Power, or Conceptualizing Europe's Strategic Actorness. Journal of European Integration, 30 (2), pp. 199-215.

4 Cohen, R. (1987). An Academic Perspective. In C. Clarke, & T. Payne (Eds.), Politics, Security and Development in Small States. London: Allen & Unwin, p. 212.

5 J. F. Triska (Ed.) (1986). Dominant Powers and Subordinate States: The United States in Latin America and the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. Durham: Duke University Press; O. Höll (Ed.) (1983). Small States in Europe and Dependence. Wien: Wilhelm Braumüller.

6 Gärtner, H. (1993). Small States and Concepts of European Security. European Security, 2 (2), p. 188.

7 Knudsen, O. F. (1993). The Foreign Policies of the Baltic States: Interwar Years and Restoration. Cooperation and Conflict, 28 (1), pp. 47-72; his (1992). Did Accommodation Work? Two Soviet Neighbors 1964-88. Journal of Peace Research, 29 (1), pp. 53-69.

8 Sharp, P. (1990). Irish Foreign Policy and the European Community: A Study of the Impact of Interdependence on the Foreign Policy of a Small State. Aldershot: Dartmouth, p. x.

wishes and abide by international law and norms, although they may manipulate great power rivalries to resist unwelcome demands.[9]

This conventional wisdom is still prevalent.[10] Several works, however, cast doubt on it. First of all, the international system is not the only source of threats for small states, or the sole determining factor of their behaviour. They are faced both with external and internal threats.[11] Despite international and domestic pressures, they are able to defend their sovereignty and affect regional arrangements.[12] They mobilise domestic resources not merely to adjust to international changes and cope with vulnerabilities in their own right, but also to function as aid donors.[13] Thus, a revisionist argument may assert that the international system does not impose the same degree of homogeneity and does not necessarily constrain behaviour; the interplay of external and internal forces produces variations in responses; and domestic politics creating political and economic stability afford small states margins of freedom to choose strategies for themselves and resist by their means.[14]

9 Earlier standard works include Fox, A. B. (1959). The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Vital, D. (1967). The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations. London: Clarendon Press; his (1971). The Survival of Small States: Studies in Small Power/Great Power Conflict. London: Oxford University Press; Rothstein, R. L. (1968). Alliances and Small Powers. New York: Columbia University Press; A. Schou, & A. O. Brundtland (Eds.) (1971). Small States in International Relations. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell; Mathisen, T. (1971). The Functions of Small States in the Strategies of the Great Powers. Oslo: Universitelsforlaget; Vayrynen, R. (1971). On the Definition and Measurement of Small Power Status. Cooperation and Conflict, VI (2), pp. 91-102; Singer, M. R. (1972). Weak States in a World of Powers: The Dynamics of International Relationships. New York: Free Press; Barston, R. P. (Ed.) (1973). The Other Powers: Studies in the Foreign Policies of Small States. London: George Allen & Unwin.

10 Bjö rkdahl, A. (2008). Norm Advocacy: A Small State Strategy to Influence the EU. Journal of European Public Policy, 15 (1), pp. 133-154;E. Reiter, & H. Gä rtner (Eds.) (2001), Small States and Alliances. Berlin: Physica-Verlag; B. Hansen, & B. Heurlin (Eds.) (1998). The Baltic States in World Politics. Surrey: Curzon; Ahnlid, A. (1992). Free or Forced Riders? Small States in the International Political Economy: The Example of Sweden. Cooperation and Conflict, 27 (3), pp. 241-276; Tetreault, M. A. (1991). Autonomy, Necessity, and the Small State: Ruling Kuwait in the Twentieth Century. International Organisation, 45 (4), pp. 565-591; Mouritzen, H. (1991). Tension Between the Strong, and the Strategies of the Weak. Journal of Peace Research, 28 (2), pp. 217-230; his (1988). Finlandization: Towards a Gereral Theory of Adaptive Politics. Aldershot: Avebury; Handel, M. I. (1990). Weak States in the International System (second edition). London: Frank Cass. For a collection of articles that brings together traditional and revisionist arguments, see W. Bauwens, A. Clesse, & O. F. Knudsen (Eds.) (1996). Small States and the Security Challenge in the New Europe. London: Brassey's.

11 Wiberg, H. (1987). The Security of Small Nations: Challenges and Defences. Journal of Peace Research, 24 (4), pp. 339-363.

12 Panke, D. (2010). Small States in the European Union: Coping With Structural Disadvantages. Surrey: Ashgate; Lee, M. (2006). How Do Small States Affect the Future Development of the EU. New York: Nova Science Publishers; Thorhallsson, B. (2000). The Role of Small States in the European Union. Surrey: Ashgate; Arter, D. (2000). Small State Influence Within the EU: The Case of Finland's 'Northern Dimension Initiative'. Journal of Common Market Studies, 38 (5), pp. 677-697; E. Inbar, & G. Sheffer (Eds.) (1997). The National Security of Small States in a Changing World. London: Frank Cass.

13 Schwartz, H. (1994). Small States in Big Trouble: State Reorganization in Australia, Denmark, New Zealand, and Sweden in the 1980s. World Politics, 46 (4), pp. 527-555; Hveem, H. (1987). Small Countries Under Great Pressure: The Politics of National Vulnerability During International Restructuring. Cooperation and Conflict, XXII (4), pp. 193-208; Hoadley, J. S. (1980). Small States as Aid Donors. International Organization, 34 (1), pp. 121-137.

14 R. Steinmetz, & A. Wivel (Eds.) (2010), Small States in Europe: Challenges and Opportunities. Surrey: Ashgate; A. F. Cooper, & T. M. Shaw (Eds.) (2009), The Diplomacies of Small States: Between Vulnerability and Resilience. New York: Palgrave Macmillan; Gleason, G., Kerimbekova, A., & Kozhirova, S. (2008). Realism and the Small State: Evidence from Kyrgyzstan. International Politics, 45 (1), pp. 40-51; C. Ingebritsen, I. Neumann, S. Gstohl, & J. Beyer (Eds.) (2006), Small States in International Relations. Washington, D.C.: University of Washington Press; J. A. K. Hey (Ed.) (2003), Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign

Evidence shows that small states neither constitute an insignificant number of countries nor are inconsequential actors. The post-war era experienced the creation of numerous small states thanks to the sweep of decolonisation. The development incited concern about small states, which was overridden by the Marxist-oriented dependency theory and the works on North-South relations and faded away with the advent of the second Cold War in the early eighties. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, interest recurred. In today's world, two thirds of the states are small states, for the growing need for understanding small state behaviour. This book is an attempt to inform the debate, focusing primarily on the relationship between structural imperatives and small state grand strategy. In particular, I seek to explore how the impact of the international system and the state's domestic structure on the making of grand strategy matters to small states in pursuing and attaining territorial expansion.

1. THEORY AND STRATEGY

At the risk of generalisation, I group international relations theory into two schools of thought. The first using the systemic level of analysis contends that systemic forces can best account for strategy. The second school, focusing on the unit level of analysis, regards strategy as a response to domestic imperatives. For the sake of simplicity, I examine one exemplar of each school. Of the 'outside-in' theories, I select Kenneth Waltz's systemic explanation, which lays stress on the polarity of the international system.[15] Waltz is worth noting because he spells out the established argument most straightforwardly: the pressures of the international system are so powerful that afford small states little autonomy in choosing other courses of action than subordination to great powers. Of the 'in-outside' theories, I analyse the domestic structure explanation, which originates in the area of international political economy and Peter Katzenstein's writings.[16] Katzenstein clearly challenges the conventional view, but the importance he attaches to unit-level factors is overstated, downplaying the concurrent influence of the international system.

1.1. The Systemic Explanation

Waltz's theory explains the impact of the distribution of systemic power on relations between states. The international system is conceived as a structure consisting of poles of great powers, which limit the state's ability to act according to its intentions; rather, systemic pulls and pushes induce the state to behave in similar and predictable ways. The principal

Policy Behavior. Boulder: Lynne Rienner; Joenniemi, P. (1998). From Small to Smart: Reflections on the Concept of Small States. Irish Studies in International Affairs, 9, pp. 61-62; L. Freedman (Ed.) (1998). Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases. Oxford: Oxford University Press, chaps. 4-5, 7, 10; Platias, A. (1995). High Politics in Small Countries. In Institute of International Relations (Ed.), Cosmos Yearbook 1995. New York: Aristide D. Caratzas, pp. 155-168; de Silva, K. M. (1995). Regional Powers and Small State Security: India and Sri Lanka, 1977-90. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press; Katzenstein, P. J. (1985). Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; R. Alapuro, M. Alestalo, E. Haavio-Mannila, & R. Vä yrynen (Eds.) (1985). Small States in Comparative Perspective: Essays for Erik Allardt. Oslo: Norwegian University Press.

15 Waltz, K. N. (1979). Theory of International Politics. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.

property of the structure is the recurrent formation of balances of power, a self-regulating process that reflects the state's attempt to maintain its position in the system.

As for small states, Waltz, using the terms weak and lesser to denote them, is biased against their investigation, on grounds that 'the theory, like the story, of international politics is written in terms of the great power of an era'. Inasmuch as 'in international politics, as in any self-help system, the units of greatest capability set the scene of action for others as well as for themselves', a 'theory of international politics is necessarily based on the great powers'. Only when the latter are 'in a stalemate', can small states manoeuvre because 'they enjoy the freedom of the irresponsible since their security is mainly provided by the efforts that others make'. They must align with the great powers; 'if they are free to choose', they are expected to balance by allying with 'the weaker side' because 'it is the stronger side that threatens them'.[17]

Purely from the standpoint of small states, the first work that provides an explanation of this character is that of Annette Fox's *The Power of Small States*. It argues that 'war among the great powers is only one situation in which small-power diplomacy may be observed to advantage'. In the event of war, small states do not necessarily act as pawns. The great powers are likely to demand either territorial concessions to command natural resources and control strategic points; and/or alignment against, and denial of military aid to, opposing great powers. By employing diplomacy, small states can obtain bargaining power and escape compliance. In the face of an unwelcome demand posited by one great power, they should draw on another great power in such a 'benevolent neutral' way so that they convince the former that the benefit of coercion is unlikely to outweigh the cost. Siding with the dominant power, an alignment coined as 'anti-balance of power', is therefore the only strategy that small states can adopt.[18]

The best-known exponent of the systemic explanation is Michael Handel, who as with Waltz takes 'weak' to refer to 'small'. He argues that small states are dependent on the system's structure rather than domestic politics. Confronted by the dictates of anarchy, they must by sheer necessity, not on preference, turn to the great powers to achieve security. A small state 'within a balance-of-power system tends to pursue a destabilizing policy, contradicting the classical rules of that system by adding their weight to the stronger side'. Instead of balancing the more powerful and threatening power, small states align with it, a choice that represents an 'anti-balancing' strategy.[19]

But the systemic explanation has important theoretical and empirical shortcomings. It assumes that the state's domestic structure is separate from the international system. Waltz, for example, points out that he abstracts the systemic from the unit-level factors to single out how the former determine the outcomes. This methodology yields the deterministic proposition that although the system's structure results from interactions and 'causes at the level of units,' only the system thereafter conditions state conduct.[20] In addition, it overlooks the state's ability to influence international developments. Experience shows that small states can overcome weaknesses and exploit opportunities by mobilising their human

16 P. J. Katzenstein (Ed.) (1978). Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policy of Advanced Industrial States. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
17 Waltz, pp. 72-73, 127, 184-185, 195.
18 Fox, pp. 3, 6, 8-9, 187.
19 Handel, pp. 3, 120-121, 171, 187, 261-262.
20 Waltz, pp. 48-49, 58-59, 79-81, chap. 4.

and material resources. The collapse of communist regimes in the small states of Eastern Europe and Greece's policy towards the name-issue of FYROM cannot be explained without investigating the legacy of history, domestic politics, and the leaders' miscalculations.

Also, the state is understood as a monolithically unitary actor. The systemic explanation disregards the fact that the state is part of society with decision-making institutions, governments are accountable to electorates, and interest groups are able to reinforce or weaken the state's capacity to extract resources from society. Neither can it account for the different strategies that several small states devise when faced with common systemic imperatives. The incorporation of unit-level factors into the systemic level of analysis does not negate the systemic explanation simply because 'evidence that different interest groups favour alternative strategies is not necessarily an indication that state survival is not their primary aim'.[21] From this angle, some scholars suggest the construction of a broader systemic approach that integrates unit attributes and interactions with the system's structure defined in terms of poles and power disparities.[22] The question nonetheless is, as I discuss below, how systemic and unit-level factors are interlinked into a coherent pattern of totality.

As a whole, the systemic explanation serves as an insightful theoretical foundation for elucidating how the international system affects small state behaviour and why strategy falls into particular ranges. Focusing only on the balance of power, however, it views small states as burdened with inescapable systemic constraints and unable to deal with them without submitting to great power demands. In this sense, small state grand strategy is predetermined and inconsequential. The conclusion cannot tell us how small states resist unwelcome demands and secure their own demands. Neither can it account for variations in style and forms of strategies. This deficiency arises from a lack of focus on forces at the domestic level.

1.2. The Domestic Structure Explanation

Katzenstein's theory asks why states confronted with similar international pressures react in different ways. He takes domestic structure to pertain to the relationship between state and society in terms of centralisation and policy networks. Examining the responses of the USA and France to the energy crisis of the seventies, he relates domestic structure to foreign economic policy. He argues that variations in policies are due to the different historical evolution of domestic structures. Countries with weak states and strong societies, like the USA, are likely to behave in line with their ruling group and corporation requirements for profits; while countries with strong states and weak societies, such as France, act as rational, unitary actors to increase their national power. Thus, domestic level variables sufficiently account for strategy.

An application of this explanation to the study of small states is found in Katzenstein's *Small States in World Markets.*[23] The question is why, in the face of similar constraints

21 Elman, C. (1996). Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy? Security Studies, 6 (1), p. 41.

22 Schweller, R. L., & Priess, D. (1997). A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate. Mershon International Studies Review, 41 (1) (1997), pp. 1-32; Snyder, G. H. (1996). Process Variables in Neorealist Theory. Security Studies, 5 (3), pp. 167-192.

23 Katzenstein, Small States. Platias, A. G. (1986), one of Katzenstein's students, argues that domestic structure "determines 'high politics' even in small states". In High Politics in Small Countries: An Inquiry into the Security Policies of Greece, Israel and Sweden. Ithaca: unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Cornell University.

posed by the world economy, the economic strategies of the small states of Western Europe differ from those of major industrial countries. The main analytical category is the concept of democratic corporatism, which has three characteristics: a culture of compromise and social partnership, a system of centralised economic interest groups, and a process of bargaining among political actors. The argument is that thanks to their economic openness and party system, the small states concerned are characterised by corporatist structures in their state-society relations. The result is flexible strategies of industrial adjustment, which reflect a combination of international liberalisation and domestic compensation. Also, these states deviate from one another in the pattern of corporatism, a variation that produces different forms of industrial policies. The range of domestic responses can best be explained by an analysis of the historical evolution of democratic corporatism.

Generally speaking, the state's domestic structure points to state institutions and the policy networks that link them to interest groups. Matthew Evangelista asserts that the term 'domestic structure' bridges the international and the domestic level of analysis, with the underlying idea that the state stands in between international and domestic politics as an inherent component of them both.[24] The domestic structure explanation, therefore, departs from the emphasis on the international system by shifting attention to domestic factors. The state is understood as an intervening variable in the external-internal interaction. In the face of similar international dictates, small states with different domestic structures pursue different strategies. While the balance of power conditions strategy by delimiting alternatives, forces from within domestic structure determine strategy and the extent of autonomy.

The argument is problematic, however. It cannot explain convincingly, for instance, the change of Greek military doctrine from static defence against the Warsaw Pact to the deterrence of the Turkish military threat after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, because it disregards systemic changes and challenges. Although it provides a useful 'first-cut' at explaining why state-society relations affords small states freedom for choice, the domestic structure explanation gives the impression that domestic structure generates only opportunities, not limitations, ignoring the fact that it might constrain state actions and scale down autonomy of action. Also, it neglects the fact that even if small states are faced with similar external constraints, they are placed differently in the international system by their relative power. Variations in strategy are equally due to the system's structure, as each state calculates both its capabilities and the capabilities of its allies and adversaries. Essentially, the domestic structure explanation makes the same mistake as the systemic explanation but the other way around: it ascribes explanatory primacy to domestic structure.

2. THE CHALLENGE

Two conclusions, the logic of which I challenge in the pages that follow, emerge from the foregoing discussion. First, the international relations theory falls within the broad compass of the argument that the international system affords small states negligible autonomy of action. State survival is dictated by size and the balance of power, thereby small states have no alternative but to acquiesce in great power demands. At worst, a small state is the great

24 Evangelista, M. (1995). Domestic Structure and International Change. In Institute of International Relations (Ed.), p. 92.

powers' pawn, defined in terms of it being a bridgehead of their expansion, an extension of their territory, and an addition to their power. At best, it is a free rider, who benefits from their protection but without paying for the cost. Second, the explanations are mono-causal. They accord causal weight to their level of analysis. This entails that as each explanation reduces the argument that the other puts forward, following the reversed reasoning of the other, research boils down to detecting which level best accounts for strategy.

To begin with, arguing that size and the international system are the only determinants of small state behaviour points to an abstract theorisation of power and the impact of systemic forces. The case of the European small states no longer corroborates the contention that size, power, and security go hand in hand.[25] Evidence indicates that small states can stand on a competitive footing in international markets and maintain a high level of prosperity.[26] The same goes for the military dimension of power.[27] Israel refutes the traditional view that small states are unable to build efficient conventional armed forces. The example of such 'peaceful' small states as Singapore and the Netherlands show that smallness is rarely correlated with the quality of defence and the extent of military autonomy.[28]

What matters from the point of small states, too, is not so much the structure of the international system in general as their location, the regional balance of power, and the extent to which the power they possess meets their interests. As power is relational, it is the policy-contingency framework that merits closer consideration. Confronted with great powers in their area of vital interests, small states risk military defeat or political downfall. Seen in a regional power context, however, small states can play a leading role and go beyond accommodation to the use or the threat of the use of force. The error that most scholars commit is to place little weight in the war strength of small state armies. Small states can project and sustain military power, to use it as a tool of statecraft, as an instrument of coercion.

Portugal and the Netherlands were the first small states in modern Europe that secured overseas acquisitions and territorial aggrandizement. The wars of self-determination and independence initiated by small states liberation armies, the Balkan states against Ottoman Turkey, Greece against Italy in the second year of W.W.II, Vietnam against the USA, Afghanistan against the Soviet Union, Algeria against France, Taiwan against China, all illustrate that small states are not simply able to resist great power unwelcome demands. They also win wars against greater opposition, though seemingly a paradox due either to considerable disparities in size and power or to the use of smart counter military strategies on the ground.[29] Effective resistance to and expansion against great powers is not beyond the

25 Norrback, O. (1998). Small States and European Security. Irish Studies in International Affairs, 9, pp. 5-9. Compare to Rickli, J.-M. (2008). European Small States' Military Policies After the Cold War: From Territorial to Niche Strategies. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 21 (3), pp. 307-325.

26 Olafsson, B. G. (1998). Small States in the Global System: Analysis and Illustrations from the Case of Iceland. Aldershot: Ashgate; Honko, J. (1994). Competitive Strategies of Small Industrialized Countries. Berlin: Sigma.

27 E. A. Kolodziej, & R. E. Harkavy (Eds.) (1982), Security Policies of Developing Countries. Lexington: Lexington Books.

28 Matthews, R., & Yan, N. Z. (2007). Small Country 'Total Defence': A Case Study of Singapore. Defence Studies, 17 (3), pp. 376-395; Honig, J. W. (1993). Defense Policy in the North Atlantic Alliance: The Case of the Netherlands. Westport: Praeger.

29 Arreguín-Toft, I. (2005). How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Mack, A. (1975). Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict. World Politics, XXVII (2), pp. 175-200.

reach of small state capabilities. Contrary to the prevailing consensus, the international system supplies small states with a wider range of strategic options.

Much misunderstanding originates in identifying small states with weak states. This ambiguity is indicated in the definition of Robert Rothstein and Eric Lab. According to the former, a small state is one that 'recognises that it cannot obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes, or developments to do so'.[30] According to the latter, a weak state is a state that 'cannot alone maintain its security and autonomy against the full might of a Great Power'.[31] Both conceptualise two different terms in a similar way and relate smallness and weakness to a particular option, the mobilisation of external resources. It should be noted that even great powers are not able to function free of some kind of alliance. Definitions that imply *a priori* strategy are misleading because it is the consequences of smallness and weakness that should be studied. How smallness and weakness are intertwined in the making of grand strategy should not be accorded causal primacy in accounting for a single pattern of conduct.

Small and weak are relative terms and hence several definitional criteria can be set out. A definition of what is a small and what is a weak state incites disputes as to how wide or narrow categories should be formed.[32] But if these terms are to have any analytical value, they need conceptual qualification at a broad level of abstraction that permits a minimum of content and serves as a guideline for their distinction.

I take smallness/greatness to pertain to the state's position in the international system. Waltz, speaking of the great powers, reasons that aggregate resources 'can not be sectored and separately weighed'. The placement of states in the top rank is not defined as to whether 'they excel in one way or another'. It is about 'how they score on all of the following items: size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence'.[33] Likewise, small states stand in relation to one another by their power. It is an empirical question, a matter of common sense to identify who the great powers of an era are, and which states are not placed in the top rank.[34] The degree of smallness or greatness therefore is an attribute of the system's structure.

I understand weakness/strength as having two aspects. The first pertains to the state's capacity to sustain its authority and legitimacy. The second points to the state's ability to extract human and material resources from society and mobilise them resolutely. The indication of weakness is a double-edged perceptual problem depending on the state's perception of itself and other states' perception of it. The degree of weakness or strength

30 Rothstein, p. 29.

31 Labs, E. J. (1992). Do Weak States Bandwagon? Security Studies, 1 (3), p. 409, note 1.

32 Maass, M. (2009). The Elusive Definition of the Small State. International Politics, 46 (1), pp. 65-83.

33 Waltz, p. 131.

34 My discussion does not overlook medium-rank states. Hill, J. R. (1986) defines them with respect to their ability to protect by their own resources their territorial integrity and independence, while small states are unable to do so. In Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers. London: Croom Helm, pp. 19-26. This definition falls victim of empirical contradictions: were the Balkan states in 1912 or Vietnam in the sixties and seventies, or Afghanistan in the eighties medium powers? To overcome this problem, the conception of smallness I suggest involves medium-ness. This means that one small state is less or more powerful than another small state; although they are placed differently in the balance of power, both are perceived as small states in relation to great powers. I assume one pair of states, the great powers and the small states. Compare to Stairs, D. (1998). Of Medium Powers and Middling Roles. In K. Booth (Ed.), Statecraft and Security: The Cold War and Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 270-286.

therefore is an attribute of the state's domestic structure. A small state might be less powerful but stronger than another one. The crucial aspect is what strategic options a small and strong state has and what a small and weak state.

Misapprehension, too, results from not distinguishing between behaviour, politics, policy, and strategy. At a maximum level of abstraction, these terms can be qualified as distinctive elements of a whole in a straight descending order. I take behaviour to refer to a course of action. Politics concerns collective human action, social practices. Policy reflects the coordinated process of decision-making. And strategy represents action dilemmas. It manages resources, identifies threats, sets priorities, and underpins moves; thereby, it regulates the extent of autonomy, being the mechanism that substantiates politics and fulfils the objectives of policy. Grand strategy functions as a bridge between them all. It provides a rationale for means-ends relationships and enables states to shape the direction of developments. In this respect, even if it is assumed that a small state adopts a single pattern of grand strategy, the manifestation of the latter is not fixed because there are many ways in which the means can be connected to the ends in view.

Furthermore, the belief that small states act as pawns disregards the fact that provided the great powers struggle for mastery, it is through small states that the international system becomes, what Robert Jervis calls, consistent and balanced.[35] The system prevents hegemonic and power monopolising trends because small states are the go-betweens or equalisers in great power rivalries and arrangements. Small states cannot override or rewrite the rules of the power game in world politics. But they can challenge or emerge as backers of the rules by virtue of their aspirations for expansion and consolidation. They act as if they are called on to play significant partnership roles in their region: establish contacts and forms of cooperation, check powerful and threatening states, and act as regional-scale guardians of security.[36] Small states, other than colonies and protectorates, can hardly be presented only as pawns. Whether or not they act as puppets or partners is an attribute of their strategy. How Tito's Yugoslavia built state strength and manipulated the West to resist Soviet demands for capitulation is a good demonstration. When pressures for action come to the crunch, whether small states make the most of the partnership roles and obtain power and security is ordered by their grand strategy. This point is overlooked. Why?

Basic to the conventional small state scholarship is the stereotype that world politics is too serious a business to be dealt with by all states, for great powers are to decide, while small states obey. Strategy matters only to great powers, not to a small state because accommodation and compliance with the powers is the persistent pattern of its strategy. The advance of an autonomous grand strategy is unattainable and in fact matters little. Since strategy is posited in advance, it makes little sense to explore grand strategy from the perspective of small states. This inference is not fully spelled out, but it underlies current

35 Jervis, R. (1997). System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life. Princeton: Princeton University Press, chap. 6.

36 On this count, too, small states could be said to pursue to enhance their international prestige and status with a view to contributing to the advance of multilateral cooperation or of a great power's regional governance ambitions. For insights, see Larson, D. W., & Shevchenko, A. (2010). Status Concerns and Multilateral Cooperation. In I. W. Zartman, & S. Touval (Eds.), International Cooperation: The Extents and Limits of Multilateralism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 182-207; Tow, W. T., & Parkin, R. (2007). Small State Security Postures: Material Compensation and Normative Leadership in Denmark and New Zealand. Contemporary Security Policy, 28 (2), pp. 308-329.

thinking on small states. It is the motivation to argue against this logic that lies at the core of my research.

As regards causal weighting, I believe that this is missing the forest for the trees. The assertion that different causes are interrelated is 'an argument against assuming that there is a single cause that can be isolated by analysis and eliminated or controlled by wisely constructed policy'.[37] The systemic and domestic structure explanations need to be supplemented with insights from each other. It makes sense to enquire into small state grand strategy from the perspective of the intersection of the international system and domestic structure. What is the reason motivating this approach?

If either of the levels of analysis is taken in isolation, it lacks the cognitive strength to capture the complexity of the subject. An analysis should begin by looking at systemic forces because 'the most powerful generalisable characteristic of a state in international relations is its relative position in the international system'.[38] But this analysis should simultaneously examine the effect of society on the state's ability to mobilise resources. As Lawrence Freedman puts it,

> neglecting the domestic dimension of security policy leads to a forgetfulness of the extent to which people taking critical decisions also spend much of their time worrying about the levels of taxation, competing demands on public expenditure, promoting their personal and party images, getting re-elected…. policy options which might be…reasonable within some narrow security framework turn out to be… unrealistic in terms of the actual freedom of manoeuvre available to those responsible for taking the decisions.[39]

Thus, the omission of domestic forces misconstrues important dimensions of strategy.

The international-domestic interaction implies that both the international system and domestic structure set the stage for the making of strategy. Grand strategy is neither an attribute of the international system nor an attribute of the state's domestic structure; it is the degree of compatibility or the collective property of them both. This implies that

> domestic constraints are sufficient to prevent or retard the policy response apparently dictated by international pressures. International stimuli generate a response when the domestic political and economic factors are conducive to it. Conversely, domestic imperatives can sometimes generate aggressive policies that should be precluded by the restraints of the external environment.[40]

In other words, the international system dictates (or prevents) strategic actions that are precluded (or propelled), or are manifest in a different way from that when left to proceed in their own right by virtue of the interactive influence of domestic structure.

I qualify the international system and domestic structure as inextricably interrelated factors. Charged with the design of strategy, the state is situated at the nexus of international and domestic politics. Some in the field may raise objections to the external-internal synthesis

37 Waltz, K. N. (1959). Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis. New York: Columbia University Press, p. 229.

38 Zakaria, F. (1992). Realism and Domestic Politics. International Security, 17 (1), p. 197.

39 Freedman, L. (1986). The Price of Peace: Living with the Nuclear Dilemma. New York: Henry Holt, p. 7.

40 Rosecrance, R., & Stein, A. A. (1993). Beyond Realism: The Study of Grand Strategy. In R. Rosecrance, & A. A. Stein (Eds.), The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p. 17.

approach. While the systemic and domestic levels of analysis can be employed separately at different times according to the phenomenon to be explained, they are not inclusive because they point to a different epistemological approach, that is, to account for the phenomenon in terms of the behaviour of the unit or of the system.[41] The combination is unlikely to 'solve the problem' because 'there are always two stories to tell', one to explain the phenomenon by generalising through observation from outside and the other to understand it by 'rational reconstruction of rules and reasons' from within.[42] Others venture however that the levels of analysis are complementary, for what is needed is a synthesis.[43] The analysis should begin with the systemic level to obtain the wider 'first-cut' picture; and then, if considered inadequate to explain variations, it should be layered with domestic level variables.[44] Otherwise, the two levels should be added together in a sequential way and be ascribed *ad hoc* relative causal weight.[45] Introducing an international (or domestic) factor to interact, as a 'transmission belt', with domestic structure (or the international system) appears to be the best method of linking international and domestic forces.

Invoking intervening variables to account for deficiencies is nonetheless problematic, as it does not provide an explicit analysis of the concurrent impact of international and domestic imperatives on the making of strategy.[46] To overcome the problem, some theorists apply the model of 'two-level games', which views statesmen as strategic actors who manipulate pulls and pushes in the international and domestic realms simultaneously; and the 'domestic analogy', which asserts that since certain domestic norms and processes are embedded in the international system, the latter is bound to become domesticated and less anarchic; or the metaphor of 'cross-level processes', which argues that the productive factors of land, labour and capital, causing economic and political cleavages, give rise to multiple coalitions and collective actions that cross sector lines and borders.[47] An alternative formula is to suggest that because states and the system's structure constitute each other the levels of analysis can be assembled into a whole board.[48] The question is not whether the two are interrelated but how they are perceived as combined. I lay out my thoughts about this interplay in the next chapter.

41 Singer, J. D. (1961). The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations. World Politics, XIV (1), pp. 90-91.

42 Hollis, M., & Smith, S. (1991). Explaining and Understanding International Relations. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 6-7.

43 Brecher, M. (1999). International Studies in the Twentieth Century and Beyond: Flawed Dichotomies, Synthesis, Cumulations. International Studies Quarterly, 43 (2), pp. 228-230.

44 Waltz, Theory, pp. 48-49; Nye, J. S., Jr. (1993). Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History. New York: HarperCollins, p. 29; Keohane, R. O. (1986). Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond. In R. O. Keohane (Ed.), Neorealism and its Critics. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 188-190.

45 Spirtas, M. (1996). A House Divided: Tragedy and Evil in Realist Theory. Security Studies, 5 (3), pp. 418-423.

46 Moravcsik, A. (1993). Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining. In P. B. Evans, H. K. Jacobson, & R. D. Putnam (Eds.), Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 5-15.

47 Ibid, pp. 15-34; Caporaso, J. A. (1997). Across the Great Divide: Integrating Comparative and International Politics. International Studies Quarterly, 41 (4), pp. 563-592; R. Pahre, & P. A. Papayoanou (Eds.) (1997), Using Game Theory to Link Domestic and International Politics. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41 (1, special issue); Putnam, R. D. (1988), Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. International Organization, 42 (3), pp. 428-460.

48 Buzan, B. (1995). The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations Reconsidered? In K. Booth, & S. Smith (Eds.), International Relations Theory Today. London: Polity Press, pp. 213-214.

Why is it worth establishing this synthesis especially for small states? It is the lack of theoretically informed studies on the subject that makes this effort worthwhile. Several writings have moved beyond the contest between the levels of analysis and made attempts at convergence. This tendency originates in those who remain rooted in the state-centred paradigm and explore issues of foreign economic policy. Qualifying the state as an intermediating variable between international and domestic forces, they explain how the structures of state and society influence policy-making process; and how domestic arrangements are entangled with systemic dictates through 'the black box of government'.[49] In strategic studies, however, it is not long before that this sort of investigation and a broader research agenda begin to develop.[50] Paradoxically, the works that transcend the dichotomy of international and domestic forces focus chiefly on great powers.[51] Little was done on this count in the area of small states.[52] It is the motivation to reflect on the external-internal synthesis from the most often ignored perspective of small states that additionally lies at the core of this book.

To sum up, the issue-area of small state grand strategy is an original field for inquiry. The collapse of empires coupled with the proliferation of small states has perplexed scholars. In one scholar's terms, this is labelled as 'the small state paradox'.[53] I find I cannot explain it by shedding light solely on the enabling and constraining effects of the international system or the state's domestic structure. From this standpoint, a plausible explanation cannot be identified with the claim that small states can offset their vulnerabilities by handling great powers competition to their advantage, obtaining bargaining power by supplying military aid

49 J. K. Ikenberry, D. A. Lake, & M. Mastanduno (Eds.) (1988), The State and American Foreign Economic Policy. International Organization, 42 (1, special issue).

50 Classic works are K. Booth (Ed.) (1991), New Thinking About Strategy and International Security. London: HarperCollins; Buzan, B. (1991). People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (second edition). New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

51 S. E. Lobell, N. M. Ripsman, & J. W. Taliaferro (Eds.) (2009), Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Miller, B. (2007). States, Nations, and the Great Powers: The Sources of Regional War and Peace. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Zakaria, F. (1998). From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Rose, G. (1998). Review Article: Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy, World Politics, 51 (1), pp. 144-172; Christensen, T. J. (1996). Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilisation, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958. Princeton: Princeton University Press; T. Risse-Kappen (Ed.) (1995), Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Evans; Rosecrance, & Stein (Eds.), Domestic Bases; P. Kennedy (Ed.) (1991), Grand Strategies in War and Peace. New Haven: Yale University Press. Partial exceptions are Huth, K. P. (1996). Standing your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press; B. Korany, P. Noble, & R. Brynen (Eds.) (1993), The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World. London: Macmillan.

52 A clear exception is Elman, M. F. (1995). The Foreign Policies of Small States: Challenging Neorealism in its Own Backyard. British Journal of Political Science, 25 (2), pp. 171-217. Standing out as one challenger to conventional wisdom, she develops a two-level model intended to bridge international and domestic factors. My analysis differs in some respects. First, I argue that grand strategy is an outcome of the combined impact of international and domestic structural imperatives. Elman, instead, treating domestic politics as a 'transmission belt' through which international factors influence foreign policy, asserts that while the system's structure affects domestic institutional development, foreign policy is conditioned by institutional arrangements. Second, I distinguish between smallness and weakness; I do not use them interchangeably. Third, I use the term domestic structure rather than institutions, which is more encompassing. Likewise, I use the term grand strategy rather than foreign policy. Finally, my aim is to suggest a new perspective in the field of small state grand strategy by working on the external-internal synthesis approach. It is not to falsify neo-realism and corroborate the classic realist tradition as Elman aspires to do.

53 Amstrup, N. (1976). The Perennial Problem of Small States: A Survey of Research Efforts. Cooperation and Conflict, XI (3), p. 169.

in regional conflicts and getting away with benefits from their access to great power decision-making establishments.[54] Neither can it be reduced to the view that the 'paradoxical power of the weak' stems not only from great power rivalries but also from such assets as solidarity and the threat of defection.[55] Nor do I consider it sufficiently comprehensive to regard small states either as 'system-affecting' that is, those that exert influence through alliances and multi-lateral agencies; or as 'system-ineffectual' that is, they play no part in world politics.[56] Also, it goes beyond the interpretation of the 'defensive power' puzzle, which suggests that small states can do little but to seek to defend their autonomy.[57] Clearly, only through their interplay and their reciprocal relationship with grand strategy can the international system and domestic structure account for the small state paradox.

I argue that grand strategy matters to small states. Why? Obviously, it matters because power limits dictate that small states should manage their scarce resources skilfully and program their moves cautiously. Specifically, it matters because small states have autonomy in the choice of action to the extent that 'autonomy means, not freedom of independent action, but distinctive ways of acting, or of not being able to act'.[58] The ability to act or not to act is about the use of the means that enables or disables states to respond to structural imperatives, an ability that is directed by grand strategy. As the international system and domestic structure are a set of enabling and disposing forces that spark off incentives for response but without determining the distinctive way of acting, the question is not so much whether they allow room for autonomy as how they shape and set the stage for strategy to carry the choice of action into effect. This is to imply that while they are a powerful sufficient cause, strategy is the necessary cause of action; unless strategy is pursued, action could hardly come into being.[59] In essence, structural imperatives make strategy and constitute through it state behaviour and the material reality of statehood, a process that is filtered and fulfilled by state leadership.[60] It is through the grand strategy that the interplay of the international system and domestic structure affords small states partnership value and autonomy of action

54 Kivimaki, T. (1993). Strength of Weakness: American-Indonesian Hegemonic Bargaining. Journal of Peace Research, 30 (4), pp. 391-408; Bar-Siman-Tov, Y. (1980). Alliance Strategy: U.S.-Small Allies Relationships. Journal of Strategic Studies, 3 (2), pp. 202-216; Park, C. J. (1975). The Influence of Small States upon the Superpowers: United States-South Korean Relations as a Case Study, 1950-53. World Politics, XXVIII (1), pp. 97-117; Keohane, R. O. (1971). The Big Influence of Small Allies. Foreign Policy, 2, pp. 161-182.

55 Lindell, U., & Persson, S. (1986). The Paradox of Weak State Power: A Research and Literature Overview. Cooperation and Conflict, XXI (2), pp. 79-97.

56 Keohane, R. O. (1969). Lilliputians' Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics. International Organization, XXIII (2), pp. 291-297.

57 Aron, R. (1966). Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, pp. 82-84.

58 Hoffmann, S. (1976). No Trumps, No Luck, No Will: Gloomy Thoughts on Europe's Plight. In J. Chace, & E. C. Ravenal (Eds.), Atlantis Lost: U.S.-European Relations After the Cold War. New York: New York University Press for the Council on Foreign Relations, p. 8.

59 In mainstream social sciences a permissive or necessary condition is defined as a circumstance that unless it happens, an occurrence does not come into being; and a proximate or sufficient that whenever it happens, an occurrence comes into being. J. M. Baldwin (Ed.) (1901), Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology: Vol. 1. London: Macmillan, p. 143; P. Edwards (Ed.) (1967), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Vol. 5. New York: Macmillan, p. 60. For a classic application in the field of international studies, see Waltz, Man, pp. 231-232; Vasquez, J. A. (1993). The War Puzzle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 293-301. Unlike this dominant understanding, my discussion of the causal role of strategy is meant to imply that a sufficient or a necessary cause reflects, as Kurki, M. (2008) puts it, the 'real causal powers of ontological entities', not an observed regular pattern of occurrences, in Causation in International Relations: Reclaiming Causal Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 11.

60 I take statehood to denote the state's international and domestic politics.

in achieving ends in view. Smallness and weakness do not entail preordained strategies. The crux of small state grand strategy cannot be reduced to survival defined in terms of existence. More widely, it involves the ability to resist unwelcome demands and defend the *status quo*; and acquire unredeemed or alien territory and stake out political claims.

Thus, small state grand strategy merits attention. The rationale resides in the theoretical gap that tends to be growing in the discipline of international relations. If this effort has any contribution to make, it is to avoid small states becoming a theoretical anomaly in the newly developed scholarship on grand strategy and the external-internal synthesis. It represents a first effort not only to see small state behaviour through the insights of the grand strategy literature; but also to join those who while working on bridging the international system and domestic structure pay little attention to states other than great powers. No single work has examined small states from this double-edged perspective, which challenges the traditional argument that grand strategy does not matter to small states by virtue of the fact that they have no choice but to ally with great powers in return for subordination. A most promising improvement in the field is an understanding of how the combined effect of systemic and domestic structural forces on the making of grand strategy matters to small states in pursuing and attaining territorial enlargement. And equally promising are the research avenues that are about to open up for theorising the subject in a more comprehensive way.

3. THE CASE

Greece in the years between 1909 and 1920 represents a rare example of a small state that pursued and attained the enlargement of its territorially ordered rule by using force and diplomacy on its own. After eleven years of peace and war, it increased more than twice its territory and population. This achievement, which might be called the Greek 'military and territorial expansion paradox', provides a fertile ground for an original inquiry in the area of small states.

The paradox lies in the gap between Greece's territorial enlargement and its smallness and weakness. In 1909 the country, still suffering the disgrace of the 1897 debacle of the war with Ottoman Turkey and of the control of its economy by an international financial commission, was plagued by domestic turmoil. This culminated in the *Goudi* revolt and the rise of Eleftherios Venizelos to power, which inaugurated an era of bourgeois reforms and expansion, coincided as this era was with the outbreak of two Balkan wars in October 1912 and June 1913 respectively. W.W.I, too, drew Greece into the vortex of a fierce internecine strife, known as the *Ethnikos Dichasmos* (national schism). But in 1920, the Greeks achieved over-expansion by the conclusion of the Sèvres Treaty, which created a greater Greece of 'the two continents and the five seas'.[61] Throughout the years concerned, therefore, they gained a foothold in nearly two thirds of Macedonia including the ports of Salonica (Thessaloniki) and Kavala, considerable sections in Epirus, the islands of the eastern Aegean, and Crete; sanctioned, at least on paper, the acquisition of the whole of Thrace, all the Dodecanese but Rhodes, and Imbros and Tenedos, two small islands at the mouth of the Straits; and took the

61 The continents were Europe and Asia, while the seas were the Ionian, Aegean, Marmara, Black Sea and the Mediterranean.

mandate for the administration of Smyrna and a substantial portion of its hinterland in Asia Minor.

Greece's performance did not match its position in the regional balance of power and its limited capabilities. It is worth investigating this paradox through which I also shed light on the overlooked theme of the asymmetric war initiation by a small state, that is, a less powerful state's decision for war against a more powerful adversary.[62] Some may object to the case study on account of Greece's patron-client relations with the great powers of the time, especially Britain. This reproduces the unqualified argument that small states are powerless pawns of the powers. I contend that Greece's dependency on them is not a given by assumption. It is something to be treated as a variable and must be explained. Whatever foreign favour or patronage, what matters is the grand strategy that the state brings into play to exploit the former. In the light of disposing international and domestic forces, it was the determination of Greek leadership in the period under discussion to activate, by articulating efficient strategies, the instruments of military power and the leverages of diplomacy that resulted in Greece capitalising on structural opportunities to the fullest and securing territorial gains.

Two further aspects of the paradox should be noted. First, most of today's small states have proceeded from the stage of self-determination to that of national independence. When engaged in expansion, Greece had already been recognised as an independent state. Second, Greek irredentism had preceded that of Italy. It was the first nationalist ferment of this sort in modern Europe, though the term was coined to denote the Italian movement to lay claim to 'unredeemed' territories under Austrian and Swiss domination in the last third of the nineteenth century.[63] In this respect, the years concerned were the most important for the growth of Greece as an integrated nation-state.

After the collapse of the Byzantine Empire, the territory covered by today's Greece had remained under the rule of the Ottoman Empire for about four centuries. During this considerable period, an ideal of popular culture was cultivated that the Greek-speaking Orthodox populations were a superior people, the 'chosen' heir of Byzantium. Inspired by this narrative of collective destiny, an ethno-religious tradition prevailed that the Greeks had a mission to accomplish: the re-union of Hellenism and the resurrection of Byzantium on the remnants of the Ottoman Empire. The belief in this divine dispensation generated a sense of nationhood, which established the legitimacy of the 'nation' on grounds of religious myths and historical claims in the sacred 'fatherland' of the East. This nationalist faith was pitted against the Western civil nationalism, based on citizen rights and the constitutional nature of the state defined in terms of a sovereign, territorially bounded political entity.[64] Constantinople, the capital of the illustrious Byzantium, emerged as the primary symbol of Greek national regeneration and assertion.

The inception of an independent Greek state in 1832 left out of its frontiers, and under Ottoman domination, large segments of Greek and Greco-phone populations. Not only was

62 Exceptions are Fischerkeller, M. P. (1998). David Versus Goliath: Cultural Judgments in Asymmetric Wars. Security Studies, 7 (4), pp. 1-43; Paul, T. V. (1994). Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

63 Ben-Israel, H. (1991). Irredentism: Nationalism Reexamined. In N. Chazan (Ed.), Irredentism and International Politics. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, pp. 24-25.

64 Smith, A. D. (1999). Ethnic Election and National Destiny: Some Religious Origins of Nationalist Ideals. Nations and Nationalism, 5 (3), pp. 344-345; Roudometof, V. (1996). Nationalism and Identity Politics in the Balkans: Greece and the Macedonian Question. Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 14 (2), pp. 253-257.

the old consciousness strengthened. It became the organising ideology that set the stage for the construction of the 'imagined community' of the new state, whose aim of wholeness was the retrieval of territories that were considered an integral part of the 'Hellenic heritage' and inhabited by ethnically related groups. This vision mirrored a newly formed reality, in which

> the traditional anti-Turkish symbolism, reinforced by the experiences of fighting an all-out War of Independence against the Turks, was linked with a precise political program which visualised the replacement of the Ottoman Empire by a Greek state in the East led by the Greek crown. The small kingdom was to lead the struggle for the liberation of unredeemed Greeks and the recovery of historic Greek territories in pursuit of Panhellenic unity.[65]

The dream of integrating the 'unredeemed' Hellenic lands with the Greek motherland dominated political life in the tiny kingdom of Greece.

After Britain, as a gesture of friendship, handed over to Greece the Ionian islands, in 1864, and Thessaly with a small strip of Epirus, in 1881, Greek leadership sealed its

> determination to bring the entire Hellenic race under a single Greek state. This Hellenic Megali Idea envisaged a future Greater Greece which was to include Epirus, Macedonia, Thrace, western Anatolia and the Aegean islands. The ultimate fulfillment of the Megali Idea would be achieved with the incorporation of Constantinople (Istanbul)…into the future Greek state. According to Greek nationalists, such a state was to materialise with the final dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, a process which they regarded as inevitable.[66]

Hence, what might be deemed as an aggressive expansion was perceived as a legitimate national demand from the perspective of Greek leadership and people. This was the irredentism of the Greek *Megali Idea* (Great Idea).

Modern Greek historiography does have much concern for Greek irredentism and in particular Venizelos's era.[67] Although the literature is enormous, nearly all falls into the category of diplomatic, political, economic and social history.[68] Within the small Greek

65 Kitromilides, P. M. (1979). The Dialectic of Intolerance: Ideological Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict. Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, VI (4), p. 15.

66 Alexandris, A. (1982/83). The Constantinopolitan Greek Factor During the Greco-Turkish Confrontation of 1919-1922. Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, 8, p. 137.

67 The classic work of encyclopaedic character is (1976). Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Έθνους: Τόμ. XIV-XV (History of the Greek Nation: Vols. XIV-XV). Athens: Ekdotiki Athinon. Useful standard surveys include P. M. Kitromilides (Ed.) (2006), Eleftherios Venizelos: The Trials of Statesmanship. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press; Hatzivassiliou, E. (1999). Ο Ελευθέριος Βενιζέλος, η Ελληνοτουρκική Προσέγγιση και το Πρόβλημα της Ασφάλειας στα Βαλκάνια 1928-1931 (Eleftherios Venizelos, the Greek-Turkish Rapprochement and the Problem of Security in the Balkans, 1928-1931) (No. 270). Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies; T. Veremis, & G. Goulimi (Eds.) (1989). Ελευθέριος Βενιζέλος: Κοινωνία-Οικονομία-Πολιτική στην Εποχή του (Eleftherios Venizelos: Society-Economy-Politics in his Time). Athens: Gnosi; G. T. Mavrogordatos, & C. Chatziiosif (Eds.) (1988), Βενιζελισμός και Αστικός Εκσυγχρονισμός (Venizelism and Modernization). Irakleio: Cretan University Press; Karamanlis, C. A. (1986). Ο Ελευθέριος Βενιζέλος και οι Εξωτερικές μας Σχέσεις 1928-1932 (Eleftherios Venizelos and our Foreign Relations 1928-1932). Athens: Greek Europublishing; T. Veremis, & O. Dimitracopoulos (Eds.) (1980), Μελετήματα Γύρω από τον Βενιζέλο και την Εποχή του (Studies on Venizelos and his Era). Athens: Philippotis.

68 Kitroeff, A. (1989). Continuity and Change in Contemporary Greek Historiography. European History Quarterly, 19 (2), pp. 269-298. Original writings that make headway in foreign policy inquiry are diplomatic historical accounts. Among others, see Finley, P. B. (1993). The Relations Between the Entente Powers and Greece, 1923-1926. Leeds: unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University of Leeds; Karvounarakis, T. (1991).

community of international relations, too, the established scholarship shows an unusual tendency to ignore the theme and period with which I am concerned. Even works that address the subject of the military in the years under discussion have little theoretical relevance to the realm of security and strategy or are narrow in scope.[69] A key shortcoming of the field[70] is that it lacks strategic studies dealing with the years prior to W.W.II. Most works focus on the position of Greece in the post-war and post-Cold War international system. The Greek civil war and the conflict with Turkey have received the lion's share of attention. None of them provides a strategic analysis of Greek historical development, a fact that makes the case worth studing. It is the motivation to explore Greek expansion through the ignored lenses of grand strategy and the external-internal synthesis that additionally lies at the core of my research.

Moreover, this book, to the best of my knowledge, is the first that charts the strategic dimension of Venizelism. The case study provides an opportunity of examining how Greek grand strategy was pursued by Venizelos, acclaimed as one of the few gifted statesmen in Greek history. In focusing on Venizelos's leadership, I by no means elevate it to the rank of the most outstanding explanatory variable. Rather than drawing on volitional and dispositional explanations, I examine how international and domestic structural forces prompted Venizelos's governments to opt for a particular course of action. The project is expected to allow me to show how structural conditions, perceived as they were by leadership, made grand strategy and constituted through it the territorially enlarged material reality of Greek statehood, fulfilled as this process was by leadership.

By way of conclusion, combining theory and history to the study of Greek grand strategy is all the more imperative. Although the existing Greek literature is plagued by a plethora of disputes of all sorts, it is instructive in highlighting several aspects of the question I address. The criticism I raise nevertheless is that it makes little effort to integrate international relations theory with historical research; and the conceptual lenses it employs, the evidence it presents, and the theoretical findings it yields, all tend to paper over the dimension of security and strategy. What is striking is the reluctance of international relations scholars to look at original sources. One part of the problem is that as a general rule the Greek government over-classifies documents and precludes access to the archives of the Ministry of Defence and

Anglo-Greek Relations, 1920-1922. Cambridge: unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Cambridge University; Carabott, P. (1991). The Dodecanese Question 1912-1924. London: unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, King's College, University of London; Gardikas, H. (1989). Greek Foreign Policy, 1911-1913. London: unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, King's College, University of London; Portolos, D. G. (1974). Greek Foreign Policy from September 1916 to October 1918. London: unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Birbeck College, University of London; Yanoulopoulos, Y. (1974). The Conference of Lausanne, 1922-1923. London: unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Birbeck College, University of London.

69 Fotakis, Z. (2005). Greek Naval Strategy and Policy, 1910-1919. London: Routledge; Dertilis, G. B. (1999). Κοινωνικός Μετασχηματισμός και Στρατιωτική Επέμβαση, 1880-1909 (Social Transformation and Military Intervention, 1880-1909) (sixth edition). Athens: Exantas; Spyropoulos, E. (1993). The Greek Military (1909-1941) and the Greek Mutinies in the Middle East (1941-1944). New York: Boulder; Veremis, T. (1983). Οι Επεμβάσεις του Στρατού στην Ελληνική Πολιτική, 1916-1936 (The Interventions of the Army in Greek Politics, 1916-1936). Athens: Odysseas; Mouzelis, N. (1979). The Army and Politics in Modern Greece (review essay). Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, VI (2), pp. 75-88; Papacosmas, S. V. (1977). The Military in Greek Politics: The 1909 Coup d' Etat. Kent: Kent State University Press.

70 Doing justice to the Greek scholarship, however, I must remind Gray, S. C. (2007)'s observation that a key deficiency found in the field worldwide is that 'strategic history is largely missing', and that while the scholars of strategic studies 'know too little history', the 'students of history and international relations are inclined to short-change the strategic dimension to their subjects', in War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History. London: Routledge, pp. xiii, 13.

various ‘sensitive’ records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The other is a forgetfulness of the fact that ‘history and political science are the homes for strategic studies’.[71] While historians refuse to inform their thinking with theories from the discipline of international relations, the students of security and strategy are reluctant to enrich their insights by researching archives. When they initiate dialogue, the discussion and the debates fail to bring their perspectives together in a theoretically informed way, most often burdened with political overtones As a result, the strategic implications of developments that marked a watershed in Greek history are still overlooked.

A means of rectifying this oversight is the use of the archival ‘data base’ from ‘an angle of vision that would take into account both sequence and system-both the approach of the historian and that of the political scientist’.[72] I do not stay away from archives. But my effort is not a contribution to Greek diplomatic and military historiography. It does not purport to present declassified government records and add original evidence to the stocks of documentation already disclosed and published. The consultation of the primary sources, mainly of the British Foreign Office, the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Venizelos’s manuscripts, is eclectic and narrow in scope. It intends to clarify my central argument. Suffice to say, I use part of the vast bulk of the available historical material. In addition to other motivations, therefore, the book aspires to bridge academic boundaries and break new ground in the Greek scholarship on security and strategic studies.

71 Betts, R. K. (1997). Should Strategic Studies Survive? World Politics, 50 (1), p. 24.

72 Gaddis, J. L. (1987). Expanding the Data Base: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Enrichment of Security Studies. International Security, 12 (1), p. 21.

Chapter 2

CONSTRUCTING A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

Constructing a framework for analysis requires four tasks. The first is specifying the research method. The second is defining concepts; the third is positing assumptions, while the last is indicating their links.

1. THE METHOD

Contrary to other external-internal synthesis approaches, I do not reduce international (or domestic) forces to a 'transmission belt' through which domestic (or international) imperatives shape strategy. Instead, I use insights from the agency-structure theory to delineate a building block intended to assemble the international system and domestic structure into a single whole. The method I adopt combines conceptual analysis with the 'historical-tracing' approach.

The framework is not designed to test the explanatory weight of rival paradigms. Nor is it an *a priori* formulation of theoretical hypotheses to be confirmed or refuted. It is a classification scheme that develops categories of analysis and provides a rationale for links between sets of variables; which should in advance be posited in order to capture the complexity of evidence in the form of compact images. As for the 'historical-tracing' approach, it is performed by the structured, focused study of a single case.[1] The controlled case study draws on the 'heuristic' mode of analysis, which uses propositions as a means of revealing aspects of the subject matter neglected by current scholarship. This theoretically informed and historically oriented perspective is expected to sharpen my understanding of the impact of the interplay of the international system and domestic structure on grand strategy.

Two caveats are appropriate. First, it is argued that the examination of individual cases is most useful at that stage where 'candidate theories are "tested".'[2] Many in the field deduce causes, spell out what these are expected to hold in several circumstances, and set off predicted outcomes against findings to look for their causal weight. Research is nothing less

1 George, A. L. (1979). Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison. In P. L. Gordon (Ed.), Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy. London: Free Press, pp. 43-68.

2 Eckstein, H. (1975). Case Study and Theory in Political Science. In F. I. Greenstein, & N. W. Polsby (Eds.), Strategies of Inquiry: Vol. 7. Handbook of Political Science. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, p. 80.

than an empirical corroboration or falsification of expectations. My method suggests another track of inquiry. While I assume general causes, I do not hypothesise in advance particular outcomes. Guided by certain theoretical insights, I explain at a maximum level of abstraction how the international system and domestic structure are interrelated in the making of grand strategy; and then, with the help of the 'historical-tracing' approach, I demonstrate these links by sorting out strategies and outcomes. Second, a framework of analysis may misconstrue the particular of events. The opposite view may be equally persuasive. Empirical descriptions often do little justice to the subject in question, for theoretical analysis and factual research should complement each other. Carr points out that 'the historian without his facts is rootless and futile; the facts without their historian are dead and meaningless'.[3] Embedded in a framework of analysis therefore, the 'historical-tracing' approach is not reduced to an a-theoretical account. It is a two-track inquiry that develops analytical tools for the study of history and draws insights from historical experience.

2. THE CONCEPTS

How concepts are coined is critical for the argument. In this section I mark out what I mean by the terms international system, domestic structure, power, security, and grand strategy.

I take the international system to pertain to the system's polarity and the strategic arrangements defined in terms of alignments and threats. Polarity points to the number of the great powers and the alliances that the powers form. A system that consists of two powers, each dominating its own coalition, has bipolar characteristics. A system that embraces many powers, probably tied into two or more opposing alliances, is multi-polar. As the focus of my investigation is a small state, whose interests lie in its adjacent area, the regional power disparities and arrangements are considered key elements of the international system.

As regards domestic structure, Katzenstein understands it as the institutional channels that associate interest groups with the government and political parties. Dominated by a ruling class or governing coalition, the state is made up of the established classes and groups originating in the state apparatus, and in the relations of production and institutions like banks, corporations, and ministries. The society consists of networks linking public bureaucracy to the private sector. The degree of the networks' development determines the degree of centralisation and the degree of the state's autonomy, with regard to which state and society are qualified as strong or weak.[4] This sort of strong-weak distinction is problematic, nonetheless. It takes national sovereignty for granted, equates juridical with substantial statehood, and neglects the case of a weak state with weak society.[5] It overlooks institutional collapse, the eclipse of the state.[6] It discards that the rate of dislocating local

3 Carr, E. H. (1989). What is History (second edition). London: Macmillan, p. 24.

4 Katzenstein, P. J. (1978). Introduction: Domestic and International Forces and Strategies of Foreign Economic Policy. In Katzenstein (Ed.), Power, pp. 15-22; his (1978). Conclusion: Domestic Structures and Strategies of Foreign Economic Policy. In Katzenstein (Ed.), Power, pp. 307-308.

5 Sorensen, G. (1997). An Analysis of Contemporary Statehood: Consequences for Conflict and Cooperation. Review of International Studies, 23 (3), pp. 260-261.

6 Evans, P. (1997). The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalisation. World Politics, 50 (1), pp. 62-87.

loyalties dictates the extent of state weakness or strength.[7] Also, it ignores patron-client relations, a pattern of linkages between state and society that, reflecting a reciprocal exchange of goods and services, affects how strong or dependent on each other are the partners involved.

Other scholars have enriched the concept. Jack Snyder defines it in terms of unitary, democratic and cartelised political systems on grounds of the centralisation of political power and the pattern of industrialisation.[8] Peter Gourevitch focuses on the coalition-building processes within state and society.[9] Thomas Risse-Kappen sheds light on the mechanisms through which social demands are channelled into the political system, and on the structure of society defined in terms of polarisation and how claims are manifested.[10] The received wisdom, in sum, is that domestic structure denotes the political system, state institutions, policy networks, coalition-building processes, and the structure of society.

In addition to the oversight of patronage politics, the established conceptualisation has two deficiencies. First, it omits economy. A key feature of the state-society relations is the structure of the economy, 'the "profile" of the country's production of goods and services.'[11] As both state and society are structured by the mode of production, the economy is vital for state strength because it determines resource availability and the government's ability to meet social claims ranging from pays rise to public sector employment. Aggregate resources, too, are under the control both of state and society. Because of constraints posed by bureaucracy and populace, the state faces difficulties in mobilising not only its own properties but also assets authorised by society. It is not given that the state is able to extract resources; nor is this function without friction. Rather, this limitation is the most critical.

Second, it overlooks the relationship of state and society to the armed forces, the civil-military relations. Evangelista, for example, takes the military to pertain to the military policy-making bureaucracy: he substitutes society for the military and understands it in strong-weak terms.[12] The military is classified as a status group that is involved in the formation of state policy. But this interpretation misses the fact that apart from being an instrument of securing the state against external threats, the military is the ultimate resort of the government to keep domestic order. In effect,

> while the military may…assume political control, military power is no longer the necessary basis of internally administered state authority. But the other side of this is that the military

[7] Migdal, J. S. (1988). Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

[8] Snyder, J. (1991). Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 31-60.

[9] Gourevitch, P. (1978). The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics. International Organization, 32 (4), pp. 905-906.

[10] Risse-Kappen, T. (1995). Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Introduction. In Risse-Kappen (Ed.), Bringing, pp. 20-24.

[11] Barnett, M. (1990). High Politics is Low Politics: The Domestic and Systemic Sources of Israeli Security Policy, 1967-1977. World Politics, XLII (4), p. 539.

[12] Evangelista, M. (1988). Innovation and the Arms Race: How the United States and the Soviet Union Develop New Military Technologies. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

> can no longer 'opt out' from the political system, or act in isolation from the broader sovereign community.[13]

Hence, standing armed forces, marked by mass conscription and the professionalisation of officers, give the military an enduring political feature.

The state is a coercive entity able to rule and enforce thanks to its monopoly of the means of organised violence, the most supreme of which is the military. The latter is state established and state oriented, as it is institutionally embedded into the machinery of government. The rise of the military to office, or the participation of officers in a governing coalition, cannot be regarded just as a case where a social group evolves into the guardian of order or hijacks institutions to further its professional interests and reach prominence that is, the state is weak. Nor is it a case where the state submits to the military that is, the society is strong. Rather than being solely part of society, the military situates both in state and society, entrusted with the duty to preserve sovereign statehood. By extension, an examination of military arrangements from organisation to the tasks of defence is essential to understanding domestic structure.

Thus, I take domestic structure to pinpoint the state's ruling system, which represents, whether constitutionally based or not, the politico-economic regime and the rules of the power game. Monarchy and republic are its principal forms, with dictatorship being an extreme version. That duly acknowledged, domestic structure is made up of four components. The first is the governing coalition, defined as the state's leadership consisting of the executive branch of the government and policy elites, the power competition within which determines the degree of political polarisation and the degree of the centralisation of decision-making power. The second is the structure of society, understood in terms of class differentiation or polarisation and the mechanisms through which social demands are mobilised. I assume that patron-client relationships are a structural property of society. The third is the structure of the economy, which refers to production features and the distribution of economic power between the public and private sectors and between sectors like agriculture, industry, commerce, finance, and shipping. I do not identify it with the mode of production; I assume it as being capitalist or quasi-capitalist. The last component is the military.

With respect to power, it is traditionally considered to be commensurate with the size of forces, national product, territory, and population, and with the capacity to coerce. The more resources a state possesses, the greater the power it has to inflict deprivation. This understanding accounts for 'the further, the weaker' problem; a situation in which a state is powerful but its resources are drained out the further it distances itself from home, thereby the cost of transport and sustaining supply lines gets greater.[14] However, it insufficiently explains the 'paradox of unrealised power', namely the problem of converting indigenous and externally borrowing resources into realised, actual power. Hardly being a matter of size, power conversion is a function of the assessment of the potential of resources and management.[15] Also, it overlooks the policy-contingency framework. Power is meaningful

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[13] Giddens, A. (1996). The Nation-State and Violence. Cambridge: Polity, p. 227.

[14] Boulding, K. E. (1985). The World as a Total System. London: Sage, p. 129.

15 Baldwin, D. A. (1979). Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends Versus Old Tendencies. World Politics, XXXI (2), pp. 161-194. Experience, after all, demonstrates that the numerical superiority of armed forces affect positively military outcomes only if it interacts with advanced skills and technology. See Biddle, S.

only when compared to the power of other states. It is not generally effective. Aggregate material facilities may be suitably required for one situation, while being no asset in another. Notwithstanding that the military and economic dimensions of power overshadow all else where there exists the ability and will to employ them, qualitative factors are important as well; all go into the calculus of policy-makers when they evaluate structural imperatives.

Joseph Nye captures this point in writing that power substantiates the state's ability not only to get others to do what they would not otherwise do but also to get them to want what it wants. The first face of power, which manipulates inducements, threats, and coercion, is called 'directive or commanding'. The second that relies on promises of rewards, culture, ideology, and institutions, is labelled 'indirect or co-optive'.[16] In essence, power has to do with three elements: resources, actors and outcomes.[17] As each one of them coexists with the other, I take power to pertain to the state's ability to control resources in order to get other states to do or want what it wants, with a view to moulding intentions and preferred outcomes.

As for security, the conventional view defines it as the state's preparedness to prevent or engage in war; that is, the ability to protect territorial integrity from attack, conquest, or annihilation should they occur.[18] This understanding reduces security to protection only from military challenges. It ignores threats that undermine political stability, social cohesion, and development.[19] Hence, I conceptualise security as the freedom from threats of all sorts, a 'material ontological' entity that sets the stage for states to develop and preserve international and domestic conditions that promote their professed interests.[20]

I move on, finally, to pinpoint what I mean by grand strategy. Encapsulating an opinion widely held, strategy relates means to achieve ends in view. It is the threat or the use of military power for coping with threats and attaining objectives, while grand strategy concerns the guidance of the conduct of war at the highest level.[21] As Liddell Hart puts it, strategy is 'the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil the ends of policy'; and the mission of grand strategy is 'to co-ordinate and direct all the sources of a nation, or band of

(2007). Explaining Military Outcomes. In R. A. Brooks, & E. A. Stanley (Eds.), Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness. Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 207-227.

16 Nye, J. (1990). The Changing Nature of World Power. Political Science Quarterly, 105 (2), pp. 181-182.

17 Hart, J. (1976). Three Approaches to the Measurement of Power in International Relations. International Organization, 30 (2), pp. 289-305.

18 Art, R. J. (1991). A Defensible Defense. International Security, 15 (4), p. 7; Walt, S. M. (1991). The Renaissance of Security Studies. International Studies Quarterly, 35 (2), pp. 212-213.

19 Miller, B. (2001). The Concept of Security: Should it be Redefined? Journal of Strategic Studies, 24 (2), pp. 13-42; Buzan, B., Waever, O., & de Wilde, J. (1998). Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder: Lynne Rienner; Baldwin, D. A. (1997). The Concept of Security. Review of International Studies, 23 (1), pp. 5-26.

20 I draw on Booth, K. (2007). Theory of World Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 95-110; Buzan, B. (1991). New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century. International Affairs, 67 (3), pp. 432-433; McKinlay, R. (1989). Third World Military Expenditure: Determinants and Implications. London: Pinter, p. 110; McNamara, R. S. (1968). The Essence of Security. London: Hodder & Stoughton. Compare to McSweeney, B. (1999). Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. For insightful overviews of the main theories of security in the discipline of international relations, see Smith, S. (2005). The Contested Concept of Security. In K. Booth (Ed.), Critical Security Studies and World Politics. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, pp. 27-62; Kolodziej, E. A. (2005). Security and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

21 Gray, C. S. (1999). Modern Strategy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 17-18; Snyder, C. A. (1999). Contemporary Security and Strategy. In C. A. Snyder (Ed.), Contemporary Security and Strategy. London: Macmillan, p. 4.

nations, towards the attainment of the political objective of the war'.[22] This definition recognises that strategy should be subordinated to the ends of policy. But it neglects the non-military aspect of strategy and the process of power conversion. Consideration should take into account that a state's choice of strategy depends not only on its power but also on its rivals' designs and anticipated reactions. In a sense, 'this interaction of competing, conflicting state objectives is what strategy is about'.[23] André Beaufre highlights this detail: strategy is 'the art of the dialectic of force or, more precisely, the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute'.[24] It involves war fighting, war avoidance, and a peacetime conduct designed 'to make it clear to any potential adversary that the costs of fighting it will far outweigh any conceivable benefits'.[25]

From a broader angle, strategy is the 'art of creating power' in the sense of producing effects in war and peace.[26] It is the mechanism through which power is created to carry security into effect. It is through this link that power as a means is related to security as the end of power. Grand strategy, representing a deliberate response to structural imperatives, is about the state's attempt to employ all domestic and international resources available to obtain security.[27] Along a similar line, I understand grand strategy as a set of strategies ranging from the military to the social and the cultural, with which a state creates and directs its power to obtain security in constant relationship with the strategies of its potential allies and adversaries and with the demands of its society. These strategies, which acquire an external or internal character with regard to the realm to which they are applied (international or domestic politics), appear as though they are intertwined in a single overarching design.[28] But let me elaborate the assumptions.

3. THE ASSUMPTIONS

I introduce two assumptions to inform the argument. The first gives a reasoning for the interaction of the international system and domestic structure, and their reciprocal relationship with grand strategy. The second, reflecting on the state, speculates that in principle small states are able to expand and consolidate the *status quo* by their own means, even by using force. Suffice to say that the assumptions describe ideal patterns of human arrangements that serve as building blocks of making sense of reality.

22 Liddell Hart, B. H. (1967). Strategy: The Indirect Approach (second edition enlarged). London: Faber & Faber, pp. 335-336.

23 Layne, C. (1979). British Grand Strategy, 1900-1939: Theory and Practice in International Politics. Journal of Strategic Studies, 2 (3), p. 309.

24 Beaufre, A. (1965). An Introduction to Strategy. London: Faber & Faber, p. 22.

25 Howard, M. (2001). Grand Strategy in the Twentieth Century. Defence Studies, 1 (1), p. 2.

26 Freedman, L. (1992). Strategic Studies and the Problem of Power. In L. Freedman, P. Hayes, & R. O' Neil (Eds.), War, Strategy, and International Politics: Essays in Honour of Sir Michael Howard. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 283, 291.

27 Rosecrance, & Stein. Realism, pp. 4, 13, 20.

28 I draw on Gray. Modern Strategy, pp. 23-24; Kennedy, P. (1991). Grand Strategy in War and Peace: Towards a Broader Definition. In Kennedy (Ed.), p. 5; Papasotiriou, C. (1991). Byzantine Grand Strategy. Stanford: unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Stanford University, p. 3; Luttwak, E. N. (1987). Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, p. 179; Posen, B. P. (1984). The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p. 13.

The Interaction of the International System and Domestic Structure

Grand strategy is a function of human interaction and consent constituted as it is by material structural forces. The logic I suggest finds expression in Karl Marx's dictum that people make their history but not as they please; they make it under circumstances inherited from the past. Human beings are the driving force of history thanks to their singular collective activity, though their freedom is not unrestrained. They are the sole agents who possess emergent power, which is structurally embedded within particular historical limits prefigured by social material conditions of the past and present.

Agents and structures are mutually constitutive of each other in a pattern of dialectical totality.[29] The latter entails that the dichotomy or duality of agents and structures is left behind in forming aggregate entities in social life. Human agency is historically and socially constructed in the sense that, through its action and consciousness, within the historical process, it becomes substantiated as part of the social material reality by constellations of individual subjective actors, the social forces. It is through these social forces and their practices (an amalgam of collective action and 'inter-subjective' consciousness) and mental constructs (inter-subjective meanings and images) that human agents instantiate configurations of social relations; which are inter-subjectively constituted entities that 'while not real physical objects nevertheless give real physical form to the human situation because everyone acts as though they are real entities'.[30] These configurations coined as structures, enable, condition, and reshape the doings and identity of social forces by determining not the strategic choice *per se* but the context and range of choices. Essentially, they re-constitute the social forces and their practices and mental constructs by crediting them with 'material structural' substance and forming through and with them objectified products (inter-subjectively constituted 'material structural' human functions). It is through this interaction that structures appear in the form of opportunities and constraints as if they are the material reality of the social world; which is nothing other than the totality of agents and structures and their attributes. But within this interplay only agents produce or transform structures.[31]

Strategy in effect, like politics, is 'by its very nature, always embedded in ongoing human relationships'.[32] It is the objectified product of the dialectical interplay of agency and structure and becomes, at the same time, the medium of the constitution of the social material order of human life. It is the strategy that directs social practices through which agents as

[29] Exponents of this line of thinking include M. Rupert & H. Hazel (Eds.) (2002), Historical Materialism and Globalization. London: Routledge; Cutler, A. C. (2002). Critical Historical Materialism and International Law: Imagining International Law as Praxis. In S. Hobden, & J. M. Hobson (Eds.), Historical Sociology of International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 181-199; A. Bieler & A. D. Morton (Eds.) (2001), Social Forces in the Making of the New Europe: The Restructuring of European Social Relations in the Global Political Economy. New York: Palgrave; Cox, R. W. (1999). Approaches to World Order (reprinted). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; van der Pijl, K. (1998). Transnational Classes and International Relations. London: Routledge; Gill, S. (Ed.) (1992), Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; C. N. Murphy, & R. Tooze (Eds.) (1991), The New International Political Economy. Boulder: Lynne Rienner; Cox, R. W. (1987). Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History. New York: Columbia University Press.

[30] Bieler, A., & Morton, A. D. (2001). The Gordian Knot of Agency-Structure in International Relations: A Neo-Gramscian Perspective. European Journal of International Relations, 7 (1), p. 22.

[31] Cerny, P. G. (2000). Political Agency in a Globalizing World: Toward a Structurational Approach. European Journal of International Relations, 6 (4), pp. 436-437.

[32] Lamborn, A. C. (1997). Theory and the Politics in World Politics. International Studies Quarterly, 41 (2), p. 191.

social forces make or reshape the historically constituted structures of the social world; which set the stage for the perception of structures and the articulation of strategies by particular social forces.

Approached from this angle, the international system and the state's domestic structure are considered to be instantiated and reproduced by human interaction and consent. They represent configurations of social relations that substantiate the social material order of world politics. This is to imply that the material reality of statehood is social, socially constructed. The determining aspect is that the state exists not only as a real structural entity but also as a social force. It is a bearer both of agential and structural properties. The state is the most relevant constellation of actors within territorially ordered institutional confines, the 'supreme' political form of the social organisation of human beings in terms of rule making, accountability and legitimacy.[33]

The state as a social force therefore is at this point in time the dominant agent of world politics. It is thanks to this agential capacity that the state monopolises the emergent power, as it makes the socially and historically constructed entities of the international system and domestic structure.[34] Having the state as a common bearer, these structures concurrently condition and shape it. Strictly speaking, the international system and domestic structure are causally interrelated to the 'agential' state. But since domestic structure substantiates the state's structural properties and leadership the state's agential properties, the 'agential' and the 'structural' state appear as if they are internally co-determined; that is, they reciprocally interact, presumably as a 'unified agency', with the international system to engender strategy. This interaction can be viewed as a combination of volitional but not unrestrained acts; mechanistic processes that is, apparently predetermined patterns of arrangements; and chance coincidental occurrences that is, a synchronic occurrence of causally independent events.[35] From this standpoint, the 'structural' state seems as though it exists as part of the 'agential' state, and hence it is assumed, through its embedded property of 'unified' agency, to have become causally interrelated to the international system, while the 'agential' state being functioned as the only real driving social force behind. It is in this sense that the state's grand strategy is the objectified product of the dialectical interplay of the international system and domestic structure.

The State

I understand the state as an 'institutional-legal structure of authority'.[36] It substantiates the government and their administrative apparatus, 'a set of central decision-making

[33] Arts, B. (2000). Regimes, Non-State Actors and the State System: A 'Structurational' Regime Model. European Journal of International Relations, 6 (4), p. 528. Compare to McSweeney, pp. 149-150.

[34] For insights see Hobson, J. M. (2001). The 'Second State Debate' in International Relations: Theory Turned Upside-Down. Review of International Studies, 27 (3), pp. 395-414.

[35] Suganami, H. (1999). Agents, Structures, Narratives. European Journal of International Relations, 5 (3), pp. 370-375.

[36] Paul, D. E. (1999). Sovereignty, Survival and the Westphalian Blind Alley in International Relations. Review of International Studies, 25 (2), p. 230.

institutions and roles' designed to take authoritative decisions for society.[37] It consists of an organised authority, people and territory, a machinery of power that, as Max Weber puts it, claims the right to wield the 'monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force'.[38]

The state is usually viewed only as an externally located entity. It situates in an international system, which is anarchic in the sense that it lacks a centrally controlled government, a supranational authority to enforce order. Anarchy has two structural properties and imperatives. The first is force, the use of which is made according to the imperative for the preservation of the system's order. Since violence is not punished, anarchy makes the threat or the use of force possible.[39] But the use of force is not reckless. It is restricted by the belief states share that they constitute a society in which 'they are the principal actors' and 'the chief bearers of rights and duties'; and their society 'will remain the prevailing form of universal political organisation, in fact and in right'.[40] The second property is the solitary struggle for survival, which pertains to the self-help imperative. States are concerned about security because they worry not only about their survival but also about gains.

The starting point in this line of thinking is that anarchy generates an enduring problem of security for all states with two strategic implications. First, states distrusts of each other as potential threats because of force; each state reasons that other states are prepared to use force and demand concessions.[41] Second, the struggle for survival forces states to look after their power in relation to other states that is, to improve their position in the system's structure. The motive is that 'by enhancing their own relative capabilities, or diminishing those of an adversary, states get a double payoff: greater security and a wider range of strategic options'.[42]

Insecurity induces states to take measures that fall under the heading of internal and external balancing; that is, to balance behaviour by using endogenous and exogenous sources of strength respectively. All states are 'like' units and function similar tasks to the extent that they are preoccupied with their existence in terms of three vital interests: territorial integrity, political independence, and economic autonomy. The similar task they function is to obtain power and security in order to fulfil their interests. Internal and external balancing, in that regard, implies that states compete and cooperate with each other.[43] Also, the state struggle for power and security is not identified with a pre-determined 'objective' national interest, which directs state actions. Rather, it is a matter of perception, motivation, and articulation. The way interests, power, and security are socially constructed and become part of the social

[37] Krasner, S. D. (1978). Defending the National Interest: Raw Material Investments and US Foreign Policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 12, 55.

[38] H. H. Gerth, & C. W. Mills (Eds.) (1967), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. London: Routledge, p. 78. For a comprehensive and critical overview of the main theoretical approaches to the state in the international relations theory, see Hobson, J. M. (2000). The State and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[39] Howard, M. (1970). Studies in War and Peace. London: Temple Smith, p. 11.

[40] Bull, H. (1977). The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. London: Macmillan, p. 16.

[41] Mearsheimer, J. (1990). Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War. International Security, 15 (1), p. 127.

[42] Layne, C. (1993). The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise. International Security, 17 (4), p. 12.

[43] Glaser, C. L. (1996). Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help. Security Studies, 5 (3), pp. 122-163.

order of world politics is mediated by how state leadership perceive, articulate, and normalise responses to structural imperatives.[44]

What is the logic motivating the state struggle for power in the international system? Robert Gilpin understands it as a zero-sum struggle of all against all in the sense that one state's gain is another state's loss.[45] Hans Morgenthau argues that this struggle is a political end in itself, and that 'nations active in international politics are continuously preparing for, actively involved in, or recovering from organized violence in the form of war'.[46] One could contend that territorial expansion is the dynamic that underlies the struggle for power. There seems a connection between the value states ascribe to territory and military conflicts.[47] But should this picture be authentic, there would be a number of overextended great powers at infinite war. Instead, in the real world out there, few great powers and many small states compete and cooperate. This is because power is endowed with the limits of 'the further, the weaker' and 'unrealised power'. History shows that overextension is self-defeating and occurs when the state expands so much that ultimately it is self-encircled; and when the state takes over commitments that it cannot meet.[48] As much as states expand so they pull back. Expansion is one side of the struggle for power.

Barry Buzan highlights the whole spectrum when he views the struggle for power as a 'continuous tension' between revisionist and status quo states.[49] The former seek to overturn the system because they are convinced that otherwise they cannot survive; thereby, they try to exploit opportunities for expansion defined in terms of territorial acquisitions and the advance of demands.[50] The latter value stability to benefit from situational conditions. As much as states seek to revise the established arrangements so they strive to preserve the *status quo*. Consolidation is the other side of the struggle for power.

Again, what is the logic motivating the state struggle for security in the international system? It is the state's concern for protection from external threats. Buzan argues that the dynamics propelling the state struggle for power and security are the same; we should consider them a single, unified struggle. Although the logic of the struggle for security emanates from the fact that 'all states are in some sense status quo', in practice it does not differ from that of the struggle for power because status quo states 'have security interests not only in preserving the system but also in maintaining their position within it'; and revisionist states 'tend to view security in terms of changing the system, and/or improving their position

[44] Works informing my point include Booth, World Security; Little, R. (2007). The Balance of Power in International Relations: Metaphors, Myths and Models. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; van Evera, S. (1999). Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Weldes, J. (1996). Constructing National Interests. European Journal of International Relations, 2 (3), pp. 275-318; Wohlforth, W. C. (1993). The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

[45] Gilpin, R. (1985). War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 94-95.

[46] Morgenthau, H. J. (1978). Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (fifth edition revised). New York: Alfred A. Knopf, pp. 30, 42.

[47] Hensel, P. R. (2001). Contentious Issues and World Politics: The Management of Territorial Claims in the Americas, 1816-1992. International Studies Quarterly, 45 (1), pp. 81-109; Huth.

[48] Kupchan, C. (1994). The Vulnerability of Empire. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Snyder. Myths.

[49] Buzan. People, pp. 297-311.

[50] Geller, D. S., & Singer, J. D. (1998) show that dissatisfaction with status quo may result in the outbreak of war-like confrontations in their Nations at War: A Scientific Study of International Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chap. 3.

within it'.[51] In short, expansion and the consolidation of the *status quo* reflect the two sides of the state struggle for power and security.

In the state struggle for power and security, a security dilemma develops. Actions with which states endeavour to improve their security create a sense of insecurity in other states; the latter perceive these self-help moves as threatening and take additional measures regarded as offensive by the former, and so on.[52] This dilemma exacerbates uncertainty, producing two effects: it incites suspicion and weakens the policy makers' ability to perceive and assess the intentions and capabilities of allies and adversaries; and it complicates crisis management and accelerates arms race. All this intensifies yet another dilemma, the defence dilemma.[53] It arises from the technological advance of the instruments of force. It has two aspects. The first refers to the cost of defence that is, the allocation of resources for the military compared to the resources devoted to other policy ends. The second aspect is that the technological development of weapon systems is such that states might put their security at stake without being engaged in war. An example is the nuclear bomb, which can destroy or severely damage a state as a result of a first offensive strike, inadvertent escalation, or unintentional nuclear accident.

Although states are endowed with similar properties, their performance is not alike. Why? Because they do not figure equally in the system's structure. States stand in relation to one another according to their relative power. The smaller a state, the more are the constraints and less the opportunities to consolidate the *status quo* and expand; and vice versa, the greater a state, the fewer are the constraints and more the opportunities to perform the same function effectively. In principle, systemic imperatives by no means rule out the likelihood that small states can consolidate and expand by their own means, even by using force.

All states, great and small, are located in an anarchic international system that bestows on them the use of force and the solitary struggle for survival. The result is that they are pushed to function a similar task, to obtain power and security, which is nothing less than a struggle for expansion and consolidation. This struggle can be seen as an external dimension of statehood, as a struggle for international power and security. But its logic, which entails a commitment of resources, coupled with the dissimilar performance of states prompts me to descend the analytical ladder to the inner world of the state. Apart from a strategic actor in international politics, the state is a collection that substantiates institutionally totalised summations of social functions. It is the 'gatekeeper' between external and internal forces.[54]

States are forced not only to compete and balance power but also to legitimise power; in the sense of sanctioning their authority to use force internally and stimulating their people to defend their sovereignty and fight other states.[55] War should not be viewed only as a function of force or instrument of state policy. The state's ability to politicise population and extract resources from society for war is a critical determinant of its survival. To divert public

[51] Buzan. People, pp. 297, 303-304.

[52] Booth, K., & Wheeler, N. J. (2008). The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan; Jervis, R. (1976). Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, chap. 3.

[53] Buzan. People, chap. 7; his (1987). Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International Relations. London: Macmillan, chap. 14.

54 Nettl, J. P. (1968). The State as a Conceptual Variable. World Politics, XX (4), p. 564.

attention from social grievances and foster domestic regimes, governments often galvanise populace by resorting to the image of war and territorial aggrandizement.[56] War and the military organisation therefore become requisites of statehood.[57] Anthony Giddens emphasises the importance of warfare to the making of the territorially bounded state. A fundamental feature of the modern state is 'the consolidation of military power in association with control of the means of violence within a range of territories', in order to sustain its 'territorially ordered' rule.[58] The military is the state's institution that possesses the monopoly of control over force and represents its ultimate tool not only for waging war against external challengers but also for enforcing order in its domestic arena. How a state mobilises its military power to obtain security is equally determined by how it situates in its internal environment.[59] War preparation is dependent on the state's human and material resources. Michael Barnett provides a rationale informing this point:

> First, the state must extract revenue in order to pay for its consumption of military resources. Second, it must guarantee the provision of war material, from supplies, clothing, and food to the actual instruments of warfare. And third, it must mobilise the necessary manpower.[60]

State formation is a two-way process of interaction with the international system and society. Not only are states placed in the system's structure in relation to other states. They are also placed in their domestic system's structure in relation to their societies. As much as states seek power in the international system so they seek power in their domestic system. The state is engaged in a struggle for domestic power by virtue of its need to build and consolidate central administrative institutions with monopoly of legitimate authority and use of violence. The state struggle for domestic power is nothing more than a process of state building and ruling.

Likewise, as much as states seek security in the international system so they seek security in their domestic system. The logic motivating the state struggle for domestic security is the concern for protection from internal threats. It reflects the state's effort to create man-made resources, arrest dislocating effects and sustain control over the instruments of violence. It is for domestic security reasons that governments place equal emphasis on war preparation, political stability, and economic growth. Hence, the dynamic propelling the state struggle for domestic power and security are the same. The logic of both struggles is to manipulate society to make the state effectively ruled. The state struggle for domestic power and security is thus a struggle for state building and ruling.

But the state must not place enormous demands on society because otherwise it is likely to mar its viability and stir up social unrest; a balance between the society's cost and the

55 Nau, H. R. (2001). Why 'The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers' Was Wrong. Review of International Studies, 27 (4), pp. 582-584.

56 Chubin, S., & Tripp, C. (1991). Iran and Iraq at War. London: I. B. Tauris, pp. 5-6.

57 Tilly, C. (1995). Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, chap. 3; Downing, B. M. (1992). The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe. Princeton: Princeton University Press, chap. 1.

58 Giddens, p. 20.

59 Brooks, R. A. (2007). Introduction: The Impact of Culture, Society, Institutions, and International Forces on Military Effectiveness. In Brooks & Stanley (Eds.), pp. 1-26; Rosen, S. P. (1995). Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters. International Security, 19 (4), pp. 5-31.

60 Barnett, p. 536.

state's gain from resource requisition should be kept. To put it differently, in the state struggle for domestic power and security, a 'domestic security dilemma' may arise.[61] I pinpoint its content as follows: resource mobilisation might cause so strong a popular outcry and make economic growth so sluggish that the state incapacitates its domestic power and security.

Although states function a similar task, to obtain domestic power and security, their performance is not alike. Why? Because they stand in relation to their society according to the domestic power they possess. Buzan views the state as consisting of three elements: the physical base, which points to population, territory, and resources; the institutions, which refer to the decision-making apparatus of the government; and the idea of state, which concerns the organising ideologies and the nation designed to muster the loyalty of masses. States are identified as strong or weak with respect to how well interrelated the elements are, that is, the degree of socio-political cohesion. A strong state enjoys social consensus and is concerned with external threats. A weak state is marked by large-scale violence and vague distinction between the executive, legislature, and judiciary, and is preoccupied with domestic security.[62]

Kal Holsti however argues that the missing point in Buzan's 'objective' bases of the state is the role of political legitimacy based on two pillars. The first is the vertical legitimacy, which concerns the state's right to govern and establish its authority. It differs from the government's popularity as it relates the loyalty of individuals and groups to the formal rule of the state. The second pillar is the horizontal legitimacy pointing to the territorial base and community over which the state's authority is exercised. It lays down the rules of the game and criteria for participation, as well as the prerequisites by which the state extracts revenues from society and provides social goods in return. From this angle, a strong state is horizontally and vertically integrated. A weak state instead lacks vertical and horizontal legitimacy. It is plagued by recurrent interventions of the military in politics, corruption, and the personalisation of political power. It is likely to confront the 'insecurity dilemma' or the 'state-strength dilemma' should attempts to remedy weakness and build strength result in further weakness.[63]

Thus, one determining aspect of state strength or weakness is the ability to penetrate and extract resources from society to reproduce its existence.[64] These resources, which originate from control over the instruments of coercion, production, bureaucracy, and finances, determine how able the state is to marshal manpower and material facilities behind its interests.[65] Another key aspect is the ability to reconcile the forces of power fragmentation and centralisation, to sustain authority and muster loyalty. On the whole, a strong state responds to external and internal threats primarily through cooperation with

61 Following a similar albeit not identical idea in Buzan, B., Jones, C., & Little, R. (1993). The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 120-121.

62 Buzan. People, chap. 2.

63 Holsti, K. J. (1996). The State, War, and the State of War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 72-128.

64 Taliaferro, J. W. (2009). Neoclassical Realism and Resource Extraction: State Building for Future War. In Lobell, Ripsman, & Taliaferro (Eds.), pp. 197, 217-219; Lindberg, S. I. (2001). Forms of States, Governance, and Regimes: Reconceptualizing the Prospects for Democratic Consolidation in Africa. International Political Science Review, 22 (2), p. 180.

65 Barnett, M. N. (1992). Confronting the Costs of War: Military Power, State, and Society in Egypt and Israel. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 41-42.

society, while a weak state resorts to repression.[66] A weak state is unable to take and carry out decisions, to centralise its decision-making power.[67] And the stronger a state, the less intense is its struggle for domestic power and security; and vice versa, the weaker a state, the more intense is its struggle for domestic power and security. In principle, domestic imperatives do not deprive small states of the ability to expand and consolidate the *status quo*, even by using force.

To come full circle, anarchy engages states, no matter what their size, in a struggle for expansion and consolidation in the international system. Simultaneously, the need to wield central authority and monopoly of violence engages states in a struggle for state building and ruling in their domestic system. As an integrated whole, all states situated in the realms of international and domestic politics strive to obtain power and security, both international and domestic. Structural imperatives do not constitute an inescapable, though not unconstrained, barrier to the state struggle for power and security. By definition, the spectrum of strategic choices available to all states ranges, under the general heading of external and internal balancing, from one end point of the use of force to the other end point of capitulation. States seek to deal with international constraints at minimum cost and capitalise on international opportunities at maximum profit without causing domestic complications, while they endeavour to make domestic conditions compatible with their struggle for expansion and consolidation. But how are smallness and weakness/strength interrelated? A small state that is weak is less able to sacrifice the struggle for state building and ruling for the sake of expansion; otherwise it runs the risk of annihilation. A small state that is strong is more able to devote itself to the struggle for expansion and consolidation.

A final qualification is needed, nonetheless. I take the state to act in a unified, utility-maximising way. This is seemingly inconsistent with the assumption that the state is located in the intersection of the international system and domestic structure. Once the Pandora box of domestic politics opens, it is a customary practice in the literature to regard the state as a non-rational actor. Rather, there is a difference in perspective. State officers make decisions on cost-benefit calculations. But they are instrumentalist rational agents with beliefs, preferences and images; their calculations reflect subjective perceptions and expectations as to probabilistic consequences of actions.[68] Decision-making, too, is a contest over who decides, how, and for what purpose. Personal motivations might be perfectly carried out in parallel with the pursuit of state interests. Decisions might be purposely taken to further narrow individual choices, contain disputes among rival elites, and legitimise pre-existing policy priorities. Strategy, above all, is not 'rational in itself, but only from a particular point of view, from some conception of a valued end to be served'.[69] It is made by those who are in charge of ruling and who are thus concerned to bolster their grip on power.[70] In this sense, the decision-making process is not a mechanical response to imperatives. It is rational insofar as it is externally and internally conditional and dependent on policy-makers values.

66 Hobson, J. M. (1997). The Wealth of States: A Comparative Sociology of International Economic and Political Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 10.

67 Zakaria. Wealth, p. 39.

68 Zagare, F. C. (1987). The Dynamics of Deterrence. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 8.

69 Barkawi, T. (1998). Strategy as a Vocation: Weber, Morgenthau and Modern Strategic Studies. Review of International Studies, 24 (2), p. 181.

70 Lepgold, J., & Sterling, B. L. (2000). When Do States Fight Limited Wars? Political Risk, Policy Risk, and Policy Choice. Security Studies, 9 (4), pp. 127-166.

4. THE LINKS

As I claimed before, state leadership substantiates the 'agential' state, which acts as the real driving social force behind the interplay of the international system and domestic structure. Leaders are seen as a social arrangement to solve problems of coordination among groups and the allocation of gains resulting from social action. They possess the 'discretional' power to get people to do what they might not otherwise do and preserve their position in office over time.[71] But,

> leaders are not…a transmission belt for the imperatives of subjectively understood structures. Leaders have goals of their own. To achieve them, they may seek to escape the supposed imperatives of structure...or to change the structures, domestic and international that give rise to them.[72]

Therefore, how leaders perceive structural conditions and articulate strategic aims is of critical importance.

Emphasising the importance of leadership is meant to imply that the making of grand strategy is not the product of 'mechanical' processes or 'blind' historical forces. It is, instead, a complex process that 'involves internal political influences and idiosyncracies of individual behaviour as well as the pressure of external events and threats'.[73] Structural imperatives delimit options, but they do not dictate as an invisible hand the final choice. Leaders are causative agents, retaining relative autonomy in the choice of action.[74] In the light of opportunities dictating delicate diplomacy, they may risk a war. In the light of pressures dictating a modest response, they may pursue policies of a broader vision. Essentially, they filter through their perceptions and fulfil by their actions the bridging function between structural conditions and the making of grand strategy.

That duly recorded, a grand strategy design should ideally direct and enable states to deal both with their struggle for expansion and consolidation and their struggle for state building and ruling. As these struggles are operating simultaneously and, thereby, cannot be rank-ordered, a scheme that establishes connections between components of grand strategy should encompass all the key strategies that are applied to the realms of international and domestic politics, serving the ends of both struggles. However, for the purposes of the book, and for reasons of analytical parsimony, I examine grand strategies related only to the state struggle for expansion and consolidation; and I focus on strategies of external character, in particular military strategy and diplomacy, which are more critical and relevant to this struggle.

I sketch an inventory of small state grand strategy constituted along three components: patterns, categories of strategies and strategies. The patterns involve the grand strategy of expansion pointing to the acquisition of territories and the advance of demands; and the grand strategy of consolidation, which aims at the preservation of the *status quo* and the denial of

71 Calvert, R. L. (1992). Leadership and its Basis in Problems of Social Coordination. International Political Science Review, 13 (1), pp. 7-24.

72 Lebow, R. N. (1996). Play it Again Pericles: Agents, Structures and the Peloponnesian War. European Journal of International Relations, 2 (2), p. 254.

73 Murray, W., & Grimsley, M. (1995). Introduction: On Strategy. In W. Murray, M. Knox, & A. Bernstein (Eds.), The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 20.

74 Hah, C., & Bartol, F. C. (1983). Political Leadership as a Causative Phenomenon: Some Recent Analyses. World Politics, XXXVI (1), pp. 100-120.

unwelcome demands. These patterns are structured by categories of strategies, which I cluster as non-alignment, fight alone, and alignment. The categories of strategies are ordered by strategies, both of which are detailed into constituent forms and types (Tables 1 and 2). Thus, the questions that guide my inquiry are, in the context of the interplay of international and domestic forces, how military strategy and diplomacy relate means to ends, what categories of strategies are pursued by these strategies, and what patterns of grand strategy are carried into effect by the categories of strategies. The objective is to make sense of the evidence and consider my argument that grand strategy matters through the response to structural conditions to small states in pursuing and attaining territorial enlargement. Suffice to say that none of the components of grand strategy cancels out the others or precludes their combined use. I begin with the categories of strategies.

Non-Alignment

This category concerns the state's refusal not merely to choose sides but also to accept external assistance. The advantage of non-alignment is that the non-aligned state does not undertake commitments. It presupposes that the state is free from external threats or benefits from a security regime provided by other states. Moreover, it requires the state to be endowed with abundant resources to compensate for the lack of allies.

A common form of non-alignment is neutrality. A neutral state should prevent violation of its impartiality by way of persuasion or force, in order to legitimise its stance. The breach of neutrality has two aspects. The first is external pertaining to the violation of territory by belligerents through occupation or transfer of war to the neutral's territory. The second aspect is internal, which concerns the neutral's obligation to abstain from providing the belligerents with military facilities.[75] An unusual form of non-alignment is isolation. Enver Hoxha's Albania is the best example. Also, as a non-aligned state strives to protect alone its national interests, neutrality and isolation resort to the same type of strategy, that is, extreme defence gauged in general military and diplomatic terms.

Fighting Alone [76]

This category involves forms that fall under the heading of defence and offence. The forms are detailed into common types of strategies, which are identical with the forms of military strategy, as I discuss them below. The strategy of fighting alone refers to cases where a state, whether part of an alliance or not, decides to defend its sovereignty or wage aggressive war without drawing on external sources of power. It is qualified as the common line at which non-alignment and alignment strategies meet.

75 Karsh, E. (1988). Neutrality and Small States. London: Routledge, chaps. 2-4.
76 I borrow this term from Labs, p. 390.

Table 1. Categories of Strategies.

Categories of Strategies	Forms	Types
Non-Alignment	Neutrality	
		Extreme Defence
	Isolation	
Fighting Alone	Defence	
		Annihilation
		Limited War
	Offence	
Alignment	Balancing	Military Balancing Diplomatic Balancing
	Accommodation	Constructive Accommodation Bandwagoning Appeasement Dependency

Finland's unilateral defence against the Soviet Union in 1940-1941 is a case in point. The German attack on Poland in September 1939 and the Italian attack on Greece in October 1940 are other examples: Germany and Italy were allies, but they initially conducted offensive operations separately, while Poland and Greece were under the protection of Britain and France, but they fought alone. Bulgaria's offensive during the Second Balkan war is another example: Bulgaria was isolated from its allies and the great powers were unwilling to come to its assistance. Greece's strategy against Turkey after 1974 and Israel's strategy in the Middle East are cases that demonstrate the intermediate line between non-alignment and alignment. Although Greece is a member of NATO and Israel retains a strategic relationship with the USA, they are prepared to resist unwelcome demands by manipulating external diplomatic power for their own purposes, even by fighting alone.

Alignment

Alignment mirrors the state's determination to choose sides. It aims to aggregate capabilities and increase power manipulation in interstate rivalries. Experience indicates that an important factor that motivates alignment is to counter both external and internal threats.[77] States facing this situation are likely to prefer external to internal balancing and mobilisation.[78] Although it is burden sharing, alignment entails strategic compromises.[79]

77 Harknett, R. J., & van den Berg, J. A. (1997). Alignment Theory and Interrelated Threats: Jordan and the Persian Gulf Crisis. Security Studies, 6 (3), pp. 112-153; David, S. R. (1991). Explaining Third World Alignment. World Politics, 43 (2), pp. 233-256.

78 Levy, J. S., & Barnett, M. N. (1992). Alliance Formation, Domestic Political Economy, and Third World Security. Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 14 (4), pp. 19-40; Barnett, M. N., & Levy, J. S. (1991). Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962-73. International Organization, 45 (3), pp. 369-395.

79 Layne. Strategy, p. 304. Essentially, external balancing entails cooperation which, in turn, points not simply to agreement, argument, reciprocity and defection but also to the creation and allocation of benefits. See, Zartman, I. W., & Touval, S. (2010). Introduction: Return to the Theories of Cooperation. In I. W. Zartman, & S. Touval (Eds.), p. 3, 7.

The problem is the availability of partners who share common interests and are willing to make concessions for certain benefits in return.

States, indeed, forfeit part of their autonomy by committing resources to their allies. But they tend to undertake lesser obligations and gain more profits. This is perplexing because a state should convince another state that it needs assistance, which is likely to be highly remunerative. Thus, the extent of sacrifice states make and the rewards they receive, with respect to whether they align with or against power and/or threat, can be taken as a criterion for distinguishing between two forms of alignment strategies:

- Balancing. With this strategy aligned states orchestrate their policies and use their combined power to compete power and/or protect themselves against threats both in the international system and domestic arena. The main way to balance is by forming or entering alliances.[80] I regard alliance as 'formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states'.[81] Balancing is structured around two types. The first is the military balancing strategy, which aims to achieve objectives by adding up military forces. The second is the diplomatic balancing strategy designed to secure political support.

Although states may opt for balancing to oppose internal security threats, as a rule they balance against other states posing the most powerful and threatening challenges. They take the side of their formal allies when they join a war or dispute.[82] Sometimes, they balance against an aggressive adversary whose power and threat are on the decline.[83] They also balance by aligning with other states to initiate a short-term tactical manoeuvre of 'divide and rule' in an 'imperial strategy of conquest'.[84]

- Accommodation. This refers to the state's decision to ally with a powerful state posing a potential threat or bring competing policies into compromise and/or conciliate domestic challenges. The main way to accommodate is by making peace settlement treaties, non-aggression pacts, and conflict resolution arrangements. Several overlapping terms, like bandwagoning, appeasement, rapprochement, are used to identify accommodation. Some qualification is appropriate.

As Stephen Walt puts it, bandwagoning is defined as aligning with 'the source of danger'. It has two faces. The first is appeasement. A state aligns with another powerful and

80 I identify alliance with a defence pact or gentlemen's agreement of 'alignment against'. Clarifying this point is partly due to Snyder, G. H. (1991)'s insights in his Alliances, Balance, and Stability. International Organization, 45 (1), p. 125 and (1990). Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut. Journal of International Affairs, 44 (1), pp. 104-105. Compare to Gibler, D. M., & Vasquez, J. A. (1998) who incorporate into the term any security-related commitment in their Uncovering the Dangerous Alliances, 1495-1980. International Studies Quarterly, 42 (4), p. 787.

81 Walt, S. M. (1994). The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p. 12. As Krebs, R. S. (1999) shows an alliance may exacerbate pre-existing tensions or intensify conflict among its members in Perverse Institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish Conflict. International Organisation, 53 (2), pp. 343-377.

82 Werner, S., & Lemke, D. (1997). Research Note. Opposites Do Not Attract: The Impact of Domestic Institutions, Power, and Prior Commitments on Alignment Choices. International Studies Quarterly, 41 (3), pp. 529-546.

83 Rosecrance, R., & Lo, C. (1996). Balancing, Stability, and War: The Mysterious Case of the Napoleonic International System. International Studies Quarterly, 40 (4), pp. 479-500.

threatening state to moderate aggressive intentions. It occurs when the state is weak and unable to activate allies, having no alternative but to deal with security challenges alone.[85] The second face takes shape when in wartime a state defects to the prevailing side with a view to sharing the spoils of victory. In this respect, small states tend to bandwagon with a threatening great power. But because they are more concerned about the regional balance of power than great power confrontations, they are inclined to balance against other small states posing the most direct challenges in their region. A dilemma arises as to the choice of allies should multiple security problems emerge. In this case, small states are expected to align with the great power and/or regional small state they perceive as least aggressive and most willing to advocate their demands in order to counter the predominant challengers.[86]

This understanding yields a number of anomalies. First of all, when a small state aligns with the least powerful and threatening great power and/or regional small state to balance against the prevailing local aggressor, what form of alignment strategy does this move reflect? Is it balancing or bandwagoning?[87] It is neither. Walt himself is ambiguous. He cautions that we should not confuse attempts at accommodation with bandwagoning 'especially when basic security arrangements are maintained. On the contrary, they reflect an astute effort to maximise security by aligning with one side while maintaining cordial relations with the other'.[88] Likewise, balancing does not preclude concessions to opponents and does not negate efforts intended to improve relations.[89]

Furthermore, recent research suggests that small states balance rather than bandwagon when challenged by an aggressive great power.[90] In exchange for concessions, states may bandwagon to prevent attack and secure demands.[91] They may jump on the aggressor's bandwagon to appease internal security challenges. But in this case what is the difference between balancing and bandwagoning? An answer based only on whether a state aligns against or with the source of danger is insufficient. Otherwise, why is the Munich incident in 1937 notoriously known as a case of bandwagoning and appeasement? Britain and France bandwagoned with Hitler's Germany in Europe to protect more vital interests in other regions. The same goes for Finlandisation. Finland bandwagoned with the Soviets to resist unwelcome demands. States seeking to preserve peace may adopt a strategy of tethering with a relatively equal adversary to contain reciprocal hostility.[92] Appeasement can be seen as a

84 Doyle, M. W. (1993). Politics and Grand Strategy. In Rosecrance, & Stein (Eds.), Domestic Bases, p. 31.

85 Larson, D. W. (1991). Bandwagon Images in American Foreign Policy: Myth or Reality? In R. Jervis, & J. Snyder (Eds.), Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 85-111.

86 Walt. Alliances, pp. 20-21, 29-31, 156-178.

87 Wohlforth, p. 27.

88 Walt, S. (1988). Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: The Case of Southwest Asia. International Organisation, 42 (2), p. 315.

89 Walt, S. (1992). Alliances, Threats, and U.S. Grand Strategy: A Reply to Kaufman and Labs. Security Studies, 1 (3), pp. 454, 471.

90 Labs; Mueller, K. (1995). Patterns of Alliance: Alignment Balancing and Stability in Eastern Europe. Security Studies, 5 (1), pp. 38-76.

91 Walt (1985) agrees with this point in his Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power. International Security, 9 (4), p. 8. See also Schweller, R. L. (1994). Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In. International Security, 19 (1), pp. 72-107.

92 Weitsman, P. A. (1997). Intimate Enemies: The Politics of Peacetime Alliances. Security Studies, 7 (1), pp. 156-192.

strategic move of conflict avoidance.[93] Evidence shows that sometimes states avoid balancing and 'pass the buck' to other states.[94]

Rival states, too, may decide to reach an *entente* in the face of common or separate security challenges.[95] Does this rapprochement reflect bandwagoning? If so, from the side of whom is it? If not, what is it? Germany and France in post-war Europe offers the best demonstration that accommodation should not be identified necessarily with bandwagoning and appeasement. Finally, a state is likely to make formal or informal security arrangements with another non-aggressive state to have a measure of authority over its state affairs. Patron-client relationships and the establishment of an international financial control are good examples.

Therefore, I group accommodation strategies into four constituent types. The first is the constructive accommodation strategy.[96] It is a strategy of reciprocity with which states seek reconciliation with opponents on account of the equivalence of benefits. It is defined as allying with: a) an assertive state to balance against the most dominant external and/or internal threat; b) an assertive state to gain time until balancing moves are carried out and/or domestic threats are dealt with; c) an assertive state by buck-passing the balancing to other states; d) an assertive state to secure demands or ensure a share of the spoils; e) a long-time enemy to manage or end an enduring confrontation, and f) the winning side in wartime. The second type is the bandwagoning strategy, which is an alignment with the predominant powerful and threatening state in order to resist unwelcome demands without resorting to force. Finlandisation is a case in point. The third type is appeasement, which is a strategy of capitulation to demands. Protectorates are good examples. The fourth type is the dependency strategy. I take it to pertain to a state's decision to request another state to patronise its international and domestic politics. Let me now present the strategies.

Military Strategy

Military strategy fights campaigns, commands coercion, and repulses attacks in wartime; and guards territorial integrity, underpins crisis management or low-intensity disputes settlement, and conduct peace or humanitarian operations in peacetime. The ultimate aim is to obtain power and security with the threat or the use of force.

Military strategy is traditionally understood in terms of offence and defence. This distinction implies that when aggression and conquest are readily feasible, war is likely to break out, and vice versa, when defence is predominant, war can be avoided; the common denominator is the relative ease of destroying an adversary's armed forces.[97] Sometimes, it

93 Dimuccio, R. B. A. (1998). The Study of Appeasement in International Relations: Polemics, Paradigms, and Problems. Journal of Peace Research, 35 (2), p. 253.

94 Kaufman, R. G. (1992). 'To Balance or To Bandwagon?' Alignment Decisions in 1930s Europe. Security Studies, 1 (3), pp. 417-447.

95 Antolik, M. (1990). Rediscovering Entente as a Policy of Accommodation. Diplomacy and Statecraft, 1 (2), pp. 137-155.

96 Shimshoni, J. (1988) uses this term to denote the pursuit of 'conciliation' where 'deterrent threats' are 'relevant and appropriate' in his Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p. 7.

97 van Evera, chaps. 6-7; Glaser, C. L., & Kaufmann, C. (1998). What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It? International Security, 22 (4), pp. 44-82; Lynn-Jones, S. M. (1995). Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics. Security Studies, 4 (4), pp. 660-691.

Table 2. Strategies

Strategies	Forms	Types
Military	Annihilation	Attrition
		Genocide
		Manoeuvre/*blitzkrieg*
	Limited War	
Diplomacy	Bullying	
	Firm-but-Flexible	
	Conciliatory	

denotes the expansion of war aims and the offensive maximisation of power, or the defensive preservation of the *status quo*.[98] Focusing on war initiation and duration, however, the offence-defence balance appears to equate grand strategy with military strategy. It reduces the function of military power to offence and defence, overlooking other alternatives like coercion and deterrence.[99] Also, it confuses offence and defence with the destruction of forces. On the battlefield, the objective of military strategy, whether offensive or defensive, is to destroy enemy forces.[100]

I suggest an inventory of military strategy along the axes of annihilation and limited war.[101] Annihilation aims to gain decisive victory through the complete disarmament or devastation of the enemy. It is classified into three types. The first is attrition, the goal of which is to wear away enemy forces gradually. It involves the ability to escalate over-whelming firepower against strongholds in set-piece engagements until decisive victory comes about in an all-out battle. From the standpoint of defence, attrition substantiates three responses: a) the static, which refers to a front-wide sequence of prepared fortifications arrayed in line along the border; b) the forward, which reflects a flexible deployment of forward forces up and down the frontier; c) and the defence in depth, in which the defending forces are deployed in parallel or dispersed positions all around the territory. As a whole, attrition requires the state to possess abundant resources of recruits, supplies, and weapons; thus, it results in tremendous human and material losses. The second type is genocide, which often materialises in peacetime with military operations other than war. It is designed to deploy violence in the form of mass massacres against specific sections of the population involved in an interstate or intrastate conflict. Essentially, military action is rationally organised and directed toward ethnic cleansing.

The third type, too, is manoeuvre/*blitzkrieg.* It aims to bring about the total defeat of an opponent with the least commitment of force. It represents an indirect approach to the

98 Labs, E. J. (1997). Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims. Security Studies, 6 (4), pp. 1-49.

99 Art, R. J. (1980). To What Ends Military Power? International Security, 4 (4), pp. 3-35.

100 Jones, A. (1996). Elements of Military Strategy: A Historical Approach. Westport: Praeger, p. xiii.

101 I borrow ideas from Arreguín-Toft, pp. 29-33; Paul. Assymetric, pp. 24-31; J. Baylis, J. Wirtz, E. Cohen, & C. S. Gray (Eds.) (2002), Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Reiter, D., & Meek, C. (1999). Determinants of Military Strategy, 1903-1994: A Quantitative Empirical Test. International Studies Quarterly, 43 (2), pp. 364-367; Mearsheimer, J. J. (1983). Conventional Deterrence. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 33-58; Garnett, J. (1976). Limited War. In J. Baylis, & K. Booth (Eds.), Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies (reproduced). London: Croom Helm, pp. 122-125; Brodie, B. (1970). Limited War. In J. Garnett (Ed.), Theories of Peace and Security: A Reader in Contemporary Strategic Thought. London: Macmillan, pp. 216-219.

paralysis of the opponent's will and ability to resist or expand.[102] It is based on the surprise deployment of highly mobile forces at weak points of the front line. After it breaks through the line and creates a breach, an attacker tries to race deep into the rear to disrupt communication, incapacitate command, dislodge reserves from fortified barracks, and encircle and cut off the mass of defending forces from their base. From the standpoint of defence, it attempts to outflank the invader and conduct skirmishes behind its rear, a mode of fighting masterminded by mobile defence/guerrilla warfare. Apart from a full-scale campaign, manoeuvre/*blitzkrieg* is selected to carry out either a preventive war, which is usually initiated by a state facing a mounting threat posed by, or the rising power of, a potential aggressor; or a pre-emptive strike intended to avert or slow down an attack by striking first.[103] It requires the state to possess well-organised military institutions able to concentrate and disperse forces with speed and a high degree of coordination. But, although it favours an economy of means, manoeuvre/*blitzkrieg* is dependent on intelligence information, the success of deception, the efficiency of sudden attack, the rate of advance, and the distance from base area.

The strategy of limited war can be employed both in an all-out military confrontation and in warlike and peace situations. It does not purport to win the field by the total, cumulative destruction of the adversary's forces and infrastructure. The aim is to strike out identified targets with low or high-intensity firepower through a limited-scale conventional combat. It often rests on surprise and mobility to inflict severe damage and present a *fait accompli* before the adversary's main strength gets alerted. It may realise gunboat diplomacy, coercive diplomacy, crisis management, and peacekeeping or peace enforcement, in which the objective is to push the adversary to comply with demands or back off with the application of limited force. In addition, it may carry out a preventive war or pre-emptive attack and perform punishment or retaliation.

The means of military strategy involve communication, equipment, command systems, the techniques of combat, and the logistics of supply. Politically speaking, the principal means are manpower and armament. That is, the military strategy attempts to maintain or increase manpower and modernise facilities and weapon systems. It is designed in relation to the relative force size of actual or potential adversaries and the sort of threats. It should match by proportion the adversaries' forces or trade off quantitative weakness for qualitative supremacy in organisation and technology. It is in effect dependent on the state's ability to extract from society human and material resources. The problem is that the issues of the distribution of national income, the rate of growth, the obsolescence or non-obsolescence of equipment, the competence of officers, the mobilisation of troops, all are liable to cause a domestic security dilemma. The cost of armaments, for instance, may grow faster than the capacity of the economy to procure funds for additional defence spending.

In sum, military strategy is an effective tool for dealing with external and internal threats. It prepares the groundwork for forming alliances and supplying devices for bargaining agreements in case the threat or the use of force proves more efficient than the economic and diplomatic dimensions of power. Its disadvantage lies in the fact that it might exacerbate,

102 Liddell Hart.

103 van Evera, chaps. 3-4; Renshon, J. (2006). Why Leaders Choose War: The Psychology of Prevention. Westport: Praeger; Reiter, D. (1995). Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen. International Security, 20 (2), pp. 5-34; Levy, J. S. (1987). Research Note: Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War. World Politics, XL (1), pp. 82-107.

apart from domestic security dilemma, the security and defence dilemmas and drive the state to undertake commitments that wear down its power and security.

Diplomacy

Diplomacy is the art of communication, bargaining, and give-and-take compromises. The ultimate aim is to secure allies, neutralise adversaries, manage crises, resolve conflicts, and attain national objectives short of war. The means involve initiative, negotiation, persuasion, coalition-building, threats, punishments, *fait accompli*, and rewards.

Diplomacy largely selects among three options.[104] The first is the bullying diplomacy, in which the objective is to bring about the unilateral capitulation of an opponent and maximise gains. It proceeds from tough and unyielding positions, which leaves no room for reciprocal accommodation. It relies on the progressive escalation of threats and punishments.[105] Hence, representing a stance of intransigence, it either weakens or reinforces resistance to unwelcome demands. The second is the firm-but-flexible diplomacy intended to reciprocate compromising moves and conclude mutually beneficial agreements. It starts with a firm position, but it responds with flexibility to moderate requests. It is based on a mix of promises, rewards, and negative sanctions, being an effort at 'producing and eliciting rather than demanding and forcing'.[106] It adopts an attitude of 'carrot-and-stick', which paves the way for rivals to settle disputes in a cooperative way.[107] The third option is the conciliatory diplomacy, with which a state shows signs of willingness to make concessions. It overlooks the equivalence of benefits or the symmetry of satisfaction for the sake of conflict resolution. It is ineffective however, if the adversary has infinite demands.

Unless it is perceived as a sign of weakness or unwillingness to resort to force, diplomacy is a better cost-effective tool than the use of military power, having the potential to extend the state's power beyond its real capacity. Conducted prudently and depending on the availability of alternatives, the level of commitment to coveted demands, and the ability to exploit bargaining tactics, it is likely to overturn disposing structural forces and get more than state capabilities may dictate, thereby proving to be a powerful weapon in the hands of small states.[108] What makes for competent diplomacy, in fact, is the ability of leadership to set priorities, concert moves, and trade-off less critical for more vital interests. Equally important for it are diplomatic channels and personal ties between governments. This network is a useful source of public relations and information that allows the state's leadership to assess situational conditions and take decisions; as well as to persuade adversaries and allies that their national interests and demands are fair, and build up the reputation of the state as a reliable partner.

104 I follow Huth, P. K. (1988)'s classification in his Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 51-53.

105 Leng, R. J., & Wheeler, H. G. (1979). Influence Strategies, Success, and War. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 23 (4), pp. 658-659.

106 Kaplowitz, N. (1984). Psychopolitical Dimensions of International Relations: The Reciprocal Effects of Conflict Strategies. International Studies Quarterly, 28 (4), p. 381.

107 Leng, R. J. (1993). Reciprocating Influence Strategies in Interstate Crisis Bargaining. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 37 (1), pp. 3-41.

108 Habeeb, W. M. (1988). Power and Tactics in International Negotiation: How Weak Nations Bargain With Strong Nations. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, chap. 2.

Whether military strategy and diplomacy, to come full circle, attain their aims is not only a matter of the perfection of state leadership in fulfilling the bridging function between structural conditions and the making of grand strategy. It is also a matter of their ability to rally their people round the flag, an ability that facilitates and underpins state building and ruling. The effectiveness of grand strategy 'increasingly becomes a function of how well one is able to manipulate symbols to create or reinforce images'.[109] Articulating and exercising symbols and images reflects an effort to shape or change by consensus the beliefs and value orientations of a people in order to inculcate in them the self-image of a community. It is the art of constructing, cementing, and reproducing a standard of national identity, defined in terms of external distinctiveness and internal coherence.[110]

National identity formation involves two processes.[111] The first is the construction of a historical narrative, which establishes the glorious origins of the nation, cultivates a mythic image of the people, defines the meaning of the shared consciousness, depicts the political and cultural space of the state, and provides a link between the degraded present and the promised future. The second is the construction of a predominant frame of reference, most often substantiated by a legitimising state ideology, which is reproduced through public education, military service, and cultural activities.

State ideology pertains to the preferred idea of the state defined in terms of nationalism and organising ideologies.[112] It is designed to connect social practices to national identity and discourse, homogenise local identities, eliminate traditional loyalties, set out the stakes of the power game and articulate a vision of common mission. Not only is it the primary frame that state officials deploy to tie the state together with society into an integrated political and cultural entity. It is, above all, the primary mechanism of consensus creation that musters loyalty and legitimises resource extraction and strategic choices; thus, it is the main source of state authority and legitimacy. But state ideology as a rule frames the historical space and time in such a way that it justifies claims of supposed historical heritage or divine revelation, silences competing ethnic identities, whitewashes past wrong-doings, exaggerates tragedies, stimulates chauvinism or revenge, and invokes hegemonic aspirations. In effect, it socialises the state's elites and people in particular symbolic myths and national preferences, which may misconstrue the images of enmity and amity, call to fatal or mistimed action, and defy imperatives for change.[113]

Having an in-built feature of planning, is grand strategy a conscious design? One could assert that I give rationality and unity to separate strategies. Two counter-arguments can be set forth. The first is about the instrumentality of concepts. No matter how rigorous the conceptualisation is, the term is nothing less than an abstract mental construct intended to

[109] Foster, G. D. (1990). A Conceptual Foundation for a Theory of Strategy. Washington Quarterly, 13 (1), p. 52.

[110] Kowert, P. A. (1999). National Identity: Inside and Out. Security Studies, 8 (2/3), pp. 1-34.

111 Sources informing my understanding include Levinger, M. & Lytle, P. F. (2001). Myth and Mobilisation: The Triadic Structure of Nationalist Rhetoric. Nations and Nationalism, 7 (2), pp. 175-194; Barnett, M. (1999). Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: Israel's Road to Oslo. European Journal of International Relations, 5 (1), pp. 9-16.

112 Buzan. People, pp. 69-82.

113 Taliaferro, pp. 219-222; Schweller, R. L. (2009). Neoclassical Realism and State Mobilization: Expansionist Ideology in the Age of Mass Politics. In Lobell, Ripsman, & Taliaferro (Eds.), pp. 227-228; Pettman, J. J. (1998). Nationalism and After. Review of International Studies, 24 (special issue), pp. 153-154; van Evera, S. (1994). Hypotheses on Nationalism and War. International Security, 18 (4), pp. 26-30; George, A. L. (1987). Ideology and International Relations: A Conceptual Analysis. Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 9 (1), pp. 5-7.

codify cognitive material. It is an intellectual tool of reconstructing concrete perceptions of experience. The second argument holds that whatever lack of consistency in design and management, the state acts or reacts by strategic choices to international and domestic challenges. Governments need strategy because they 'have real and difficult choices to make about how they look after their own people and act beyond their borders'.[114] Grand strategy exists *per se*, in one form or another. The question is not whether grand strategy exists or not, but how and why choices and moves associated with a particular combination of means and ends work or do not work. What is debatable is whether grand strategy serves policy aims. The concept by no means implies that state leadership has a master plan for effective action. It denotes that this action is carried into effect, and is more or less subject to historical scrutiny.

But before I proceed with the case study, I recapitulate the rationale and the argument advanced in this book. In the context of structural conditions of the past and present, grand strategy is a function of human interaction and consent. This is to imply that it is the objectified product of the dialectical interplay of agency and structure, not the product of predetermined historical forces. Being embedded in everyday human relationships, it becomes the medium through which human beings constitute and reproduce the material reality of the social world. By extension, systemic and domestic structural conditions make grand strategy and constitute through it state behaviour and the material reality of statehood, filtered and fulfilled as this process is by state leadership. Based on this line of reasoning, I argue that it is through grand strategy that the interplay of the international system and the state's domestic structure affords small states partnership value and autonomy of action in achieving ends in view. Grand strategy, therefore, matters through the response to structural imperatives to small states in pursuing and attaining the enlargement of their territorially ordered rule.

[114] Freedman, L. (2001). Grand Strategy in the Twenty-First Century. Defence Studies, 1 (1), p. 14.

PART II
HISTORY BEFORE 1909

Chapter 3

THE FORMATION OF THE MODERN GREEK STATE

Foreign patronage and the peculiarities of Greek social formation mutually constituted modern Greece until after the turn of the twentieth century.[1] Not only did they leave behind their deepest mark on the liberation struggle against Ottoman rule launched in March 1821.[2] They evolved into the twin predominant determinants of Greek historical development. In this chapter I examine the evolution of these determinants and how their interplay made the strategies of the irredentism of Greek Great Idea.

1. FOREIGN PATRONAGE

Greece became the first independent state in the Balkans but without being a signatory to the act of its inception, on 7 May 1832.[3] Greek insurrection was one of the effects of the unabated power erosion of the Ottoman Empire.[4] The great powers of the era-Britain, France, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Prussia-received it with uneasiness by virtue of their fear that it was likely to imperil stability, a complication that was aggravated by their rivalries over the partition of spoils in the Near East.[5] They agreed in good faith to stand aside,

1 My understanding of the Greek historical development benefits from insights of Dertilis; Tsoucalas, C. (1992). Εξάρτηση και Αναπαραγωγή: Ο Κοινωνικός Ρόλος των Εκπαιδευτικών Μηχανισμών στην Ελλάδα (1830-1922) [Dependence and Reproduction: The Social Role of the Educational Mechanisms in Greece (1830-1922)] (sixth edition). Athens: Themelio; His (1989). Κοινωνική Ανάπτυξη και Κράτος: Η Συγκρότηση του Δημόσιου Χώρου στην Ελλάδα (Social Development and the State: The Construction of the Public Space in Greece) (fourth edition). Athens: Themelio; Mouzelis, N. P. (1986). Politics in the Semi-Periphery: Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialisation in the Balkans and Latin America. London: Macmillan; his (1979). Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment. New York: Holmes & Meier; Mavrogordatos, G. T. (1983). Stillborn Republic: Social Coalitions and Party Strategies in Greece, 1922-1936. Berkeley: University of California Press.

2 N. P. Diamandouros, J. P. Anton, & J. A. Petropoulos (Eds.) (1976), Hellenism and the First Greek War of Liberation (1821-1830): Continuity and Change (No. 156). Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies.

3 Standard sources are Svoronos, N. G. (1986). Επισκόπηση της Νεοελληνικής Ιστορίας (Overview of the Modern Greek History) (ninth edition). Athens: Themelio; Clogg, R. (1986). A Short History of Greece (second edition). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Dakin, D. (1972). The Unification of Greece, 1770-1923. London: Ernest Benn; Campbell, J., & Sherrard, P. (1968). Modern Greece. London: Ernest Benn; Stavrianos, L. S. (1963). The Balkans Since 1453. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.

4 Anderson, M. S. (1966). The Eastern Question, 1774-1923. London: Macmillan.

5 Kagan, K. (1997/98). The Myth of the European Concert: The Realist-Institutionalist Debate and Great Power Behavior in the Eastern Question, 1821-41. Security Studies, 7 (2), pp. 1-57.

leaving Ottoman suppression to take its course. The Porte however failed to wipe out the rebels, who held ground in much of mainland Greece and commanded the Aegean Sea. The protection of great power interests in the eastern Mediterranean was at stake. This sparked off a change of attitude. The powers were pushed to design a settlement to Greek liking but consistent with their wishes; above all, not to negate the principle of the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire, who still was considered the key guardian of security in the region.

Britain, France, and Russia, known as the protecting powers of the Greek cause, were cautious not to force their hand.[6] In order to manipulate it as a pawn, they sealed their determination to inaugurate an independent Kingdom with a hereditary monarch. The 1830 London Protocol offered the crown to Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, who, having failed to commit the powers to enlarge Greek borders, resigned. Two years later, the protecting powers and Bavaria concluded the Treaty of London, which promulgated the creation of Greece with a small territory embracing the Peloponnese and the islands of Cyclades and Euboia and extending northward from Arta in the west to the gulf of Volos in the east. The powers provided a loan of £2.4 million and claimed, under their treaty pledge of the guarantee of Greek sovereignty, a right of interference in domestic affairs. And Prince Otho, the younger second son of King Ludwig I of Bavaria, ascended the throne and until he came of age a council of three Bavarian regents was entitled to rule with the help of a Bavarian army of 3,500 men.

It was, therefore, the involvement of the powers that tipped the scales in favour of the insurgent Greeks and set the stage for the formation of their modern state. But the latter was endowed with limited borders, poor indigenous sources of growth, a small population of about 800,000, a foreign monarch whose authority was not framed by a constitution, and a debt disproportionate to its ability to reimburse. Two million Greeks and prosperous centres of Hellenism remained still under Ottoman domination. In reality, the new Kingdom was put in the protecting powers' tutelage and became the checkerboard arena of their antagonisms. They regarded it not so much as an addition to their greatness, as a diplomatic game through which they tried to deny gains to each other; the undertaking of Greek statehood acted both as a bridgehead of expansion and a check on the balance of power in the area. Beyond the obligation to guarantee Greece's territorial integrity by joint action, each of the powers reserved to itself freedom to exercise the right of protection at its discretion. Each of them established close ties with Greek elites not because it had much to gain from acquiring a client but because it had much to lose from a further disturbance of the newly consolidated *status quo*. In a sense, foreign intervention, patronage, and dependency became substantiated as part of the social material reality of the Greek world, a systemic force that filtered and reproduced the process of state building and ruling.

By the mid-nineteenth century, Britain being the pre-eminent of the great powers was to emerge as the unchallenged patron of the Greek state. While French and Russian fortunes were low, the British had a say in the composition of governments. They were concerned to preserve the royal regime, discourage expansionist adventurism, and use the country as an auxiliary bulwark against aggression in the eastern landscape. Apart from rare exceptions, they refrained from direct interference and unilateral display of force. They commanded

6 Rendall, M. (2000). Russia, the Concert of Europe, and Greece, 1821-29: A Test of Hypotheses About the Vienna System. Security Studies, 9 (4), pp. 52-90; Miller, B. & Kagan, K. (1997). The Great Powers and Regional Conflicts: Eastern Europe and the Balkans from the Post-Napoleonic Era to the Post-Cold War Era. International Studies Quarterly, 41 (1), p. 68.

domestic politics via diplomatic and clientele channels and resorted to coercion only in concert with other powers.

London did nothing to rescue Otho's reign when popular exasperation at his nepotism turned into an uprising in October 1862. The protecting powers were not content with Otho's expansionist designs. By fomenting the irredentist creed, he was considered incompetent in containing the nationalist fever and cementing domestic stability.[7] While the powers grasped the opportunity of Otho's dethronement to tune their interests with Greek wishes, they sealed their determination to bestow the kingship on a person of their preference. They decided on Prince George, the eighteen-year-old son of the heir to the Danish throne. Although the accession of King George I was sanctioned by a Greek constitutional assembly in March 1863, Greece was not a party to a treaty signed between Denmark and the protecting powers in July, which, in addition, envisaged a Greek acquisition of the Ionian islands at a time within British discretion. The new monarch was assigned to arrest the irredentist tide. In March 1864 Britain gave up the Ionian islands, a gesture that aimed at supporting the new dynasty.

When a Cretan insurrection broke out in 1866, the powers adopted a negative stance. Alarmed by an acute increase in agitation for the *enosis* (union) with Greece, they worked jointly to restore peace. After a renewed Russian-Turkish war resulted in the establishment of Great Bulgaria by the Treaty of San Stefano in March 1878, Britain took the initiative, in June, not only to strike a deal with Turkey to administer Cyprus as a *place d' armes*, but also to summon the Congress of Berlin; the ensuing agreement of which provided for the recognition of Serbia as an independent state, the inception of a small principality of Bulgaria under Ottoman suzerainty, and the enlargement of the northern Greek frontier. But Ottoman dilatory tactics induced London to convene a new conference, in which the powers arranged for Greece to acquire Thessaly and the district of Arta in Epirus in May 1881.[8] Four years later, Bulgaria's unilateral proclamation of independence and annexation of eastern Rumelia pushed Athens to mobilise forces and lay claim to Epirus and Crete. Ultimately, the move ended in a Greek rout.

The outbreak of yet another revolt in Crete in 1896 developed into a disastrous defeat at the hands of Ottomans in April 1897. British passivity to work for a blockade stimulated Athens not simply to encourage the dispatch of supplies and volunteers to the island but also to contemplate military engagement with the Porte. As the crisis persisted unabated, the powers were upset. They acted in concert to land troops on Crete and warned both Athens and Constantinople not to resort to violence. However, the former took the offensive driven by a miscalculation that the powers would move into line with it. When the Greek army trailed back in disarray, the protecting powers and Germany intervened. They dictated peace terms that favoured the Greeks. Crete became an autonomous but tributary principality with Prince George, the second son of the Greek king, as governor. In return, Greece accepted the authority of an international financial commission to monitor the service of its foreign loans.

By the turn of the twentieth century, in short, Greece had made piecemeal acquisitions thanks to foreign intervention and patronage; a systemic force that proved predominant in

7 Legg, K. R., & Roberts, J. M. (1997). Modern Greece: A Civilization on the Periphery. Boulder: Westview Press, p. 58.

8 Kofos, E. (1975). Greece and the Eastern Crisis 1875-1878 (No. 148). Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies; Marcopoulos, G. J. (1968). 'King George I and the Expansion of Greece, 1875-1881. Balkan Studies, 9 (1), pp. 21-40.

determining the course of its historical development.[9] Territorial growth appeared to have been the result of gestures of good will on the part of Britain. In reality, it was the outcome of competition among the protecting powers, who manipulated their treaty guarantee of Greek independence to deny relative gains to each other. This sort of checkerboard game evolved into a stage for interference in domestic affairs. Great power envoys commanded party and state leadership and exercised influence on the making of political and economic arrangements. From this angle, foreign intervention enabled and constrained the doings and identity of the Greeks; and by extension shaped and consolidated the territorially ordered rule and material reality of Greek statehood. But it was not the sole shaping factor in the genesis and expansion of the Greek state, insofar as it was prefigured by particular historically constructed domestic conditions. It was the degeneration of the war of independence into internecine strife and, afterwards, the internal power conflicts that laid the ground for the protecting powers to institutionalise the patronage of the infant state and build its ruling system along lines alien to Greek customs. In this sense, the constitution and enlargement of Greece's territorially ordered rule might be said to have been driven by the dialectical interplay of foreign patronage and Greek polity. Hence, the next task is to explore the peculiarities of Greek social formation.

2. DOMESTIC PECULIARITIES

Greek people inhabited lands in which residues of ancient motifs and linguistic symbols inspired ancestry memories of shared civilisation and a feeling of community belonging.[10] They constituted a collection of human beings with a territory and binding elements of common cultural heritage, an *ethnie*, unmade though it was in political and ideological terms.[11] In 1782 Meletios, a Greek geographer, asserted that the homeland of ethnic Greeks embraced 'Epirus, Acarnania, Attica, the Peloponnesus, Thessaly, Aetolia, Macedonia, Thrace, the islands of the Ionian and the Aegean Seas and all Asia Minor'.[12] This depiction of the Greek space, which encapsulated a perception articulated in the literate circles of the day, was 'part of a composite imperial pattern - from the empire of Alexander to the Ottoman Empire'.[13] Moreover, the Greeks were a community that possessed a measure of status and authority among the Christian population of the Ottoman Empire.

9 Couloumbis, T. A., Petropoulos, J., & Psomiades, H. (1976). Foreign Interference in Greek Politics: A Historical Perspective. New York: Pella.

10 Koliopoulos, J. S, & Veremis, T. M. (2002). Greece: The Modern Sequel from 1831 to the Present. London: Hurst, p. 1; Mazower, M. (2001). The Balkans. London: Phoenix Press, pp. 47-49; Svoronos, N. G. (1987). Ανάλεκτα Νεοελληνικής Ιστορίας και Ιστοριογραφίας (Essays on Modern Greek History and Historiography) (third edition). Athens: Themelio, pp. 68-74, 95-196. For an insightful and well argued theoretical background to the point raised here as to the historical evolution of modern nationalism and national identity, see Roshwald, A. (2006). The Endurance of Nationalism: Ancient Roots and Modern Dilemmas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

11 Svoronos, N. G. (2004). Το Ελληνικό Έθνος: Γένεση και Διαμόρφωση του Νέου Ελληνισμού (The Greek Nation: The Genesis and Formation of the New Hellenism). Athens: Polis, pp. 22, 26-27, 106-109; Roudometof, V. (1998). From Rum Millet to Greek Nation: Enlightment, Secularization, and National Identity in Ottoman Balkan Society, 1453-1821. Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 16 (1), p. 12.

12 As quoted in Deschamps, G. (1909). Hellenism in Turkish Area. In G. F. Abbott (Ed.), Greece in Evolution. London: Fisher Unwin, p. 72.

13 Tolias, G. (2001). Totius Graecia: Nicolaos Sophianos's Map of Greece and the Transformations of Hellenism. Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 19 (1), p. 16.

In the first place, the Greeks were inaugurated the 'rightful' agent of Orthodox faith. Ottoman subjects were classified into *millets* ('nations') with respect to their religion. The Orthodox *millet* (the Romans) was second to the Moslems. The Ottomans were accustomed to call it the 'Greek' (or Rum). The term identified the Orthodox subjects with the ethnic Greek or Greco-phone element. The result was that the hierarchy of the Constantinople Patriarchate and the prelates of the other Patriarchates were predominated by Orthodox subjects, who were Greek or Hellenised by language and education. The ecumenical Patriarch was the *millet bashi* (head) who exercised secular power and held civil jurisdiction in the name of Orthodox Christianity, and who was commissioned to rally the loyalty of his flock to Ottoman rule. The senior echelons of the Church, therefore, became a distinct elite of men of Orthodox lore, a religious oligarchy that constituted the nucleus of a pre-revolutionary Greek ruling class.

The fact that the liturgy in the ecumenical Patriarchate was conducted in Greek and the worship originated in the Byzantine tradition acted as a catalyst of the intellectual and cultural unity of Hellenism. By articulating folk myths and ecclesiastical legends, the clergy was instrumental in creating a popular discourse with universal, religious and imperialist overtones. A widely circulated prophecy attributed the Ottoman yoke to divine punishment and predicted that only through the Church and the assistance of the *xanthon genos* (fair-haired race), namely the Russians, would the Greeks as a 'chosen people' restore the Byzantine empire. This ethno-religious narrative, which prevailed through education and folkloric habitude, aimed to muster the illiterate and wretched Greek masses into the fold of the Church, not to cultivate a particular Greek nationalist creed. It had nevertheless the consequence of identifying the meaning and mission of Greek community with the imperial legacy of Byzantium and the holy universe of the Orthodox Church. It invoked a sense of ethnic identity.[14] It was in this respect that the discourse of Orthodoxy set off the historically embedded ideological process for the making of the 'imagined' Greek nation.

In the second place, the decline of the Ottoman Empire favoured the fortunes of certain groups of Greeks. Because the imperial domains were extended, the Sultan delegated liberties of self-government to province governors. With the weakening of central authority, many governors began to defy his power. One of the repercussions was that the *timar* system of landholding was distorted. The *spahis* (the timar holder), who previously had retained a portion of the harvest in exchange for which they ran local administration, *de facto* became an owner; a landlord who stripped the Sultan of his hereditary ownership right over the *timar* (the cultivated land) and obtained a right over the *chiflik* (the private land). The peasants were deprived of their hereditary right to cultivate small plots of the *timar* providing rent payment. They were dragged into serfdom, using their earlier landholdings as sharecropper tenants.

Meanwhile, the structure of Greek social strata of all shades was fashioned after a pattern of family formation, underpinned as it was by the fragmentation of terrain.[15] A small group of individuals based on kinship ties became the patriarchal head of an association of families, which were drawn together by bonds of all sorts on grounds of service and attachment. The *chiflik* relations of production enabled several chiefs of families that inhabited the highlands or the plain of continental Greece to acquire estates and livestock. They proved able not only to accumulate wealth and consolidate themselves as notables but also to make grade as *kotjabashis* (heads of districts) and fulfil functions of administration. Establishing

14 Forster, E. S. (1960). A Short History of Modern Greece, 1821-1956 (third edition). London: Methuen, p. 3.

connections with Ottoman functionaries, they carved out their own spheres of influence, within the bounds of which they commanded the allocation of resources and the means of violence. As they were in a position to provide livelihood and protection to their family members and wider following, doing favours developed into an art of *rouspheti* (the reciprocal dispensation of favours). This practice transformed, on the one hand, poor subjects into clients, who were obliged to submit loyalty throughout their life; and on the other, prominent elements of the family into patrons, who distributed benefits to their clientele, ranging from shelter and employment to advancement.

Patronage politics cultivated a sense of partisan identity and patriotism. Family allegiances evolved into parochial bases of power and laid the foundations for the growth of a distinct elite of men of landed property, an oligarchy of *tzakia* (great families) that became the dominant faction of the Greek ruling class. But competition and matters of honour broke up this oligarchy into rival fractions, giving birth to a pervasive social cleavage.

Those who turned to brigandage triggered yet another cleavage. Hardships forced landless peasants and shepherds to cross the threshold of lawlessness and take to the hills bearing arms. Known as *klephts* ('robbers'), outlaws of that species organised themselves into brigand bands on the family model of hierarchy and lived by plundering and providing protection in return for food and facilities. As this form of authority defiance developed into institutions of opposition, the *klephts* were glorified in the popular imagination as symbols of Greek resistance to Ottoman rule. The chieftains of the bandits, however, were men of self-interest. Once they secured amnesty from the rulers, they reverted to the other side of the law. Called the *armatoles* ('repentant sinners'), they joined existing bodies of irregular guards or continued to serve as lawful commanders of their bands of warriors, and were employed by Moslem vassals and Greek notables to crush their former fellows and collect taxes. Vested with formal power, they abused their commissions to acquire property and retinue. Although they sought to thrust aside each other, social antecedents and expertise in guerrilla warfare rendered the chieftains of the *klephts* and *armatoles* an elite of men of arms, a militarily powerful oligarchy of *tzakia* that established itself as a competitive faction of the Greek ruling class.

Two additional clusters of Greeks reached prominence. The first was the Phanariots, originating in the patriarchal quarter of Constantinople, the Phanar. They were a social stratum of higher education and linguistic accomplishment, whose skills and services Constantinople enlisted to administer the Ottoman Empire's affairs. They were attached to diplomatic and military offices of high-ranking authority, like those of the principal dragoman (interpreter) of the Porte, dragoman of the Fleet, and *hospodars* (princes) of the Danubian principalities. In addition, they controlled the ecumenical Patriarchate's non-ecclesiastical operations and had a say in the election of its hierarchy. The second category was the merchants, who commanded the Ottoman trade in the eastern Mediterranean. They were settled in urban centres and ports of the Empire and enjoyed predominance in most of the Aegean islands and coastal areas in Macedonia, Thrace, the western shores of Asia Minor and the Pontos at the Black sea. Also, they established mercantile communities in Egypt, the Danubian principalities and southern Russia.

15 Campbell, J. K. (1974). Honour, Family, and Patronage: A Study of Institutions and Moral Values in a Greek Mountain Community. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 213-262.

The Phanariots and merchants, grouped in family and clientele networks, were small but antagonistic factions of the Greek ruling class by virtue of their divisions related to social background and occupational status. As powerful oligarchies of *tzakia* in the cosmopolitan circles of Constantinople, however, they had in common that they appealed little to their compatriots and remained cut off from power arrangements prevailing in Greece. They, too, represented the elites of the Greek world that developed links with Europe. Content with the Western model of polity and rule of law, they disseminated the ideas of Enlightenment and French revolution; championed the spread of the Greek language and the revival of the thought of the classical age of ancient Greece; and sponsored the establishment of Greek schools, the publication of secular literature, and the training of Greek students in European universities.[16] As this 'national', cultural rejuvenation gathered momentum, it produced a generation of intellectuals who gave credit to the achievements of Western scholarship, the heritage of antiquity, and the racial continuity between the Ottoman and the ancient Greeks. Also, they elaborated and spoke a novel language, the *katharevousa*, literally 'purifying' Greek, which restored to the language of ordinary people, the *demotici*, ancient words and usages.

The result was the construction of a revisionist historical narrative based on values of the Hellenic days of yore and the innovations of Western progress. The articulation of the classic Greek past generated an alternative conception of ethnic consciousness, which had universal and liberal elements, thereby challenging the cultural hegemony of the Church. This set the stage for an ideological schism in the Greek social formation: the controversy between West and East, a lack of congruence between those who were admirers of Western rationalism, known as 'modernizers', and those who adhered to indigenous customs associated with the tenets of Orthodox Christianity, the 'traditionalists'.[17]

The pre-independence Greek society, in sum, was divided into two blocs of classes-with all the analytical ambiguity that the distinction involves: the ruling class consisting of the oligarchies of higher clergy, land-owning notables, chieftains, Phanariots, and merchants; and the masses of the peasantry and animal husbandry. Regional configurations of social relations and the concomitant differences within and between districts of mainland Greece and between the latter and the Ottoman lands settled by Greeks, including the diaspora, added complexity to class differentiation. It was the interaction of these two factors (understood as structures) that produced family affiliations, factionalism, localism, clientelism and brigandage (understood as social practices) and their ensuing social cleavages related to status and authority (understood as objectified products); and thus constituted and substantiated the social material order of Greek life. And the antithesis between religion and reason (understood as a mental construct) not simply reshaped cultural divisions but also provided an ideological basis for conflicts in the political sphere between two opposing camps, the traditionalists and the modernizers; a basis that was substantiated by two respective cross-cutting but polarised discourses, which articulated competing notions of Greekness.

The fact that the image of nationhood was as much vague as divisive and the process of its construction preceded and transcended the formation of the state marked an antinomy destined to circumscribe the course of Greek historical development. The 'nation', which

16 Clogg, R. (1980). Elite and Popular Culture in Greece Under Turkish Rule. In J. T. A. Koumoulides (Ed.), Hellenic Perspectives: Essays in the History of Greece. Boston: University Press of America, pp. 112-122.

17 Diamandouros, N. (1972). Political Modernisation, Social Conflict and Cultural Cleavage in the Formation of the Modern Greek State 1821-1828. New York: unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Columbia University.

should inculcate in Greek people the idea of the nation-state, was fragmented in political and ideological terms. Not only did the opposition between modernity and tradition foment conflicting national sentiments. It prevented the forging of a single legitimising ideology intended to socialise the masses in a particular vision of statehood. None of the factions of the Greek ruling class reconciled the predominant strands of Hellenic thought into a historical synthesis and rose to 'organic' hegemonic national leadership.[18]

The myth of ethnic mission related to the recovery of the Byzantine homeland was to constitute not only the binding element of Greek social formation but also the underlying common foundation of the antithetical discourses of modernity and tradition. Despite such influences,

> there was never…any serious aim to restore a Byzantine empire…. Most modern Greeks merely envisaged a Greek state covering those territories where there were strong centres of Hellenism, including those regions where the Slav-speaking populations might be large…to recognise the superiority of Greek culture, and even to aspire...to a Greek education and regard themselves as Greeks.[19]

Hence, the umbilical cord connecting the modernizers with the traditionalists was the aspiration to gain a foothold in Constantinople and restore the territories of Byzantium in the form of a Greek state; in the sense that the people of Greek ethnic descent were to control the state without eliminating or assimilating other nationalities. Approached from this viewpoint, the Greek national consciousness, though in the making, was imperial rather than purely national.[20] The common, universal and imperial mode of thought of the competing national narratives was to overshadow ideological inconsistencies and social cleavages and become the crux of the Greek *Megali Idea* (Great Idea).[21]

When the March 1821 liberation struggle launched, therefore, there was scarcely a plain frame of reference designed to connect the historical time and space to a single standard and narrative of national identity. The demand for the creation of a Greek nation-state, associated with a secular ideology of national assertion, was striking by its absence. Driven by their interests within the Ottoman administration, the modernist and traditionalist elements of the oligarchies developed half-hearted commitment to the task of national revolution.[22] They advocated moderation until the Empire broke down from within. They were divided into those, mainly the ecclesiastical establishment and notables, who ascribed their lot to divine dispensation; and those, the Phanariots and merchants, who laid stress on the educational

18 In the Gramscian sense that leaders as 'organic intellectuals' develop and inculcate in the consciousness of people their values and norms in order not only to legitimate their strategies and exercise hegemony based on persuasion and intentional compliance but also to modify the material reality of the social world.

19 Dakin, p. 8.

20 I take national to denote a national group's political attachment to a geographically bounded territory and imperial a national group's political attachment to indefinable bounds of space. Following insights in Wellings, B. (2002). Empire-Nation: National and Imperial Discourses in England. Nations and Nationalism, 8 (1), pp. 95-109; Rowley, D. G. (2000). Imperial Versus National Discourse: The Case of Russia. Nations and Nationalism, 6 (1), pp. 23-42; Buzan. People, pp. 72-77.

21 For versions of the Great Idea, see Veremis, T. (1989). From the National State to the Stateless Nation 1821-1910. European History Quarterly, 19 (2), pp. 135-149; Skopetea, E. (1988). Το 'Πρότυπο Βασίλειο' και η Μεγάλη Ιδέα: Όψεις του Εθνικού Προβλήματος στην Ελλάδα (1830-1880) [The 'Model Kingdom' and the Great Idea: Aspects of the National Problem in Greece (1830-1880)]. Athens: Polytypo, chap. 4.

22 Woodhouse, C. M. (1998). Modern Greece: A Short History (fifth edition revised). London: Faber & Faber, pp. 125-129.

regeneration of the 'nation' through which the Greeks were to come into office when the Sultan found himself on the brink of collapse. Only a few, the intellectuals and diaspora bourgeoisie, who subscribed to the nationalist ideas of their age or whose interests happened to be marred by Ottoman decline, were prepared to enlist their support. They were likewise divided into those who saw merit in a Balkan movement and those who entertained a Greek revolt.

Much to the discomfort of the established elites, it was the intelligentsia and merchant diaspora at the margin of the modernist camp, along with several chieftains, that masterminded and consolidated the insurrection. But as the uprising progressed, it was qualified by the intrigues of the oligarchies.[23] The latter lacked a clear idea of how they should constitute themselves, a coherent vision of statehood. The notables championed forms of authority they enjoyed under Ottoman rule. The ecumenical Patriarchate and clergy opposed secular institutions and tried to reconcile Orthodox tradition with Greek national particularism. The Phanariots, intelligentsia and merchants sought to establish modern structures of governance. The chieftains, finally, used their military power as a tool of defection and allegiance to move higher up the social scale.

Furthermore, the pre-revolutionary social cleavages were complicated by a new configuration of relations: the distinction between *autochthons*, the natives who were born in the liberated lands, and *heterochthons*, those who were born outside them. The indigenous oligarchies were busy accentuating the difference to preclude from public positions *heterochthon* elites who advanced modernity. Within a matter of two years, three regional and two national assemblies were convened, a constitution was enacted and revised, and the question of the demarcation of the powers of government descended into civil war. Ultimately, the rebel leadership agreed to appoint Count Ioannis Capodistrias, the Corfiote Greek who worked as an alternate foreign minister with Tsar Alexander I, as *Kyvernitis* (President) of Greece. Capodistrias's efforts to build state strength resulted in his assassination in October 1831, nevertheless. The country once again fell prey to turmoil. It was not until the arrival of King Otho in February 1833 that order was restored and the independent kingdom of Greece was established.

Reluctant to pay heed to a central authority, the ruling oligarchies had failed to forge consensus and establish decision-making institutions with a monopoly of violence on a national scale. Instead, they were intent on cultivating relations with the power that was thought most likely to enable them both to improve the fortunes of the Greek cause and take office. This process culminated in the emergence of three revolutionary parties, each of which bore the name of one of the three protecting powers with whom it was identified, known as the British, the French and the Russian parties. It was in this sense that foreign intervention was not only constitutive of Greek statehood; it was also filtered and reconstituted by the internal power conflicts and arrangements. The modernizers stepped into the foreground thanks to the powers' patronage. But imposing a westernised ideal of state on a traditional society turned out to be their Achilles heel. As they were unable to operate the imported institutions according to modern standards, they were reduced to reproducing the existing order they sought to override. Family affiliations, factionalism, localism, clientelism, and brigandage were embedded in Greek politics and polity. Clearly, that the liberation struggle was spearheaded by a small clique of nationalist modernizers; it struck root in areas of

23 Kourvetaris, Y. A., & Dobratz, B. A. (1987). A Profile of Modern Greece in Search of Identity. Oxford: Clarendon Press Oxford, pp. 36-38.

Hellenism where the traditionalists dominated; and it resulted in the creation of a modern state, whose higher offices were occupied by influential elite figures from both politico-ideological camps; all this marked yet another antinomy bound to circumscribe the Greek historical development.

Greece indeed experienced a change of royal dynasty, twenty-six elections and eighty-six governments between 1843 and until the months before the rise of Venizelos to power in October 1910.[24] Lacking vertical and horizontal legitimacy, it was forced from the very start to engage in an intense struggle for domestic power and security. The heart of the matter was that as Greek leadership failed to define the preserve of government and muster loyalty, the state apparatus was shaped by foreign authorities along western standards of policy that stood in contrast with the practices and norms of Greek social formation.

It was the Bavarian regency that created the fundamentals of a governing coalition and laid down the stakes and rules of the power game. In order to dislodge autonomies or local allegiances and enable the state to govern, the new ruling system was designed to centre only on the head of the state, the crown.[25] The latter tried to wield command by concentrating the tasks of government in its hands. The functions of the executive and legislature were assembled into a nominated body of ministers, which counted almost for nothing. The king appointed the senior civil servants and governors, while all those who exercised influence were either posted abroad to serve with diplomatic corps or were excluded from advanced offices. The result was that state building and modernisation (understood as a process that replaces attachments, kinship and religion with an authority which is exerted on grounds of rules enacted by legal procedures) was identified with the centralisation of the decision-making power, and tradition with power fragmentation. However, centralisation was considered to favour state authoritarianism, and hence incited the people's hostility toward the alien state. Essentially, it more reinforced than thwarted old interests and practices. It acted as a catalyst for the formation of a common front of the oligarchies against the monarchy. This polarisation marked the beginning of a relentless power competition between them both for control over state institutions. As the spoils of office evolved into the main stake of politics, the Greek state became the arena of elite rivalries and the mechanism that mediated everyday life.

The power of the oligarchies still resided in their personal clienteles and connections with the great powers. The critical difference was that it began to go through the revolutionary parties, which continued to function as unstable alliances of individuals seeking profit and preferment. The powers' envoys patronised party leaders to assume premiership, in exchange for which they were allowed to interfere in domestic affairs and check each other. This enabled prominent traditionalists, who had pledged fidelity to central authority, to sway the parties and state institutions. Some compensated for the loss of allegiances by public sector employment, whereas others occupied high-ranking offices and maintained their loyalties via the mantle of government favouritism. As they gathered strength, the traditionalist customs prevailed and incapacitated the modern administrative norms.

Eventually, the Greek state formalised its supremacy as the sole legitimate agent of authority in domestic politics not by eliminating the clientele networks of the great powers and the parochial bases of power but by refashioning them into mechanisms of government

24 Dakin, pp. 286-313.

and party patronage operating through and within state institutions. The apparatus of the executive developed into the primary arena and stake of political conflicts. In effect, the state struggle for domestic power and security settled down to being a struggle for control over the state. What ensued was the consolidation of a hybrid co-existence of the forces of power centralisation and fragmentation; that is, the entanglement of the modern central administration in the meshes of family allegiances, factionalism, localism, clientelism and brigandage. Although the Greek leadership assembled the modernist and traditionalist practices into a single board, the state, they failed to merge them into an integrated whole. Paradoxically, while the state became the epicentre of the political and social arrangements, they continued to lack a shared vision of how they should constitute themselves, a coherent core national doctrine designed to 'foster or preserve a strong continuous identity between rulers and ruled, and among different sections of the ruled'.[26] The contradiction engendered two mutually constitutive developments.

The first was the premature establishment of a parliamentary regime. Politicians of all shades could no longer acquiesce in royal absolutism. They called for the production of a constitution through which they sought to lay claim to the management of the state. In March 1844 thus, following a *coup d'état* staged by the Athens garrison, elections were held and a constituent assembly voted for a constitution. Greece was proclaimed a parliamentary monarchy. In reality, the legislature had a decorative role, since the crown was vested with the absolute right to revise the constitution, appoint or dismiss the government, co-make laws, and dissolve the Parliament.

Nonetheless, the revolutionary parties developed into loose coalitions of deputies, which were not identified with their foreign patron but were named after a personality or political family at their head. The adjustment, coupled with the misuse of monarchical powers, added complexity to polarisation, which culminated in the 1862 civil rebellion with the participation of military officers and chieftains. But again, foreign intervention acted as a catalyst of developments. King Otho was compelled to depart from the country, the heir of another dynasty ascended the throne, and a new constitution was enacted. Greece was proclaimed a royal republic with all powers springing from the sovereign people. Universal male suffrage, too, was introduced, a pioneer measure compared to western standards. But, although he was deprived of substantial decision-making powers in domestic affairs, the king retained the unspecified right to nominate or dismiss the government and declare war.

The new monarch, King George I, commanded the executive by appointing a premier of his liking, often the leader of the smallest parliamentary party. But in 1875 Charilaos Trikoupis, a modernist statesman, forced him, by igniting the popular sentiment to the support of his views, to recognise the principle of *dedilomeni* (the vote of confidence). The king should call on the party leader who commanded the parliamentary majority to form a government. Unless the latter enlisted the support of the majority of deputies, their tenure in office would end. Not only did this change curtail the power of the king to install ministries at his discretion and monopolise the decision-making process. It also set the stage for the formation of a representative system of two parties with explicit but not exclusive modernist and traditionalist colours respectively. None of them, however, was able to sever patronage connections with the powers and establish its 'organic', national hegemony, or to create

25 Petropoulos, J. A. (1968). Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece 1833-1843. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 158, 161, 192.

conditions for the construction of a new, synthesising ideal of polity and narrative. Power competition, therefore, acquired the flavour of a pluralistic but polarised parliamentary conflict. The key aspect was that the old political polarisation came through this makeover in a more intricate form. As polarisation was substantiated by two major parties, behind the scenes George aspired to command party politics and reserve to himself the freedom to take executive decisions, while the oligarchies manipulated the decision-making controversies between the crown and government. The result was that each party alternating in office tried not to build and rule but to control the state from within and undid most of the reforms introduced by the other.

The second development was that the state evolved into the primary pillar of post-independence Greek society. Thanks to the power competition for control over central administration and the underdevelopment of the Greek economy, a considerable section of the population began to work with or earn a living indirectly from the state. This gave social cleavages the character of a personal struggle for state employment and office holding. The percentage of civil servants to population was the highest in Europe. And each change of ministry was followed by the sweep of public service from its personnel, who were replaced by devotees of the incoming government. To bolster their grip on power, the establishment turned state institutions into the stake of clientele politics. They patronised politicians and parties with votes of their retinue in return for protection, cabinet seats and state commissions. The reciprocal dispensation of favours further reinforced autonomies and contributed to the growth of an overcrowded bureaucracy, which again required the patrons to intervene in order to mitigate administrative rapacity. The power of the oligarchies was no longer counted so much by the reach of local loyalties as by the hold over the state's resources and the control of the parties through which clientelistic practices were carried into effect. It was through this sort of access to the state apparatus and the power competition for the distribution of spoils that the oligarchies monopolised parliamentary life and mediated the participation of populace in the political process.

One effect was the involvement of the masses in party politics. The old division between ruling and subordinate classes was transformed into an antithesis between the established elites and their retinue who were entrenched around, or intimately associated with, the state and the masses that were excluded from it. But clientelism remained as prevalent as ever before. Not only did it continue to function as the principal mechanism through which the masses were manoeuvred out of the power game and social demands were channelled into the political system. It also acted as a bridge between the state's ability to control resources and the society's will to supply the instruments of production, finance, coercion, and bureaucracy.

The other was the growth of a distinct state bourgeoisie of politicians, civil servants, and state-salaried officials, including university professors, teachers, and the clergy.[27] Several elements of this category, especially the senior echelons of the Church and those who occupied high-ranking offices in the administration, education, military, police and judiciary, emerged into an oligarchy of *tzakia*, a stratum of men of the state that possessed authority and status. This upper state bourgeoisie outweighed the political power of big landowners and became the dominant faction of the Greek ruling class.

26 Benner, E. (2001). Is There a Core National Doctrine? Nations and Nationalism, 7 (2), p. 162.
27 Tsoucalas. Εξάρτηση, pp. 209-226.

As a whole, the early introduction of parliamentary institutions and the domination of society by the state marked the inauguration of the era of mass politics and the institutionalisation by constitutional rules of the power game. In retrospect, they prevented the stratification of society purely along class lines and complicated the bourgeois transformation of Greek social formation. That is, they retarded the development of a civil society of citizens and parties of principle, as well as the autonomous political and corporate organisation of the urban and peasant masses, whose parliamentary representation was mediated by the ruling oligarchies; disrupted the ideological unity of the bourgeois elites; and suffocated the forces of change in the sense that the rising classes were pushed to be involved in traditionalist arrangements to reach prominence.

Hence, contradictory but mutually constitutive relations of weakness and strength developed between state and society, a pattern that ultimately made the Greek state fundamentally weak. Unless society was rewarded with state benefits ranging from employment to the management of power and was allowed to maintain attachments, the state would be unable to muster power and loyalty. The state struggle for domestic power and security boiled down to requiring both the formal displacement and the informal intersection of the patron-client networks under the veneer of government tolerance. Unable to wean society away from traditionalist practices, the state provided legitimacy in their exercise to render the parochial bases of power less dangerous. But concurrently it became dependent on these practices and bases to mobilise human and material resources. What regulated the drive for state strength was the extent to which the scale of the state's and the society's autonomy were held in equilibrium. Only when this condition was met, did the Greek state appear as if it was strong.

The roots of this paradox can be traced in the disparity between the early adoption of parliamentarism and the late advent of industrialisation.[28] Advanced democratic institutions were imported, which could hardly keep pace with the backwardness and embryonic capitalism of Greek society. In other words, a bourgeois parliamentary regime was established before the rise of a hegemonic national bourgeoisie.

The Greek state was characterised by an underdeveloped mode of production, in which agriculture predominated and flourishing operations in the fields of commerce finance, and shipping overshadowed industrial activity. The state's investment inertia, coupled with the predominance of sharecropping subsistence farming in the 1890s, prevented agriculture from evolving into the locomotive of the economy. Greece proved unable to become autarkic in vital items of food, like cereals and wheat, as farm tenancy slowed down the capitalisation of cultivation and favoured the production of a few luxury commodities (raisins, currants, and olive oil), mainly intended for exports. The new territories, public health improvements and the increase in life expectancy, all complicated the problem. This eventually forced, on the one hand, the landlords to turn to commercial and financial operations for greater profits and on the other hand, the peasant smallholders and sharecroppers to look for better employment opportunities in urban areas or abroad. One effect of rural poverty and the depopulation of the countryside was the reduction of cultivated land and crop output. The other was the regular outbursts of agrarian violence and the rise of a pressing popular demand for the distribution of 'national lands'.

28 Mouzelis. Politics.

It was the 1880s before the Trikoupis governments embarked on an extensive program of public works investments on dock, rail and road construction, which started the process of industrialisation.[29] Despite improvements in infrastructure and the creation of manufacturing establishments, the growth of industrial production and services failed to bring with it new sources of earnings and increase the weight of manufacturing in the economy. Growth rested on public loans rather than direct investment capital, while the rapid industrial expansion owed much to high import duties and state commissions for construction materials. Most of the capital was invested in trade and banking and some in the establishment of distillery, textile, mine-extractive, shipbuilding, food-processing, and consumer goods industries. The bulk of business profits were rarely reinvested in production. They were used for land purchases and financial speculation or transferred abroad. Indigenous and foreign entrepreneurs, including the notables, remained in the spheres of distribution and exchange and were involved in industry only after they secured public funds, tax exemptions, and favourable borrowing terms. In a sense, the ruling bourgeoisie made the state the foundation of their wealth.

These relations of production, along with state protectionism and the small size of the domestic market paralysed competition and consolidated a pattern of development depending on foreign and Greek diaspora capital.[30] In addition to indebtedness and the scarcity of raw resources, Greece's economic autonomy was narrowed by foodstuff shortages, the commodity concentration in exports, trade fluctuations, and deficits in the balance of payments.

Constrained by these weaknesses, the economy was fashioned after a dual pattern, which distorted the capitalisation of the means of production and the process of industrialisation. A large number of small property-holdings of all sorts co-existed with a few large estates and enterprises, a configuration of economic relations that prevented the expansion of wage remuneration and the growth of a massive industrial and peasant proletariat. By importing manufactured commodities and fuels and exporting agrarian goods and raw materials, Greece's exports never averaged half the value of imports.[31] Agricultural output accounted for most of the earnings from exports, for which the leading markets were Britain, France, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Turkey. Apart from the small export proceeds, the main sources of foreign exchange were emigrant remittances and the earnings from shipping, while public revenue was also furnished by indirect taxation, tariffs, and borrowing at home and abroad. Since its inauguration, in sum, Greece remained an agricultural country with a primitive infrastructure, poor rate of growth, low per capita income, lasting shortage of credit, high tax evasion, and inadequate supply of trained manpower.

Nevertheless, the acceleration of the pace of commercialisation and industrialisation during the last quarter of the nineteenth century prepared the ground for the rise of an entrepreneurial bourgeoisie of bankers, financers, ship-owners, and industrialists; a new oligarchy of *tzakia* that evolved into a competitive faction of the Greek ruling class. This

29 Vergopoulos, C. (1994). Κράτος και Οικονομική Πολιτική στον 19ο Αιώνα: Η Ελληνική Κοινωνία (1880-1895) [State and Economic Policy in the 19th Century: The Greek Society (1880-1895)] (second edition). Athens: Eksantas, chaps. 2-3.

30 Tzokas, S. (1998). Ανάπτυξη και Εκσυγχρονισμός στην Ελλάδα στα Τέλη του 19ου Αιώνα: Υπανάπτυξη ή Εξαρτημένη Ανάπτυξη; (Development and Modernisation in Greece at the End of the 19th Century: Underdevelopment or Dependent Development?). Athens: Themelio.

31 Sinarelle, M. (1984). Το Εξωτερικό Εμπόριο της Ελλάδας κατά τον 19ο Αιώνα (The External Trade of Greece in the 19th Century). Istorika, 1 (2), pp. 349-370.

bourgeoisie, without direct access to the state's resources, established contacts with the upper state bourgeoisie by exchanging economic rewards for government benefits, a practice that allowed it to influence the decision-making process and engage in parliamentary politics. Along with this development, which involved the motherland and diaspora, came the emergence of classes of men of profession, a bourgeoisie of medium private-sector status that differentiated itself from the hired labour of the manual and farm workers. Because they lacked an autonomous parliamentary representation and their political participation was mediated by the oligarchies, these classes constituted the nucleus of a distinct social group, the petty bourgeoisie. By the close of the century, therefore, Greek society was divided into three blocs of classes: the ruling bourgeoisie consisting of the oligarchies of notables, the upper state bourgeoisie, and the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie; the petty bourgeoisie consisting of the middle and lower orders of the state bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie of medium private-sector status; and the lower classes of labour force of all kinds. But again, none of the factions of the ruling bourgeoisie had the character of a strong class able to dominate the relations of production and establish its 'organic' hegemony.

As regards the formation of the military, it was driven by the state's attempt to gain strength and monopolise the use of organised violence.[32] Associated as it was with the personal command of arms and local loyalties, the indigenous military element of the war of independence was considered the principal threat to central authority. The regency tried not just to crush the revolutionary military establishment and bring former or active irregulars into the fold of the law but also to close off the avenue of state employment to powerful chieftains. As oppression took its course, numerous warriors resorted to outlawry and brigandage. Opposition was further incited by the introduction of conscription in 1837, following the departure of the Bavarian army. Most of those who defected from service joined brigand bands. As upheavals fed and meshed with the power struggle, the crown was pushed to accommodate brigandage by transforming its activities into band irredentist warfare. The move, coupled with the flare-up of the irredentist ferment, set the stage for incorporating bandits into state institutions. Chieftains were placed in honorary, high-ranking military offices and commissioned to use their armed retinue or recruit outlaws to buttress insurrections across the border.

It was through this arrangement that banditry and the concomitant practices became embedded into military institutions. The military acquired a structure of dual character, which it retained until after the turn of the twentieth century. There were, on the one hand, the standing, conscripted forces with a professional officer corps, graduating from the *Scholis Evelpidon* (the Military Academy), who were assigned to enforce domestic order; and on the other, the irregular, independent units of outlawed warriors with state-salaried brigand commanders, who were unofficially employed to stir up revolts in the 'unredeemed' territories of Hellenism.

The military evolved into an instrument both of the state and society. While the services were to underpin the state struggle for international and domestic power and security, they were concurrently manipulated by the oligarchies for blocking the authoritarianism of the king and the extension of state power. As the social antecedents of military and paramilitary leadership originated in established families, the dual character of the military organisation

and task did not just entrench the forces into the system of government and give their operations an enduring political feature. It also transformed them both into an arena of political intrigues and patronage practices and a mechanism that mediated internally and externally administered state authority. The result was that a double-edged penetration between the military and the governing coalition developed. Whether through their own initiative or not, the recurrent intervention of the military into politics was a function of the officers' effort to reach prominence in the name of their legitimate right to preserve the state's power and security; and of the society's struggle against the state's centralising or authoritarian tendencies.

Since the officers were tied into rival clientele networks, they could hardly grow into an autonomous corporatist group. The problem was complicated during the last third of the nineteenth century when the foundation of a Naval Academy and a School for Non-Commissioned Officers opened the way for the massive entry of elements of the lower classes, thereby giving the military a less elitist and exclusive character. This exacerbated professional grievances related to grade scales and procedures for promotion. Alongside this came the determination of Greek governments to entrust regular troops with the task of waging irredentist operations. The defeat of 1897 indicated that the role of irredentist associations and their bands of irregulars was catastrophic: it was the activities of the *Ethniki Etairia* (national society) that drew Greece into war with Turkey.[33] Ultimately, the force of change unleashed culminated in the 1909 'military revolution' of the junior and middle officers, which as such signified a turning point of transition from band irredentist warfare to state irredentist warfare.

By that time, to come full circle, the small Greek state was marred by social cleavages related to office holding and state employment, substantiated as they were in the political sphere by the ideological split between traditionalists and modernizers. The peculiarities of Greek social formation emanated from two antinomies that proved predominant in determining the course of Greek historical development. The first was the articulation of a vague image of nationhood; and the second was the operation of westernised institutions within a traditional society. These antinomies were rooted in the interaction of three domestic structural forces: the class differentiation, the regional differences and the distinction between autochthons and heterochthons. It was these structures that, along with the interactive effect of foreign patronage, shaped the modernist and traditionalist practices and their ensuing social cleavages and power conflicts; and thus constituted and substantiated the social material order of Greek politics and polity.

3. IRREDENTISM AND EXPANSION

The Greek social peculiarities distorted the process of modernisation. In the context of the involvement of foreign authorities in domestic affairs, alien state institutions, and

32 Veremis, T. (1997). The Military in Greek Politics: From Independence to Democracy. London: Hurst; Koliopoulos, J. S. (1987). Brigands with a Cause: Brigandage and Irredentism in Modern Greece 1821-1912. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

33 Yanoulopoulos, Y. N. (1999). 'Η Ευγενής μας Τύφλωσις…': Εξωτερική Πολιτική και 'Εθνικά Θέματα' από την Ήττα του 1897 ως τη Μικρασιατική Καταστροφή ('Our Noble Blindness': Foreign Policy and 'National Issues' from the Defeat of 1897 to the Asia Minor Disaster). Athens: Vivliorama, pp. 3-183.

parochial autonomies, the state struggle for domestic power and security settled down to being a struggle for control over the state, which consolidated the hybrid co-existence of power centralisation and fragmentation. This contradiction set the stage for the early establishment of parliamentary institutions and the domination of society by the state, which acted as shaping factors in the genesis of a paradox pattern of mutual strength and weakness between state and society. To remedy weakness and simultaneously avoid the domestic security and state-strength dilemmas, the Greek governing coalition both reduced and accommodated the society's strength by a combination of repression and paternalist cooperation. Unable to otherwise mobilise resources and sustain legitimacy, they tried to win society to their side by opening the door of irredentism; notwithstanding that Greece was so limited by its weakness that it could not afford to toy with revisionist designs. It was under such influences that the conduct of band irredentist warfare and state irredentist warfare contributed to the making of the territorially ordered rule of Greek statehood.

Therefore, the old myth of ethnic mission was rearticulated to provide the Greek state with a foreign policy 'direction' and a rhetoric tool of socialisation. No sooner had the first decade of independence gone by than in 1844 Prime Minister Ioannis Kolettis set out, before the Parliament, the Great Idea as the state's national objective:

> The Kingdom of Greece…. constitutes only one part, the smallest and poorest. A Greek is not only a man who lives within this kingdom but also one who lives in Jannina…Salonica…Serres…Adrianople…Constantinople…Smyrna…Trebizond… Crete…Samos and in any land associated with Greek history or the Greek race...There are two main centres of Hellenism: Athens, the capital of the Greek kingdom, [and] 'The City' [Constantinople], the dream and hope of all Greeks.[34]

Clearly, Greek leadership believed that they should obtain domestic and international security only through irredentist expansion. By incorporating the 'unredeemed lands' of the Balkans and Near East, Greece was destined for territorial enlargement. Otherwise, it could hardly survive.

Greek irredentism was by no means merely a stimulus of power growth in the sense that the small territory and scarcity of resources required the state to expand in order to secure viability. Nor was it solely an invented device for diverting public attention or a mechanism of consensus creation to the extent that it became a vehicle for power competition.[35] It was, above all, the principal frame that the governing coalition and oligarchies deployed to cultivate a strong sense of nationhood and muster loyalty to the authority of state institutions.

It was the internal process of building strength and the external process of penetrating ideologically the Greek diaspora and Orthodox Christian communities settled in Ottoman lands that imparted to the state the instrumental role of constructing the 'imagined community' of the 'nation'. This process of national assertion culminated in the articulation of the Greek irredentist nationalism.[36] The Greek state created the discourse and policy of the Great Idea as the basic binding element and inspiration of Hellenism so that this should

34 As quoted in Clogg. Short History, p. 76.

35 For insights, see Saideman, S. M. (1998). Inconsistent Irredentism? Political Competition, Ethnic Ties, and the Foreign Policies of Somalia and Serbia. Security Studies, 7 (3), pp. 51-93.

36 Kitromilides, P. M. (1990). Greek Irredentism in Asia Minor and Cyprus. Middle Eastern Studies, 26 (1), pp. 3-17; his (1989). 'Imagined Communities' and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans. European History Quarterly, 19 (2), pp. 159-177.

produce the 'essence' of Greek nation and imprint on ethnic Greeks or Greco-phones a shared sense of national identity.[37]

But since there long before existed competing meanings of Greekness, Athens was forced to inculcate a unified form in a 'modern' but undefined nation. The 'pre-modern histories' of ancient Greece and Byzantium developed into the narrative of the 'Hellenic-Christian' nation based on the notion of Greek national continuity and unity through the ages; the tenets of modernity and tradition became 'the chief constituent elements' of Greek nationhood.[38] This hybridity however was far from being an integrated whole. Rather, it reflected an inconsistent irredentist vision of a greater Greece, in which the values of modernity and tradition were either unable to win over one another or were a long way off firmly congruent synthesis. As none of the factions of the ruling bourgeoisie was able to establish its hegemony and define the territorial space of the Greek state, the meaning of modern Greekness was founded in the common, universal and imperial mode of thought of the pre-revolutionary ideals of polity and discourses. Over time the Greek national consciousness might acquire a more nationalist flavour but without dismissing its religious and imperialist overtones altogether.

It was no accident that the Greek state put the Church in the nation's service.[39] The royal act of 4 August 1833 proclaimed the Greek Orthodox Church *autocephalous* (autonomous) and self-governed from the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Despite outcry, the Constantinople Patriarchate recognised autonomy in 1850. One effect of the 'hellenisation' of the Church was that the Greek nation was conceived

> as a religious and cultural unity in both space and time, which included, in addition to the Greeks of the free state, the Greek Orthodox of the Ottoman Empire, and those of the Diaspora as well. This broad view of the Greek nation favoured the postponement of the projection of definite geographical boundaries and adaptation of national aspirations to these boundaries.[40]

But the lack of a definition of the scope of territorial claims meant that the state of the Greek motherland regarded its projected border as embracing both the ethnic Greeks and all the Orthodox Christian populations of the unspecified 'lost' Greek 'fatherland' of the East; that is, any people and land in Anatolia associated with Greek history and culture. In terms of historical narrative and policy discourse, the bases of Greek irredentism were as much national as imperial and universal.[41]

Another effect was that it incited nationalist outbursts among Balkan nationalities in the Ottoman province of Macedonia. Greek cultural superiority and ecclesiastical dominance

37 Comerford, P. (2000). Defining Greek and Turk: Uncertainties in the Search for European and Muslim Identities. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, XIII (2), p. 244.

38 Liakos, A. (2001). The Construction of National Time: The Making of the Modern Greek Historical Imagination. Mediterranean Historical Review, 16 (1), pp. 30-39; Tsoucalas, C. (1999). European Modernity and Greek National Identity. Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, 1 (1), pp. 7-14; Herzfeld, M. (1982). Ours Once More: Folklore, Ideology, and the Making of Modern Greece. Austin: University of Texas Press.

39 Makrides, V. N. (1997). Secularization and the Greek Orthodox Church in the Reign of King George I. In P. Carabott (Ed.), Greek Society in the Making, 1863-1913. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 185, 192.

40 Koliopoulos, p. 308.

41 Andreopoulos, G. (1981) argues that the Great Idea as irredentist nationalism and the 'dream' of the restoration of Byzantium were part of the nation-state building policy, the paradox of which was that the mistrusted Greek state was the only vehicle for this transformation, in his State and Irredentism: Some Reflections on the Case of Greece. Historical Journal, 24 (4), pp. 951-953.

were challenged when in 1870 the Bulgarians established their own national Orthodox church (the Exarchate). Since Athens considered the Christian populations in the region members of an ecumenical Greek nation, a fierce contest between Greeks and Bulgarians broke out.[42] Having turned Bulgaria into yet another national enemy, the Greek state embarked on a militant policy of national unification and assimilation in the territories of Macedonia, which escalated into a band irredentist warfare, known as the 'Macedonian Struggle' of 1903-8.

Since the war of independence, by way of conclusion, the formation and enlargement of modern Greece appeared to have proceeded on a dependent basis to the extent that subservience to the protecting powers became part of statecraft. Irredentist ventures appeared to have been driven by the belief that unless the state was extended and the Greek communities of Ottoman Turkey were integrated into the motherland, national development could hardly be endured. In fact, foreign intervention was not only constitutive of Greek politics and territorial expansion; it was also instantiated and reproduced by them. The territorially-bounded material reality of Greek statehood was constituted, through the Greek leadership's strategies of irredentism, by the dialectical interplay of foreign patronage and the peculiarities of Greek politics; two shaping factors that persisted as the twin predominant determinants of Greek historical development. And the rhetoric of the irredentism of Greek Great Idea was the ensuing mental product of this interplay.

Greek irredentism represented the demand for the extension of state boundaries to include ethnic kin and people of all religious and ethnic affiliations inhabited in the Greek 'fatherland' of the East. The vision of a greater Greece became the state's legitimising ideology and as such the source of Greek identity and the nucleus of Greek nationalism. Capitalising on the powers' guarantee of Greek territorial integrity, Greek governments felt that they could indulge in the luxury of irredentist adventurism. Defying international and domestic imperatives, they engaged in offensive operations without local allies or consent from their foreign patrons. But the strategy of fighting alone was reduced to dependency and appeasement. The ferment of expansionism overshadowed deficiencies and the concern for the consolidation of the *status quo*. It also overwhelmed those who laid stress on the strategy of accommodation until Greece became stronger and the Ottoman Empire was hellenised from within. It was only after the 1897 debacle that they realised that that they could not sacrifice the struggle for domestic power and security for the sake of expansion and bear the brunt of war single-handedly.

Paradoxically, nationalist flare-ups and the related strategies of expansion became the medium of the territorial acquisitions. These strategies, reflecting intended responses to particular structural imperatives, mattered to Greece. They mattered inasmuch as they carried into effect choices of actions, the repercussions of which repeatedly pushed the protecting powers to exercise the right of interference in domestic politics and manage Greece's international affairs in a manner that eventually set the stage for its expansion. Unless Greek irredentist strategies were pursued, the powers would hardly intervene and work for the award of expansion to the Greeks. In this respect, the strategies were the necessary cause of expansion, and by extension Greece's territorial enlargement was not the product of 'mechanical' historical forces. It was through this odd though distinctive way of acting that

42 Agelopoulos, G. (1995). Perceptions, Construction, and Definition of Greek National Identity in Late Nineteenth-Early Twentieth Century Macedonia. Balkan Studies, 36 (2), pp. 247-263; Kofos, E. (1989). National Heritage and National Identity in Nineteenth-and-Twentieth-Century Macedonia. European History Quarterly, 19 (2), p. 231.

over the years up to the turn of the twentieth century Greek leadership submitted to great power will. Foreign patronage and dependency was 'forced' rather than adopted by it.

What it comes down, however, is that Greece expanded thanks to foreign intervention, not because of the efficient use that it made of its means, in order to exploit enabling international and domestic forces to its benefit. The strategies it pursued stood in disharmony with structural conditions, and hence afforded it little partnership value and autonomy of action in attaining territorial enlargement on its own. The result was that it was manipulated more as a puppet than a partner by virtue of its inability to perceive the main partnership role it was called on to play: to preserve the peace and check the balance of power in the region, as Ottoman Turkey waned.

PART III
EXPANSION, 1909-1913

The year 1909 found Greece powerless and weak, unable to become master in its own house and press forward with irredentist demands. In less than four years, however, it proved itself able to build state strength and almost double its territory and population in the aftermath of the end of the Balkan wars in August 1913. Throughout the period, the crucial aspect was the growth of a checkerboard game in the international system, which narrowed the freedom of the great powers to have recourse to force in resolving regional disputes and laid the ground for the resurgence of nationalism in the Balkans. These systemic factors, along with momentous changes in Greek politics, might be said to have been a forceful source of Greece's territorial enlargement.[1]

My analysis of the events concerned, nonetheless, suggests that enabling international and domestic forces were sufficient but not necessary causes of expansion. The latter could hardly come into being, unless strategies were articulated to capitalise on these forces as unique opportunities for action, a process that is filtered and fulfilled by state leadership. The historical record demonstrated that structural imperatives set the stage for Greek grand strategy to pursue expansion but did not dictate as an invisible hand the choices and moves through which expansion was effected. Greek expansion was not the product of 'mechanical' processes or 'blind' historical forces. This implies that the grand strategy was the necessary cause of expansion. It was through the Greek leadership's grand strategy that the interplay of the international system and domestic structure afforded Greece partnership value and autonomy of action in attaining the enlargement of its territorially ordered rule.

This part consists of three chapters. Chapter Four examines the great powers' system and the domestic transformation that Greece underwent as a result of the *Goudi* revolt and the rise of Venizelos to office. In Chapter Five I turn to the Balkan alliances and wars. While the narrative in these two chapters identifies the structural conditions in which military strategy and diplomacy were made and related means to ends, Chapter Six considers the categories of strategies and the patterns of grand strategy pursued, and assesses how they mattered to Greece in achieving the goal of expansion.

1 Standard works are Gardikas-Katsiadakis, H. (1995). Greece and the Balkan Imbroglio: Greek Foreign Policy, 1911-1913. Athens: 1995; Ε.Ε.Λ.Ι.Α. (Ed.) (1993), Η Ελλάδα των Βαλκανικών Πολέμων 1910-1914 (The Greece of the Balkan Wars 1910-1914). Athens.

Chapter 4

INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS

1. THE GREAT POWERS

The turn of the century witnessed Europe's mastery in world politics.[1] Although the growth of the USA and Japan changed the global productive and military balances, these were slow to impinge on the hegemony of the European courts. Two other systemic developments seemed more consequential. The first was the unification of Germany and Italy, which challenged the greatness of Russia and Austria-Hungary. The second was that the 1882 alliance between Austria-Hungary, Germany and Italy, the 1891 French-Russian understanding, the 1904 French-British agreements, and the 1907 Anglo-Russian convention, all crystallised two rival alliance systems: the *Entente* Powers, which pulled together Britain, France and Russia, and the Triple Alliance consisting of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy.

Britain, being the world's unrivalled maritime power, outstripped all the rest in overall capabilities; albeit with its pre-eminence beginning to be eroded owing to the decline of its ability to sustain growth at the same pace as the rising powers. Valuing stability in Europe and India, it reserved to itself the freedom to act as it might choose. The British were more willing to rely on diplomacy rather than force.[2] To prevent the domination of Europe by Germany and defend imperial possessions, they coalesced with Russia and France but without extending a security guarantee or undertaking a continental commitment. They were also concerned to avoid any entanglement in the Balkans that might imperil the unity of the powers.[3] Alongside this went their effort to maintain the Ottoman Empire as a bulwark against aggressive designs in the region; regardless of the fact that the strategic importance of the Straits was no longer rated so high after the opening of the Suez Canal.

France was a great power of the first-rank, who felt the weight of German power. After grandiose ventures in North Africa, it was reconciled with Britain and devoted its energy to balancing the German threat and preserving the balance of power in Europe. Russia's lead in

1 Kennedy, P. (1989). The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. London: Fontana Press; Taylor, A. J. P. (1971). The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

2 Kennedy, P. (1985). The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British External Policy 1865-1980. London: Fontana Press, chaps. 1-2.

3 Crampton, R. J. (1977). The Balkans, 1909-1914. In F. H. Hinsley (Ed.), British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 256-270.

aggregate resources could hardly substitute for advances in production and drive the struggle for world-power leadership. Having suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of Japan in the Far East, it aimed to recover its influence in the Near East and secure free access to the Mediterranean. A similar fate of power dislodgement befell Austria-Hungary. Alarmed by Russia's assertiveness in the Balkans, it aspired to command the Slav Balkan states and acquire a share of the European territories of Turkey by diplomacy. Germany proved able to prosper at a faster rate and catch up with Britain in world industrial and engineering output. Cautious not to incur the hostility of the established powers, it set out to make itself an imperial power, build an ocean-going battle fleet, and command developments in the Near East. Finally, Italy, being the least powerful, sought to dominate the Adriatic and obtain an effective control of the Mediterranean.

By the period 1909-1913, thus, the discipline of the post-1815 Concert of Europe had faded. A new configuration of power, marked out by polarised strategic arrangements, took footing. The international system was fashioned after six poles, consolidated as they were by the division of Europe into two constellations of great powers in confrontation. Each camp distrusted the other, while they were forced to consult one another and refrain from unilateral armed intervention when regional conflicts broke out. This fuelled the endemic insecurity of the powers and laid the ground for the small Balkan states to defy great power will and advance their claims on their own. Systemic polarisation threw up proximate margins of freedom. It was left, however, to these small states' strategies to go through them and determine an assertive way of acting to their benefit.

2. THE *GOUDI* REVOLT

The tides of the July 1908 Young Turk revolt drew Greek politics into the vortex of an irredentist ferment by an increase in agitation for the *enosis* of the island of Crete with the motherland. The decision of the Cretans to set up a committee, in which Venizelos was included, to run local administration in the name of King George and elect deputies for the Athens Parliament provoked outcry in Europe and Turkey, adding complexity to the crisis. As the October Cretan declaration of union met with rebuff from the Theotokis government, it ignited as much irritation in public opinion as in military ranks against the discredited party and state establishment. The situation was aggravated by the enactment of a law, which restricted the chances of promotion of the non-commissioned officers to commissioned rank. This, along with the inclination of Crown Prince Constantine, the commander-in-chief, to direct the staff personnel and the rank and file by favouritism practices incited uncontrollable exasperation in the military. Hence, professional grievances brought together around 1,300 officers into the *Stratiotikos Syndesmos* (military league) and paved the way for a 'military revolution'.

In May 1909, a cluster of young, non-commissioned military officers, who were members of the *Syndesmos*, mutinied. The movement was promptly suppressed. A month later, the mutineers were joined by a fellow-group of commissioned officers, who, representing the *Syndesmos*, demanded the ousting of the crown prince from his post. On 16 July, as the Cretan question rested in deadlock and army disorders spread, Theotokis resigned.

Although he appeared to sympathise with it, the new premier, Dimitris Rhallys, tried to crush the *Syndesmos*: some officers were sent before a court of discipline and others were arrested.

Nonetheless, a committee of the officers' *Syndesmos* headed by Colonel Zorbas drew up a memorandum of reforms. Rhallys's refusal to receive them acted as a catalyst for the outbreak of the *Goudi coup d'etat* on 28 August. A force of 1,800 men moved out of barracks to a camp in the district of *Goudi*, threatening to march into Athens unless their ultimatum was met. This demanded a written subscription of the government to the memorandum; a pledge that the parliament would be adjourned only after it voted for reforms; the removal of the royal princes from their military commands; the appointment of senior officers to the Ministries of War and the Navy; the granting of amnesty; and the re-instatement of the non-commissioned officers dismissed in the previous May. Rhallys refused to give way and resigned. George was prepared to abdicate, while certain officers called for the enforcement of a dictatorship and others for the establishment of a republic.[4]

Britain took the lead and advised George to abandon the idea of abdication. It was prudent to instruct the Admiralty that 'the only action which could be taken by His Majesty's ships would be…to take on board members of the Royal Family'.[5] Vienna and Berlin, who feared that developments might open the Pandora Box of nationalism in the Near East, consented to the move.[6] Essentially, the powers sought to stem the tide short of direct involvement. Their concern was to maintain the royal regime and the ruling dynasty, these being a guarantee that Athens was to remain anchored in their control.

Thanks to foreign patronage, George decided to leave Greece only if the *Syndesmos* were not dissolved, after the parliament passed reforms and adjourned itself.[7] He sent for Kiriakoulis Mavromichalis, the leader of a small opposition party, who was willing to implement the *Syndesmos*'s platform. But Mavromichalis, acting counter to his promise, refused to call on the chamber until the government restored order.[8] No sooner had masses of the Athenian population taken to the streets and intrigues emerged among competing factions of officers than the parliament met on 3 October and began to decree the desired measures. Afterwards, when a number of deputies declined to vote a new procedure for promotion and the abolition of royal positions, the *Syndesmos* threatened the government and legislature with dismissal.[9] As the princes were pushed to resign, Zorbas assured Mavromichalis that he had no intention of driving him out of office.[10]

Broadly speaking, the changes did their share in reconstituting the material reality of Greek statehood in which Greek grand strategy was made. First of all, Mavromichalis called for an increase in revenue to finance armaments. By then, the army's fighting force stood at its lowest level, having one class of conscripts with the colours; and military exercises were suspended because Athens did not wish to give the impression that an offensive against

4 Correspondence, in 1909, F.O. 371/677 and F.O. 371/678.
5 Grey to Elliot, 31 Aug. 1909, tel. no. 254, F.O. 371/678.
6 Salis to Grey, 1 Sep. 1909, F.O. 371/678; Cartwright to Grey, 5 Sep. 1909, tel. no. 166, F.O. 371/678.
7 Elliot to Grey, 2 Sep. 1909, F.O. 371/678; Elliot to Grey, 6 Oct. 1909, F.O. 371/678.
8 Elliot to Grey, 6 Sep. 1909, F.O. 371/678.
9 Elliot to Grey, 4 Oct. 1909, F.O. 371/678; Elliot to Grey, 15 Oct. 1909, tel. no. 85, F.O. 371/678; Elliot to Grey, 17 Nov. 1909, F.O. 371/679.
10 Elliot to Grey, 15 Oct. 1909, tel. no. 87, F.O. 371/678; Elliot to Grey, 21 Oct. 1909, F.O. 371/679.

Turkey was intended.[11] And the navy consisted of obsolete vessels, apart form three refurbished light cruisers and eight destroyers.[12] Not surprisingly, Athanasios Eftaxias, the minister of finance, overturned the preceding policy of economies at the expense of military expenditure because 'this…had proved wrong…and…dangerous…as…the neighbouring states, whose interests clashed with those of Greece, had passed her in their military preparations'.[13] The lack of adequate internal funds forced him to press for a foreign loan to the value of 200 million French francs, of which 70 million were registered in the 1909 budget for the purchase of a battle-cruiser, the *Averoff*, and some torpedo-boat destroyers; but the agreement was complicated in that France and Germany sought to trade the assistance for their firms receiving naval orders.[14]

Moreover, Bills were passed providing for the abolition of the royal offices of the commander-in-chief and general staff corps; the division of the army into military districts of army divisions; and the establishment of a supreme council of divisional commanders consisting of the commanders of the army divisions with the minister of war to act as a figure-head.[15] The government gained parliamentary authority to employ foreign military officers to instruct the serving staff of the army and navy for a three-year period short of war.[16] Legislation, too, was introduced to reduce the enrolment age from 21 to 19; males from the age of 16 upwards were obliged to do preliminary military exercises before recruitment with a reward for those who would complete the training of some months' reduction of their term of service; and untrained reservists were called up.[17]

These renewed domestic structural conditions had, through their interplay with the Cretan tinderbox and international instability, an enormous reshaping influence on strategic priorities and the manner in which military and diplomatic ends were related to means. The *Syndesmos*'s high echelons defined 'the defence of the country and of the rights of the Hellenic race' as the principal objective of military strategy.[18] According to the minister of war, Colonel Lapathiotis, military strategy should make Greece a reliable ally of its Balkan neighbours and build up armed forces able to serve national interests short of war. Active troops and reserves of 200,000 men should be organised (from 164,000 at the end of 1909), an army that was expected to supply 450,000 men on mobilisation.[19] But due to state weaknesses, the war strength could hardly reach half that figure.[20] In March 1910, the creation of the army divisions was still on paper, the classes in service amounted only to 16,800 men, including 1,800 officers and 3,000 non-commissioned officers, and transport and supply were lacking.[21] It was estimated that Athens could mobilise two classes of active army and ten classes of reserves, which were to put into the field as five divisions of 20,000 men each.[22] Apart from the increase of manpower, attention was given to rearmament. A significant step was taken with the ratification of the purchase of the *Averoff* by the chamber

11 Elliot to Grey, 15 July 1909, F.O. 371/679; 'Annual Report 1909', in Elliot to Grey, 14 Feb. 1910, F.O. 371/910.
12 Elliot to Grey, 10 April 1909, F.O. 371/677.
13 'Statement of Greek Minister of Finance', 13 Oct. 1909, in Elliot to Grey, 14 Oct. 1909, F.O. 371/677.
14 Young to Grey, 15 Dec. 1909, in Elliot to Grey, 15 Dec. 1909, F.O. 371/677.
15 'Three Bills Referred to by Greek Minister of War', 13 Oct. 1909, in Elliot to Grey, 13 Oct. 1909, F.O. 371/677.
16 Elliot to Grey, 6 Nov. 1909, F.O. 371/679.
17 Elliot to Grey, 11 Nov. 1909, F.O. 371/677.
18 Elliot to Grey, 13 Oct. 1909, F.O. 371/677.
19 Elliot to Grey, 11 Nov. 1909, F.O. 371/677.
20 Elliot to Grey, 2 Feb. 1910, F.O. 371/910.
21 Tyrrell to Elliot, 3 Mar. 1910, in Elliot to Grey, 5 Mar. 1910, F.O. 371/910.
22 'Annual Report 1910', in Elliot to Grey, 8 Feb. 1911, F.O. 371/1130.

on 23 November 1909; a battle cruiser that, while supposed to be delivered in June 1910, was put into service in September 1911.[23]

As for diplomacy, dominated by the Cretan problem, influential policy elites argued that Greece could repel Ottoman aggression.[24] Mavromichalis, however, submitted to George's orders to maintain good relations with the Ottoman Empire.[25] The hurdle was that Constantinople sought to force the Greeks to capitulation. It received without anxiety the news that Athens was about to reinforce its military. Since it believed that 'the land and sea forces of such a small power as Greece was never likely to be formidable', it ignored 'for the moment any possibility of future co-operation between Greece and any of Turkey's northern Balkan neighbours'.[26] From this angle, it turned a deaf ear to a Greek proposal for alliance, simply dropping hints of closer relations.[27] Under the circumstances, Mavromichalis adopted a conciliatory stance. He was willing to accept a model of autonomy reminiscent of that of Eastern Roumelia or Samos.[28] Also, alarmed by rumours to the effect that the powers were to resort to force, he undertook to prevent the Cretans from sending deputies to the Greek Parliament.[29]

In this context, at the end of 1909, political turmoil rekindled. On 20 December, the minister of war, Colonel Lapathiotis, addressing a bill, levelled criticism at Theotokis about the dwindling state of the military. The Theotokist deputies left the sittings, asking for the resignation of the minister as a condition of confidence in the cabinet.[30] George rejected Zorbas's appeal for compromise. This induced the *Syndesmos*, on 1 January 1910, to send an ultimatum demanding not merely that the chamber should pass the bills still at reading and bring the session to a close within five days; but also demanding the dismissal of the minister of the interior, an outspoken royal supporter. To keep in line with public feeling, George accepted the resignation. But he refused to subscribe to Zorbas's overtures to reshuffle the government, although he had little opinion of them.[31] The parliament resumed its labours, but the air was burdened by the Cretans' insistence to dispatch deputies to Athens, a move that was likely to provoke a conflict with Turkey.

Meanwhile, the *Syndesmos* placed their faith in Venizelos, who on their invitation had arrived in Athens during Christmas. Although it was triggered by indignation against the old party leaders and the nepotism with which members of the royal family carried out their commissions, the *Goudi* revolt by no means aimed at the king. It was not anti-dynastic in nature.[32] The mutinous troops returned to military quarters after swearing allegiance to the crown and the people who stood by them never refrained from giving cheers for George.[33]

23 Elliot to Grey, 26 Nov. 1909, F.O. 371/677; Elliot to Grey, 14 Sep. 1911, F.O. 371/1131.
24 Elliot to Grey, 30 June 1909, F.O. 371/677.
25 Elliot to Grey, 31 Aug. 1909, tel. no. 67, F.O. 371/678.
26 Lowther to Grey, 7 Sep. 1909, F.O. 371/678.
27 Elliot to Grey, 11 Nov. 1909, F.O. 371/677; Elliot to Grey, 16 Dec. 1909, F.O. 371/677.
28 Elliot to Grey, 16 Dec. 1909, F.O. 371/677.
29 Grey to Elliot, 12 Jan. 1910, F.O. 371/908.
30 Elliot to Grey, 20 Dec. 1909, tel. no. 97, F.O. 371/679; Elliot to Grey, 21 Dec. 1909, tel. no. 98, F.O. 371/679.
31 Elliot to Grey, 31 Aug. 1909, F.O. 371/678; Elliot to Grey, 25 Dec. 1909, F.O. 371/908; Elliot to Grey, 2 Jan. 1910, F.O. 371/908.
32 'Memorandum by Mr. Parker Respecting the "Reform" Movement in Greece (up to March 1910)', 22 Mar. 1910, F.O. 371/910.
33 Elliot to Grey, 29 Aug. 1909, tel. no. 63, F.O. 371/678; Elliot to Grey, 22 Sep. 1909, F.O. 371/678; Elliot to Grey, 27 Sep. 1909, tel. no. 79, F.O. 371/678.

Leaving intact the ruling regime, the *Goudi* leadership were not intent on taking office or displacing one government with another; all they sought to do was to enforce reforms by working through and with the establishment.

Despite rhetoric to the contrary, the officers could not escape the perception of Greece as a small pawn destined to acquiesce in patron dictates. They were convinced that their ability to make a clean sweep of the governing coalition was constrained by the anxiety of how the powers might react. Not only did Britain have the Mediterranean Squadron cruising in Greek waters, with two ships stationed at Phalerum Bay;[34] it was also acknowledged that 'any of the powers represented on the International Financial Commission would have the right to land armed forces for the protection of that institution and of the Greek National Bank, which holds some of the funds belonging to it'.[35] The *Syndesmos*, too, proved unable to check extremism and forge discipline among the officer corps. A symptom was the naval movement of November 1909. Suffering a rebuff of their claim as to the age limit of retirement, several junior naval officers threatened the destruction of the fleet at the arsenal of Salamis. The mutiny was put down and the conspirators were committed to trial on charges of insurrection and damage to public property.[36]

The fear that the protecting powers were about to intervene, coupled with the lack of internal coherence, scaled down the *Syndesmos*'s options. By instinct of survival and reasoning, the *Goudi* leaders were loath to incur the odium of the powers and bear the cost of rewriting the rules of the domestic power game. Nevertheless, abstaining from overthrowing the regime created conditions for a new start of the play, in which the role of guarantor of the emerging political order could be reserved for the *Syndesmos*. Being aware of this edge of leeway, they brought about the renewal of the governing coalition at a moment when they lost trust in the cooperation with the establishment and realised the limits of their competence to command the functions of government single-handedly. They threw in their lot with Venizelos by virtue of his potential as an inspired leader. Having made a name as a fervent vanguard of the *enosis* of his native island of Crete with Greece, Venizelos 'had the great virtue in the eyes of the Military League of not being compromised by any close involvement with the oligarchy of mainland politicians and their aura of chaos, jobbery and incompetence'.[37] Venizelos's political actions in the months to come did justice to this judgement.

Venizelos was by then reported to have stated that 'the only policy for Crete to pursue is absolutely to conform to the wishes of the Powers'.[38] Committed to persuade the Cretans to postpone elections, he voiced the view, to which the *Syndesmos* subscribed, that a national assembly should be called in the coming September or December to revise the 1864 constitution; an interim caretaker government should wind up the session of the chamber; and until then the military, having reinforced their fleet with the light cruiser *Averoff*, should be set on active foot in order that it might gain a foothold in the Aegean islands as an offset for a would-be Ottoman occupation of Thessaly.[39] George had already declined to give way to a similar advice by Sir Francis Elliot, the British minister in Athens, to dissolve the parliament

34 F.O. to Admiralty, 30 Aug. 1909, F.O. 371/678.
35 Elliot to Grey, 9 Oct. 1909, F.O. 371/678.
36 Elliot to Grey, 1 Nov. 1909, F.O. 371/679; Elliot to Grey, 3 Dec. 1909, F.O. 371/677.
37 Clogg. Short History, p. 99.
38 Elliot to Grey, 16 Jan. 1910, F.O. 371/908.
39 Elliot to Grey, 31 Jan. 1910, F.O. 371/908.

and order elections. But the force of circumstances presented him with two alternatives: to form a *cabinet d' affaires,* an option that he considered improper because of the lack of a reliable politician to take up the duty or to hold elections, an option that left the way open for the Cretans to send deputies.[40]

George, too, was disinclined to call for a revisionary parliament. As the constitution deprived the crown of constituent authority, a constitutional change had the risk of ceding all constituent powers to the legislature and government, allowing no room for a bearing that previously was based on custom.[41] Military and foreign policy was such a realm, in which the demarcation of the powers was unspecified. At last, George got a compromise; having framed the reach of constitutional reform, he tuned his interests to popular feeling. On 29 January 1910, he convened the council of the parliamentary party leaders. Although the latter agreed about elections, they opposed the idea of a constituent assembly intended to revise the fundamental clauses of the constitution. This consensus prompted George to call for a revisionary parliament empowered to amend only the non-fundamental articles. Mavromichalis resigned, and on 31 January an interim cabinet was appointed under Stefanos Dragoumis, with Zorbas undertaking the Ministry of War.[42]

The same day the Ottomans took a harder line. They let it be known that they would consider the election of Cretan deputies a *casus belli*. Unless the great powers took effective action, they were determined to invade Thessaly.[43] Like Mavromichalis, Dragoumis responded to the threat with a conciliatory attitude. He stated that 'Greeks and Cretans alike are in duty bound to comply with the wishes of the powers'.[44] No sooner had his cabinet been formed than he hastened to reassure Constantinople of Greece's positive attitude.[45] In mid-February the powers, who valued the *status quo* in the Mediterranean, warned him against the participation of Cretans in Greek elections and the admission of Cretan deputies to the Greek Parliament.[46] Dragoumis had no option but to capitulate because to the pressure was added the need of continuing the talks that Mavromichalis had left inconclusive for foreign financial aid. In July a loan of 150 million francs was definitely acquired; of which 40 million were advanced to pay for deficits and the construction of railways and hydraulic infrastructure in Thessaly.[47] Scarcely surprising, in the summer, when persecution and trade boycott turned against the Ottoman Greeks, Dragoumis requested only an indemnity of 20 million francs; a communication that was handed back.[48]

Meanwhile, the *Goudi* leadership did not conform to Dragoumis's bid for dissolution. George rejected Elliot's proposal to proclaim a national assembly; he was determined not to call for elections unless the *Syndesmos* were dispersed. Early in March the parliament voted for the convocation of a revisionary chamber, in which as the constitution envisaged, double the deputies of an ordinary parliament were to be elected. Eventually, Venizelos, who in

40 Elliot to Grey, 22 Dec. 1909, F.O. 371/679; Elliot to Grey, 17 Jan. 1910, F.O. 371/908.
41 Dakin, p. 184.
42 Elliot to Grey, 31 Jan. 1910, F.O. 371/908.
43 Lowther to Grey, 31 Jan. 1910, tel. no. 14, F.O. 371/908; Grey to Bertie, 1 Feb. 1910, F.O. 371/908.
44 Elliot to Grey, 1 Feb. 1910, tel. no. 20, F.O. 371/908.
45 Lowther to Grey, 8 Feb. 1910, F.O. 371/909.
46 Elliot to Grey, 17 Feb. 1910, F.O. 371/909.
47 Young to Grey, 1 Aug. 1910, F.O. 371/910.
48 Lowther to Grey, 21 Sep. 1910, FO 371/911.

January had left Athens for Crete where he had become premier, convinced the officers' *Syndesmos* to place their act of dissolution in the hands of George.[49] He had stated that 'the convocation of the Assembly had as its chief basis the dissolution of the League'.[50] The parliament adjourned itself, and in July elections were decreed for 21 August. In these, the so-called Independents, who declared themselves as Venizelos's followers, won 146 out of 362 seats. Theotokis and Rhallys, who had jointly run the campaign, gained 94 and 64 victories respectively; and Zaimis and Mavromichalis secured the remaining 58 deputies. Venizelos, who was placed at the head of the ballot contrary to his authorisation, came first in the constituency of Attica-Boetia with 32,256 votes, compared to 24,982 cast for Rhallys whose name figured tenth.[51]

Social and military unrest, in short, found expression through the *Goudi* revolt and the subsequent elections, which resulted in the renewal of state leadership. Venizelos and the Independents represented the triumph of the change, no matter that the 'Double Chamber' was entitled to discuss articles intended for amendment. The next assembly had the constitutional power to sanction the revised constitution, for new elections should be held. But it was these developments that consolidated the ascendancy of an unblemished, heterochthon statesman to office and engaged Greece in a refreshed process of state building and ruling, destined to unleash sufficient domestic structural opportunities for expansion.

3. VENIZELOS'S RISE TO POWER

The way in which Venizelos engineered his entry into the political scene illustrated a strong attitude of autonomy and sharp grasp of the range of personal possibilities and freedom in Greek politics. He primarily sought to fabricate a non-violent regeneration out of a military revolutionary situation, not to turn the fundamentals of the ruling system upside down. His ultimate aim was to rearrange the domestic power game within the existing set of constitutional rules by introducing new players and reframing the power competition for the spoils of office.

Venizelos initially refrained from direct political involvement in mainland politics. He spelled out to Elliot that he 'interfered in Greek affairs because he saw that they had got into a dangerous *impasse*. King, Chamber, and Government had become simply puppets working for the Military League'.[52] Free of any association with the established oligarchies, Venizelos tried to act as a go-between and forge a broad consensus. Not only did he refuse to stand for election as a candidate for Rhallys's party. He declined an offer of office during the time he served the officers' *Syndesmos*, declaring that, being on private business, he simply advised them. His proposals for elections and the convocation of a national assembly sounded the views both of Elliot and party leaders.[53]

49 Military League, 'Proceedings', 15 (28) Mar. 1910, V.A. 173/353.
50 Elliot to Grey, 26 Feb. 1910, F.O. 371/909.
51 Elliot to Grey, 1 Mar. 1910, F.O. 371/909; Elliot to Grey, 30 Mar. 1910, F.O. 371/909; Wratislaw to Grey, 21 Jan. 1910, F.O. 371/908; Young to Grey, 27 Aug. 1910, F.O. 371/912.
52 Wratislaw to Grey, 7 Feb. 1910, F.O. 371/909.
53 Elliot to Grey, 16 Jan. 1910, F.O. 371/908; Elliot to Grey, 3 Feb. 1910, F.O. 371/908.

Before the elections, Venizelos stated publicly that 'the bases of the constitution' and 'the articles concerning the monarchy and parliamentarism' should be preserved.[54] He held firm to this view even after the elections. He ventured that the monarchy 'was necessary for Greece'; but 'he could not agree that the royal relationships were really an advantage', inasmuch as 'Greece should have learnt to rely on her own forces'.[55] On 18 September 1910, addressing a crowd on his arrival in Athens, he resisted strong undertones for a constituent parliament. He reasoned that 'the reigning democracy, which our form of government is, …is the form best suited to the political training of the Greek people, and which best serves the national interests'. He also stressed that 'I do not come as a leader of a new…party, but…as the standard-bearer of new political ideas'.[56]

When the time came to rise to power, Venizelos had no hesitation in giving signs of moderation in return for a clear popular mandate and autonomy of ruling. First, he denounced the popular plea for the abolition of monarchy or a curtailment of royal prerogatives. Second, he persisted in delineating the bounds of constitutional powers among the crown, executive, legislature, and military.[57] It was through this step that he tried to centralise the government's decision-making power and contain George's efforts to command parliamentary politics.

Indeed, the double chamber, from its first sitting on 15 September, was split between those who advocated that it should be proclaimed a constituent body and those who maintained that it should be revisionary. Dragoumis, whose assignment had been prolonged, resigned in the second week of October on grounds that he could no longer command the confidence of the chamber. Following consultations with Theotokis and Rhallys who refused to take office, George summoned Venizelos to form a minority government. Although George was not in sympathy with Venizelos and was aware of the Ottoman warning to break off relations in this case, what weighed heavily on his decision were Venizelos's popularity and the need of restoring public order. Thus, on 19 October, Venizelos was appointed prime minister.[58]

Also, Venizelos manipulated the people's verdict to retain freedom from control of the establishment. Asking the parliament for a vote of confidence, he pronounced his intention to proceed only with the revision of the constitution and submit the reform program to the next ordinary assembly. Most deputies of the old parties left and refused the chamber a quorum. Venizelos handed in his resignation. George refused to receive it and requested the deputies to carry on their labours. Venizelos again demanded an unconditional vote of confidence. He obtained an unclear majority: out of the 266 deputies present, 157 deputies cast in favour and 51 partisans of Theotokis qualified their support with reservation. Venizelos, claiming defeat, resigned, and George issued a decree of dissolution.[59] The elections for the second double chamber were held on 11 December. With Theotokis, Rhallys and Mavromichalis abstaining,

54 Elliot to Grey, 26 Feb. 1910, F.O. 371/909.
55 Young to Grey, 6 Sep. 1910, F.O. 371/912.
56 Elliot to Grey, 23 Sep. 1910, F.O. 371/913.
57 Andreopoulos, G. J. (1989). Liberalism and the Formation of the Nation-State. Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 7 (2), pp. 200-204; Papacosmas, S. V. (1981). The Republicanism of Eleftherios Venizelos: Ideology or Tactics? Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, 7, p. 170.
58 Elliot to Grey, 20 Oct. 1910, F.O. 371/913.
59 Elliot to Grey, 22 Oct. 1910, F.O. 371/913; Elliot to Grey, 26 Oct. 1910, F.O. 371/913.

Venizelos, who stood as a leader of the newly formed *Komma ton Fileleutheron* (Liberal Party), won an overwhelming majority of about 300 seats.[60]

The parliament met on 21 January 1911. Three weeks later, Venizelos presented his policy priorities, which were to revise the constitution, transform the judicial system and eradicate gambling, outlawry and cattle-theft. After the chamber carried through about fifty amendments to non-fundamental provisions, on 15 June George signed the revised constitution. Although the revisionary double chamber was authorised to sit for four years, Venizelos demanded, and on 9 June the deputies voted for the close of the session by the end of the year and the holding of elections within four months. He argued that the accomplishments of his government should be submitted to the judgment of the electorate and a 181-seat ordinary assembly should be elected.[61] The elections were held on 24 March 1912. With the old parties taking part, Venizelos secured 149 victories, Theotokis 14, Rhallys 8, Mavromichalis 6, and Zaimis 4.[62] The new parliament promulgated and put into effect the revised constitution, the making of which had acted as a catalyst for building state strength.

4. DOMESTIC TRANSFORMATION

That Venizelos won three consecutive elections showed that the electorate trusted his leadership competence and invested him with the mandate to renew the political life and initiate reforms. That, too, he was patronised neither by the great powers nor by the old ruling oligarchies indicated an important break with the past. While foreign interference acquired a less direct and commanding character, the old oligarchies lost their monopoly of mediating the participation of the middle and lower orders in the political process. As elements of the rising strata of professionals and merchants, weaned away from local attachments and entered the electoral competition in an autonomous way via a new party, the traditional political families were forced to yield part of their hold over the state. In addition to the Liberal Party's parliamentary dominance, the most enabling force was the attitude of George, who meanwhile was reported to have become content with Venizelos's statesmanlike way of ruling.[63] George abided by constitutional legitimacy and allowed Venizelos to direct state affairs with freedom of action, even in the realm of foreign policy. Parliamentary institutions, in this respect, could be said to have begun to function according to modern standards of an advanced bourgeois regime.

The Liberals took the ground from under the feet of the old oligarchies. Not only did they broaden the power game with new players, without challenging the existing royal regime. They also forged consensus among the governing coalition and established an ephemeral political hegemony instantiated in the semblance of one-party system of government. One effect of this development was that it strengthened the state's ability to centralise decision-making power and sustain its authority and legitimacy. The other effect was that it inaugurated an era of considerable social rearrangements, consolidating a feeling of polity

60 Elliot to Grey, 16 Dec. 1910, F.O. 371/913.
61 Elliot to Grey, 8 Mar. 1911, F.O. 371/1130; Elliot to Grey, 14 June 1911, F.O. 371/1130.
62 Elliot to Grey, 27 Mar. 1912, F.O. 371/1380.
63 Elliot to Grey, 29 June 1911, F.O. 371/1131.

change. As a whole, it led to an increase in domestic power and security, bound to mould sufficient domestic conditions for Greek grand strategy to stake out expansionist demands.

4.1. Society

In the years concerned, Greek society underwent inconsequential changes. It was still structured round the three blocs of classes that took shape in the late 19th century: the ruling bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie, and the lower categories of labour force. The critical difference was the *Goudi* revolt, which obtained legitimacy thanks to the support of the rising bourgeoisie.[64] The revolt and the advent of Venizelos restructured social arrangements and set off the process of an endogenous bourgeois transformation.[65] They marked the culmination of an intra-bourgeois struggle for control over the state; to the extent that the parliamentary representation of the petty bourgeoisie by the Liberals opened the way for the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie to take the upper hand *vis-à-vis* the notables and upper state bourgeoisie in directing state affairs.

Venizelos's Liberal Party acted indeed as a catalyst of renewal and social realignment. First, it provided an institutional vehicle for the joint political participation of the Independents. The latter, who had been elected to the Parliament for the first time, originated mainly in the middle classes of status and occupation.[66] That the new party had mass appeal to the petty bourgeoisie in no way meant that its base of popular support was confined only to this stratum. Instead, it represented a broader interclass coalition, made up of converts from the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie, the bourgeoisie of medium private-sector status, the middle and lower orders of state officials, the urban proletariat and the landless peasants, ideologically ranging from the leftist and modernist edge to the conservative and traditionalist one. What was outstanding in the emergence of this heterogeneous but distinct bloc was Venizelos's charisma, which was decisive in inspiring unity and a feeling of common purpose among its factions.[67] But the crucial aspect was the growth of a competitive class alliance, the leadership of which challenged the role of the old oligarchies as exclusive parliamentary intermediaries.

Secondly, the Liberal Party proved instrumental in the political emancipation of the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie. Prominent elements of the oligarchy of the commercial, financial, shipping and industrial capital, especially those of the Greek diaspora, sponsored Venizelos to sweep away the ruling establishment, enlarge the territorial space of national economy and turn their economic pre-eminence into lasting political power.[68] It was through the domination of parliamentary politics by the Liberals that the entrepreneurial

64 Ventiris, G. (1970). Η Ελλάς του 1910-1920: Τόμ. I (Greece of 1910-1920: Vol. I) (second edition). Athens: Ikaros, chap. 1.

65 Mavrogordatos, pp. 116-127; Rigos, A. (1992). Η Β΄ Ελληνική Δημοκρατία, 1924-1935: Κοινωνικές Διαστάσεις της Πολιτικής Σκηνής (The Second Greek Republic, 1924-1935: Social Dimensions of the Political Scene) (second edition). Athens: Themelio, pp. 168-170.

66 Dertilis, pp. 193-207.

67 Mavrogordatos, pp. 55-59, 180-181; Diamantopoulos, T. (1985). Οι Πολιτικές Δυνάμεις της Βενιζελικής Περιόδου: Τόμ. I (The Political Forces of the Venizelist Period: Vol. I). Athens: Ant. Sakkoulas, pp. 44-46, 66-73, 78-81.

68 Tsoucalas. Εξάρτηση, pp. 366-367.

bourgeoisie controlled from within the decision-making process, spearheaded modernisation, and became independent from the notables and upper state bourgeoisie with respect to access to the state's resources. It could be said to have evolved into the predominant faction of the ruling bourgeoisie but without yet establishing its 'organic' hegemony, inasmuch as it failed to eliminate old customs and adapt Greek society to its modernist values and interests.[69] Again, the key aspect was Venizelos's leadership, which attracted the petty bourgeoisie and stimulated it to enter the political scene through his party.

Against this background of structural continuities and changes, the state remained the primary pillar of Greek society. As social cleavages were bound up with public office holding and aggravated by the rift between traditionalists and modernizers, the state struggle for domestic power and security was still a struggle for control over the state. The peculiarities of Greek social formation continued to be produced by the same antinomies as those in the past: the vague image of nationhood and the operation of imported, bourgeois institutions within a traditional society. This society was rooted in the interaction of the class differentiation, the regional divisions, and the distinction between autochthons and heterochthons. However, Venizelos tried to disentangle the central administration from the meshes of the traditionalist practices and strengthen the state's ability to penetrate and extract resources from society.

The most important step was taken with the revision of the constitution, intended to establish modern norms of an advanced parliamentary regime but without challenging the existing rules of the power game. In addition to the introduction of supplementary guarantees for civil liberties, the rights of public meeting and the freedom of the press, the amendments to the non-fundamental clauses laid down that the three powers should be more clearly framed into distinct functions; primary education was within the jurisdiction of the state; civil servants and the judiciary were secured permanence of tenure; parliamentary quorum was reduced from one-half plus to one third to eradicate filibustering; a committee of lawyers selected by lot from members of the supreme courts of justice should be responsible for the verification of election returns; the age limit for the members of parliament was lowered from 30 to 25; military officers on active list and state functionaries were ineligible to hold parliamentary seats; a council of the state should be founded to operate both as a consultative body for the drafting of bills and a high court of appeal for the control of administrative abuses; judicial authorities should be promoted by an independent special council; and private property was inviolable, the expropriation of which for reasons of public benefit and national security could be effected only by legal means and accompanied by compensation.[70]

Efforts, too, were made to modernise and develop a new infrastructure. Venizelos, for example, resorted to the assistance of Italy to reform the services of accounts and customs.[71] Bills were enacted to establish a Ministry of National Economy with Departments of Agriculture and Commerce; expand the yields on taxation; substitute a progressive income tax for indirect taxes; arrest tax evasion; increase the land under cultivation; make primary education compulsory and free; reorganise local authorities; recruit state officials by public examination; eradicate corruption in the administration and justice;

69 As Mavrogordatos argues, the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie 'imposed its own hegemonic project', which was the 'expansion of the state, hence of the market, which would incorporate and consolidate under Greek sovereignty as much as possible of the economic space in which this bourgeoisie had previously operated as diaspora bourgeoisie', p. 128.

70 Elliot to Grey, 30 June 1911, F.O. 371/1130; Beaumont to Grey, 26 July 1911, F.O. 371/1130.

71 Elliot to Grey, 1 July 1912, F.O. 371/1380; Beaumont to Grey, 16 Aug. 1912, F.O. 371/1381.

introduce a minimum wage for women and children; legalise trade unions; install regulations related to the rights of workers in the factories and fields; and improve living conditions in prisons.[72] Also, policies were initiated to consolidate order in rural areas and thwart outlawry and brigandage.

Venizelos's program of recovery, in sum, brought about modest bourgeois changes, consolidating the central administration and keeping social radicalism in check. This was made possible because the Greek state continued to provide legitimacy to party and state clientelism, in order to obtain domestic power and security and avoid the domestic security and state-strength dilemmas. Reforms did little to impinge on patron-client relationships, the long-established networks linking rulers and ruled in Greek society. Notwithstanding that it was not named after its leader, the Liberal Party refrained from dislodging clientelism. In fact, the 'clientelistic component' prevented its development into a mass party of principle.[73] Venizelos and his fellows bolstered their grip on power, built state strength, and won society to their side by shifting 'orientations, allegiances, and resources' from 'the local to the national level'; that is, they transformed clientele politics into a broad 'centralised party-oriented' patronage arrangement.[74] By opening the access to, and enlarging the reach of, central authority, they reinforced the importance of the state apparatus as the arena and stake of clientelism. Not only did they transfer loyalties from individual patrons and political families to the party. They also became the main vehicle for the direct parliamentary representation of the petty bourgeoisie and fabricated, thanks to the universal male suffrage, the integration of the working classes into the political process. And all this enhanced the state's ability to penetrate and extract resources from Greek society for underpinning the purposes of grand strategy.

4.2. The Economy

In 1907 less than one sixth of the active population was employed in manufacturing.[75] Constrained by heavy foreign debt and the dependence on the capital of Greek diaspora, the Greek economy was dominated by agriculture and flourishing operations in commerce and finance, constituted along an underdeveloped, dual pattern of numerous small and few large property-holdings of all sorts. The structural features of production and the poor rate of growth remained unchanged in the years to come, although certain economic aggregates were set in good order.

Public debt was still the most enduring weakness. In 1893, after a sharp fall in receipts from exports of currants and in exchange holdings, Athens suspended the service of its outstanding debts. Four years later, in the wake of the 1897 Greek-Turkish war, an international financial commission was set up to monitor and pledge revenues for the debt service. The liquidation of the arrears of loans imposed an unprecedented burden on the

72 Dakin, p. 187; Clogg. Short History, p. 100.
73 Mavrogordatos, pp. 86-87.
74 Mouzelis. Politics, pp. 45-48.
75 Riginos, M. (1982). Ενεργός Πληθυσμός και Διάρθρωση των Οικονομικών Δομών (1909-1936) [Active Population and the Arrangement of Economic Structures (1909-1936)]. Istorika, 1 (2), pp. 377, 379.

country's finances and stunted sustainable development. By the end of June 1910, the accumulated public debt happened to descend, standing at £36,668,910 compared to a larger sum of £37,195,600 in 1909.[76] The annual loss of revenue assigned to the service increased, nevertheless. It was up to £1,465,041 in 1912 (estimated), compared to £1,342,832 in 1911, £1,222,068 in 1910, and £1,192,520 in 1909 (3% premium in gold). To this was added the burden of immigration with the thousands of Greek refugees who fled from Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey. The estimates for expenditure to be appropriated for them amounted to £255,400 in 1912, compared to £137,000 in 1911, £63,271 in 1910, and £200,916 in 1909.[77] Not accidentally, after the *Goudi* revolt, it was felt that Greece was again 'on the road to a second bankruptcy'.[78]

The recourse to external aid was once again inescapable. In October 1910, Venizelos, despite the borrowing concluded by Dragoumis disproportionate to Greece's ability to reimburse, acquired a new foreign loan of 90 million francs.[79] Like his predecessors, he sought to save money and create sufficient supplies of wealth for the modernisation of the military. Unlike them, he set out to improve public finances.

Although military credits dominated the allocation of capital expenditure, attention was paid to serve old debts.[80] In November 1910, a loan of £1.6 million was arranged for the repayment of the advance made in the previous July.[81] After the second double chamber was elected, Venizelos concluded a loan of six million pounds and assigned its management to the international financial commission. As he refused to conform to the obligations of the 150 million francs loan convention on the excuse of fiscal deficits, he suspended the railway investment in Thessaly and modified the terms so that the loan was reduced and was intended for drainage works.[82] This arrangement and the proceeds of the loans rendered the state of revenue stronger than it had ever been before. Data showed a surplus of revenue over expenditure of £1,368,065 in 1910 and £2,156,166 in 1911, compared to a deficit of £435,618 in 1909. However, heavy defence spending and the Balkan wars inflated the deficit, as war expenditure soared to an estimated total of £6,120,965 in 1912 and £8,700,000 in 1913; and the public debt to £42,827,021 in 1912.[83]

The service of public debt stood second to the funding of the military. One fifth of expenditure was annually provided for the service and almost half the budget for the military. In 1910 £3,828,200 was registered for military credits, a sum that had never been spent in peacetime before. The ordinary and extraordinary expenditure on the army and navy amounted to £3,345,425 and £482,775 respectively.[84] In 1911 the total was about £2,596,078, of which £1,828,355 was allocated to the army and £767,723 to the navy. The following year witnessed a significant increase in the navy's allotment. The 1912 budget brought up the military and naval expenditure to £3,051,201. Of this amount, some £1,928,577 was disposed for an army of 1,888 officers and 22,060 non-commissioned

76 'Annual Report 1910'.
77 Meaumont to Grey, 3 Apr. 1912, in Elliot to Grey, 3 Apr. 1912, F.O. 371/1380.
78 Young to Grey, 30 Nov. 1909, in Elliot to Grey, 3 Dec. 1909, F.O. 371/677.
79 Elliot to Grey, 7 Oct. 1910, F.O. 371/910.
80 Meaumont to Grey, 3 Apr. 1912, in Elliot to Grey, 3 Apr. 1912, F.O. 371/1380.
81 'Annual Report 1910'.
82 Elliot to Grey, 7 June 1911, F.O. 371/1130; Elliot to Grey, 15 June 1911, F.O. 371/1130; Elliot to Grey, 30 June 1911, F.O. 371/1130.
83 Beaumont, 'Report on the Finances of Greece for the Years 1912 and 1913', 24 July 1913, in Elliot to Grey, 30 July 1913, F.O. 371/1656; 'Annual Report 1913', in Elliot to Grey, 20 May 1914, F.O. 371/1999.
84 Beaumont to Grey, 26 July 1911, F.O. 371/1130.

officers and men, including the cost of the acquisition of war materials; and £1,122,624 for a navy of 406 officers and 3,164 petty officers, including the payment for the purchase of two submarines, a battle cruiser, two destroyers, and six torpedo boats.[85]

In anticipation of the outbreak of hostilities, on 14 October, the parliament voted for supplementary military credits of £2,900,000 in round figures. While the estimates for 1912 anticipated a budget deficit of £1,570,314, this was brought up to £4,586,306 for 1912 and £2,076,377 for 1913. Before the Balkan wars, Athens expected to meet the deficit by an amount of £3,000,000 from the proceeds of the loan of 1911, the budget surplus of the past two years, the sale of state property, and the issue of yet another small loan. Afterwards, as it failed to raise a loan in the USA and obtain permission from the international financial commission to use a portion of the surplus of assigned revenues, it attempted to find a sum equal to the deficit by the issue of treasury bonds and the use of the surplus and of a portion of the reserves of the National Bank.[86] When the First Balkan war broke out, military expenditure began to evolve into an awesome drain on Greece's finances. It was the foreign loans and budget surplus that stimulated Venizelos to release funds for armaments and bear the cost of operations without bringing the economy to its knees.[87] But having reached the limits of its defence spending potential, it seemed clear that the economy could not sustain a war for long without going bankrupt.

4.3. The Military

Coming to office, Venizelos took over the Ministries of War and the Navy. He made the reconstruction of the military an integral part of state recovery. In the first place, he opted for the course that offered arrest of military intervention in politics. The *Goudi* revolt made its mark as the first action against the establishment ever planned and carried into effect by the military through their own initiative. But apart from its independent flavour, it shied away from challenging civilian order. Like other earlier instances of military involvement in social upheavals, it reflected both the officers' effort to better their prospects of professional advancement and the society's struggle to resist the state's centralising or authoritarian tendencies. Although the officers' *Syndesmos* handed over the government to Venizelos, they were not to be allowed to manipulate their military power as a tool of political pressure.

Venizelos, thus, issued a circular proclaiming that the mission of the armed forces was to accomplish their military commissions.[88] He released from prison and reinstated to active service the officers who had been arrested by the *Syndesmos*; and introduced a law stipulating the creation of the post of inspector-general, which on 25 March 1913 was occupied by

85 Beaumont to Grey, 11 Jan. 1912, in Elliot to Grey, 12 Jan. 1912, F.O. 371/1380; Elliot to Grey, 25 Mar. 1912, F.O. 371/1380.

86 Beaumont to Grey, 24 Oct. 1912, in Elliot to Grey, 24 Oct. 1912, F.O. 371/1380; Beaumont to Grey, 27 Nov. 1912, in Elliot to Grey, 28 Nov. 1912, F.O. 371/1380; 'Memorandum by Mr. Beaumont on Greek Finances, with Special Reference to the War', 22 Mar. 1913, in Elliot to Grey, 22 Mar. 1913, F.O. 371/1654.

87 Elliot to Grey, 16 Dec. 1913, F.O. 371/1654; C.E.I.P. (1914). Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars. Washington, D.C., p. 250.

88 Elliot to Grey, 31 Oct. 1910, F.O. 371/909.

Crown Prince Constantine.[89] In this way, Venizelos proved that he was not a creature of the military. Not only did he retain autonomy of action and build state strength by keeping the officer corps out of politics, but also he reconciled the military with the royal family and won the confidence of George.

In the second place, Venizelos laid the foundations for the formation of a modern military according to western standards. He sought to improve the professionalism of the officer corps and thwart the long-established dual structure of the military, the co-existence of standing forces and irregular bands; the task was to transform the military into a mechanism that would mediate only externally administered state authority. In this respect, he eliminated band irredentist incursions across the border and shifted the operations of the military from the preservation of domestic regime to the defence of national security and the conduct of an irredentist war in the 'unredeemed' territories of Hellenism. He, too, restructured the military organisation and education by inviting France and Britain to take charge of this duty in the army and navy respectively.

Paris had responded in the affirmative to the application made by Dragoumis. General Eydoux and his staff arrived in Athens in January 1911. Although the crown prince displayed his antipathy to their work thanks to his German-originated military training, the French put forward innovative measures: the service's administration and the system of resources supply was reformed; a staff college and schools of arms instruction were established; and a number of officers of infantry, artillery, and engineers were sent for training to the French Military Academy.[90]

Moreover, in January 1912, Eydoux recommended and the second double chamber sanctioned changes in the organisation of the army. Greece was divided into four military districts to each of which corresponded an army division of three regiments of infantry; each regiment was made up of three battalions of three companies each. The active troops and their reserves included: six *Evzone* battalions; three regiments of cavalry, two of which consisted of five squadrons and one of six; four regiments of field artillery, three of which were made up of six battalions and one of eight; two regiments of mountain artillery of four batteries each; a battalion of heavy artillery of three batteries; four companies of transport and two regiments of engineers; and several auxiliary services, such as schools of higher study, posts of reserve officers, clerks, ambulance corps, and veterinary hospitals.[91] Venizelos expected these changes to increase the war strength of the army from 110,000 to 130,000 men.[92] Finally, an effort was made to keep the army in line with breakthroughs in the air force. In the end of 1911, officers were sent to France to study aviation, and some months later three new aeroplanes were placed at the disposal of the general staff.[93]

Meanwhile, in November 1910, Venizelos sounded Elliot about the possibility of British officers being allowed to reorganise the navy. Under seal of secrecy London accepted the proposal on the condition that Athens should make a formal application; and some clauses of the law respecting the engagement of foreign field officers should be revised so that the head

89 Elliot to Grey, 29 June 1911, F.O. 371/1131; Elliot to Grey, 12 Apr. 1912, F.O. 371/1380.
90 Elliot to Grey, 20 Dec. 1910, F.O. 371/913; Military Attache in Sofia to Elliot, 19 Nov. 1911, in Elliot to Grey, 6 Dec. 1911, F.O. 371/1131; 'Annual Report 1911', in Elliot to Grey, 12 Feb. 1912, F.O. 371/1380.
91 Elliot to Grey, 16 Feb. 1912, F.O. 371/1380.
92 Elliot to Grey, 5 Mar. 1912, F.O. 371/1380.
93 'Annual Report 1911'.

of the naval mission should not direct operations in time of war.[94] On 16 January 1911, Athens applied to Britain for a loan of naval officers, while in May it amended the legislation to the effect that foreign missions were not allowed to offer their services during hostilities; the officers were to retain their nationality; and the heads were to work with the minister of war as chief advisors and have a rank higher than what they might have in their native army or navy. Afterwards, Rear-admiral Tufnell and some retired officers, who had arrived in Athens by the end of April, were entrusted for three years with training the Greek navy.[95]

Although vested interests held back Tufnell's reforms, considerable headway was made.[96] In January 1912, ten Greek sub-lieutenants were sent to attend courses of gunnery, torpedo, and navigation instruction in British naval schools.[97] Measures were initiated to modernise ships; found schools of gunnery and torpedo firing; refurbish establishments; and build new stores.[98] To strengthen his hand of ruling, in August Tufnell was appointed inspector-general of the navy.[99] Ultimately, the Greek minister of the navy acknowledged the contribution of the mission to the growth of the fighting efficiency, which according to Tufnell in October 1912 stood ahead Turkey's.[100]

The reorganisation of the military was successfully carried out. This however did little to eliminate old customs. The Military Academy continued to operate as a highly eclectic school of instruction, which supplied the elite destined to take the field. Admission was still subject to criteria of social background and access to political families, and preferment on good personal contacts. A symptom of the spoils system and the discrimination as to class and family affiliations was that only after the outbreak of the Balkan wars was universal conscription enforced.[101] Although Venizelos contained royal favouritism, he broadened, by increasing chances for education and promotion, the power game within the officer corps, an action that led to more flexible clientelistic politics.[102] In reality, while he pulled the military out of politics, he did not remove politics from the military, which remained an arena of political intrigues and paternalistic practices. It was through the formation of patron-client networks of Venizelist colour that he mustered loyalty and reformed the forces.

Greece's domestic transformation, to sum up, represented the reconstitution of Greek polity, which was to play its part in enabling Greek strategies to pursue and attain expansion. The *Goudi* revolt and the rise of Venizelos's Liberal Party to power marked a watershed moment of bourgeois transition in Greek social formation. Not only did they signify the parliamentary participation of the petty bourgeoisie. They also reflected the culmination of a complex intra-bourgeois struggle for control over the state, which provided a basis for the power predominance of the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie *vis-a-vis* the notables and upper state bourgeoisie. It was only after the petty bourgeoisie entered the political scene in an

94 Elliot to Grey, 22 Nov. 1910, F.O. 371/913; Grey to Elliot, 25 Nov. 1910, F.O. 371/913.
95 Gryparis to Elliot, 27 Nov. (10 Dec.) 1910, in Elliot to Grey, 10 Dec. 1910, F.O. 371/913; Elliot to Grey, 10 Apr. 1911, F.O. 371/1129; Elliot to Grey, 25 Apr. 1911, F.O. 371/1129.
96 Elliot to Grey, 3 May 1912, F.O. 371/1381; Elliot to Grey, 20 May 1913, F.O. 371/1655.
97 Correspondence, in 1911, F.O. 371/1131 and 1912, F.O. 371/1380.
98 'Annual Report 1911'.
99 Beaumont to Grey, 31 Aug. 1912, F.O. 371/1380.
100 Elliot to Grey, 18 Oct. 1912, F.O. 371/1381.
101 (1914). The Success of the Greek Army in the Recent Balkan Campaigns. Army Review, VI (1), p. 52.
102 Veremis, T. (1976). The Officer Corps in Greece (1912-1936). Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, 2, pp. 128-130.

autonomous way via a new party that the political game was broadened, the political personnel was renewed, and the old ruling oligarchies consented to the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie taking the lead in managing state affairs. Although family, factionalism, localism, clientelism, and brigandage continued to shape and substantiate politics, a semblance of one-party system of government emerged; a minimum consensus concerning the distribution of spoils was forged; and the party polarisation and decision-making conflicts within the governing coalition faded, at least temporarily.

Against this background, clientelism kept functioning as the basic mechanism through which demands were mobilised. In contrast to the past, it was not used as a means of manoeuvring the masses out of the power competition; it was refashioned into a means for their controlled inclusion into it. This came through an important change in the operation of the parties, which were no longer the channels through which social paternalism by the oligarchies was effected. The parties as independent institutions began to strip the oligarchies of their patronage power and manipulate it in their own right. Government and party clientele networks became autonomous in reproducing the traditionalist practices through and within state institutions. But they continued to fulfil the bridging action between the state's ability to marshal human and material resources and the society's will to supply the instruments of coercion, production, bureaucracy, and finance. The Liberals' state building and ruling reproduced rather than eliminated the hybrid co-existence of power centralisation and fragmentation and the ensuing pattern of mutual strength and weakness between state and society. Nonetheless, as Venizelos's domestic governance and charismatic leadership held in equilibrium the scale of the state's and the society's autonomy, Greece appeared much stronger.

It was indicative that although the Great Idea of uniting the 'unredeemed' territories with the Greek motherland was popular, the ordinary people welcomed the outbreak of the Balkan wars with such enthusiasm that recruits went to the colours in mass; to the effect that extra battalions and independent bands of volunteers were created and the general staff found no reason to deploy them all to the front. Also, one third of men under arms originated in the Greeks of the diaspora, who came from abroad covering travel expenses on their own.[103] Venizelos, therefore, was able to build state strength and rally the Greek people round the flag, a powerful enabling domestic force that was to afford Greece autonomy of action in taking the offensive against a much greater adversary, the Ottomans. But having examined the international and domestic structural conditions, I turn to shed light on the particular share that the regional imperatives of the Balkan setting had in making Greek grand strategy.

103 Correspondence, in 1912, G.M.F.A. 8.3; Elliot to Grey, 31 Jan. 1913, F.O. 371/1654; Γ.Ε.Σ./Δ.Ι.Σ. (1988). Ο Ελληνικός Στρατός κατά τους Βαλκανικούς Πολέμους του 1912-1913: Τόμ. Ι. Επιχειρήσεις κατά των Τούρκων στην Μακεδονία και τα Νησιά του Αιγαίου (Α΄ Βαλκανικός Πόλεμος) [The Greek Army in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913: Vol. I. Operations Against the Turks in Macedonia and the Islands of Aegean (A΄ Balkan War)]. Athens, pp. 19-20.

Chapter 5

REGIONAL DYNAMICS

1. THE BALKAN STRATEGIC ARRANGEMENTS

As systemic polarisation reduced the great powers' appetite for a trial of strength with each other, what shape did strategic arrangements in the Balkans take?[1] To begin with Ottoman Turkey, two events were central. The first was the 1908 Young Turk revolt. One effect was to induce Austria-Hungary to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina; Bulgaria to incorporate Eastern Rumelia and declare its independence from Ottoman suzerainty; and Crete to proclaim *enosis* with Greece. Another effect was to intensify the ethnic clashes in Macedonia, insofar as it accelerated the Turkification of Ottoman subjects; that is, the forced conversion of people of Moslem and Christian creed and race into Ottoman Turkish citizens.[2] Convinced that they could not fight a war with Vienna or Sofia, the Young Turks resisted only the Cretan challenge. The second event was Italy's attack on Libya in September 1911. The bombardment of the Dardanelles and the occupation of the Dodecanese islands showed the Young Turks' inability to cope with strategic overextension.[3] It was under these circumstances that nationalism resurrected in the Balkans.

Of the small Balkan states, only Romania kept itself away from the Balkan imbroglio. It was committed, having three times renewed a secret alliance with Austria-Hungary to which Germany and Italy became affiliated early in 1913, to appease the irredentist ferment of its ethnic kin being under Austrian rule.[4] The other capitals however tried to capitalise on Turkey's plight in order to gain a foothold in its European provinces. But they did not work jointly. They were torn by rivalries over the fate of nationalities and the partition of spoils in Macedonia and Thrace. The apple of discord was *Salonika*. This city, lying on the edge of the Vardar valley on the shores of the Aegean, was the sole important port serving Balkan commercial shipping in the Mediterranean.[5] In this struggle Bulgaria and Serbia were

1 The discussion draws on Helmreich, E. C. (1938). The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars 1912-1913. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

2 Sloane, W. M. (1911). Turkey in Europe II. Political Science Quarterly, 26 (4), pp. 678-679.

3 Yasamee, F. A. K. (1993). Abdulhamid II and the Ottoman Defence Problem. Diplomacy and Statecraft, 4 (1), pp. 20-36.

4 Karousos to Coromilas, 2/15 May 1912, G.M.F.A. 1.1; Xidakis to Coromilas, 20 Aug./2 Sep. 1912, G.M.F.A. 97.3.

5 Mazower, M. (1994). Salonica Between East and West 1860-1912. Dialogos. Hellenic Studies Review, 1, p. 106.

structurally better placed than Greece and Montenegro. Nonetheless, the Bulgarians were of the first rank in terms of military strength.

Regional pressures, therefore, were destined to shape Greek grand strategy, but only through the interactive impact of other structural forces. The Balkan balance of power was conducive to moves seemingly precluded by Greece's inferior military and economic capabilities. The depleted state of the army, coupled with the lack of capital stock, poor public finances, and heavy debt dictated strategies that normally should cut back military expenditure and arrest irredentist assertiveness. Athens, nonetheless, perceived the Bulgarian and the Serbian growing military power and a latent naval antagonism with Turkey, not so much as threats that ordered accommodation, as a systemic stimulus to reinforce its services and advance expansionist demands.

The problem was twofold. The first aspect was that the more the old ruling oligarchies were concerned with the spoils of office, the less able they were to secure the support of the powers and extract additional resources from Greek society to finance armaments. The second was that reducing irredentist ventures into appeasement and dependency marked Greece's diplomacy since its inception. As they misperceived the protecting powers' guarantee of independence as a 'blank cheque' to play for high stakes, the governing coalition boiled down to exchanging foreign interference for the discretion to hold office and distribute spoils at will. The 1897 debacle stepped up still further the pressure on them for an understanding with Turkey. But Crete's claim for union worked against moderation, an international constraint that confronted Greek governments with a severe strategic dilemma: while they were inclined to encourage the island's recurrent uprisings, they were unprepared to incite the powers' and the Porte's hostility. The *Goudi* revolt and the ensuing bourgeois transformation created, as I discussed before, sufficient domestic conditions, which, along with the concurrent influence of proximate Balkan developments, were to enable Venizelos to adopt strategies potentially necessary for achieving the ends in view.

Taking office, Venizelos was able to reap the fruits of these opportunities. Despite the nationalist ferment in Greek society, he was cautious not to incur the odium of the great powers and Turkey. He believed that the international and domestic situation dictated that Greece should hold firm positions but respond with flexibility to accommodating hints, avoiding adventurism. The Cretan issue took Greece almost to the brink of war with Turkey. So fiercely did the tension develop that in October 1910 the Ottoman minister in Athens was granted leave of absence and his duty was taken over by a charge d' affaires; it was May 1912 before an ambassador presented his credentials.[6] Also, on London's initiative, the protecting powers conveyed a veto to Athens not to admit deputies representing Cyprus and Samos to its Parliament.[7] That Constantinople was resolute to resist the Cretan claims and the powers advocated the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire afforded Athens no opportunity to play off each power against the other or display intransigence.[8] The Venizelos government, however, never dismissed their irredentist ambitions. Instead,

> they were in something of a dilemma for, unlike the Serbs, Bulgarians and Montenegrins, the 'unredeemed' Greeks were not compactly settled but were widely

6 Lowther to Grey, 19 Oct. 1910, tel. no. 229, F.O. 371/913; Elliot to Grey, 29 May 1912, F.O. 371/1381.

7 Grey to Young, 12 Sep. 1910, tel. no. 147, F.O. 371/912; Grey to O'Beirne, 14 Sep. 1910, tel. no. 572, F.O. 371/912.

8 Venizelos to King George, 1912, V.A. 173/265.

> scattered throughout the Near East and were thus vulnerable to Turkish reprisals. If Greece stood aside…she might miss out on the spoils in Macedonia.[9]

As a matter of fact, at the time of Venizelos's rise to power, moves that might weaken the hold of Turkey on its European provinces did not favour Greece. The unsatisfactory state of the economy and military narrowed the freedom for assertive strategies.

In this context, Venizelos's ultimate strategic aim was to preserve the *status quo* and advance claims short of war. Particular attention was devoted to averting conflict with the Porte; resisting adverse developments in Macedonia at the expense of the Greek national communities; establishing alignment relations with other Balkan states; and gaining time in order to summon up more strength through domestic recovery. From this angle, Venizelos constituted Greek diplomacy along the firm-but-flexible form. Three constituent objectives directed it until the outbreak of the Balkan wars: conciliation with Turkey, renunciation of the Cretan demands, and rapprochement with Bulgaria and Serbia. The means used were largely initiative and coalition-building.

Athens was powerless and weak to secure acquisitions from the Porte. What it could afford to do was to keep moderation and deny unwelcome demands. Venizelos sought to annex Crete by peaceful means; he was disposed to come to an understanding with Turkey and pay a tribute in return for a formal recognition of the Cretans' demands to elect and dispatch deputies to the Greek Parliament.[10] In April 1911, he was ready to prevent by force the admission of Cretan deputies.[11] In November, he threatened to resign should the chamber not sanction his decision.[12] In April 1912, he and George sealed their determination to work for peace, in order to complete domestic reforms. But they concurred in the view that while it was imperative to refrain from any action designed to dissolve the territorial integrity of the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire, they should be prepared to 'seize an opportunity of advancing the national interests if one should present itself'.[13] On 1 June, when the Cretan deputies arrived in Athens to attend the opening meeting of the parliament, he stuck by his pledge.[14] Eventually, the Cretan chamber telegrammed their resolution to submit to his policy.[15] Venizelos, too, expected of the powers to settle the Macedonian dispute in consonance with the Treaty of Berlin, which envisaged the introduction of reforms and the protection of the rights of the Christian population. Clearly, by then Greek leadership felt that they were not yet strong enough to take action, unless Balkan conditions were proximate for such a step. It was in Greece's interest to remove any likelihood of war over Crete or Macedonia with the Sultan; at least it did not gain the latter's or the powers' enmity at a moment when domestic transformation was in the course of its full development.

9 Clogg, R. (1995). A Concise History of Greece. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 79.
10 (undated). Mr E. Venizelos' Great Speech on the Balkan Crisis in the Debate of 4th July, 1913, in the Greek Chamber. In Mr E. Venizelos' Great Speech on the Balkan Crisis and a Sketch of the Political Career of this Great Man from the Pen of the Hon. W.P. Reeves. London: Hakikiopulo & Sorotto, pp. 3-4.
11 Elliot to Grey, 28 Apr. 1911, F.O. 371/1131.
12 'Annual Report 1911'.
13 Elliot to Grey, 26 Apr. 1912, F.O. 371/1381.
14 Elliot to Grey, 7 June 1912, F.O. 371/1381.
15 Elliot to Grey, 18 Oct. 1912, F.O. 371/1381.

Meanwhile, alliance consultations between the small Balkan states had begun to take shape and substance. The first cooperation overtures were made by Greece to Bulgaria late in 1910. The two countries long before quarrelled over the fate of Macedonia and the Christian population and churches thereof. But as conciliation between the Greek Patriarchate and the Bulgarian Exarchate grew steadily, Athens decided to show signs of moderation and better relations ensued.[16] Venizelos was eager to side with Sofia, in order to buy time for domestic reconstruction, contain the Ottoman aggressiveness, and improve the plight of unredeemed Greeks in Macedonia. The fear of a flare-up in Crete, however, distressed the Bulgarians, who primarily sought to establish a closer relationship with Serbia. Consequently, throughout 1911 the two capitals exchanged communications, without looking for more cordial consultations.[17] And Athens was aware only of the Bulgarian effort to accommodate Turkey.[18]

Bulgaria and Serbia received the Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina with alarm. Sofia, who wanted to secure ports in the Aegean and expand up to Dobrudja in the north, in 1911 made accommodating overtures to the Sultan to obtain concessions in Macedonia and bring the Balkan states together into a concert against Austria-Hungary; but his intransigence forced it to adopt a policy of balancing and confrontation.[19] Belgrade, seeking to take Croatia, Slavonia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Dalmatia, aimed not to act forcefully, in order to acquire an outlet in the Adriatic or the Aegean. Ultimately, geographical proximity, coupled with the shared fear of an attack by Vienna and Constantinople and the anxiety that the Italian-Turkish war might act as a pretext for the great powers to seize gains, pushed the two capitals to look for common cause. A treaty and a secret annex were signed on 13 March 1912, subsequently supplemented by a military convention and an agreement between the two general staffs.[20] The alliance targeted Austria-Hungary and Turkey, providing for Serbia to annex territories in Macedonia and secure territorial access to the Adriatic; and for Bulgaria to acquire a share of the seaboard in the Aegean, while leaving open the way to Constantinople.

It was before the agreement with Belgrade was concluded that in February 1912 Sofia notified Athens of its desire to enter into negotiations. Not later than the end of April Venizelos submitted a draft alliance convention to the Bulgarians. Controversies over Macedonia once again emerged, which dragged talks into impasse. Greece valued the *status quo* and demanded recognition of the Sultan's decrees that sanctioned the rights of the Christian population. Bulgaria, instead, called for autonomy and recognition of the relevant provisions of the Treaty of Berlin. At this juncture, Athens happened to have become informed that an alliance between Serbia and Bulgaria had recently been concluded, stipulating the partition of Macedonia.[21] Although this development could have ignited the fire, it acted as a catalyst of compromise: as much as Athens felt the danger of isolation, so equally was Sofia alarmed by the threat of quasi-encirclement should Greece align with Turkey. But what really carried weight was the Greek response to the challenge. Venizelos filtered international and domestic conditions and decided to make a deal with the Bulgarians

16 Young to Grey, 2 Aug. 1910, F.O. 371/912; Elliot to Grey, 29 Sep. 1910, F.O. 371/912.
17 'Annual Report 1911'.
18 Panas to G.M.F.A., 18 Nov. (1 Dec.) 1911, in 1912, G.M.F.A. 97.2.
19 Hall, R. C. (1992). Bulgaria's Failed Rapprochement With the Ottoman Empire 1911-1912. Diplomacy and Statecraft, 3 (2), pp. 229-242.
20 Texts, in Γ.Ε.Σ./Δ.Ι.Σ., pp. 233-241.

by virtue of his belief that while they 'were bad…the Turks were worse at that time'.[22] It was through this strategic choice that structural imperatives afforded Greece partnership value.

Greece and Bulgaria agreed to lay aside their rivalry in Macedonia in order to stand united and oppose the most dominant threat in the region, Turkey. A treaty was signed on 30 May, subsequently supplemented by a military convention.[23] The alliance was of defensive character, as it included no clauses related to acquisitions. The main text laid down that each of the parties was committed to come to the help of the other in the event of attack by a third power against their territorial integrity or vested interests. Both parties were obliged to take measures in concert for the peaceful co-existence of the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire and the protection of their religious and educational rights. To this was added an annexed declaration, stating that if the Cretan deputies were allowed to attend the Greek Parliament and Greek-Turkish hostilities followed suit, Bulgaria was bound to 'benevolent neutrality'.[24] This reservation was withdrawn in the convention, which envisaged that Bulgaria should supply 300,000 men and Greece commit 120,000 men and prevent the sea transfer of Ottoman forces from Asia Minor to Macedonia.

While Montenegro signed separate military conventions with Serbia and Bulgaria, Venizelos set out to align with Serbia. Talks for rapprochement got under way, and in summer closer relations were established. It was after the opening of the First Balkan war that Athens presented a draft agreement reminiscent of the Greek-Bulgarian treaty. This provided for mutual military assistance in the event of attack by a third power and protection of their nationalities in Macedonia. Nothing came out of this move. As the campaigns took priority, negotiations were suspended. But the heart of the matter was that the interplay of the international system and domestic structure shaped the Greeks' diplomacy and constituted through it Greece's Balkan strategic arrangements; which, along with the concurrent effect of other enabling international and domestic forces, were to set the stage for Greek grand strategy to pursue and attain expansion.

As regards Greek military strategy, Venizelos put emphasis on building up effective forces as a basis of consolidating the *status quo* and enhancing the bargaining capacity of Greek diplomacy. The means were furnished by the augmentation of the manpower of the army and navy and the modernisation of weapon systems. Of the structural conditions that enabled this option, the resurgence of nationalism and ethnic fighting in Macedonia, the Italian-Turkish war, the record of budget surplus, and the reorganisation of the military seemed most critical.

By October 1912 the target mark for a mobilised army of about 120,000 officers and men was met. This manpower was brought up to 186.523 soon after the outbreak of hostilities.[25] Although armament figured at the top of the agenda, Greece could not build its own artillery and warships. It was dependent on the powers' credits and will to supply military equipment.

21 Dakin, p. 193; Ventiris, pp. 95-98; Metaxas to Venizelos, 16 (29) June 1913, V.A. 173/311.
22 Venizelos' Great Speech, p. 10.
23 Texts, in Γ.Ε.Σ./Δ.Ι.Σ., pp. 241-245.
24 Dakin, pp. 193-194; Helmreich, p. 76; Anderson, p. 292.
25 Γ.Ε.Σ./Δ.Ι.Σ., p. 16; G.M.D., 'Note on the Army's Manpower since the Beginning of the War', 1912, V.A. 173/79.

The weakness was expressed in the refusal of Britain to sell two battle cruisers.[26] Despite difficulties, in October 1910 a deal was concluded for the purchase of a submarine, to be ready for delivery in eight months.[27] This was added to the earlier acquisition of the battle cruiser *Averoff*. But while considerable headway was made to update war materials, the number of men under arms lagged behind that of Bulgaria and Serbia. On the other hand, Greece's competence at sea was unrivalled.[28] The Greek fleet was a match for the Ottoman.

Venizelos laid stress on the reinforcement of the navy.[29] The shipbuilding program took the lion's share in the allocation of military expenditure, a decision that was dictated by the naval arms race between Constantinople and Athens. In December 1908, Turkey assigned to a British naval mission the task of improving the fighting efficiency of its navy. In the Italian-Turkish war, nevertheless, the Ottoman fleet was bottled up in the Straits, unable to challenge the Italian command of the sea route to Libya and prevent the seizure of the Dodecanese. It was this awkward experience that prompted the Ottoman headquarter staff to draft a five-year plan of naval construction. This envisaged the creation of a battle fleet of six dreadnoughts, four scout cruisers, twenty destroyers, and six submarines. Also, Constantinople was reported to have bought from Germany two second-hand battleships. In response, the Greeks tried to acquire two old battleships from France, an effort that was doomed.[30]

In February 1911, Athens issued a royal decree fixing the strength of the fleet. Two battle-cruisers (*Spetsai* and *Averoff,* still on trial), four torpedo-boat-destroyers, three steam sloops and the Royal Yacht Amphitrite were qualified in commission; two battle-cruisers (*Hydra* and *Psara*), four torpedo-boat-destroyers, three steam corvettes, one transport vessel, and one torpedo-ship were set in reserve.[31] Following a Turkish order for a dreadnought in the summer, the Venizelos government began to negotiate the purchase of a battle cruiser, two destroyers, and six torpedo boats. In June 1912, ultimately, they placed the construction orders in the hands of a German firm on account of its offering the lowest price and fastest delivery.[32] Having missed out on the orders, London and Paris believed that the warships were part of a German shipbuilding program and were given thanks to a secret agreement between the Kaiser and Venizelos. Although the rumour was not far from reality, the fact of the matter was that in view of the coming war, Venizelos was eager to receive the warships as soon as possible. Berlin kept its promise by delivering the two destroyers in four months. At the same time, Britain walked off with an order of four destroyers, which were being constructed for Argentina and were delivered to Greece shortly after the hostilities with Turkey broke out.[33]

Thus, the First Balkan war found the Greek and the Ottoman fleet standing on equal footing. The former consisted of a newly built heavy battle-cruiser, three repaired light battle-cruisers, six new and eight old destroyers, one submarine, a number of torpedo-boats and gunboats and various auxiliary ships; while one heavy battleship and six torpedo-boats were

26 Grey to Young, 12 Sep. 1910, F.O. 371/910.
27 Elliot to Grey, 6 Oct. 1910, F.O. 371/913.
28 Γ.Ε.Σ./Δ.Ι.Σ., chap. 2 & pp. 287-288.
29 Venizelos to G.S.N., 31 Dec. 1910 (13 Jan. 1911), V.A. 173/77.
30 Halpern, P. G. (1971). The Mediterranean Naval Situation 1908-1914. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, pp. 314-315, 318-319, 324.
31 Elliot to Grey, 14 Feb. 1911, F.O. 371/1130.
32 Elliot to Grey, 29 June 1912, F.O. 371/1381; Seeds to Grey, 1 Aug. 1912, F.O. 371/1381.
33 Halpern, pp. 325-328.

on order. The latter was made up of a new dreadnought, five old battleships, two modern cruisers, eight destroyers, six or seven torpedo boats, and several smaller craft. But the Greek navy enjoyed fighting pre-eminence thanks to the quality of its vessels. Although the Ottomans possessed a 23,000-ton dreadnought with a maximum speed of 21 knots and more battle-cruisers, the *Averoff* made the difference in terms of speed (23-24 knots) and weapons.[34] From this point, it was through the response to structural imperatives that Greek military strategy mattered to Greece in improving its position in the Balkan military balance of power, which along with other enabling structural forces, were to throw up proximate opportunities for the Greeks to take action against Turkey.

2. THE BALKAN WARS

The powers' reluctance to confront each other incited the expansionist aspirations of the small Balkan states other than Romania, and paved the way for the conclusion of bilateral alliances between them. Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro were in one way or another pledged to help each other militarily, should Turkey go to war against either one. That they sided with one another against the Ottoman Empire allowed for the growth of an alternative structural pole, which challenged its mastery in the Balkans. The chasm of relations deteriorated thanks to an Albanian uprising, which resulted in the granting of significant concessions to the insurgents. This distressed the Balkan allies, who realised that unless they rushed to catch up with developments, the anticipated inception of an autonomous Albania would negate their designs.[35]

As early as August 1912 the outburst of frontier skirmishes in Macedonia rendered the eruption of violence inescapable. Sofia communicated to the Sultan the determination of the allies to fight together unless he conceded autonomy to his European provinces. It was not until the first week of October that Constantinople notified all quarters of its intention to comply with the obligations of the Treaty of Berlin with respect to the rights of nationalities. On 8 October, Austria-Hungary and Russia, having consulted the other powers, presented a note to Balkan capitals stating that any military action or territorial partition was intolerable. But the same day, Montenegro took the offensive against Turkey, presenting a *fait accompli.*

Meanwhile, Greece had intensified military preparations.[36] It had been aware of Germany's, Austria's and Russia's decision not to allow the disturbance of peace in the area, and of the powers' efforts to push Turkey to advance reforms in Macedonia.[37] On 10 October, despite the powers' warning, Venizelos declared in Parliament:

34 Ibid, pp. 316-317, 323-324; Dakin, p. 189.

35 Kondis, B. (1984). The Role of the Albanian Factor upon the Greek-Bulgarian Understanding of 1912. Balkan Studies, 25 (2), pp. 384-387.

36 Beaumont to Grey, 30 Sep. 1912, F.O. 371/1380.

37 Theotokis to Gryparis, 5 (18) Feb. 1912, G.M.F.A. 1.1; Psychas to Gryparis, 16 (29) Apr. 1912, G.M.F.A., 1.1; Theotokis to Coromilas, 10 (23) July 1912, G.M.F.A. 1.1; Correspondence, in 1912, G.M.F.A. 97.3.

> I continue to hope that peace can still be preserved, since we and our allies and friends do not pursue acquisitive objects…. But if our hopes should be belied, the Greek nation knows that it may place confidence in its army and its fleet.[38]

Venizelos believed that the powers were loath to enforce the *status quo* and thereby, unless Athens acted together with Serbia and Bulgaria, it could be cut out of the spoils of victory. He had abundant wisdom to comprehend that he could not indulge in the luxury of neutrality or cooperation with Turkey; should the latter come out of the war victorious, Greek communities in Asia Minor were destined for humiliation.[39]

The allies felt that the powers were unable to enforce their will.[40] On 13 October, Athens, Sofia, and Belgrade issued a statement to the powers to the effect that they took the Macedonian question in their hands. They communicated an ultimatum to Turkey, demanding for Macedonia autonomy and the appointment of Christian governors.[41] On 17 October, the day that it signed a peace agreement with Italy, Constantinople reacted by declaring war on Bulgaria and Serbia. The next day Greece, honouring the treaty pledges, came to the assistance of its allies, proclaiming the annexation of Crete and the admission of Cretan deputies to its Parliament.

Systemic, regional and domestic opportunities, therefore, motivated Venizelos to act forcefully and strive for territorial acquisitions. The powers' qualms about military intervention, Balkan alliances, the reconstruction and re-armament of the military, and the consensus of the governing coalition and society afforded him much autonomy of action in marching against Turkey in concert with his allies. Taken together these enabling forces, reinforced as they were by the imperative to run first to the spoils, negated such constraints as the inferior position in the Balkan overall balance of power and the heavy public debt. Accommodation was no longer rewarding or promising. The force of circumstances dictated that it was the proper timing for Athens to strike out on its own and grab what it could. It was from this perception of the structural conditions and the national interest to be served that Venizelos articulated the ultimate strategic aim of territorial expansion. Unless the choice was made and related strategies were adopted, expansion could hardly happen. Greek grand strategy, being the objectified product of the dialectical interplay of the international system and domestic structure, became the medium through which Athens pursued and attained the enlargement of its territorially ordered rule.

Greece entered the First Balkan war, targeting Macedonia and the islands of the Aegean.[42] Venizelos stood firm on this strategic move. On the eve of hostilities and throughout their initial stages, he turned down an offer of autonomy for Crete and other enticing overtures made by Turkey.[43] The priorities of Greek military strategy were reset. The objective was to obtain power and security in the Balkans through the use of force, in

38 Elliot to Grey, 10 Oct. 1912, F.O. 371/1381.

39 Venizelos' Great Speech, pp. 12-13.

40 Stavrianos, p. 534.

41 Coromilas to O.M.F.A., 30 Sep. (13 Oct.) 1912, in Γ.Ε.Σ./Δ.Ι.Σ., pp. 245-247.

42 The reconstruction of the campaigns and strategy relies on primary and secondary materials in Γ.Ε.Σ./Δ.Ι.Σ. & Γ.Ε.Σ./Δ.Ι.Σ. (1992). Ο Ελληνικός Στρατός κατά τους Βαλκανικούς Πολέμους του 1912-1913: Τόμ. ΙΙΙ. Επιχειρήσεις κατά των Βουλγάρων (Β΄ Βαλκανικός Πόλεμος) [The Greek Army in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913: Vol. III. Operations Against the Bulgarians (B΄ Balkan War)]. Athens; of which I cite documents that focus only on important details.

43 Correspondence, in 1912, G.M.F.A. 2.5; Caclamanos, D. (1937). Reminiscences of the Balkan Wars. Slavonic and East European Review, XVI (46), p. 117.

order to annex 'unredeemed' lands. In the face of a powerful enemy, the strategy aimed not to bring about a destruction or disarmament of Turkey. The scale of the task, which was disproportionate to state strength, along with the powers' attempts to contain the war, should render the choice of a strategy of annihilation self-defeating. Hence the strategy of limited war was selected. The Greek forces struck specific targets and gained decisive victories by surprise, mobility, and high-intensity firepower.

In anticipation of the war, the bulk of Greek divisions, making up the Thessaly Army, had been mustered in Larissa at the Greek-Turkish border. The Ottoman guards acting in the area were well fortified but inferior in numbers. Once the fighting opened, the Greek army moved up rapidly and forced the guards to flee in disorder. Within a matter of days, it marched across Thessaly to the frontiers of Macedonia dislodging the Ottomans from the heights of Sarantaporon. It was then intending to take the way in a line as far as Florina to southern Macedonia, as the commander-in-chief, Crown Prince Constantine, sought to get a grip on Monastir. Venizelos ordered him, however, to turn back to the north and advance through the river Axios (Vardar) to Salonica, the symbol of Greek irredentism in Macedonia.[44] After he cleared up his flanks, Constantine did indeed race down and seize the city on 9 November 1912. He entered it just a few hours before Bulgarian battalions arrived at the suburbs.[45] Afterwards, Greek divisions moved forward to southern Macedonia, liberating Florina and Kastoria and throwing the Ottomans back on Monastir, which had already been taken by Serbia. In these victories, Greek naval competence was of paramount importance. Not only did the Greek fleet liberate the Greek islands in the northeastern Aegean and force the Ottoman warships to shelter behind the artillery guns of the Dardanelles. It also blocked up the transfer of Ottoman army corps from Asia Minor through the Aegean Sea to the major theatres of operations in Macedonia. Turkey's ability to resist was paralysed. It was deprived of naval communications and the only chance to obtain superiority on the ground and wipe out the allies' attack.[46]

In contrast to these military achievements by the Thessaly Army, the small Epirus Army failed to capture Jannina, the capital of Epirus, the siege of which was reduced to attrition fighting.[47] But having put on the field 400,000 men and distributed them over several fronts, the Porte found itself semi-encircled by allied formations, the combined force of which amounted to 1,300,000 in round figures (200,000 Greeks, 620,000 Bulgarians and 470,000 Serbians).[48] Not later than the end of November, it surrendered all territories east of Jannina in Epirus, north of Scutari in Macedonia, and west of the Chataldja lines in Thrace. It was not until Turkey sued for peace and operations in Macedonia were mopped up that, in the

44 Venizelos to Constantine, 12 (25) Oct. 1912, in Γ.Ε.Σ./Δ.Ι.Σ. Vol. I, p. 64; Γ.Ε.Σ./Δ.Ι.Σ. Vol. I, pp. 67-68.

45 'Report on Military Engagements up to the Capture of Salonica', 1912, V.A. 173/79; Dragoumis to Venizelos, 'Report on the Capture of Salonica', 16 (29) Nov. 1912, V.A. 173/79.

46 Halpern, pp. 330, 337; Duggan, S. P. (1913). European Diplomacy and the Balkan Problem. Political Science Quarterly, 28 (1), p. 117; Schurman, J. G. (1914). The Balkan Wars 1912-1913. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 51-52; Hudson, G. F. (1939). Turkey, Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 8-9.

47 Γ.Ε.Σ./Δ.Ι.Σ. (1994). Ο Ελληνικός Στρατός κατά τους Βαλκανικούς Πολέμους του 1912-1913: Τόμ. ΙΙ. Επιχειρήσεις κατά των Τούρκων στην Ήπειρο (Α΄ Βαλκανικός Πόλεμος) [The Greek Army in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913: Vol. II. Operations Against the Turks in Epirus (A΄ Balkan War)]. Athens.

48 Dakin, p. 195.

first week of December, Constantine and his armies went out to Epirus and set out to score victory at Jannina.

Clearly, the great powers had failed to compel the small Balkan states to bend to their will and maintain the *status quo* by force of arms. The allies' victories took them by surprise.[49] Britain, for instance, anxious to keep the Straits open to merchant shipping, received with uneasiness the fact that it had naval missions both in Constantinople and Athens. Ultimately, the missions were shelved, but they stayed to resume their commissions after the war.[50] What was left for the powers to do was to embark on an effort to dictate peace terms. On 3 December, when all the allies but Greece signed an armistice, they convened in London a Balkan conference of the ambassadors of the belligerents, which launched in mid-December. A few days earlier an international summit of the ambassadors of all the powers had begun its sessions on the invitation of Sir Edward Grey, the British foreign secretary.

Under the circumstances, Venizelos intertwined Greece's firm-but-flexible diplomacy with bullying elements. As many times as he proceeded from unyielding positions to maximise Greek benefits, so he signalled his intention to make concessions for the sake of a concerted action. Military victories allowed him to cope with the constraining fact that Greece lagged behind Serbia and Bulgaria in overall capabilities and the powers were involved in the peace making. Thus, Greek diplomacy was concerned to underpin and legitimise territorial enlargement; that is, to obtain power and security in the Balkans by bargaining means, in the sense of consolidating acquisitions on political and legal grounds. Three constituent objectives were pursued, which were to gain time for the military to capture 'unredeemed' lands; obtain legally binding guarantees for the war profits; and resist unwelcome demands by balancing and co-binding moves.

The Greek leadership believed that military operations would have a powerful impact on the shaping of post-war arrangements. Once London was fixed for talks, Venizelos was reported to have declared that 'we had much better meet at Chataldja and dictate peace beneath the protection of our guns'.[51] Athens did not sign the armistice, in order to give time to its army to occupy Jannina and complete the liberation of the Aegean islands. Nonetheless, it sent a delegation to join in the Balkan meeting.[52] It sought not to miss out on the unique opportunity of sanctioning its territorial acquisitions through an international treaty. Military strategy and diplomacy, in that regard, went hand in hand to legalise on paper what had been won in the field and to gain time until Jannina was overrun. Dilatory and bullying tactics enabled the Greek contingents to obtain better power and security conditions, which in turn scaled up the freedom of Greek delegates at the peace talks.

The question that dominated the international summit was that of Albania, associated as it was with the Serbian demand for a territorial outlet in the Adriatic and the Greek claim to northern Epirus. Russia, having secured France's support, worked for the award of a port to Serbia. This pursuit confronted Austrian and Italian designs. By then, Vienna had been

49 Dakin, p. 195; Helmreich, p. 196; Anderson, p. 294.

50 Admiralty to F.O., 18 June 1914, F.O. 371/1999.

51 Kerofilas, C. (1915). Eleftherios Venizelos: His Life and Work (translated B. Barstow). London: John Murray, p. 89.

52 Venizelos to Constantine, 2 (15) Nov. 1912, in Γ.Ε.Σ./Δ.Ι.Σ. Vol. I, p. 276; Telegraphic Communication Between Venizelos and Constantine, 20 Nov. (3 Dec.) 1912, in Γ.Ε.Σ./Δ.Ι.Σ. Vol. I, pp. 276-278.

reconciled to the idea of the change of the *status quo*.[53] But it was determined, seconded by Rome, to create Albania as a bulwark both against the westward expansion of Serbia and the southward expansion of Greece to the coastline opposite the island of Corfu. At the same time, Germany sought to smooth out Balkan difficulties in cooperation with Britain.[54] The latter was disposed, inasmuch as the Porte seemed to have failed to stir up Moslem opinion, to recognise the dissolution of Ottoman Turkey by virtue of its concern to preserve the Anglo-Russian *entente*.[55] Grey linked the dispute over the boundaries of Albania with the outstanding problem of the Dodecanese. The move was designed to get a compromise and secure Britain's position in the Mediterranean.[56]

Eventually, the powers agreed that the Straits and Constantinople should remain under Ottoman control; the independent kingdom of Albania should be established with the eastern shore of the Adriatic; the fate of the Aegean islands should be tied up with the delineation of Albania's southern frontier; and Serbia should gain a commercial access to the Adriatic. However, delimiting Albania's southern frontier disconcerted the powers.[57] Austria-Hungary contended that Albania should be given as many borders as possible with Scutari as capital. Germany, backing Greece, proposed a more northerly line. Italy held out for a more southerly line, threatening to make war should the Greeks annex Cape Stylos.[58] And Russia, Britain, and France threw their weight behind Athens and Belgrade.

In this context, the Balkan conference became an arena of conflicting claims; each of the allies were resolute to come out of it with as many territorial gains as possible, to acquire the lion's share of Macedonia and Thrace. Greek proposals for the formation of a single grand alliance were doomed to failure.[59] Paradoxically, the umbilical cord connecting the allies together was the Porte's threat against their national populations in Macedonia and the opportunistic interest in capturing its European provinces. This forced them to cooperate, at least temporarily. They agreed to bargain with one voice and consider the partition of spoils after the conclusion of a final peace agreement. They demanded the Greek-conquered islands in the Aegean, Adrianople, and the territories west of a frontier starting in the north from Midia on the Black Sea and ending, through the course of the rivers Erghene and Maritsa, in the south at the gulf of Enos in the Aegean. On 28 December, the Sultan cut down the starting point of negotiations to the following terms: the surrender of Adrianople was out of the question, Macedonia was to become an autonomous principality under his suzerainty, the future fate of Crete was to be determined by him and the protecting powers, and Albania was to be granted autonomy. As the two sides left the settlement of the Albanian question to the

53 Bridge, F. R. (1972). From Sadowa to Sarajevo: The Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary 1866-1914. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, p. 346.
54 Crampton, R. J. (1977). The Balkans as a Factor in German Foreign Policy, 1912-1914. Slavonic and East European Review, LV (3), pp. 370-390.
55 Heller, J. (1983). British Policy Towards the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1914. London: Frank Cass, pp. 72-75.
56 Hayne, M. B. (1987). Great Britain, the Albanian Question and the Concert of Europe, 1911-1914. Balkan Studies, 28 (2), pp. 327-354.
57 Crampton, R. J. (1974). The Decline of the Concert of Europe in the Balkans, 1913-1914. Slavonic and East European Review, LII (128), pp. 393-419.
58 Elliot to Grey, 5 Dec. 1913, F.O. 371/1655.
59 Batowski, H. (1966). The Failure of the Balkan Alliance of 1912. Balkan Studies, 7 (1), pp. 115-117.

powers, talks dragged on as to the fate of Adrianople, the status of the Aegean islands, and the payment of reparations.[60]

In fact, the stage was set not only for a new round of hostilities with Turkey but also for a spiral into the Second Balkan war. The outstanding problem of the partition of spoils, tied as it was with the their fierce struggle for expansion, divided the allies. Throughout the peace-making deliberations, under the pretext of Ottoman intransigence, Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia failed to keep in check their differences. They were, behind the scenes, at swords' points, since each, seeking to uphold what they had gained in Macedonia, perceived the other as a threat.

It was Venizelos who defected and turned against the Bulgarians to resist unwelcome claims. He opted for the course that offered alignment arrangements with Serbia, a strategic choice that mattered to Greece both in consolidating the new *status quo* and pursuing further expansion. The main systemic opportunity was afforded by the clash between Sofia and Belgrade over the implementation of the territorial clauses of their treaty. As the former acquired more territories in Thrace and the latter more in Macedonia, both were averse to comply with their obligations. Serbia argued that: the Bulgarians stood aloof from the fight in the Vardar valley; the reinforcements it sent to support the Bulgarian campaign in Adrianople were more than those it had undertaken to commit; and its acquisitions in Macedonia compensated for the loss of an outlet in the Adriatic. Bulgaria reasoned that its gains in eastern Thrace in no way cancelled out the treaty; and it was its armies that stood up to the Ottoman offensive and paved the way for the rest to occupy the regions over which they now sought to establish their control.[61]

The heart of the matter was that while they all looked on Salonica as the highest stake of the war, only Greece won the field. At the conference, Bulgaria laid claim to the city.[62] It contended that the Greeks' sacrifices were not commensurate with their rewards. Unlike Sofia, who was awarded the secondary ports of Kavala and Dedeagatch, Athens, already in possession of Piraeus, a strategically key port in the Mediterranean, was to annex Crete, the islands of the eastern Aegean, and much of Macedonia. Greece argued that many people in Salonica were of Greek origin and most of the city's commercial and cultural activities were under control of Greeks. It also maintained that the Bulgarians had no good cause to voice complaints. They were to acquire the three-fifths of the spoils in Macedonia and Thrace, which could not be captured, unless the Greek navy prevented the transfer of Ottoman forces stationed in Asia Minor, while the rest of the allies were to cede northern Epirus, part of Kossovo, and Scutari to Albania.[63]

As much as Bulgaria stood firm on its pretensions, so Greece and Serbia opposed it. Although Venizelos was concerned about the likelihood of an Austrian attack against Serbia, he voiced the opinion before a cabinet summit that the Bulgarian threat was more dangerous because 'an isolated Austro-Serbian clash is unlikely. It would lead to a European war, since Russia will not leave Serbia to her fate. Behind Russia there is France. Greece will then be

60 Gardikas-Katsiadakis, pp. 144-148; Duggan, 117-118; his (1913). The Balkan Adjustment. Political Science Quarterly, 28 (4), p. 628.

61 Duggan. Adjustment, p. 634; Helmreich, pp. 353-355.

62 Hall, R. C. (1992). The Role of Thessaloniki in Bulgarian Policy During the Balkan Wars. Balkan Studies, 33 (2), pp. 231-241.

63 Ractivan to G.M.F.A., 7 (20) Nov. 1912, G.M.F.A. 2.2; Correspondence, in Γ.Ε.Σ./Δ.Ι.Σ. Vol. I, pp. 270-271, 279-281; Duggan. Adjustment, pp. 634-635.

allied to the whole of the Triple Alliance'.[64] With the turn of the year Athens and Belgrade, anxious about Bulgarian aggressiveness, agreed to resume the consultations that had been left inconclusive since the previous October.

In the first week of January 1913, after the allies warned Turkey of a resort to force unless it complied with their claims, the negotiations in the Balkan meeting foundered. The ultimatum stimulated the powers, on 17 January, to present peace preliminaries to Constantinople, which provided for the cession of Adrianople and the settlement of the question of the Aegean islands by them. The Sultan agreed to these terms. The hard line elements of the Young Turks, however, were aggrieved at the concessions. On 22 January they attempted a *coup d' etat* and seized power. The new government stated that they were resolute to uphold the part of Adrianople on the left bank of the Maritsa and leave the fate of the islands to the powers' decision on the condition that these would not be given to Greece. As a result, on 3 February, the day that the armistice expired, the allies having met with rebuff resumed fighting.[65]

Early in March the Greek army seized Jannina. By then George was assassinated by a madman in Salonica, an unexpected event that nevertheless did little to upset the coherence of state leadership and the unity of strategic purpose. While Greek forces pushed on beyond Jannina to occupy Koritsa and Cape Stylos in northern Epirus, animosities grew between Greece and Bulgaria. The latter, having lost Salonica, tried to force the former to give up the area around the Strumnitsa valley. This pushed Athens to devote additional energy to warding off the Bulgarian assaults and securing the new acquisitions in Macedonia.[66] Meanwhile, within a matter of some weeks the Ottoman troops were forced back from their remaining strong-points: Scutari was lost to the Montenegrins and Adrianople to the Bulgarians. Being on the verge of collapse, in mid-April Turkey agreed to discuss the proposals that the powers had formulated in their international summit. These proposals stipulated that the lands to the west of the Midia-Erhgene-Enos line and the islands should be ceded to the allies; the Sultan should abandon his pretensions about Crete; the allies should renounce their claim for a money indemnity, retaining the right to participate in the deliberations regarding their reimbursement proportion of the Ottoman debt; and an independent Albania was to be established.[67] Serbia, too, grasped the chance to denounce its 1912 alliance treaty with Bulgaria.

It was 30 May before the Treaty of London between the allies and Turkey was signed, formally ending the First Balkan war.[68] Its provisions laid down that Constantinople should: withdraw from its European provinces west of the Midia-Enos line; recognise Greek sovereignty over Crete; accept that the fate of Albania and the islands of the eastern Aegean were to be decided by the powers as they might think fit; and agree that the delimitation of its European frontiers, along with the question of reparations and the share of the Ottoman debt, were to be dealt with by an international commission in Paris. However, the outcome of the Balkan conference acted as a catalyst for the fall of the Bulgarian government and the rise to

64 As quoted in Prevelakis, E. (1966). Eleutherios Venizelos and the Balkan Wars. Balkan Studies, 7 (2), p. 374.
65 'Annual Report 1913'.
66 Γ.Ε.Σ./Δ.Ι.Σ. Vol. III, chaps. 1-2.
67 'Annual Report 1913'.
68 Text, in Elliot to Grey, 3 Dec. 1913, F.O. 371/1656.

office of politicians of nationalist affection, who, under the influence of extreme senior military officers, were ready to launch a campaign in Macedonia against Greece and Serbia.[69] This, along with an array of interrelated events, refueled violence in the Balkans.

In particular, on 1 June Greece and Serbia concluded an alliance treaty and a military convention.[70] Both parties were committed to assist each other in the event of attack by a third power; establish a common boundary beginning at Ochrida and ending at Gevgeli; and arrange for Serbia and Bulgaria to have a frontier drawing from Gevgeli to the old Turkish-Bulgarian line. They sealed their determination to divide the lands west of the Vardar in Macedonia and annex the regions they could seize on their own. Also, it was envisaged that in the event of a victorious campaign, Serbia would gain an outlet in the Aegean and the territories northwest of the Vardar; and Greece would take possession of the region lying southeast of the Vardar. In parallel, Serbia communicated a note to Sofia requesting the revision of the 1912 Serbian-Bulgarian agreement. Bulgaria rejected the claim. To this was added that Greece dropped hints of cooperation to the Ottomans.[71] It toyed with the idea of an alliance designed to balance against the most dominant threat at that time, the Bulgarian troops in Macedonia. It had no choice but to manipulate the less aggressive Ottoman power to avert a concentration of Bulgarian armies, or a Turkish-Bulgarian alliance against it, and divert Bulgaria's attention to the Bulgarian-Turkish frontier at the Chataldja line. It, too, aspired to secure more territorial gains, counting on the opposition of Russia to a greater Bulgaria and the military assistance of Serbia and Romania.[72] Against this background, on 28 June Bulgaria attacked Serbia and Greece, a move that the next day incited Romania and Turkey to declare war on it.

With the outbreak of the Second Balkan war, Greece took the offensive against Bulgaria in concert with allies, who this time were Serbia, Romania, Turkey, and Montenegro. The ultimate strategic aim was once again territorial expansion. The crucial aspect was that military strategy set out not merely to annex the territories laid down in the Greek-Serbian treaty but also to eliminate the Bulgarian threat and pave the way for the future capture of Thrace.[73] Bulgaria's aggression, the availability of alliance alternatives, the army's high morale and fighting competence, the experience of the recent war victories, and the consensus of the governing coalition and society, all these enabling structural forces shaped the decision and through it afforded Greece autonomy of action in pursuing this ambitious design.

The strategy of annihilation, nonetheless, was not adhered to steadfastly; its type of manoeuvre/*blitzkrieg* was pursued but without success. Greek formations, coming to Serbia's assistance, pulled the Bulgarian garrisons out of the outskirts of Salonica. Afterwards, they failed to race deep into the rear and gain a decisive victory in an all-out battle. Instead, they were forced to fall back to a line from Gevghelli in the west to Drama in the east. In effect, annihilation boiled down to a strategy of limited war. By then, the Serbians had already taken Bregalnitsa, Ishtib and Kotchana. While Romania gained a foothold in Dobrudja and rushed into Sofia, the Ottomans invaded Thrace and regained Adrianople. Only after Constantine arrived at the front, did the Greeks counter-attack and occupy Drama, Serres, and Kavala; and

69 Anderson, p. 298.
70 Texts, in Γ.Ε.Σ./Δ.Ι.Σ. Vol. III, pp. 349-360.
71 Correspondence, in 1913, G.M.F.A. 10.
72 Dakin, pp. 197-198; Helmreich, p. 350.
73 Venizelos to Constantine, 20 June (3 July) 1913, in Γ.Ε.Σ./Δ.Ι.Σ. Vol. III, pp. 382-383; Venizelos to Constantine, 28 June (11 July) 1913, in Γ.Ε.Σ./Δ.Ι.Σ. Vol. III, p. 405.

then advance into a region lying from Kresna and Djumaya to Kilkis, Xanthi and Dedeagach in the east and Lahova in the west. Hence, in less than four weeks Bulgaria suffered overwhelming defeats. It miscalculated on Romania's stance. Since December 1912, Bucharest had spelled out that it was prepared to exchange its neutrality for the acquisition of Silistria and the delimitation of the Tourtoukai-Baltchik line as a common frontier. Sofia refused to enter into this arrangement and tried to come to grips with the Ottomans. In May 1913, when it offered to give up Silistria, Romania asked for more concessions, a demand that was declined. This induced the Romanians to take action against it.

As the Romanian, Greek, and Serbian troops were moving towards Sofia, Ferdinand made a bid for support to Austria-Hungary, who advised him to appeal to King Carol of Romania. The latter agreed to mediate to cease hostilities and open peace-making consultations. The problem was that Constantine was determined to sign the peace terms on the battlefield.[74] He and Venizelos had initially had reservations about Carol's peace preliminaries and shied away from consenting to an early termination of hostilities, in order to gain time for the Greek military to push further into Macedonia and Thrace, notwithstanding the pressure of Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Serbia.[75] Having scored major victories, Constantine and the general staff sought to annihilate Bulgaria. Venizelos however, sensing the danger of political isolation, decided to sign the armistice on 30 July, and went to the Balkan peace talks in Bucharest.[76]

At the conference, the Greek envoy staked a claim to most of the shores of Macedonia and Thrace, including Kavala, Serres, and Drama. Bulgaria sought to reach a separate agreement with Romania, whose demands were moderate. Bucharest shut down the appeal and called for a single treaty. Although it was committed to respect the rights of the Romanian minority of Kutsovlachs in Bulgaria, Sofia resisted the Serbian claim to the Strumnitsa valley and the joint Serbian and Greek demand for reparations.[77] Moreover, it tried to reduce Greek claims to Kavala. This question developed into a checkerboard game among the powers. Britain, France, Russia, and Austria-Hungary worked for this award to Bulgaria. But after Germany took the side of Greece, France began to support Greece.[78] London tended to cast its favour on Athens. It feared that Sofia revolved around Russia and thus Constantinople risked falling into hostile hands.[79] For his part, Venizelos refused on strategic grounds to make concessions. He was reported to have said that 'I could not be sure that if I sacrificed Kavala I should be in a position to secure peace from the Balkans…if I gave up Kavala the effect would be to stimulate Bulgarian voracity'.[80] Eventually, when the fate of the city and its hinterland came to the crunch, Germany, France, and Britain won over the rest. The Treaty of Bucharest between the allies and Bulgaria was concluded on 10 August 1913.[81] Bulgaria maintained Adrianople, the Strumnitsa valley, and a territorial

74 Constantine to Venizelos, 11 (24) July 1913, in Γ.Ε.Σ./Δ.Ι.Σ. Vol. III, p. 419.
75 Correspondence, in Γ.Ε.Σ./Δ.Ι.Σ. Vol. III, pp. 410-419.
76 Correspondence between Venizelos and Constantine, in Γ.Ε.Σ./Δ.Ι.Σ. Vol. III, pp. 417-419; Venizelos to G.M.F.A., 17 (30) July 1913, in Γ.Ε.Σ./Δ.Ι.Σ. Vol. III, pp. 425-426.
77 Duggan. Adjustment, pp. 641-642.
78 Γ.Ε.Σ./Δ.Ι.Σ. Vol. III, pp. 293-294; Romanos to Venizelos, 18/31 July 1913, tel. no. unnumbered, G.M.F.A. 3.
79 Dakin, p. 199; Anderson, p. 301.
80 As quoted in Gibbons, H. A. (1921). Venizelos. London: Fisher Unwin, pp. 157-158.
81 Texts, in Γ.Ε.Σ./Δ.Ι.Σ. Vol. III, pp. 426-440.

corridor to the Aegean through Dedeagatch. Greece annexed Kavala and the area lying south of the Greek-Bulgarian-Serbian line up to the outfalls of the river Nestos in the Aegean; the union of Crete with it was once more recognised. Serbia was given Gevgeli, Ishtip, Kotchana, Radovishta, and the lands north of these regions in the Vardar. And Romania was envisaged to have a southern frontier running from Turtunaia to Balchik in the Black Sea. But Turkey was irritated at this arrangement because of the loss of Adrianople, which had since the end of July been in its hands. In mid-August its armies overran Maritza and occupied western Thrace. Bulgaria, having received cold comfort from the powers, agreed to discuss the delineation of a new border. On 29 September, it signed the Treaty of Constantinople, which provided for an Ottoman repossession of Adrianople and a boundary running from Sveti Stefan in the north to the mouth of Maritza in the south.[82]

To summarize, Greece was able, through the strategic response to particular structural imperatives, to enter the Balkan wars and reap the rewards of success in the military and diplomatic arena. It sanctioned by legal means most of the territories that its forces had captured militarily. It obtained international power and security in terms of territorial expansion, thereby reconstituting and territorially enlarging the material reality of Greek statehood. Greek military strategy was enabled not only by the increase in state strength, the fighting efficiency of the military, Balkan alliances, and the weakness of the powers to preserve peace; but also by Greek diplomacy, which postponed the opening of peace conferences until the Greek army won the field and allowed Greek leadership to negotiate from a better bargaining position. The case of northern Epirus and the islands of the eastern Aegean, however, illustrated how great power interests and state smallness and weakness cast a heavy shadow on the stimulating forces of Greek diplomacy. The latter failed to exchange the surrender of regions for payoffs elsewhere or acquire lands that Greek armies had never occupied.

In the international summit the powers had decided since July that Albania's territory should embrace Scutari and north Epirus. This agreement was made possible because Vienna consented that some Albanian towns in the north should be ceded to Serbia; and Athens was assured that it would be given, in return for yielding Koritsa and Cape Stylos, all the islands but Imbros, Tenedos and the Dodecanese. The London accord of August 1913 laid down that, until the powers selected a prince to ascend the throne, Albania should be administered by an international control commission, its southern frontier should run along a line from Cape Stylos through Koritsa to Ochrida, and an international boundary commission should fix the border. In December, too, the Florence Protocol called on Greece to cede Koritsa, Chimara, and Argyrocastro.

As the delimitation of the Albanian frontier was tied up with the fate of the islands, Athens was pushed to initiate negotiations in the form of a 'package deal'. It consented to cede northern Epirus to Albania on the understanding that it would annex the islands in return. It emphasised the Greek character of the islands' population and argued that otherwise a rivalry with Turkey was to persist unabated; it was ready not to fortify the islands in order not to challenge the Ottoman control of the Dardanelles. In fact, little headway was made. The Treaty of Bucharest contained no clause with regard to the issue simply because the powers were divided over the islands. While Austria-Hungary and Italy were opposed, Britain

82 Anderson, p. 299; Duggan. Adjustment, p. 643.

and France cast their favour on the side of Greece; and Germany remained aloof, reluctant to restrain its allies and join any attempt at coercion against the Ottoman Empire.[83]

At the time, Constantinople, seeking to recover the command of the Aegean, rejected any compromise. It advocated that being located at the entrance of the Straits, Imbros, Tenedos, and Lemnos were important to the defence of the Dardanelles. In addition, Chios and Mitylene, just off the western seaboard of Asia Minor and at the mouth of the port of Smyrna, constituted the territorial stretch of Asiatic Turkey into the sea; should Greece annex Chios, it would control the sea route to Mitylene and provoke the insurrection of its national communities in Smyrna, half of whose population was Greek.[84] Not only did the Ottomans hold out against cession; they also threatened to resort to war to prevent the formal acquisition of the islands by Greece. The Ottomans were seconded by Italy, who reckoned on the outburst of violence being stayed in the Dodecanese. Turkey had no reason to force the hand of the Italians since they feared that the Greek fleet would seize the opportunity to gain a foothold in them.[85] The question remained unsettled even after the conclusion between the two countries of the Treaty of Athens in November 1913, which regulated outstanding citizenship and property issues.[86]

The British realised that Italy was all the more intent on manipulating the evacuation of the Dodecanese as a bargaining leverage.[87] By year's end, they put forward a proposal providing for the annexation of all Aegean islands but Tenedos and Imbros by Greece; and the restoration of the Sultan's sovereignty to the Dodecanese. Ultimately, the powers agreed to let the islands go to the Greeks without enforcing the withdrawal of the Italians from the Dodecanese. At the end of February 1914, nonetheless, the Greeks of northern Epirus rose against the local Albanians, declaring their independence. As irregular fighting intensified, Greek troops occupied Santi-Quaranta to pre-empt an Italian aggression. After consultations, Venizelos undertook not to arm the Aegean islands and to relinquish northern Epirus, while the control commission of Albania and the provisional government of northern Epirus concluded the Statute of Corfu, which granted autonomy to Argyrocastro and Koritsa.[88] Although he stuck by his pledge, Albania experienced disorder and the problem of the islands remained in deadlock.

Despite this development, in short, Athens legitimised the effective possession of the islands; a fact that accounted for its resistance to the unwelcome Ottoman demand for a repossession of the islands. By then, a pressing Greek claim for a formal annexation would resume hostilities. The great powers' reluctance to compel Turkey to abandon its pretensions, or encourage Greece to attack, and Serbia's unwillingness to come to assistance, along with the exhaustion of economic resources, narrowed the autonomy of action. Fighting alone for the purposes of strategic coercion was a humiliating, self-defeating option. The Greeks, above all, should devote their strength to defending the new lands. They had no choice but to bring diplomatic pressure to bear on Turkey.

83 Crampton. Decline, pp. 404-414.
84 'Note', 2 Oct. 1913, G.M.F.A. 16; Hudson, p. 10.
85 Correspondence, in 1913, G.M.F.A. 16.
86 Text, in Γ.Ε.Σ./Δ.Ι.Σ. Vol. III, pp. 441-451.
87 Bosworth, R. (1970). Britain and Italy's Acquisition of the Dodecanese, 1912-1915. Historical Journal, XIII (4), pp. 698-702.
88 Correspondence, in 1914, G.M.F.A. A/5τγ.

Chapter 6

CONCLUSION: EXPANSION AND THE COMPONENTS OF GREEK GRAND STRATEGY

Greece came out of the Balkan wars as a powerful and strong actor in the Near East, outstripping Bulgaria and standing on equal power footing with Serbia. Having gained a foothold in Crete and considerable sections of Macedonia and Epirus and having obtained effective possession of the islands of the eastern Aegean, excluding the Dodecanese, it increased its territory from 64,000 to 120,000 square kilometres and its population from 2,800,000 to 5,000,000 in round figures.[1] Territorial enlargement appeared to have been driven by the continued decline of the Ottoman Empire, the failure of the great powers to control the nationalist flare-ups of the small Balkan states, and the bourgeois transformation of the Greek social formation. In fact, these enabling systemic and domestic forces proved a proximate cause of expansion. Unless strategies were pursued to capitalise on these forces, Greek territory could hardly be enlarged. The strategies were the necessary cause of expansion. What really mattered to Greece in achieving the ends in view was the strategic response to structural imperatives and the use that was made of the means to initiate war against a greater adversary and activate the leverages of diplomacy. It was through Greek grand strategy that the interplay of the international system and domestic structure afforded Greece much partnership value and autonomy of action in attaining its territorial enlargement, filtered and fulfilled as this process was by Greek leadership.

Venizelos adopted strategies that, being in harmony with structural imperatives, worked out in favour of territorial gains. The central aspect was that although he was committed to the Great Idea, he did not subscribe unconditionally to the designs and rhetoric of irredentist expansionism.[2] While irredentism remained constant, he did not adhere to a preordained or inflexible plan of a grand strategy of expansion. His initial concern was to establish forms of cooperation with the Balkan states, including Turkey.[3]

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1 Γ.Ε.Σ./Δ.Ι.Σ. (1987). Επίτομη Ιστορία των Βαλκανικών Πολέμων 1912-1913 (An Epitomised History of the Balkan Wars 1912-1913). Athens, p. 255.

2 Compare to Smith, M. L. (2006). Venizelos' Diplomacy, 1910-23: From Balkan Alliance to Greek-Turkish Settlement. In Kitromilides (Ed.), pp. 134, 141-150, 172.

3 'Statement Made by Venizelos to the Havas Agency', in Elliot to Grey, 4 Nov. 1910, F.O. 371/913; Elliot to Grey, 29 Nov. 1910, F.O. 371/913.

From his first term in office, Venizelos sought to foster peace. He stated in Parliament that 'by devoting herself to the work of internal reform Greece will best prove that she is an element of peace in the East'.[4] Later, in anticipation of war, he set out to check the balance of power in the Balkans. He spelled out that 'Greece did not attempt to establish a hegemony in the Balkan Peninsula, but demanded the balance of power between the Balkan peoples'.[5] It was through the performance of these partnership roles and the accretion of pragmatic responses to security exigencies that Greece played for high stakes. Behind the partnership service lay Venizelos's aspiration to make Greece a reliable and effective partner in its region. In fact, this vision emerged from and, itself, guided the ultimate strategic aims of the consolidation of the *status quo* and territorial expansion. After the conclusion of the Treaty of London, it was no accident that Grey, congratulating Venizelos on his constructive attitude, reassured Athens that had won British sympathy.[6]

In the years concerned, therefore, Greek grand strategy was equally constituted along the patterns of expansion and consolidation. Before it rushed out to contest territorial acquisitions, Athens's energy had been devoted to preserving the *status quo* until the mobilised strength of the military was increased substantially and domestic reforms were completed. It looked for friendly relations with its neighbours and tried to secure demands short of aggressive actions, although it stood firm on its will to fight a war if peace could not be assured.[7] In this context, the category of strategies that directed grand strategy was alignment. Prior to hostilities, the form of alignment that was pursued was accommodation, which took its constructive accommodation type; throughout hostilities, alignment was effected by a blend of accommodation and balancing, structured as it was around the strategies of constructive accommodation and military and diplomatic balancing.

Venizelos realised that Greece was too weak to sacrifice the struggle for state building and ruling for expansion. The strategies of non-alignment and fighting alone were no longer rewarding. He perceived what Elliot reported on the Cretan crisis:

> If Greece disregards the difficulties of others, and attempts to force the hand of the four Powers and Turkey, she runs a grave risk not only of delaying a solution of the Cretan question…but of finding herself in a worse position.[8]

Clearly, structural conditions constrained irredentist adventurism. In the absence of a dominant international threat and in view of the need for foreign aid and domestic tranquillity, the establishment of good relations with the powers and active engagement in regional politics on grounds of give-and-take compromises were more promising. As systemic bipolarity afforded no opportunity to play off each power against the other, or to challenge the Ottoman Empire's territorial integrity, Venizelos kept moderation. He was cautious neither to bring Greece face to face with the powers and the Porte nor to lean towards them unless Greek interests were served.

In containing Turkey and Bulgaria, the most threatening challenges to Greek security, Venizelos's aim was to exchange reckless expansionism for self-restraint and time, in order to

4 Elliot to Grey, 22 Oct. 1910, F.O. 371/913.
5 Venizelos' Great Speech, p. 18.
6 Gennadios to G.M.F.A., 15 (28) May 1913, in Γ.Ε.Σ./Δ.Ι.Σ. Vol. III, p. 347.
7 Elliot to Grey, 1 Nov. 1910, F.O. 371/913; Elliot to Grey, 5 Mar. 1912, F.O. 371/1380; Venizelos, 'Note', 1912, V.A. 173/265.
8 'Annual Report 1909'.

carry out the work of recovery and pacify the internal threat of the nationalist ferment over Crete and Macedonia. The strategy of constructive accommodation with Turkey also aimed to secure the annexation of Crete and protect the rights of the Greek ethnic kin in the Ottoman Empire short of war, and with Sofia to contain their rivalry over Macedonia. That the Liberals dominated the parliament and mustered the loyalty of the military not only favoured constructive accommodation but also scaled up their margins of manoeuvres against domestic outcry. But when the Porte's intransigence came out most plainly and Bulgaria allied with Serbia, Venizelos put aside the question of the partition of spoils in Macedonia and concluded a defensive alliance with the less dangerous Bulgarians to balance against the more aggressive adversary, Turkey. Convinced that if he held back, Serbia and Bulgaria could make disproportionate gains, he did not hesitate to bear the brunt of a war with Turkey. In addition to these dangers, the reconstruction and reinforcement of the military and the consensus of the governing coalition, the most stimulating force of this decision was the inability of the powers to avert the common action of the Balkan states and enforce peace.

The Greek political and military leadership concurred in the belief that the battlefield was to determine the allocation of territory and dictate the peace terms. Subsequent diplomatic arrangements did justice to this calculation. Also, they did not lack the nerve to turn against their assertive ally, Bulgaria, in order to consolidate the war profits during the peace deliberations. What is more, they made overtures to Turkey and concerted their steps with Belgrade to repel the predominant Bulgarian threat. Of the structural forces that shaped the mixture of constructive accommodation and military and diplomatic balancing, the fear of a Bulgarian strike, alliance alternatives, and fighting efficiency, coupled with the military inaction of the powers and the failure of Turkey to launch a massive retaliatory attack, seemed most critical. In terms of the relative importance of strategies in achieving the ends in view, military strategy acted as a catalyst. It was the sweeping victories in the field that paved the way for diplomacy to advance Greek demands at the negotiation table and sanction the annexation of the conquered lands by legally binding guarantees. Of the forms and types of strategies, the blend of limited war and firm-but-flexible diplomacy proved most effective. The achievements of military strategy and diplomacy, however, were not simply a matter of enabling structural forces or the leadership's competence in handling state affairs. They were also a matter of popular loyalty, above all Venizelos's charisma to inspire and sustain the devotion of public opinion to his person and Greek strategic choices.

By the end of 1913, through the Greek leadership's grand strategy, systemic and domestic conditions had afforded Greece autonomy of action in attaining expansion. By playing partnership roles in congruence with the then dictates of the power game in world politics, it exploited opportunities thrown up by the international system and domestic structure, of which the most enabling were the division of Europe into two alliance camps, which rendered the powers unable to coalesce in order to prevent the outburst of violence in regional disputes; the power erosion of the Ottoman Empire; the Balkan alliances; the Liberals' parliamentary dominance; the modernisation of the military; the unity of society; the acquisition of foreign loans; and the record of budget surplus. These structural forces, which gave Athens the incentive to engage in an asymmetric conflict, set the stage for Greek strategies not only to pursue expansion but also to cope with such constraints as Greece's inferior placement in the regional balance of power, the Balkan allies' uncompromising interests related to the partition of spoils, the powers' involvement in the peace talks, the heavy public debt, and the weakness of the treasury to back large-scale campaigns. The

statesmanship of Venizelos and the prudence of King George, and later of King Constantine, evolved into important shaping factors in harmonising the enabling and disposing structural forces; thereby, they efficiently fulfilled the bridging function between these material conditions and the making of grand strategy. Alongside this went the ability of the governing coalition to rally the Greek people round the flag.

Nevertheless, in constituting, through Greek grand strategy, the territorially enlarged material reality of Greek statehood, the dialectical interplay of the international system and domestic structure left Greece with several structural problems. The new frontiers were not easily defended, while the population of the annexed territories had to be assimilated at a moment when Bulgaria and Turkey were eager to win back lost lands. Many 'unredeemed' territories, which embraced significant commercial bases of the Greek bourgeoisie, remained under Ottoman rule. Greek estimates put the Greek ethnic kin in western (Bulgarian) and eastern (Turkish) Thrace, Asia Minor, and Constantinople at about 2,550,000.[9] In addition to the loss of northern Epirus and the failure to obtain, by treaty pledges, the recognition of Greek sovereignty over the Aegean islands, Athens failed to annex the Dodecanese and Cyprus or exchange them for other concessions; although these lands remained a side issue in the agenda of irredentist demands.[10]

Moreover, the war mobilisation sparked defence spending, the rate of which to revenues was disproportionate to the state's industrial and financial strength. The problem was that Venizelos paid little attention to the reframing of the process of development and the creation of sound conditions for the increase of national income. Not only did he resort to external and internal borrowing to finance reforms and the modernisation of the fighting services. He also failed to keep in balance the allocation of resources between productive investment and consumption, in particular armament spending. As time passed, more credits were disposed for the military. In 1912, for example, construction projects intended to supply Athens with adequate water and refurbish the establishments of the Piraues harbour dragged on because of lack of money.[11] Compared to the huge amount of money appropriated for the military, only 600,000 pounds were provided for railways, roads, harbours and drainage works.[12] To the burden of the war expenditure was added the maintenance cost of the refugees, the number of whom in 1913 stood at 157,000.[13] The poor growth of domestic product, too, could hardly augment the wealth of the state substantially and development continued to depend on foreign capital markets. What ensued was the inflation of public debt and fiscal deficits. This, by sheer necessity, narrowed the freedom of Greek leadership to improve the state infrastructure, acquire new weapons, and keep fully mobilised forces without causing domestic security and state-strength dilemmas.

Finally, the grand strategy of the period reinforced symbols and value orientations, which reproduced the established Greek national identity. The latter, based on the hybrid co-existence of modernity and tradition and the old myth of ethnic mission, misconstrued and misleadingly articulated Venizelos's strategic moves. In other words, although the policy and discourse of irredentism was not manipulated by the Liberals to rally opinion in their favour,

9 (1919). The Liberation of the Greek People in Turkey: An Appeal Issued by the London Committee of Unredeemed Greeks. London: Norbury, Natzio & Co., p. 11.

10 G.M.F.A. to G.C.L., 7 (20) Dec. 1912, G.M.F.A. 1.1; Carabott, P. (1996). 'Pawns That Never Became Queens': The Dodecanese Islands, 1912-1924 (No. 4). Cambridge: Κάμπος, Cambridge Papers in Modern Greek, pp. 4.

11 Beaumont to Grey, 3 Apr. 1912, in Elliot to Grey, 3 Apr. 1912, F.O. 371/1380.

12 Beaumont to Grey, 11 Jan. 1912, in Elliot to Grey, 12 Jan. 1912, F.O. 371/1380.

they were held to function as the binding element and inspiration of Hellenism. The narrative of the 'Hellenic-Christian' nation with its nationalist, religious, and imperialist overtones continued to represent the state's legitimising ideology, and as such the main source of state authority and the nucleus of Greek nationalism. But this 'expansionist' image of nationhood was not identical with Venizelos's vision of a greater Greece. He sought to check the irredentist creed and play partnership roles in order to make Greece a reliable and effective partner in the East; and then, only through this course of action, and as the vision was materialising, to integrate the 'unredeemed' Greeks into the motherland by extending its boundaries to the 'lost' fatherland until the dictates of partnership service and peace forced a halt. The problem was that he was slow to reshape the self-image of Greek society and the rhetoric of the Great Idea in conformity with this vision, a contradiction that was camouflaged by his charisma and the vortex of war victories.

The heart of the matter was that Venizelos and his fellows established an ephemeral political hegemony under the guise of one-party system of government but without rising to 'organic' hegemonic national leadership. One aspect of this limitation was that they did not articulate a new national doctrine designed to foster a strong identity between rulers and ruled purely along modernist lines or merge the forces of power centralisation and fragmentation into a synthesising ideal of polity, beyond the hybrid co-existence of modernity and tradition. Though Venizelos redefined the constitutional powers among the crown, executive, and legislature, he shied away from demarcating clearly the preserve of monarchy and government, from encroaching on the scales of royal authority and the parochial bases of power based on custom and clientelism. As the decision-making influences of the king and old oligarchies were not eliminated, what reforms aiming at reframing the power game did was to wrap up in an artificial silence the competition for the spoils of office and the opposition of the establishment.

The other aspect was that the Liberals remained anchored in the vague imperial vision of the national confines of Hellenism. Venizelos refrained from deeds of expansionist adventurism, adopting strategies that in principle reflected a national rather than an imperial attitude. But in practice, he neither defined definitely the territorial space of the Greek state and accordingly adapted Greece's irredentist aspirations to this space, nor denounced the dream of the restoration of the Byzantine homeland. A symptom of the inconsistency was that unlike Constantine, Venizelos laid stress on the capture of Salonica, which happened to have become an important centre of the Greek diaspora bourgeoisie. And Coromilas, the then minister of foreign affairs, aspired to a Greek conquest of Asia Minor, while Eydoux and General Daglis, the chief of the general staff, contemplated a Greek invasion of the Straits.[14] Not only did this difference in priorities indicate that one or the other sought to lend more nationalist or imperialist credence to irredentism. It evidenced, above all, the lack of a shared understanding of Greek historical space and time.

The result was that when conflicts of domestic authority recurred, national unity came tumbling down. A clash over who had the constitutional right to make foreign policy between Constantine and Venizelos removed the pretext of conciliation. The old party polarisation rekindled with unprecedented intensity, a severe political reverse that was destined to exacerbate the peculiarities of Greek social formation and undermine state strength. Venizelos

13 C.E.I.P., p. 257.

had recourse to force not simply because the Greek state was still fundamentally weak but also because he made no effort to design a new core national doctrine and deploy a corresponding frame of reference intended to socialise Greek elites and masses in his preferred idea of statehood. This might be said to have been the underlying cause of the forthcoming *dichasmos*.

Despite strategic liabilities, to come full circle, Greek grand strategy mattered through the response to systemic and domestic forces to Greece in pursuing and attaining the enlargement of its territorially ordered rule in the years concerned. Discussion in the chapters of this part has tried to illuminate the links between structural imperatives and Greece's grand strategy and enlargement. The links suggest that Greek grand strategy and territorial expansion were a function of human interaction and consent, not the product of 'mechanical' historical forces. The international system and domestic structure made Greek grand strategy and constituted through it Greece's enlarged territory, a process that was filtered and fulfilled by Greek leadership. In the context of systemic and domestic structural conditions of the 'then' past and present, the grand strategy became the medium through which the Greeks reconstituted the territorially bounded material reality of their statehood. These reconstructed material conditions, coupled with the concurrent impact of structural forces of the 'then' present, set the stage for the perception of structural imperatives and the articulation of strategies by the Greek governing coalition when the latter was faced with the challenge of W.W.I.

14 Eydoux to Venizelos, 20 Oct (2 Nov.) 1912, V.A. 173/78; Daglis to Constantine, 18 Nov. (1 Dec.) 1912, in Γ.Ε.Σ./Δ.Ι.Σ. Vol. I, pp. 272-274; Gardikas-Katsiadakis, p. 162; Smith. Venizelos, p. 149-150.

PART IV
OVER-EXPANSION, 1914-1920

On the eve of W.W.I Greece, having materialised many of its irredentist demands, set out to consolidate its authority in the new territories and deal with the liabilities of the Balkan wars, the most worrying of which were the aspirations of Turkey and Bulgaria to regain what they had lost. However, the outbreak of hostilities set Greek leadership before a severe international challenge. Not only did this evolve into a stage for the involvement of the Greek general staff in the decision-making process. It also caused a rift of foreign-policy authority between Constantine and Venizelos over the question of Greek participation. Authority controversies fuelled foreign interference and spilled over into extra-parliamentary activities, which paved the way for a national schism. It was through the strategic moves of Constantine that the interaction of these adverse systemic and domestic developments afforded the country little partnership value and autonomy of action in defending the *status quo*, and eventually drove Constantine into exile and Venizelos into the ranks of the *Entente*. Although Greece lost considerable ground, it proved itself able to join in the sessions of the 1919 Paris peace conference on the side of the winners and sign the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, which created a greater Greece of 'the two continents and the five seas'. The treaty reduced the Ottoman Empire to its Asiatic domains and provided for Greek forces to: acquire eastern Thrace and Imbros and Tenedos, the two small islands off the mouth of the Straits; and keep Smyrna, into which they had since May 1919 marched with the Allies' consent, until after five years a plebiscite should determine its fate.

Reflecting on this paradox, I argue that unless Venizelos had articulated strategies to reap the rewards of some structural opportunities, Greek over-expansion could hardly have come into being. These strategies were the necessary cause of over-expansion, the medium through which he reshaped Greece's much larger territory. Therefore, the grand strategy that Venizelos pursued mattered through the response to structural imperatives to Greece in attaining the aggrandizement of its territorially ordered rule.[1]

This part has five chapters. Chapter Seven identifies Greece's security challenges after the Balkan wars and strategic response to the outburst of violence in Europe. In Chapter Eight

[1] Standard works are Smith, M. L. (1998). Ionian Vision: Greece in Asia Minor, 1919-1922 (new introduction). London: Hurst; Petsalis-Diomidis, N. (1978). Greece at the Paris Peace Conference (1919) (No. 175). Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies; Leon, G. B. (1974). Greece and the Great Powers 1914-1917 (No. 143). Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies.

and Nine I describe how Greece was enmeshed in a bitter *ethnicos dischasmos*. Chapter 10 examines how the country sided with the *Entente* and took part in the peace-making arrangements. While in these chapters I focus on the structural conditions in which military strategy and diplomacy were made, Chapter 11 assesses the part that the components of grand strategy played in Greece achieving over-expansion.

Chapter 7

AFTER EXPANSION

1. NEW CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

The immediate aftermath of Greek grand strategy throughout the Balkan wars was Greece's territorial enlargement. This presented the Venizelos government with the challenge of installing the process of state building and ruling in the new lands. In the first months of 1914, thus, they enacted Bills to apply Greek law in the acquisitions, including the islands of the eastern Aegean, and distribute the estates evacuated by Moslem emigrants.[1] They, too, granted amnesty to those who had committed acts of ethnic cleansing or assisted the enemy in order to facilitate the assimilation of minorities and restore stability in Greek Macedonia.[2]

The critical dimension of the expansion, nonetheless, was the reconstitution of the material reality of Greek statehood. First, Greece's position in the Balkan overall balance of power compared equally, if not favourably in terms of naval competence, with respect to other small states in the region. The development incurred the hostility of Bulgaria and Turkey, who targeted Greek acquisitions in Macedonia and the Aegean islands respectively. Having evolved into the country's primary international security concern, these revisionist designs narrowed the margins of freedom for Greek leadership to stake out further expansionist demands.

Second, war victories and profits created a veneer of state strength, which concealed rather than eliminated the peculiarities of Greek social formation. The expansion, coupled with the bourgeois transformation set off by Venizelos's pre-war reforms, consolidated the pre-eminence of the rising bourgeoisie. But the adjustment was slow to impinge on the structures of Greek society, which were the class differentiation among the ruling bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie and the lower hired labour, the regional divisions, and the distinction between autochthons and heterochthons. The interaction of these structures continued to reproduce the antinomies of the vague image of nationhood and the operation of imported bourgeois institutions within a traditional society. These antinomies, in turn, preserved the social cleavages related to office holding and state employment, substantiated as they were in the political sphere by the split between traditionalists and modernizers.

1 Elliot to Grey, Athens, 23 Jan. 1914, F.O. 371/1995.
2 Elliot to Grey, 24 Feb. 1914, F.O. 371/1996.

The roots of this paradox resided in the fact that the Venizelist camp was a mass state-oriented interclass coalition of fairly moderate flavour. Of its constituent factions, the petty bourgeoisie entered politics to emerge into prominence by occupying prestigious public positions or acquiring state benefits. And the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie, while it imposed its *hegemonic project* of territorial expansion, proved unable to establish its 'organic' hegemony in the sense of socialising the Greek people in its modernist values. These factions captured the middle ground of the political system and made the state the basis of their social and economic standing. They rallied round the Liberal Party, so long as it initiated changes and made room for them to step into the foreground. They espoused irredentism, inasmuch as Venizelos's strategic choices created conditions for development and secured the enlargement of the national space, without awakening the domestic security and state-strength dilemmas or undermining their new status.

The Liberals' modernisation, eventually, boiled down to refashioning clientelism into a means of manoeuvring the masses into the power game by attributing a centralised, nationwide character to government and party clientele networks. This enabled them to bolster their grip on the state apparatus and muster loyalty; and above all, to bridge the gap between the state's ability to mobilise resources and the society's will to supply the instruments of coercion, production, finance, and bureaucracy. But as the state struggle for domestic power and security persisted in being a struggle for control over the state, the hybrid co-existence of power centralisation and fragmentation kept the Greek state fundamentally weak; though it appeared strong thanks to Venizelos's charisma to maintain the balance in the scale of autonomy between state and society.

Furthermore, apart from a substantial increase in the country's territory, resources, and population, the expansion had an inconsequential impact on the structure of the Greek economy. Instead, having shot armament spending and the cost of mobilisation to a level quite disproportionate to the state's financial strength, it aggravated fiscal deficits. As the spheres of cultivation, distribution, and exchange overshadowed that of production, Greece remained a backward agricultural country with thriving operations in finance and commerce, still fashioned after a dual pattern of many small and few large plantations or enterprises of all sorts. In addition to importing agricultural items and fuels, it was dependent on foreign markets for investment capital and loans. Public revenue, too, was dependent on fluctuating receipts from shipping, emigrant remittances, and the export of a small number of agrarian goods and minerals. This situation made it difficult to increase the yields on taxation and extract more funds from the existing sources of earnings. The post-war recovery was complicated not only by the burden of resettling the refugees, but also by the problem of indebtedness that the newly enlarged state inherited from wartime. The low national income and poor rate of growth could hardly finance the service of the public debt. The course of resorting to external and internal borrowing was inevitable.

In June 1914, a law was passed entitling the Venizelos government to issue treasury bills to the value of £1,600,000.[3] Early in January, meanwhile, parliamentary authority was given to them to raise a loan of 500 million francs abroad, the proceeds of which were intended to meet the deficit in the 1913 budget, liquidate treasury bonds and bills, and pay for current military expenses. The strain that the Balkan wars imposed on public finances and the scale of the country's dependence on foreign aid were manifested in the obligations that

3 Erskine to Grey, 20 June 1914, F.O. 371/1999.

Athens undertook in order to conclude the deal with France and the Paris club of banks. These included to extend permission to the international financial commission to pledge more assigned revenues for the loan repayment; to promise to place naval orders in the hands of French shipbuilding firms; and to take up a share of the Ottoman debt.[4] However, it was not until January 1915 that the first advance of 20 million francs was made.[5]

On the other hand, the Balkan wars won the military the esteem of Greek society as the vanguard of irredentist warfare, and hence definitely fashioned it after a structure of a single character, the standing fighting services with a professional officer corps. Having to defend a significantly larger country, Venizelos intensified his efforts at upholding modern forces. Reconstruction yet again was to benefit from the expertise of the foreign military and naval missions.

The army underwent changes that broke ground from its past shape. In January 1914, Greece was divided into five military districts to each of which corresponded an army corps, four of which were made up of three divisions and one of two. Out of the active manpower, there were formed 42 regiments of infantry, *Evzones* and Cretans, which were apportioned to 14 divisions; five regiments of field artillery, the first four of which consisted of three groups, and the last of two, of three batteries each; 14 groups of mountain artillery, one of which was assigned to each division; one division of cavalry of four regiments of three troops and one squadron each; four regiments of engineers of six companies each and one independent battalion of four companies; five battalions of transport, four of which were composed of three companies and one of two; and several subsidiary units, like communications, hospitals, and railways.[6] In April General Villaret was assigned to head the French mission in the place of Eydoux, whose work against the forces of ignorance met with success.[7] Also, the Military Academy revised its system of recruitment and schooling to supply more officers for the field. The curriculum was designed to last three instead of five years and tailored for practical training; annual admissions increased; non-commissioned officers were allowed to attend courses of instruction for two years and attain commissioned rank; and reserve officers began to take up regular commissions.[8]

As for the navy, obstruction and corruption evolved into in-built features, so that little progress was made.[9] Because the commission of the British naval mission had been suspended during the Balkan wars, on 10 May 1913 Athens made overtures for its renewal, requesting London to spare active service officers. The appeal was sanctioned, and in September Rear-Admiral Kerr replaced Tufnell as head of mission for two years.[10] In May 1914, a royal decree fixed the Aegean fleet at one armoured division, made up of the battle-cruisers *Psara*, *Spetsai*, and *Averoff*; and at one light flotilla, made up of cruisers, destroyers, torpedo-boats, submarines, and auxiliary supply vessels. One of the rear-admirals of the British mission was assigned the supreme direction of the flotilla with a Greek counterpart

4 Correspondence, in 1914, F.O. 371/1995.
5 Elliot to Grey, 11 Jan. 1915, F.O. 371/2368.
6 Beaumont to Grey, 22 Jan. 1914, F.O. 371/1994.
7 Elliot to Grey, 18 Apr. 1914, F.O. 371/1994.
8 Veremis. Officer Corps, pp. 115-116.
9 Elliot to Grey, 9 Apr. 1915, F.O. 371/2368.
10 Correspondence, in 1913, F.O. 371/1655.

taking up the operational command.[11] In October the age of enrolment was reduced from 21 to 20 years, with a view to keeping more men with the colours.[12]

After the Balkan wars, therefore, structural imperatives dictated that Greece should avoid irredentist adventurism. They created proximate conditions for a radical change in Greek strategic priorities. It was left, nevertheless, to the Greek governing coalition to make the final choices and moves. From this angle, the sufferings of Greek ethnic kin in 'unredeemed' lands intensified the suspicions of Athens that Constantinople and Sofia advocated repression to force it to take the offensive, and thereby shoulder the burden of overturning the Treaty of Bucharest.[13] Venizelos threw his weight in favour of peace.[14] As both he and Constantine happened to perceive the international and domestic conditions as disposing forces in adopting an assertive way of acting, they articulated the preservation of Greek acquisitions as their ultimate strategic aim. Unless this strategic response was decided, the interplay of the international system and domestic structure could hardly afford Greece autonomy of action in pursuing the consolidation of the *status quo*.

The crucial aspect was that Venizelos considered the Bulgarian threat more dangerous than the Ottoman menace; containing the latter seemed to have assumed priority.[15] He felt that the preservation of the Ottoman Empire was in the Greek interest. Not only did he look for friendly relations with it; he also dropped hints of his will to conclude an alliance.[16] But as the fate of the Aegean islands was still uncertain, he laid stress on the military strategy, in order to secure Greece's territorial integrity and enable Greek diplomacy to cook up a peaceful solution involving a compromise taken from a position of military strength. Much energy, therefore, was devoted to reinforcing the navy, and in general to maintaining competitive armed forces.

In mid-summer 1914, Turkey was to receive two German dreadnoughts. Athens feared that its naval supremacy in the Aegean would be given up for lost unless it delivered a pre-emptive strike. It scheduled to launch an assault before the first battleship left for the Dardanelles; to wreck or wrest it on its way through the Mediterranean was ruled out.[17] Venizelos reasoned that after it was put in service, Turkey would attack Greece or compel it to declare war. As the acquisition of a battle-cruiser in near future was impossible, he stood out for a blow before the vessels afforded Turkey superiority at sea. But he admitted that unless a decisive battle was fought, the war would result in a stalemate. This might prompt him to contemplate landing Greek armies at the port of Smyrna in Asia Minor.[18] The Greek general staff entertained plans to engage the Ottomans on their ground and occupy Constantinople or points on the mainland of Asia Minor. The campaign was regarded as being within the reach of Greek military capabilities.[19] But although Bulgaria was unlikely to allow passage of troops or transfer of combat into its territory, it was open whether the Greeks could bend the enemy to their will should they prevail in a naval engagement and

11 Elliot to Grey, 14 May 1914, F.O. 371/1999.
12 Elliot to Grey, 18 Oct. 1914, F.O. 371/1905.
13 Bunsen to Grey, 15 June 1914, tel. no. 74, F.O. 371/1998.
14 Svolopoulos, C. (1999). Ελευθέριος Βενιζέλος: 12 Μελετήματα (Eleftherios Venizelos: 12 Studies). Athens: Ellinika Grammata, p. 76.
15 Venizelos to G.M.F.A., 8/21 Jan. 1914, G.M.F.A. A/5α; 'Note', 6 (19) Feb. 1914, G.M.F.A. A/5α.
16 Erskine to Grey, 15 July 1914, F.O. 371/1998.
17 'Memorandum by Captain Boyle respecting the Naval Situation as Between Greece and Turkey', in Mallet to Grey, 21 May 1914, F.O. 371/1998; Mallet to Grey, 21 May 1914, F.O. 371/1998.
18 Elliot to Grey, 28 May 1914, F.O. 371/1998.
19 Cunliffe-Owen to Mallet, 15 June 1914, in Mallet to Grey, 16 June 1914, F.O. 371/1998.

disembark men in Asia Minor or the Dardanelles; insofar as the Sultan might prove able to marshal adequate forces in the area and resist with every prospect of success.[20] Ultimately, as the option involved the risk of incurring the hostility of the powers, Venizelos took the middle course of naval armaments.

Modernising the navy's weaponry was a difficult task. One constraint was a lack of consensus about the warships that should be acquired. On assuming his duty, Kerr suggested that the dreadnought which was under construction in Germany should be sold; and the fleet should consist of a sufficient number of destroyers, submarines and aircraft, having in commission two or three battle-cruisers. The proposal, while it reflected Venizelos's opinion, brought cold comfort to the naval staff. The latter sought to build up a flotilla of capital ships of dreadnought type in order to foment morale and secure the command of the Aegean. This planning Kerr questioned on cost-benefit grounds.[21] He voiced the view that the narrow waters of the Aegean bottled up heavy battleships in a limited radius of action, making them ineffectual and costly. Thanks to its geography and its enemies' expansionist designs, Greece should acquire ships able to develop high speed, project sea power in large range, and shoot effective fire. In addition to the naval station in Salamis, too, it should establish two Flotilla bases: one in the north of the Aegean, in case Bulgaria sided with Turkey and Romania to recapture the territories it had lost in Macedonia and Thrace, and the other on its west coastline in the event of an alignment between Sofia and Rome or Vienna.[22] The fleet should ideally comprise three armoured cruisers, 34 destroyers, 20 submarines, and several auxiliary vessels.[23]

Another constraint was Greece's dependency on foreign shipbuilding market. When it received its second submarine, Athens decided, with the consent of Britain, to obtain three 'dreadnought' battle-cruisers, including one on order in Germany, three cruisers, six submarines and some smaller vessels.[24] But there was great difficulty in purchasing warships ready for immediate delivery. Negotiations, initially initiated for acquiring two 'dreadnought' cruisers being constructed in Chile and deposited by the British, foundered.[25] Next the Greeks agreed with China to buy a light cruiser, which then was being built in the USA and was due for completion in May.[26] Also, they acquired from Washington two second-hand battleships, one of which arrived late in August.[27] Venizelos believed that the ships would help the navy retain its fighting pre-eminence.[28] Thus, apart from the six battle-cruisers, in October 1915 the Greek fleet was made up of 14 destroyers, 13 torpedo-boats, and 8 gunboats.[29] Most of these, along with the two submarines and various auxiliary crafts, were manned ready for sea.[30]

20 Cunliffe-Owen to Mallet, 29 May 1914, F.O. 371/1998, in Mallet to Grey, 1 June 1914, F.O. 371/1998.
21 Elliot to Grey, 26 Sep. 1913, F.O. 371/1655; Kerr to G.M.N., 'Private', 4 Oct. 1913, V.A. 173/81.
22 Kerr, 'Constructive Proposals', in Elliot to Grey, 25 Mar. 1914, F.O. 371/1994.
23 Kerr, 'Proposed Constitution of Greek Fleet', in Elliot to Grey, 25 Mar. 1914, F.O. 371/1994.
24 Kerr to Admiralty, 18 Oct. 1913, F.O. 371/1656; Elliot to Grey, 29 Oct. 1913, F.O. 371/1656; Elliot to Grey, 25 Mar. 1914, F.O. 371/1994.
25 Elliot to Grey, 19 Mar. 1914, tel. no. 62, F.O. 371/1998; F.O., 29 May 1914, F.O. 371/1998.
26 Elliot to Grey, 16 Apr. 1914, F.O. 371/1998.
27 Erskine to Grey, 10 July 1914, F.O. 371/1998; Erskine to Grey, 31 Aug. 1914, F.O. 371/1998.
28 Erskine to Grey, 26 June 1914, tel. no. 112, F.O. 371/1998.
29 Admiralty to F.O., 4 Oct. 1915, F.O. 371/2271.
30 Elliot to Grey, 30 Oct. 1915, tel. no. 1138, F.O. 371/2277; Elliot to Grey, 31 Oct. 1915, tel. no. 1153, F.O. 371/2277.

Yet another problem was the enormous expense in upkeep. The economy narrowed Greece's margins of military autonomy. Docking the squadron in a state of alert could hardly be financed from the existing sources of public revenue and borrowing. To save money, Venizelos attempted to restructure unpaid military debts. He asked of London to settle outstanding instalments for construction orders of one light cruiser, four destroyers, and one repair ship, due for completion by British firms in July 1915. In return, it was suggested that the vessels, if built on time, should be placed at the disposal of the British navy, provided Turkey was in arms against the *Entente*. Britain consented to undertake to pay off, in the form of a loan, all the arrears to the amount of £1,311,506.[31] Despite difficulties, as a whole, systemic and domestic structural challenges shaped Greek military strategy and reproduced through it Greece's naval preponderance and post-war enhanced position in the Balkan military balance of power. These reconstructed material conditions were to play an important part in making Greek grand strategy during W.W.I.

As regards Greek diplomacy, Venizelos stood firm on his pre-war firm-but-flexible diplomacy. He sought to settle the controversies with Turkey over the fate of the islands of the eastern Aegean and the expatriation of the Greek element in Asia Minor and Thrace. Of the structural forces that enabled this option, the improvement of Greece's regional position and the reorganisation of the military, along with the moves of Greek military strategy to reinforce the navy, seemed most determining. The means were furnished by rewards and negotiation.

To start with the islands, Venizelos was willing to reach agreement with Turkey only if the administration of the islands was made subject to Greek law and jurisdiction.[32] Abiding by the decision of the powers regarding the allotment of the islands to Greece, he rejected Ottoman overtures for negotiations on a new basis.[33] Nonetheless, informal talks were launched.[34] The Sultan, who was slow to regain the Dodecanese from Italy by virtue of his fear that otherwise they would be seized by the Greek fleet, sought to cede six of these islands excluding Rhodes, and grant autonomy to Mitylene and Chios; in return, Athens should accept the nomination of Ottoman commissioners, protect the human and property rights of the Moslem population, and undertake not to fortify the two islands. However, the Greeks were ready to yield to all the other terms but not to accept autonomy.[35]

Elliot's proposal for an exchange of Mitylene for the Dodecanese and Imbros incited uneasiness in Athens, which in addition was aware that Rome was reluctant to revert the Dodecanese to Turkey to facilitate Greek-Turkish rapprochement.[36] But with a view to reaching an agreement, Venizelos made up his mind to consider this deal on condition that: the proposal would come from Turkey; autonomy would be granted; a Christian governor would be nominated; and a guarantee would be given that the demographic balance between the Christian and the Moslem population would not be disturbed by Moslem settlers.[37] He

31 Admiralty to Treasury, 14 Sep. 1914, F.O. 371/1904; Elliot to Grey, 23 Sep. 1914, F.O. 371/1904; Treasury to F.O., 5 Nov. 1914, F.O. 371/1904.

32 'Extracts from Venizelos's Speech Before the Parliament, 17 September 1914', in 4 May 1917, G.M.F.A. A.A.K.16.

33 Venizelos to G.M.F.A., 28 Jan. (10 Feb.) 1914, G.M.F.A. A/5α; Elliot to F.O., 26 Mar. 1914, tel. no. 64, F.O. 371/1998.

34 Mallet to Grey, 2 Apr. 1914, tel. no. 212, F.O. 371/1998.

35 Barclay to Grey, 2 May 1914, F.O. 371/1998; Mallet to Grey, 2 June 1914, F.O. 371/1998.

36 Elliot to Grey, 7 May 1914, F.O. 371/1998; Elliot to Grey, 22 May 1914, F.O. 371/1998.

37 Elliot to Grey, 28 May 1914, F.O. 371/1998.

went through the negotiation process in a conciliatory spirit.[38] It was Turkey's intransigence that induced him to decide not simply to dismiss the idea of exchange, but also to annex the islands. Constantinople refused to recognise Greek sovereignty over the latter because it feared that their loss would precipitate the partition of the Asiatic possessions of its Empire. While Athens was intended to sign a defensive treaty and accept suzerainty or condominium with the nomination of one of the Greek crown princes as Viceroy, Constantinople insisted that the islands, including Mitylene, Chios and Samos, should remain under its rule and the governor-general should be appointed by a joint proclamation. Ottoman demands were intolerable to Greece.[39]

As negotiations verged on collapse, both sides agreed to convene a summit in Brussels on 24 July. The ultimatum communicated by Austria-Hungary to Serbia, on 23 July, changed the plans, and the envoys were instructed to confer in Bucharest. There, the Ottomans repeated their old demands. In exchange for autonomy under the rule of a Christian subject nominated by the Sultan, they sought to restore the islands to their sovereignty, retain the customs and posts, and appropriate a part of the local taxes to the service of Ottoman debt. The Greek delegates offered to lease Mitylene and Chios for a renewable term of fifty years in exchange for a sort of Ottoman sovereignty over these islands.[40] As proposals and counter-proposals fell on deaf ears, negotiations ruptured in the second week of September.[41] In order not to incite Turkey's aggression, Venizelos postponed the annexation of the islands.[42] Some months later, London acknowledged that the islands in Greek effective possession were Mitylene, Chios, the Fourni group, Samos, Lemnos, Tenedos, Imbros, Thasos, Samothraki, Nikaria, Strati, Psara, and Castellorizo.[43]

As for the treatment of Ottoman Greeks in Asia Minor and Thrace, Turkey persecuted them to force Greece to acquiesce in their exchange for Moslem refugees who fled to the Empire from lands lost in the Balkan wars. Venizelos advocated the idea of population exchange on the condition that Turkey would make a proposal to this effect. After outrages against Greeks broke out with fierce intensity, he suggested that a mixed commission should be set up to inquire into past wrongdoings. The Ottomans received the overtures with apathy. Afterwards, they sounded Athens for a scheme of exchange on a voluntary basis between the Moslems of Macedonia and the Greeks of Smyrna. To enter the arrangement, Venizelos laid down that the national populations of Thrace should be included. It was not until the claim was accepted and the Sultan extended an invitation that official talks began.[44] The problem was that local authorities on both sides of the frontier mistreated minorities.[45]

In June the anti-Greek campaign took such an adverse turn that it brought Greece and Turkey to the brink of war. Although they were prepared for any attempt at reconciliation, the Greeks, counting on Serbian solidarity, appeared determined to resort to force; they could hardly step back against the background of naval antagonism and the issue of the islands.[46]

38 Erskine to Grey, 16 June 1914, F.O. 371/1998.
39 Matthews to Beaumont, 'Memorandum', 21 July 1914, in Beaumont to Grey, 27 July 1914, F.O. 371/1997; Erskine to Grey, Athens, 25 July 1914, F.O. 371/1998.
40 Correspondence, in 1914, F.O. 371/1901.
41 Elliot to Grey, 11 Sep. 1914, tel. unnumbered, F.O. 371/1903.
42 Elliot to Grey, 17 Sep. 1914, F.O. 371/1903.
43 F.O. to G.P.O., 1 Jan. 1915, F.O. 371/1903.
44 Correspondence, in 1914, G.M.F.A. A/21α-21η; Correspondence, in 1914, F.O. 371/1996.
45 Morgan to Mallet, 20 June 1914, in Mallet to Grey, 28 June 1914, F.O. 371/1997.
46 Erskine to Grey, 16 June 1914, F.O. 371/1998; Erskine to Grey, Athens, 18 June 1914, tel. no. 104, F.O. 371/1998.

Unless atrocities ceased, they would exploit their naval superiority and strike first before the Ottoman fleet was reinforced with the German dreadnoughts.[47] Athens communicated an ultimatum demanding the restoration of order. Turkey's reply was moderate, a fact that eased the strained relations.[48] It was the stance of Serbia and Romania that paved the way for a compromise. The former, reserving its assurance of military support, lodged a protest against the sufferings of Ottoman Greeks.[49] The latter warned the Greeks that if they provoked a war, it would neither side with them nor oppose a possible Bulgarian assistance to Turkey.[50] Bulgaria, too, notified both rivals of its intention to stand aside and resist by force violations of its territorial integrity.[51] The powers, seeking to preserve peace, refrained from commitments to one's or the other's liking.[52] However, the British, who sought to fabricate a settlement, had agreed with France to intervene should the Sultan defect from his pledge to keep the Straits open.[53]

On 1 July Constantinople undertook to permit Greek refugees to return to their homes and make reparation for land holdings abandoned by those who had emigrated.[54] Content with the new attitude, Venizelos consented to the appointment of a mixed commission to scrutinise the exchange of populations. Talks on the subject made little headway.[55] In mid-July approximately 100,000 Greeks were forced to leave Turkey for the motherland.[56] As the matter rested in stalemate, on 21 September the Porte demanded of Athens to let Moslem refugees return to Greek Macedonia and resume possession of their property. Athens stated that the compulsory expulsion of 45,000 Greek settlers was unfeasible.[57] In mid-December, after Turkey sided with the Triple Alliance, talks foundered, casting a heavy shadow on the fortunes of Ottoman Greeks. The outbreak of W.W.I had moulded structural conditions that were no longer in harmony with the priorities and moves of Greek diplomacy.

2. THE OUTBREAK OF W.W.I

Europe's hegemony in the multi-polar international system persisted unabated. As the European courts were divided into two hostile coalitions, their inability to contain the crisis occasioned by the assassination of the heir to the Habsburg throne in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914 led to the outburst of violence in the continent. While Italy and Romania, who were attached to the Triple Alliance, declared neutrality, both sets of belligerents tried to attract local allies in the Balkans. But the difficulty with the *Entente* was that they sought to make Italy switch to their side, keep Turkey and Greece out of the war, and induce Bulgaria and Romania to march against Austria-Hungary in order to relieve Serbia and deflect the Triple Alliance from joining hands with Turkey and Albania.

47 Erskine to Grey, 14 June 1914, F.O. 371/1996.
48 Bunsen to Grey, 13 June 1914, F.O. 371/1998; Erskine to Grey, 19 June 1914, tel. no. 106, F.O. 371/1996.
49 Mallet to Grey, 19 June 1914, tel. no. 363, F.O. 371/1998.
50 Barclay to Grey, 17 June 1914, tel. no. 18, F.O. 371/1998; Barclay to Grey, 18 June 1914, tel. no. 21, F.O. 371/1998.
51 Bax-Ironside to Grey, 18 June 1914, tel. no. 24, F.O. 371/1998.
52 Grey to Erskine, 24 June 1914, F.O. 371/1997.
53 Grey to Bertie, 15 June 1914, F.O. 371/1998.
54 Erskine to Grey, 1 July 1914, F.O. 371/1998.
55 Erskine to Grey, 2 July 1914, F.O. 371/1997; Erskine to Grey, 31 July 1914, F.O. 371/1997.
56 Matthews to Beaumont, 'Memorandum', 21 July 1914, in Beaumont to Grey, 27 July 1914, F.O. 371/1997.
57 Elliot to Grey, 28 Sep. 1914, F.O. 371/1904.

It was before April 1915 that the Allies committed Italy to their cause by the Treaty of London, which provided for it to keep the Dodecanese and acquire Dalmatia, Istria, Trieste, and Ottoman lands in Asia Minor. However, reconciling and reciprocating the Balkan states' territorial demands proved an awkward predicament. To this was added the British belief that the other Balkan states should offer compensations to Bulgaria so as to reconstitute a Balkan alliance.[58] Under the circumstances, the *Entente* used the bait of financial assistance, refraining from binding promises of concessions. Although they were involved in informal talks about territorial rearrangements, they were cautious not to incur hostility by securing one and deserting the other.[59]

Obtaining the support of Turkey and Bulgaria took precedence. As regards the former, satisfaction to such demands as the abolition of the capitulations and restoration of the Aegean islands and western Thrace could hardly be given.[60] As for Bulgaria, the Allies spelled out that if it aligned with them, it would secure territorial expansion on condition that Serbia and Greece would acquire substantial additions of territory, or it would profit at the expense of the states that might have fought by the enemy's side.[61] Sofia replied that unless the *Entente* made a definite offer of gains in Macedonia, or if Turkey moved with the Triple Alliance, it would remain neutral. It was nonetheless determined to resist an Ottoman assault on Greece through its territory and would reconsider its position should Bucharest and Athens join hostilities.[62] It aspired, as its minister of war stated, to reinstate the Great Bulgaria of the Treaty of San Stefano.[63] It laid no claim to Kavala, the surrender of which was a matter of time. It sought to rectify the northern frontier with Serbia by demanding the zone lying from Patarica to Ochrida.[64] When it dropped hints to this effect, however, Serbia warned that instead of standing up alone against Austria-Hungary, it would pull its armies back to defend this zone.[65] Cession was ruled out because it embraced lands west of Vardar, which commanded commercial routes to the Aegean via the free railway communication to Thessaloniki.[66]

In this international context, Greece's ultimate strategic aim remained, through the concurrent effect of proximate domestic forces, articulated by the choice of the defence of the *status quo*. Athens sought to thwart a revision of the Treaty of Bucharest and Bulgaria's expansion.[67] Bulgaria and Turkey were in the eyes of Greek leadership the potential enemies, although it was still felt that the former was more threatening than the latter.[68] It was through these predominant regional threats to Greek security that the governing coalition filtered the international threat of the war.

To Bulgarian aggressiveness was added a rising security dilemma. At a moment when Greek mobilisation was estimated to take 20 days to complete and Venizelos was anxious to avoid escalation and waste of money, Turkey had 150,000 men assembled and ready to cross

58 Memorandum Communicated to Graz, 24 June 1915, F.O. 371/2261.
59 Grey to Elliot, 27 Aug. 1914, tel. no. 151, F.O. 371/1901.
60 Mallet to Grey, 29 Aug. 1914, tel. no. 24, F.O. 371/1906.
61 Grey to Elliot, 7 Sep. 1914, tel. no. 181, F.O. 371/1901.
62 Correspondence, in 1914, F.O. 371/1901.
63 Napier to Bax-Ironside, 8 Sep. 1914, in Bax-Ironside to Grey, 9 Sep. 1914, F.O. 371/1904.
64 Mallet to Grey, 21 Sep. 1914, tel. no. 826, F.O. 371/1901.
65 Elliot to Grey, 4 Nov. 1914, tel. no. 297, F.O. 371/1902.
66 Graz to Grey, 31 Jan. 1915, tel. no. 32, F.O. 371/2242.
67 Venizelos to Streit, 12 (25) July 1914, G.M.F.A. A/5τε; Grey to Elliot, 26 Nov. 1914, F.O. 371/1902.
68 Napier to Bax-Ironside, 8 Sep. 1914, in Bax-Ironside to Grey, 9 Sep. 1914, F.O. 371/1904.

the Greek frontier in Thrace within 17 days.[69] This pushed Athens to intensify its efforts to repress Bulgarian guerrilla bands in Macedonia and prepare the ground for speedy mobilisation in case of emergency.[70] The new recruitment law enabled it to retain the services in full preparation short of mobilisation, having, in October 1914, 100,000 troops on alert.[71] A month later, its hints of disbanding certain naval units on account of cost were abandoned on Britain's request.[72] In this respect, the primary concern of Greek military strategy and diplomacy was to protect Greece's territorial integrity from attack, invasion, and conquest.

Despite the unity of strategic purpose during the early stages of the war, however, the king differed from the government in the perception of the circumstances and the way military and diplomatic ends should be related to means. Constantine sought to get on well with both the belligerents and keep alignment options open until the very end; his aim was to defect to the winning side in order to counter the post-war revisionist designs of Bulgaria and Turkey and ensure a share of the fruits of victory. From this standpoint, in early August 1914, he refused to align with Germany on the pretext that Greece was vulnerable to the British-French naval power in the Mediterranean. Although he could not tolerate a Bulgarian attack on Serbia, he was ready to withhold Greek commitment to the Serbian cause by virtue of his fear that Constantinople and Sofia might join the Triple Alliance and attack Greece.[73] Some weeks later, after Britain sounded Athens for common action against Turkey in the Dardanelles, he, seeking to forestall a breach of relations with Berlin, qualified his 'reluctant but positive consent' with the condition of an Ottoman declaration of war on Greece or the Allies.[74] Due to this stance, he came at swords' points with his premier. He declined the resignation of Venizelos, who sensed that he was no longer in accord with Constantine over the terms of intervention on the side of the *Entente*.[75]

Venizelos, indeed, was resolute to order mobilisation should Bulgaria mobilise.[76] He was disturbed once the Bulgarians laid claim to Kavala in order to agree to his proposal for re-establishing a Balkan league.[77] But before Bulgarian assertiveness came out most clearly, on 18 August, he had taken the initiative, though apparently with Constantine's consent, to offer the *Entente* Greek unconditional cooperation. Convinced that Greece's entry in the war would drive Turkey and Bulgaria into definite union with their enemy, the *Entente* declined the bid.[78] Using the lures of financial aid to bring Greece together with Bulgaria and Serbia in a Balkan bloc, they declared that if Turkey sided with the Triple Alliance, they would treat Greece as an ally; and if Bulgaria attacked Serbia, they would fund Greece to assist the latter militarily.[79] In fact, they were slow to precipitate Greek alignment. They trusted that they could indulge in the luxury of reserving Venizelos's support, as they were

69 Elliot to Grey, 25 Aug. 1914, tel. no. 169, F.O. 371/1901.
70 Elliot to Grey, 28 Aug. 1914, F.O. 371/1903.
71 Elliot to Grey, 18 Oct. 1914, F.O. 371/1905.
72 Correspondence, in 1914, F.O. 371/1906.
73 Leon, pp. 28-29, 38-40; Stavrianos, p. 566.
74 Elliot to Grey, 29 Aug. 1914, tel. no. 179, F.O. 371/1901.
75 Ventiris, pp. 250-254.
76 Venizelos to G.M.F.A., 29 July (11 Aug.) 1914, G.M.F.A. A/15ιε.
77 Elliot to Grey, 26 Aug. 1914, tel. no. 170, F.O. 371/1901.
78 Γ.Ε.Σ./Δ.Ι.Σ. (1993). Επίτομη Ιστορία της Συμμετοχής του Ελληνικού Στρατού στον Πρώτο Παγκόσμιο Πόλεμο 1914-1918 (An Epitomised History of the Participation of the Greek Army in the First World War 1914-1918). Athens, p. 18; 'The Balkans, 1914-1915, from the Outbreak of War to the Offer to Bulgaria', 28 July 1915, F.O. 371/2264.
79 Grey to Elliot, 27 Aug. 1914, tel. no. 151, F.O. 371/1901; Grey to Elliot, 28 Aug. 1914, tel. no. 156, F.O. 371/1901.

aware of his sympathy and the majority of Greek people to their cause.[80] Eager to wean Turkey from Germany, Britain advised Athens that it should trade Ottoman assurances of neutrality for a similar Greek promise.[81] In October, too, after Venizelos assured it that he could ward off a Bulgarian assault and offer 100,000 men to an allied expeditionary force, London stated that it would march against Turkey only if the latter committed an act of hostility.[82]

To summarise, from the outset Venizelos saw the merits of throwing Greece's lot in with the *Entente*. He qualified this choice as the best strategic tool for the country to achieve the ends in view, that is, to preserve the *status quo*. He believed that no matter what the 'outcome of the European war in central Europe' might be, the set of powers to which Britain belonged was to win the field in the Near East. He reasoned that as Greek attempts at rapprochement with Turkey failed, the expatriation of Ottoman Greeks persisted unabated, and Germany refused to advocate Greek demands in the question of the islands of the eastern Aegean, Athens should not side with the camp, namely the Triple Alliance, that showed signs of intention to create a greater Bulgaria as a bulwark against Slavism and 'reinforce the two main enemies of Hellenism-the Bulgarians and Ottomans' as future guarantors of Balkan stability. Instead, it should come in with the *Entente*, who were its protecting powers and disposed to go to its military assistance in the event of an Ottoman assault; thereby, it should accept allied overtures for armed contribution to a possible campaign against the Dardanelles. In the light of Bulgaria's expansionist claims however, Venizelos was prepared to get Greece to enter the war only if Bulgaria's strict neutrality or active cooperation was obtained.[83] Only after, essentially, the predominant regional threat that Bulgaria posed was contained, did he aim to align with the Allies, whom he perceived as more willing than the Triple Alliance to back Greek interests, in order to oppose the less predominant but likewise aggressive and proximate Ottoman threat.

Structural conditions nonetheless narrowed Venizelos's autonomy of action and sparked off a change of attitude. The Allies were cool to the idea of enlisting Greek support. Also, the small Balkan states abstained from involvement, and the Bulgarian and the Ottoman threat did not step up imminent pressure upon Greece to take balancing steps. Romania's position afforded Venizelos little freedom to manoeuvre, although he was aware that it had refused to join Bulgaria and Turkey in an alliance.[84] Moreover, having been reassured by his general staff that the Greek army was a match for the Ottomans, he received Bulgaria's pledge of neutrality with much scepticism. He valued more a promise of protest against a violation of the Bulgarian frontier by Ottoman men marching into Greece.[85] Finally, Constantine's reservations about the wisdom of Greek participation worked against untimely political clashes and military commitments.

Pointing to Bulgaria, thus, Venizelos left no doubt in any quarters that if the Austrian-Serbian confrontation became general, 'whoever attacked Serbia would be treated as an enemy by Greece'.[86] He based his commitment on the 1913 Greek-Serbian treaty, which

80 Elliot to Grey, 3 Sep. 1914, F.O. 371/1905.
81 Grey to Elliot, 1 Sep. 1914, tel. no. 194, F.O. 371/1903.
82 Grey to Elliot, 26 Oct. 1914, tel. no. 153, F.O. 371/1905.
83 (1970). Correspondence between Constantine and Venizelos. In Ventiris, pp. 366-370.
84 Barclay to Grey, 25 Aug. 1914, tel. no. 48, F.O. 371/1901.
85 Naoum to G.M.F.A., 23 Aug. (6 Sep.) 1914, G.M.F.A. A/5ζ; Elliot to Grey, 6 Sep. 1914, tel. no. 203, F.O. 371/1901.
86 Elliot to Grey, 13 Sep. 1914, tel. no. 220, F.O. 371/1901.

envisaged that if Belgrade put into the field 150,000 men, Athens should go to its armed assistance in the event of a Bulgarian attack. On 30 September, he stated in Parliament,

> Greece will remain neutral, but…she has obligations arising from an alliance with… Serbia, and…is determined…to carry out these obligations if the contingency of the *casus foederis* arises.…so far as depends on the initiative of Greece everyone may be sure that no extension of the conflagration of war will befall the Balkan Peninsula, and if the other peoples of the Peninsula are inspired with the same thoughts we may be sure that peace will be maintained in the East.[87]

The Greek governing coalition appeared to have agreed on the words of the statement. In reality, they were divided over the expediency and timing of intervention, a split that was destined to leave behind its indelible mark on the making of Greek grand strategy.

87 Elliot to Grey, 2 Oct. 1914, F.O. 371/1999.

Chapter 8

THE QUESTION OF MILITARY ENGAGEMENT

1. THE LURE OF THE BID FOR SMYRNA

On 5 November Turkey entered the lists as an ally of the Triple Alliance. Romania, too, which appeared to be favourably disposed towards the allied cause, refused to wage war on Austria-Hungary unless it was reassured against Bulgarian aggressiveness; thereby, an agreement with Bulgaria was required.[1] These events did their share in reconstituting the material reality of Greek statehood, but they had, through their interplay with other structural conditions, insufficient reshaping influence on Greece's strategic choices.

To begin with, Britain annexed Cyprus and the *Entente* intensified their efforts to bring Bulgaria to their side by concessions at the Sultan's expense in Adrianople and the territories he recovered from it by the Treaty of Constantinople.[2] Although the Allies met Bulgaria's claims more than half way, Sofia refused to depart from neutrality but undertook not to attack the Romanians in case they went to the aid of Serbia.[3] It had demanded of the Allies assurances of the zone in Macedonia as laid down in the 1912 Serbian-Bulgarian alliance and the Treaty of London of May 1913.[4] On 25 November the Allies notified Sofia that if it maintained neutrality, they would offer it a share of the spoils; and if it marched against Turkey or Austria-Hungary, the gains would be increased substantially.[5] Bulgaria rejected the bid as indefinite, insisting on acquiring portions of Serbian Macedonia immediately. It questioned whether the *Entente* could force Serbia to make this sacrifice in the aftermath of a victorious war.[6] The heart of the matter was that the *Entente* were trying to put 'the Balkan states all on a friendly footing together' but without making 'offers to one state which would create difficulties with other states'.[7] On the other hand, Sofia, although it expected of Germany to sweep the field, was looking for an enticing offer of cooperation, determined to

1 Barclay to Grey, 15 Nov. 1914, tel. no. 154, F.O. 371/1904.
2 Grey to Bertie, 16 Nov. 1914, tel. no. 975, F.O. 371/1902.
3 Bax-Ironside to Grey, 17 Nov. 1914, tel. no. 164, F.O. 371/1902.
4 Bax-Ironside to Grey, 3 Nov. 1914, tel. no. 147, F.O. 371/1902.
5 Bax-Ironside to Grey, 25 Nov. 1914, tel. no. 174, F.O. 371/1902.
6 Bax-Ironside to Grey, 9 Dec. 1914, tel. no. 194, F.O. 371/1902; Bax-Ironside to Grey, 29 Jan. 1915, tel. no. 28, F.O. 371/2242.
7 Grey to Bax-Ironside, 17 Dec. 1914, tel. no. 65, F.O. 371/1902.

stick by neutrality until the scales of war tilted in favour of one of the camps and Romania and Greece became engaged.[8]

Moreover, the *Entente* made up their mind in favour of Greek intervention. Although they refrained from extending an effective guarantee against Bulgarian assertiveness, they began to entice Greece by territorial compensations to intervene in support of Serbia. In October, for example, they had consented that Venizelos, who had secured the approval of the Triple Alliance as well, could send Greek detachments to Argyrocastro, Korytsa, and Premeti to restore order and protect the human rights of all national communities in the region.[9] On 5 December they presented him with the promise of the annexation of northern Epirus, without the Italian-occupied Valona area, provided he sided with Serbia immediately. Venizelos refused to consider the offer, the first that stipulated specified rewards in return for Greek cooperation, before an alliance with Romania was concluded.[10] This rebuff owed much to the fact that after Turkey's engagement, Bulgaria's ambivalent war attitude became a security obsession. As Ottoman aggression directed against Russia, Venizelos did not rush out to oppose it militarily because he continued to perceive Bulgaria as more threatening than the Porte. Scarcely surprising, as much as the *Entente* were willing to commit Sofia to their cause, but without reassuring Greece's territorial integrity, so Greek suspicions were exacerbated and so Greek efforts to obtain additional guarantees were intensified.

Thus, systemic and domestic forces had unleashed sufficient disposing conditions for Greek grand strategy not to reset its priorities. But the necessary condition for this way of acting was the Greek response to these structural imperatives. It was through the choice to avoid unconditional military intervention that Greek leadership held firm to the ultimate strategic aim of the consolidation of the status quo. The constituent objective that directed Greek military strategy was to retain the services on alert short of mobilisation. And diplomacy purported to resist infringements of Greece's national sovereignty. The critical aspect was that Venizelos was attached to the Greek-Serbian agreement and the reconstitution of a Balkan alliance, and intertwined his firm-but-flexible diplomacy with bullying tactics.

Late in September, Venizelos refused to supply Serbia with war materials unless the *Entente* made a bid for assistance and Greece proclaimed its participation in the war.[11] On 22 October he informed the Ottomans that Greece would not enter the war if they moved against Russia.[12] He was resolute to march against them only in concert with Bulgaria, and to stand by strict neutrality until the latter attacked Serbia.[13] However, he displayed flexibility and, with the general staff's and Constantine's consent, dispatched rounds for field guns to Belgrade, after Paris was committed to replacing them.[14] Britain then undertook to regard Greece as an ally should it fall victim to attack as a result of this gesture.[15] On 14 November, too, Venizelos let Romania know, with Constantine's concurrence, that if it took the offensive against Austria-Hungary, he would come to its assistance in the event of a

8 Bax-Ironside to Grey, 20 Dec. 1914, in 1915, F.O. 371/2242.
9 G.E. in Berlin to Venizelos, 21 Oct./3 Nov. 1914, G.M.F.A. A/5; Elliot to Grey, 31 Oct. 1914, F.O. 371/1905.
10 Leon, p. 92.
11 Elliot to Grey, 27 Sep. 1914, tel. no. 239, F.O. 371/1903.
12 Elliot to Grey, 22 Oct. 1914, tel. no. 270, F.O. 371/1904.
13 Elliot to Grey, 31 Oct. 1914, tel. no. 285, F.O. 371/1901.
14 Elliot to Grey, 12 Nov. 1914, tel. no. 324, F.O. 371/1903; Grey to Bertie, 14 Nov. 1914, tel. no. 952, F.O. 371/1903.
15 Grey to Elliot, 13 Nov. 1914, tel. no. 249, F.O. 371/1903.

Bulgarian attack. The intimation fell on deaf ears.[16] Later, he did not hesitate to reject a Serbian request to wage war on Austria-Hungary before certain terms were met. He was reluctant to move with Belgrade without guarantees against Bulgarian aggression, a condition that required Romania to make its entry into the war contingent on this event.[17] But at the same time, on 2 December, when Vienna urged him to advise Serbia to put out peace feelers, he refused to mediate on grounds that he might give the flawed impression that Greece sought to slip away from its treaty obligations.[18]

Also, Venizelos asked the Romanians about their attitude if Sofia marched against Greece or allowed Ottoman divisions to cross its frontier. Romania replied that unless Bulgarian cooperation was obtained, it would remain neutral.[19] Later, he made overtures to Bucharest for a common cause with Bulgaria. The Romanians rejected the overtures on grounds that it was impossible for them and Greece to yield lands to Bulgaria in Macedonia without Serbia's consent and a Russian guarantee against Bulgarian expansion to Thrace.[20]

So long as Greece was out of the war, in short, Venizelos was concerned to obtain allied guarantees primarily against Bulgarian assertiveness. He made Bulgaria's cooperation or neutrality, or at least the intervention of Romania, a condition of Greek action in support of Serbia.[21] This position was dictated by his belief that Bulgaria aspired to establish its hegemony in the Balkans. He set out to avert Bulgarian aggrandizement, and to secure that whatever territorial concessions would be given according to the 'principle of ethnical redistribution', in order to maintain the regional balance of power.[22] Venizelos, in that regard, appeared to have related status quo not only to territorial integrity but also, more generally, to the balance of power. His devotion to the Greek-Serbian treaty should be seen in this light therefore: given the threat of Bulgarian expansion to the Aegean or a possible Bulgarian-Turkish alliance, Serbia acted as a balancing shield, indeed the most important element in the opposite scale.

Meanwhile, the Greek general staff had begun to have an active negative say over the possibility of Greece's entry into the war. As November wore on, they refused obedience to Venizelos's intention not to oppose the cession of part of Serbian Macedonia to Bulgaria.[23] On 4 December the acting chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Metaxas, submitted a memo to Venizelos warning against Greek military aid to the Serbians. He contended that if Greece intervened in support of them, its armies would be able to engage the Austrian-Hungarians in less than 50 days after the start of mobilisation. This span of time might leave Bulgaria a free hand to break through the Serbian rear line in Nice; or outflank the Greek forces' line of marching in northern Macedonia and race down into Thessaloniki, cutting them off from their supply base. To avoid annihilation, Greece should first defeat Bulgaria. This required Romania's cooperation. The coalition nonetheless could hardly save Serbia from disaster because the combined Greek and Romanian troops were estimated to overrun Bulgaria in three months.[24] Not accidentally too, Metaxas, in his own capacity, sounded Germany

16 Elliot to Grey, 14 Nov. 1914, tel. no. 331, F.O. 371/1904.
17 Elliot to Grey, 1 Dec. 1914, tel. no. 374, F.O. 371/1902.
18 Elliot to Grey, 2 Dec. 1914, tel. no. 376, F.O. 371/1903.
19 Elliot to Grey, 4 Dec. 1914, tel. no. 380, F.O. 371/1902; Elliot to Grey, 7 Dec. 1914, tel. no. 386, F.O. 371/1902.
20 Elliot to Grey, 24 Dec. 1914, tel. no. 407, F.O. 371/1902.
21 Elliot to Grey, 3 Dec. 1914, tel. no. 378, F.O. 371/1902.
22 Crowe to Bertie, 10 Dec. 1914, F.O. 371/1902.
23 Elliot to Grey, 30 Nov. 1914, tel. no. 372, F.O. 371/1902.
24 Metaxas to Venizelos, 21 Nov. (4 Dec.) 1914, V.A. 173/83.

about the formation of a bloc, under its auspices, between Greece, Romania, and Turkey on conditions that the latter would drop hints of this sort and undertake to protect the rights of Ottoman Greeks.[25]

Despite Metaxas's objections, and as the danger of the extension of hostilities hung over Greece, allied bids for territorial acquisitions stimulated Venizelos to reconsider the challenge of the war and its regional implications through the lens of effective guarantees and give-and-take compromises. He was willing to sacrifice the status quo as established by the Treaty of Bucharest to the reconstitution, through mutually beneficial territorial rearrangements, of the Balkan balance of power; so as to trade Greek armed cooperation for expansionist demands, and thereby tune Greek strategic priorities with the imperative of not missing out on the spoils. It was from this perception of the structural forces that he inspired the *Entente* to suggest a motivating offer of gains in order to win over Greece.

On 7 January 1915, Venizelos, having in mind a future partition of Ottoman lands in the Near East, gave the British to understand that only an enticing proposal for compensation on Asia Minor, where the plight of Ottoman Greeks was deplorable, could make public opinion swing round to the side of the *Entente*.[26] On 24 January, indeed, Greece was offered Smyrna and a substantial portion of the coast of Asia Minor. In return, Greece should assist Serbia militarily and consent to the Allies reassuring Bulgaria that if 'Serbian and Greek aspirations' were fulfilled elsewhere, it would 'get satisfactory concessions in Macedonia' on condition that it would intervene against Turkey or, at least, adopt 'a not unfriendly neutrality'.[27]

The allied offer threw up a sufficient international force for Greek leadership to contain the Bulgarian threat, balance against the Ottoman threat, and ensure a share of the spoils. Venizelos tried to exploit it to overcome Constantine's concerns and bring Greece into the war on the side of the *Entente*. He perceived it as a unique opportunity because he understood the ultimate strategic aim of the consolidation of the status quo in dynamic terms. Provided that Bulgarian cooperation was to be obtained, he attached priority to the preservation of the balance of power between the small Balkan states rather than of Greece's recent territorial gains; in a sense he was ready to enter into a territorial rearrangement on condition that this was about to reproduce a new status quo based on the balance of power. But the allied offer was bound to reshape Greek grand strategy only through its interplay with the restraints of domestic structure, which meant that it would change Greek strategic priorities unless this was precluded by a lack of consensus within the governing coalition and military.

The very same day, in a meeting with Venizelos after the receipt of the offer, Metaxas pronounced himself against the bid. He asserted that even if Romania moved with the *Entente*, a commitment of Greek divisions to theatres of operations outside Greece would lay it open to the Bulgarian threat. Conciliating with Bulgaria was essential on this count. The move did not cancel out, nonetheless, the possibility that it might turn into an enemy during the fighting, or that Athens might find itself more exhausted than it, and thus at its mercy, after the end of hostilities. The venture of an expansion in Asia Minor was a self-defeating option because the possession of this region would present Greece with enormous military complications. Venizelos refused to go along with the suggestion of rejection, but in his

25 Leon, pp. 91-92.
26 Smith. Vision, pp. 44-45.
27 Grey to Elliot, 23 Jan. 1915, tel. no. 24, F.O. 371/2242.

consultations with Constantine, he took into account Metaxas's opinion that Romania's and Bulgaria's involvement should be assured.[28]

In a memo to Constantine submitted on the same day, Venizelos reasoned that Greece should attach priority to the *Entente* because otherwise it was likely to find Bulgaria aggrandized, the Aegean islands lost to Turkey, and Ottoman Greeks humiliated should the Triple Alliance sweep the field or should the war end in stalemate. Greek participation was requested in return for territorial rewards, which presented the motherland with the unique opportunity to 'save the greater part of Hellenism in Turkey and…create a great and powerful Greece'. Instead, 'by rejecting now the overtures', Greece 'should, even in the event of victory, secure no tangible compensation'. However, the move required both Romania's cooperation and Bulgaria's involvement or benevolent neutrality. To ensure Bulgarian intervention, Venizelos urged not simply the withdrawal of Greek objections to concessions that Serbia might make to Bulgaria; but also the cession by Greece of Kavala on the condition that the Allies would guarantee the exchange of populations and the reimbursement of their properties on both sides of the frontier. The sacrifice, though not demanded from the *Entente*, was essential, since

> a definite ethnological settlement in the Balkans would be arrived at and the idea of a federation could be realised, or…an alliance with mutual guarantees between the states which would allow them to devote themselves to their economic development without being absorbed almost exclusively in the task of strengthening their military.[29]

Constantine and Venizelos agreed to set aside the issue of Kavala and make Romanian participation and the positive attitude of Bulgaria, or a guarantee against Bulgarian aggression, a condition of their acceptance of the offer. Venizelos seemed to have been confident of Constantine's support to this line of policy.[30] In fact, he misperceived not only the concurrence of Constantine as a 'blank cheque' to commit Greece alongside the *Entente*, but also how influential could be the involvement of the general staff in the decision-making process in shaping Greek strategies.

On 25 January Venizelos informed Bucharest of the allied offer and dropped hints of common action, which three days later fell through as a result of its refusal to enter the war.[31] On 27 January he communicated to the Allies the terms of Greek cooperation. He demanded of them to advance money and supplies. He spelled out that if Bulgaria sided with the *Entente*, he would consent to it annexing part of Serbian Macedonia; if it maintained neutrality, Romania's participation should be assured; and unless it undertook to stand by neutrality, the *Entente* should dispatch reinforcements to their Balkan allies, even a small British force of 5,000 men to Thessaloniki to thwart the raids of Bulgarian bands into Greek territory.[32] Venizelos went further to concur with a British proposal that he would assist Serbia militarily, if two allied divisions were sent to Thessaloniki and Romania was committed by treaty pledges to give armed support to Greece in the event of a Bulgarian attack.[33] Not accidentally, the same day Metaxas had recurred to the question of Asia

28 'Monsieur Venizelos' Statement', in Elliot to Grey, 30 May 1915, F.O. 371/2255.
29 Venizelos to Constantine, 'Memorandum A', 11 (24) Jan. 1915, G.M.F.A. A/5(23).
30 Elliot to Grey, 25 Jan. 1915, tel. no. 45, F.O. 371/2242.
31 Elliot to Grey, 6 Feb. 1915, tel. no. 68, F.O. 371/2242.
32 Grey to Elliot, 27 Jan. 1915, F.O. 371/2242.
33 Elliot to Grey, 27 Jan. 1915, tel. no. 54, F.O. 371/2242.

Minor by a memo to Venizelos. He cast doubt on the will of the *Entente* to partition the Ottoman Empire, and insisted that a territorial aggrandizement of such a scale was disproportionate to Greek military resources.[34] It was 29 January before Constantine threw his weight against intervention due not only to assurances from Berlin that it did not contemplate any onslaught on Serbia; but also to a warning by the German Emperor that a hostile Greece could not count on his favour in case the Triple Alliance won the war.[35]

Probably unaware of Constantine's intentions, Venizelos authorised the Allies to sound Bulgaria on a deal envisaging the cession of the Kavala-Drama region in return for its intervention on grounds that: the proposal would be made by the Allies; the territorial concessions in Asia Minor would involve the western littoral and its hinterland along a line running from Cape Fineka, just off Rhodes, on the south to the outskirts of Brussa at the Sea of Marmara, or alternatively more westerly to the gulf of Kaz Daghon, just off Mitylene, on the north; and Greece should receive from Serbia an accession of the Ghevgeli-Doiran enclave in case Bulgaria's acquisitions in Macedonia were extensive.[36] It was in this sense that on 30 January he handed over another memo to Constantine. He pointed out that the offer proved that the Allies looked on Greece 'as an important factor in the regeneration of the East at a time when the Ottoman state is collapsing'. Romanian rebuff, coupled with the cautions of the Greek general staff against a joint campaign with Serbia and Romania without Bulgaria's participation, called for sacrifices. This merited the price, since Greece was to buy the formation of a Balkan bloc and lands of 125,000 square kilometres in Asia Minor with the concession to Bulgaria of a region of 2,000 square kilometres in Greek Macedonia. Unlike the top staff officers, Venizelos was sure that Greece was able to administer so large an area as Asia Minor; and questioned their fear that after the war the Bulgarians might exploit the exhaustion of the Greek army to invade the country.[37] However, Constantine remained unmoved by this argument, though Berlin in response to his overtures for territorial guarantees shied away from undertaking binding commitments.[38]

On 2 February Metaxas, having become aware of Venizelos's idea to bargain Kavala, wrote another memo to him. He maintained that Greece should remain neutral, since Bulgaria looked for a chance to capture the Serbian and the Greek portion of Macedonia as far as Thessaloniki, and the Ottoman Greeks were exposed to the danger of the Porte's persecution.[39] Broadly speaking, Metaxas believed that Greek reinforcements to Serbia were destined for isolation. Bulgaria, having three lines of railway, could muster and advance its army at a faster pace than Greece and prevent the latter from marching its forces into the front line on the Danube. The only one thing he shared with Venizelos was the view that whether Romania moved or not, Athens could repel a Bulgarian assault and conduct skirmishes behind the frontier.[40]

At that time, despite their failure to obtain Bulgaria's benevolent neutrality, the Allies decided to adopt a scheme of landing troops in Thessaloniki to ward off a possible Bulgarian attack and enable Athens to assist Serbia militarily.[41] On 15 February, taking for granted

34 Metaxas to Venizelos, 14 (27) Jan. 1915, V.A. 173/312.
35 Leon, pp. 112-114.
36 Elliot to Grey, 31 Jan. 1915, tel. unnumbered, F.O. 371/2242.
37 Venizelos to Constantine, 'Memorandum B', 17 (30) Jan. 1915, G.M.F.A. A/5(23).
38 Leon, pp. 114-116.
39 Metaxas to Venizelos, 20 Jan. (2 Feb.) 1915, V.A. 173/312.
40 Elliot to Grey, 18 Feb. 1915, tel. no. 5, F.O. 371/2243.
41 Grey to Elliot, 11 Feb. 1915, tel. no. 2, F.O. 371/2242.

Venizelos's consent given three weeks earlier, they requested him to authorise a British-French force landing in Thessaloniki. But Venizelos stood firm on the terms of his consent. He insisted on Romania's cooperation. He believed that allied divisions were an insufficient guarantee against a flank attack by Bulgaria. The reply won the approval of Constantine.[42]

By then, Britain had no doubts that owing to their German leanings, Constantine and the Greek general staff sought to intervene in support of the Triple Alliance.[43] In this respect, the landing was intended to buttress Venizelos's standing in Greek politics and serve the scheduled allied offensive against Turkey. No sooner had the Allies launched the Dardanelles campaign than Venizelos tried to enlist Greece in their ranks. He regarded it as yet another unique international opportunity for Greece to play for high stakes. To this enabling force was added the Greek public feeling that the country was entitled to its share of the capture of Constantinople.[44] The concurrent effect of the opposition of Constantine and the general staff, however, were once more to be sufficient to retard the change in the Greek strategic response dictated by these structural stimuli, perceived of course as they were as such by Venizelos.

On 1 March, Venizelos informed London that he was ready to demand, by a threat of resignation, that Constantine should sanction a new offer of cooperation: Greece would allow the Allies to disembark troops in Thessaloniki, and would dispatch three divisions to join their operations in Gallipoli.[45] The British, whose Admiralty counted on the Greek fleet, were pleased with the step.[46] The next day Metaxas advised Venizelos against Greek intervention. But Venizelos, while he was on his way to be received in audience by Constantine, ordered Metaxas to raise men for the Dardanelles expedition.

Venizelos came forth in this consultation with yet another memo, in which besides the proposal for the internationalisation of the Straits and Constantinople, he stood out for a Greek-British special relationship. Britain was not merely 'the most powerful among the great powers'. It was the only power who, 'if it became convinced that it could reckon on Greece for the protection of its interests' in the eastern Mediterranean, would be 'more than any other power in the position' to assist Greece in attaining its national aspirations. Also, he dismissed the likelihood of Bulgarian invasion because the Greek expeditionary force would be acting at a short distance from a possible theatre of attack in Macedonia; and because, whether the campaign met with success or not, allied armies stationed in the Straits could intervene in support of Greece. Finally, he ventured that unless Athens took the offensive against Turkey, it would see Bulgaria either attacking Serbia and Greece with the help of the Triple Alliance or marching into Turkish Thrace on the side of the *Entente* with a view to seizing Constantinople.[47]

Immediately after Venizelos came out of the consultation, Metaxas submitted to him another memo and next met Constantine to whom he tendered his resignation. Metaxas argued that if Greece spared one army corps for allied operations but without obtaining Romania's positive attitude, there would remain 108 Greek battalions to oppose 240 Bulgarian battalions in case Sofia concentrated its forces to strike a decisive blow against

42 Romanos to Venizelos, 2/15 Feb. 1915, G.M.F.A. A/5(20); Elliot to Grey, 15 Feb. 1915, tel. no. 2, F.O. 371/2242; Elliot to Grey, 15 Feb. 1915, tel. no. 3, F.O. 371/2242.
43 Minute by Sir A. Nicolson, 25 Feb. 1915, tel. no. 5, F.O. 371/2243.
44 Elliot to Grey, 28 Feb. 1915, tel. no. 98, F.O. 371/2254.
45 Elliot to Grey, 1 Mar. 1915, tel. no. 6, F.O. 371/2243.
46 Grey to Elliot, 1 Mar. 1915, tel. no. 5, F.O. 371/2243.

Greek Macedonia and then turned against the Serbian lines of defence and the Greek expeditionary force. The landing of three Greek and three or four allied divisions in the Dardanelles was doomed to failure. Numerical superiority, speed, and surprise no longer existed, as Turkey had already fortified its fortresses at both ends of the Gallipoli peninsula and assembled eight divisions there and twelve in Thrace. The strength of the allied divisions available for deployment was to determine the outcome of the expedition, which was critical to Greece's survival. Greek participation was inadvisable on this count. If the government decided otherwise, they should in advance guarantee Russia's help in the event of Bulgaria's mobilisation and Britain's and France's commitment to provide a sufficient number of troops to ensure success.[48] Nonetheless, Metaxas appeared ready to enter the war to thwart any effort of Bulgaria to go to the assistance of Turkey, should the Allies throw Ottoman armies back on Adrianople and Constantinople.[49]

While Venizelos appeared to have agreed with Constantine upon Greek involvement in the Dardanelles campaign, Constantine, who was alarmed by Metaxas's resignation but electrified by the vision of Constantinople, summoned the crown council. On 5 March the latter consented to Greek participation in the seizure of the Dardanelles with naval units and one division of 15,000 men.[50] Although Constantine reserved his approval, Venizelos notified the *Entente* of the decision stating that were Constantinople offered to Greece, he 'would not accept the city'.[51] The move might be justified by the fact that Britain was trying to obtain Russia's consent to Greek intervention. This was given, under seal of secrecy, on condition that Greek forces would not be allowed to command the Straits and Thrace or enter Constantinople.[52] The complication was that Constantine had sought to join the action against the Straits but without aligning with the *Entente* and declaring war on the Triple Alliance. This pursuit London renounced.[53] On the other hand, Venizelos had voiced his belief in allied victory, and that Greece should be associated with Britain. In the absence of allied guarantees of Greek security, he was reluctant to fight alongside Serbia. He was alert, like the Greek general staff, to the Bulgarian threat. But he was not swayed by their objections to Greek cooperation in the Dardanelles campaign.[54] Eventually, Constantine, having been informed of Russia's pretensions, came down on the general staff's side and vetoed Greece's entry in the war. The act pushed Venizelos to resign. This time the resignation was accepted.

In short, Venizelos's effort to go to the armed assistance of Serbia in return for Smyrna, or to join the *Entente* in the Dardanelles campaign against Turkey, met the fierce opposition of Metaxas, who declined intervention on any count in the light of the Bulgarian threat. So strong was the pressure that Metaxas's objections and resignation stepped up upon Greek politics that set the stage for the first instance of direct military involvement in the making of Greek grand strategy. Although the high-ranking officers did not take the initiative to instigate a *coup d'état* to assume power or replace one government with another, they tried

47 Venizelos to Constantine, 'Third Memorandum', 17 Feb. (2 Mar.) 1915. In Ventiris, pp. 384-388.
48 Metaxas to Venizelos, 17 Feb. (2 Mar.) 1915, G.M.F.A. A/5(23).
49 Elliot to Grey, 3 Mar. 1915, tel. no. 106, F.O. 371/2243.
50 Elliot to Grey, 16 Mar. 1915, F.O. 371/2255.
51 Elliot to Grey, 5 Mar. 1915, tel. no. 14, F.O. 371/2243.
52 Buchanan to Grey, 7 Mar. 1915, tel. no. 43, F.O. 371/2243.
53 Grey to Elliot, 4 Mar. 1915, tel. no. 7, F.O. 371/2243; Elliot to Grey, 4 Mar. 1915, tel. no. 10, F.O. 371/2243.
54 Elliot to Grey, 4 Mar. 1915, tel. no. 11, F.O. 371/2243; Elliot to Grey, 6 Mar. 1915, tel. no. 16, F.O. 371/2243.

not simply to exert pressure, but also to bring the political leadership round to their views. In Venizelos's words,

> the staff did not confine itself to giving its opinion on purely military affairs, but claimed under colour of such alleged military opinion to impose a policy of its own, which policy would not agree to the abandonment of neutrality by Greece.[55]

Military opposition took the form of the active participation of the general staff in the decision-making process, in the name of the defence of a perceived national interest, not of the existing ruling regime or professional aspirations; the top staff officers presented themselves as the only guardians of Greek statehood against external security threats. This fuelled the latent discord between Constantine and Venizelos over the value of Greek engagement. These developments, along with the interactive impact of other structural forces, were to mar the coherence of Greek grand strategy.

2. AUTHORITY CONTROVERSIES

With Venizelos's resignation, personalities attached to Constantine's entourage took the upper hand. Dimitrios Gounaris was summoned to form a caretaker cabinet until general elections were held on 13 June, and General Dousmanis was nominated to the post of chief of general staff. Constantine assured the British that he was 'in complete accord with Venizelos's policy of benevolent neutrality' by virtue of his belief that the 'future of Greece depended on friendship and prosperity of England'.[56] Alongside this, Gounaris pointed out that he would pursue the military strategy and diplomacy of his predecessor, with the difference being as to the timing of intervention and the range of concessions.[57] Clearly, the new leadership sought to preserve the *status quo* and keep Greece out of the war until particular conditions were met. However, they failed to fit firmness in with flexibility and avoid bullying moves.

On 22 March Athens notified the *Entente* of its intention to march against Turkey on condition that Bulgaria's cooperation or an assurance of Greek territory against Bulgarian aggression was obtained.[58] At that time, Bulgaria made its intervention on the side of the Allies contingent on the success of the Dardanelles campaign.[59] It was ready to go into action only against Turkey in return for guarantees, which, besides lands lying east of Vardar and along the Enos-Midia line, included Nish in the west and Kavala with the Serres and Drama region in the north.[60] But while Bulgarian cooperation weighed heavily on their calculations, the *Entente* could hardly carry concessions of territory into effect because Serbia and Greece should hand over lands so recently won and simultaneously should be offered territories elsewhere. The Bulgarians, therefore, were given to understand that they could win

55 'Monsieur Venizelos' Statement', in Elliot to Grey, 30 May 1915, F.O. 371/2255.
56 Elliot to Grey, 9 Mar. 1915, tel. no. 127, F.O. 371/2255.
57 Elliot to Grey, 11 Mar. 1915, F.O. 371/2255.
58 Grey to Elliot, 24 Mar. 1915, F.O. 371/2243.
59 Bax-Ironside to Grey, 24 Mar. 1915, tel. no. 101, F.O. 371/2243.
60 Bertie to Grey, 21 Mar. 1915, tel. no. 125, F.O. 371/2243.

back only Adrianople, the Enos-Midia strip, and the undisputed area of the Serbian-Bulgarian Treaty.[61]

Once more, the *Entente* tried to get Athens to enter the war. As they urgently needed the small vessels of the Greek navy to transfer their ground forces to the Sea of Marmara, they warned it that unless it sided with Serbia, they would go back on their promise of compensation on the coast of Asia Minor.[62] However, the Greek general staff were still obsessed by the Bulgarian threat and the way to contain it. On the one day, Dousmanis made overtures to the Serbian minister in Athens for the conclusion of a military convention stipulating common action against Bulgaria. He felt that even if Greece diverted a small force from Greek Macedonia to the Dardanelles, the joint Greek-Serbian armies was a match for Bulgarian troops. On the other day, he aspired to bring Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania into an alliance against Turkey.[63]

On 12 April, nevertheless, the Allies renewed the offer of Smyrna to Greece. Two days later, Gounaris communicated to them the Greek terms: a guarantee both of Bulgaria's positive attitude and Greece's territorial integrity, including present and future lands in its effective possession, during and for some years after the war; acquisitions, apart from those in Asia Minor, in regions of Greek character that might pass to the control of the *Entente*; and assurances for the unimpaired development of those parts of Hellenism in the East that would be left out of Greece. Also, Dousmanis stated that if Bulgaria's neutrality was secured, the Greek army could assist the Allies to dislodge the Ottomans from Gallipoli but without contributing to operations against the Asiatic shores of the Dardanelles; or could initiate a landing at the Bay of Xeros in Thrace and move into Bulgaria through Dedeagatch. Prince George went to Paris to argue for the internationalisation of Constantinople, an attempt that was thwarted by Britain. For his part, Constantine re-declared his will to participate in the Dardanelles expedition. But because he feared that unless Bulgaria's stance was assured, it might attack on the exhausted Greeks in the wake of the war, he sought the Allies to marshal at least 200,000 men. All in all, Constantine and his entourage were eager to secure Greece against Bulgarian hostility because they sensed that the circumstances might drive the two countries into 'a life-and-death struggle'; hence the hints of an alliance with the *Entente* extending into the post-war period.[64]

The Allies rejected Greek demands as excessive and sealed their determination to buy Bulgaria into the war. Not only did Grey state that 'the key to the Balkan situation is at Sofia, and it is more important to secure the co-operation of Bulgaria than that of Greece'.[65] He warned Athens not to complicate relations with Sofia and frustrate his attempts at the formation of a Balkan bloc.[66] It was after the *Entente* held up their official reply and, concurrently, resumed both their talks with Italy and their offensive against the Dardanelles that the Gounaris government got upset.[67]

61 Grey to Bax-Ironside, 25 Mar. 1915, F.O. 371/2243.
62 Grey to Bertie, 3 Apr. 1915, tel. no. 755, F.O. 371/2243; Grey to Elliot, 7 Apr. 1915, tel. no. 140, F.O. 371/2243.
63 Elliot to Grey, 9 April 1915, tel. no. 204, F.O. 371/2244; Elliot to Grey, 10 April 1915, tel. no. 206, F.O. 371/2244.
64 Correspondence, in 1915, G.M.F.A. A/5(26); Correspondence, in 1915, F.O. 371/2244.
65 Grey to Bertie, 16 Apr. 1915, tel. no. 909, F.O. 371/2244.
66 Grey to Elliot, 25 Apr. 1915, tel. no. 169, F.O. 371/2244.
67 Elliot to Grey, 25 Apr. 1915, tel. no. 252, F.O. 371/2244.

On 25 April Dousmanis dropped hints to Serbia of a joint assault on Bulgaria should it invade Dobrutcha, in case Romania was engaged in the war.[68] It was not until 5 May that he and Constantine agreed upon a clear-cut line: if Greece's national sovereignty was assured against Bulgarian aggression after the war, they would offer to disembark units of infantry and field artillery in the Bay of Xeros to cut off Ottoman communications; or to use initially the navy and later, once Sofia's attitude became plain, the army to strike Bulgaria or the Asiatic shores of the Dardanelles.[69] Thus, having learned of the London treaty and the concessions to Italy in the Adriatic and Asia Minor, Gounaris notified the Allies that Greece would offer its navy, ports, and islands, if it reserved, in the absence of a guarantee of Greek security, the use of its forces in the event of a Bulgarian attack.[70] But Constantine, infuriated at information about an understanding between Bulgaria and the Triple Alliance and Turkey, had spelled out that he would move with the *Entente* only if he was assured against Bulgarian aggression for a period of recovery after the war.[71] Ultimately, after Gounaris was informed of the Allies' decision to accept Greek proposals without assurances and compensations, he resurrected the Greek terms of 14 April.[72] As the *Entente* insisted on their position and advised Athens to entrust its aspirations to them, on 10 May he withdrew all offers of cooperation and remain neutral.[73] The royalist leadership alleged that the Germans had taken up the guarantee of Greek territory.[74] Truly, it entertained the gravest suspicions of *entente* feverish efforts to win over Bulgaria.

Meanwhile, Sofia had refused to enlist its support to the Allies unless it was assured of accession in claimed territories.[75] The *Entente* then guaranteed to allow Bulgaria to occupy immediately the Turkish slice of Thrace up to the Enos-Midia line and annex, after the end of the war, portions of Serbian Macedonia as far as Egri Palanka, Monastir and Ochrida, on condition that Serbia would receive gains in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Adriatic and Greece would concede Kavala in exchange for compensations in Asia Minor.[76] Bulgaria delayed a decision. Capitalising on the needs of the war, it was playing for time and blackmailing the belligerents to raise bids. It used the offer as a bargaining tool in its talks with Turkey to demand the acquisition of territories around the Demotica-Adrianople-Dedeagatch railway.[77] Also, it was reported to have received from Berlin promises for the possession of Dobritch at the Romanian frontier and the whole of Macedonia, along with a large slice of Thrace, up to the Albanian borders in the west, an area near Nish in the north, Drama, Serres, Kavala, and the island of Thassos in the south, and Adrianople and Demotica in the east; all in order to remain neutral.[78]

68 Elliot to Grey, 25 April 1915, tel. no. 253, F.O. 371/2244.
69 Elliot to Grey, 5 May 1915, tel. no. 272, F.O. 371/2245.
70 Grey to Elliot, 5 May 1915, F.O. 371/2245.
71 Elliot to Grey, 4 May 1915, tel. no. 268, F.O. 371/2244.
72 Leon, pp. 173-176.
73 Elliot to Grey, 11 May 1915, tel. no. 283, F.O. 371/2245; Elliot to Grey, 13 May 1915, tel. no. 290, F.O. 371/2245.
74 Elliot to Grey, 15 May 1915, tel. no. 297, F.O. 371/2245.
75 Bax-Ironside to Grey, 8 May 1915, tel. no. 204, F.O. 371/2245.
76 Grey to Bertie, 18 May 1915, tel. no. 1233, F.O. 371/2245.
77 Bax-Ironside to Grey, 2 June 1915, tel. no. 250, F.O. 371/2260; Bax-Ironside to Grey, 15 June 1915, tel. no. 288, F.O. 371/2260.
78 Stefvanovitz, 'A Letter to E.P. Bell, opened by the Postal Censor', in W.O. to F.O., 4 June 1915, F.O. 371/2260.

These developments had already induced Greece to present the *Entente* with a protest against their designs to mediate for the cession of Kavala.[79] After the Allies assured him that they never contemplated compensations to Sofia without Greek consent, Gounaris obtained from Germany the text of the allied offer to Bulgaria, in which the promise of Kavala was made contingent on Greek acquisitions in Asia Minor.[80] But by then, an important change in the Greek political scene had set the stage for a severe rift within the governing coalition over the issue of Greece's attitude towards the war. Elections were held, with the Liberals obtaining a majority of 185 seats out of 317.[81] Due to illness, Constantine could not swear into office the newly elected Venizelos government, and hence Gounaris held on to power for a while.

Late in June, Venizelos reassured London that he was attached to the allied cause and disposed to bargain Kavala. Nonetheless, allied approaches to Bulgaria raised such great difficulties with the manipulation of Constantine and public opinion that it narrowed his freedom to consent to the cession, as well as to Greek participation in the Dardanelles expedition. Venizelos could hardly move unless Bulgarian cooperation or neutrality and an assurance of Greek expansion proportionate to the aggrandizement of Bulgaria were secured.[82] The situation was further complicated by Constantine's promise to Bulgaria that he would remain neutral in case its attack on Serbia was followed by a massive Austrian-German offensive.[83] This occurred at a moment when Greek staff officers were reported to be negotiating a concerted plan of defence with Serbia, as they were aware that Sofia was prepared to attack it; talks that, revolving around a Greek military aid of 60,000 men, were inconclusive until the end of September.[84]

On 3 August, in the meantime, the *Entente* renewed their earlier bid to Bulgaria. They were reluctant to go beyond the pledge to make the future gains of Greece and Serbia contingent on the acquisition by Bulgaria of promised territories.[85] The next day they informed Gounaris, who had received with uneasiness the Bulgarian-Turkish agreement, about the renewal of the offer of Kavala to Bulgaria in return for its intervention; a concession that nonetheless would be arranged on the basis of gains for Greece elsewhere and guarantees of its territory, including Thessaloniki.[86] At that time, Serbia was unwilling to bend to allied pressures to reserve the undisputed zone in Macedonia for Bulgaria in return for lands in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Adriatic coast and Bosnia-Herzegovina.[87] The result was that when Sofia asked of the Allies to obtain both the Greek and the Serbian consent to this arrangement, they hardened their attitude and demanded of it to take the field against Turkey before they dropped hints to this effect.[88] On 13 August, however, Gounaris rejected the allied proposal.[89]

79 'Memorandum Communicated by Greek Minister, May 31, 1915', in 31 May 1915, F.O. 371/2260.
80 Elliot to Grey, 5 June 1915, tel. no. 366, F.O. 371/2260; Elliot to Grey, 23 June 1915, tel. no. 429, F.O. 371/2260.
81 Elliot to Grey, 16 June 1915, tel. no. 409, F.O. 371/2260.
82 Elliot to Grey, 25 June 1915, tel. unnumbered, F.O. 371/2245; Elliot to Grey, 26 June 1915, tel. unnumbered, F.O. 371/2245.
83 Granville to Balfour, 20 July 1918, F.O. 371/3158; Leon, p. 204.
84 Elliot to Grey, 3 Aug. 1915, tel. no. 594, F.O. 371/2249; Theotokis to G.M.F.A., 25 Aug. (8 Sep.) 1915, G.M.F.A. A/3; W.O. to F.O., 27 Sep. 1915, F.O. 371/2267.
85 O' Beirne to Grey, 4 Aug. 1915, tel. no. 430, F.O. 371/2263.
86 Elliot to Grey, 1 Aug. 1915, tel. no. 591, F.O. 371/2263; Elliot to Grey, 4 Aug. 1915, F.O. 371/2268.
87 Graz to Grey, 5 Aug. 1915, F.O. 371/2265.
88 Grey to O' Beirne, 11 Aug. 1915, tel. no. 335, F.O. 371/2263.

It was not until 23 August that Venizelos resumed office. His triumphant return at the polls and parliamentary dominance, coupled with the Bulgarian-Turkish understanding, created proximate structural conditions that could generate a strategic response to the *entente* liking, unless the concurrent influence of disposing domestic forces of the past persisted unabated.

Venizelos seemed to have been content with neutrality, but he believed that Greece should take the side of the Allies. This view he once more had the nerve to voice to Constantine some days before he assumed power.[90] Although it did not target Greek territory, Bulgaria's rapprochement with Turkey and Germany overthrew the Balkan balance of power. It set the stage for Bulgaria's territorial expansion before Bulgarian revisionism was contained by the creation, through mutual concessions, of a new *status quo* in the area. The turn of events dictated that Greece could no longer contemplate leaning towards the camp on the side of which the Balkan states that posed the most threatening regional challenges to Greek security stood united. Venizelos's ultimate strategic aim, in that regard, remained unchanged: to preserve the *status quo* in terms both of Greece's territorial integrity and the Balkan balance of power. The crucial aspect was that he aimed to abandon the line of non-engagement and align with the coalition more willing to support Greek efforts not merely to resist a possible Bulgarian incursion on Greek territory, but also to re-establish a *status quo* based on the balance of power in the Balkans. He kept giving emphasis to the priority of Greek military strategy to retain forces on alert, with the difference being as to the constituent objective, that is, to get them ready for speedy mobilisation and engagement. And he pursued his earlier firm-but-flexible diplomacy, the constituent objective of which was to prepare the ground for Greek intervention.

With the approval of Constantine and the general staff, therefore, Venizelos replied to a Serbian enquiry about Greek attitude in the event of a Bulgarian attack that Greece would honour its treaty obligations: if Bulgaria mobilised, it would mobilise.[91] On 30 August, after Serbia notified Athens of its intention to make concessions to Bulgaria, he spelled out, again in consultation with Constantine, that unless the Ghevgeli-Doiran enclave was given to Greece and a common Greek-Serbian frontier was preserved, he would renounce the alliance; terms that were intended to prevent Bulgaria from cutting off Greek communications with Belgrade and threatening Thessaloniki.[92] By then, too, Belgrade suggested a compromise with Bulgaria. When, however, on 6 September, the latter signed an alliance with the Triple Alliance, the *Entente* assured Sofia of lands in Macedonia based on the 1912 Serbian-Bulgarian treaty.[93] The Allies' offer aimed not so much to push Bulgaria into alignment with them as to force it not to march against Serbia, and to block direct connection between Germany and Turkey.[94]

Under the circumstances, Venizelos sought to create a Balkan bloc with Romania and Serbia, while Constantine appeared to have been disposed to side with Belgrade in case it was attacked by Bulgaria, no matter whether the latter was an ally of Germany or not.[95] In

89 Elliot to Grey, 13 Aug. 1915, F.O. 371/2268.
90 Elliot to Grey, 18 Aug. 1915, tel. no. 681, F.O. 371/2268.
91 Elliot to Grey, 27 Aug. 1915, tel. no. 719, F.O. 371/2265.
92 Elliot to Grey, 30 Aug. 1915, tel. no. 739, F.O. 371/2265.
93 Graz to Grey, 1 Sep. 1915, tel. no. 343, F.O. 371/2265; O' Beirne to Grey, 14 Sep. 1915, tel. no. 573, F.O. 371/2266.
94 Grey to Graz, 10 Sep. 1915, tel. no. 431, F.O. 371/2266.
95 Elliot to Grey, 16 Sep. 1915, tel. no. 830, F.O. 371/2269.

reality, Constantine, having learned of the German advance against Russia, long before made no secret of his faith in German victory, and that 'Greek policy should be based on this hypothesis'; an opinion that was not shared by Venizelos.[96] While he was concerned to keep Greece away from the danger of an Austrian-German offensive, the staff officers were averse to fight Bulgaria single-handedly.[97] Dousmanis was emphatic that unless the Dardanelles expedition met with success, Greek strategic choices should be determined by the fact that Germany was to sweep the field on land, as its victories against Russia had showed.[98]

Obsessed by the Bulgarian threat, nevertheless, Constantine and the general staff agreed with Venizelos to follow suit should Bulgaria mobilise, although Dousmanis, who at first advocated the action, pronounced himself against it in case Bulgaria mobilised as ally of Germany.[99] Venizelos, who had sensed that Constantine would oppose a Greek advance into Austria-Hungary, was contemplating to luring him with the idea that if Greek forces wiped out the Bulgarians, then they could join the *Entente* in an expedition against Constantinople.[100] But unlike Venizelos, Constantine and his military retinue filtered the Bulgarian threat through three elements: their fear of the German power on land and the British-French power on sea; Germany's assurances of Greece's territorial integrity; and the Allies' eagerness to obtain Bulgarian cooperation. They perceived these elements as disposing forces in entering the war and marching with Serbia. Moreover, they regarded Venizelos's control of the government and parliament as a powerful, disposing domestic force in evading military engagement. In effect, structural conditions accrued seeds of authority controversies, and of contradiction in Greek strategic choices.

Bulgaria's alignment with the Triple Alliance precipitated its mobilisation, declared on 22 September. The development, along with Bulgaria's intervention against Serbia on 6 October, marked a watershed in moulding new international imperatives for Greek grand strategy. In the first place, *entente* pro-Bulgarian policy received a severe setback. This rendered Greece's and Romania's commitment to fight by Serbia's side indispensable; for the Allies decided to deploy forces in Thessaloniki in order to avert a Bulgarian attack on Greece, bring Romania into action, and countenance Serbia not to strike a pre-emptive blow against the Bulgarians before their mobilisation was completed.[101]

In the second place, the question of Greece's commitment to the Greek-Serbian treaty and the priorities of Greek military strategy and diplomacy were brought to the crunch. It was common knowledge among all quarters that Sofia targeted Thessaloniki as its main stake of the war.[102] Constantine and Dousmanis, however, called for self-restraint. They reasoned that Athens was not obliged, according to the letter of the treaty, to march with Serbia, as the latter was unable to deploy 150,000 men at the Bulgarian front. Venizelos instead, while he professed that Athens could not send more than 150,000 soldiers, stood out for immediate

96 Elliot to Grey, 18 Aug. 1915, tel. no. 682, F.O. 371/2268; Grey to Elliot, 15 Sep. 1915, tel. no. 739, F.O. 371/2268.
97 Elliot to Grey, 13 Sep. 1915, tel. no. 814, F.O. 371/2268.
98 Elliot to Grey, 17 Sep. 1915, tel. no. 833, F.O. 371/2269.
99 Elliot to Grey, 20 Sep. 1915, tel. no. 845, F.O. 371/2266; Elliot to Grey, 21 Sep. 1915, tel. no. 851, F.O. 371/2266.
100 Elliot to Grey, 22 Sep. 1915, tel. no. 859, F.O. 371/2266.
101 Grey to Elliot, 27 Sep. 1915, tel. no. 791, F.O. 371/2267; Grey to Elliot, 12 Oct. 1915, tel. no. 884, F.O. 371/2273.
102 'Memorandum Concerning Relations Between Turkey and Bulgaria', 15 Nov. 1917, in Rumbold to Balfour, 15 Nov. 1917, F.O. 371/2885.

intervention in support of Serbia. He took the initiative to: sound the *Entente* on their intention to supply an equivalent force for Serbia should Romania refuse to move; appeal to Belgrade to surrender the Ghevgeli-Doiran enclave to Greece so as to enable him to bring Constantine and the general staff round to his view; and ask Romania for common action against Bulgaria.[103] Eventually, the initiative encroached on the Romanians' refusal to cast their weight against the Triple Alliance. Though they were obsessed with Bulgarian intervention, the Allies had failed to capitalise on Bucharest's earlier positive attitude. Efforts had been complicated by their weakness to dispatch reinforcements in the Balkans and compromise its claims to Banat, Bukovina, and Transylvania.[104] Hence, on the eve of Bulgarian mobilisation, Romania remained cool to a proposal not only of making common cause with Serbia and Greece but also of abandoning neutrality so long as allied detachments were landing in Thessaloniki.[105] It demanded of the Allies to offer logistical support and assurances of acquisitions before it marched with them.

On 23 September Venizelos convinced Constantine to order mobilisation as a measure of precaution, and 20 classes of conscripts were called up.[106] On 24 September, the day that Romania rejected Greek overtures, Athens was asked to invite the Allies to disembark troops in Thessaloniki.[107] Constantine, although he was aware of Venizelos's request for the dispatch of allied reinforcements, had tried to suspend its communication because he had received assurances from Germany of Bulgaria's positive attitude towards Greece and thus made up his mind to forestall Greek participation in the war.[108]

But after Serbia accepted to cede the Ghevgeli-Doiran area and renounced its demands for the Strumnitsa valley, Venizelos appeared not simply to have swayed Constantine by his argument that if Serbia, in the event of a Greek refusal to side with it, was forced to yield to Bulgarian claims, Greece would be left to repel a Bulgarian attack alone; but also to have obtained his consent to the landing of allied forces on condition that an official protest against the violation of Greek neutrality was lodged.[109] By then, the men mustered amounted to 350,000, whose transport to Thessaloniki and Kavala was expected to take 20 days.[110] Not accidentally, as mobilisation was nearing completion, some Greek staff officers were reported to have contemplated a Greek-Serbian pre-emptive attack before the Austrian-Germans invaded Serbia and Bulgaria outflanked it, with a view to forcing the Bulgarians to declare war on Turkey or disarm.[111] Venizelos, too, informed Britain that it could 'count upon him to work in the direction' it wanted.[112]

The *Entente* nonetheless insisted on the unconditional acceptance of their offer of armed assistance; on grounds that they would help Greece if it was attacked by Bulgaria as a result

103 Elliot to Grey, 21 Sep. 1915, tel. no. 854, F.O. 371/2266; Elliot to Grey, 21 Sep. 1915, tel. no. 855, F.O. 371/2266; Elliot to Grey, 23 Sep. 1915, tel. no. 863, F.O. 371/2266.
104 Correspondence, in 1915, F.O. 371/2244, F.O. 371/2258, and F.O. 371/2259.
105 Barclay to Grey, 22 Sep. 1915, tel. no. 597, F.O. 371/2269; Barclay to Grey, 16 Oct. 1915, tel. no. 659, F.O. 371/2273.
106 Elliot to Grey, 23 Sep. 1915, tel. no. 867, F.O. 371/2266.
107 Barclay to Grey, 24 Sep. 1915, tel. no. 604, F.O. 371/2267; Grey to Elliot, 24 Sep. 1915, tel. no. 780, F.O. 371/2267.
108 Elliot to Grey, 24 Sep. 1915, tel. no. 868, F.O. 371/2267.
109 Elliot to Grey, 25 Sep. 1915, tel. no. 875, F.O. 371/2267; Elliot to Grey, 25 Sep. 1915, tel. no. 877, F.O. 371/2267; Elliot to Grey, 27 Sep. 1915, tel. no. 906, F.O. 371/2267.
110 Elliot to Grey, 27 Sep. 1915, tel. no. 900, F.O. 371/2267; Elliot to Grey, 30 Sep. 1915, tel. no. 916, F.O. 371/2267.
111 Elliot to Grey, 29 Sep. 1915, tel. no. 915, F.O. 371/2267.
112 Elliot to Grey, 29 Sep. 1915, tel. no. 914, F.O. 371/2271.

of its support to Serbia, and that the disembarkation of their detachments required the cooperation of Greek military authorities.[113] To this stiffness was added the injury inflicted by Grey's statement that the Allies were to recognise the 'legitimate aspirations' of the Balkan states in order to bring about an understanding between them. Constantine and his entourage construed this as 'an expression of incurable partiality' for Bulgaria.[114]

This outcry, coupled with the fear of allied designs in Macedonia to Bulgarian benefit, had the consequence of undermining Venizelos's internal standing. When a French contingent arrived, without warning, in Thessaloniki, Venizelos was forced to draw up a protest and demanded guarantees of Greece's territorial integrity. But he displayed flexibility. Acting on the belief that their troops were to pass into Serbia, he requested the Allies to speed up their landing and instructed the Thessaloniki authorities to facilitate it.[115] Although the *Entente* informed Venizelos that their offer to Sofia had lapsed, they declared that they intended, contrary to his expectations, to build a military camp in Thessaloniki. They also declared that the expedition was understood as having intimated and welcomed by Greece in order to fulfil its treaty obligations to Serbia and repulse a future German-Bulgarian offensive.[116] Ultimately, Venizelos decided to confirm his command of the parliament. On 4 October he addressed it in favour of the engagement and won a vote of confidence. Constantine's opposition to his strategic direction, however, led him to resign the next day.[117]

The government and the king, to summarise, understood the compliance with the Greek-Serbian treaty and Greek mobilisation through their different perception of the structural conditions and the way strategic ends should be related to means. Venizelos connected the mobilisation with the obligations arising from the treaty. He argued that if Serbia fell victim of a Bulgarian assault, Greece should go to its military help. Constantine, who was assured by Germany of a definite possession of the Aegean islands if he stood apart from hostilities, sought to maintain good relations with Turkey and keep Russia out of Constantinople. In his mind, while the Bulgarians were welcomed to cross the frontier to pursue the allied forces stationed in Thessaloniki, the mobilisation served to drive them back from Greece should they refuse to retire.[118]

In particular, Venizelos and Constantine differed from one another in the conception of the preservation of the *status quo*. Venizelos deemed a Bulgarian attack on Serbia as an act of violence against Greece because it was directed against the *status quo*, in the sense of disturbing the balance of power in the Balkans. The mobilisation and the assistance to Serbia were a first stepping-stone to Greek participation in the war on the side of the *Entente*. Resisting the effort of Bulgaria to annihilate Serbia and establish its hegemony in the region was the optimal means for Greek grand strategy to preserve the *status quo*. On the contrary, Constantine identified the *status quo* only with the maintenance of Greece's territorial integrity. Until he chose the winning side, the mobilisation was intended to protect Greek territory from occupation. It was the most effective means of defending the *status quo* against Bulgaria.

113 Grey to Elliot, 1 Oct. 1915, tel. no. 821, F.O. 371/2270.
114 'Allies and Balkan States. Announcement by Sir Edward Grey, House of Commons, 28 September 1915', 30 Sep. 1915, F.O. 371/2267; Elliot to Grey, 30 Sep. 1915, tel. no. 922, F.O. 371/2267.
115 Elliot to Grey, 1 Oct. 1915, tel. no. 933, F.O. 371/2270; Elliot to Grey, 2 Oct. 1915, tel. no. 951, F.O. 371/2270; Elliot to Grey, 5 Oct. 1915, tel. no. 973, F.O. 371/2270.
116 Grey to Elliot, 2 Oct. 1915, tel. no. 832, F.O. 371/2270; Grey to Elliot, 3 Oct. 1915, tel. no. 835, F.O. 371/2270.
117 Elliot to Grey, 5 Oct. 1915, tel. no. 969, F.O. 371/2271; Elliot to Grey, 5 Oct. 1915, tel. no. 975, F.O. 371/2271.
118 Elliot to Grey, 28 Dec. 1915, tel. no. 1486, F.O. 371/2280.

This difference of opinion, however, involved a profound quarrel of grand strategic perspective: Venizelos sought to side with the *Entente*, while Constantine was trying to keep the country out of the war until after the tides of victory turned the tables on one of the belligerents and substantial gains were obtained. One effect was the failure of the military strategy and diplomacy to prevent the allied disembarkation and, thus, the infringement of Greece's national sovereignty before the Greek war attitude was determined.

Another effect was that the difference evolved into an irreversible decision-making split. Constantine alleged that 'I am content to leave the internal affairs …to my government, but for…foreign relations I hold myself alone responsible before God'.[119] He believed that besides a final word on issues of war and peace, he was entitled to sweep away the government at his discretion, without bowing to popular mandate.[120**]** Venizelos stated that 'constitutionalism had been suspended'.[121**]** He argued that the king violated the spirit of the constitution in bringing him down for a second time and dissolving the chamber of 13 June. Shortly after his resignation, he levelled before the parliament an accusation against Constantine's authoritarianism:

> our regime is a constitutional Kingdom or Royalist democracy where all responsibility is borne by the government….the crown has the right to differ in opinion from the government insofar as it perceives a difference of opinion between the government and the people. But this difference was removed by elections.**[**122**]**

In fact, the relations between Venizelos and Constantine were embittered by the lack of a precise definition in the Greek constitution about the jurisdiction of the premier in directing foreign policy with regard to the king's prerogatives, not altogether plainly conferred but based on tradition. As the king reserved by constitutional custom the right to have a say in foreign affairs, the question of the participation in the war entangled the governing coalition in the meshes of mounting political discord. Not only did this disrupt the autonomy of ruling and the consistency of strategic decisions. It also exacerbated the peculiarities of Greek social formation and reverted political life to the pre-Venizelist era of flagrant foreign interference in domestic politics. Having complicated the competition for control over the state apparatus, authority controversies resulted in extra-parliamentary conflicts, which were to culminate in an internecine strife, the division of the Greek people into two camps with separate governments and armies, known as the *dichasmos*.

3. Political Turmoil and Great Power Coercion

After Venizelos tendered his resignation, Constantine sent for Alexander Zaimis. By then 1,5 million francs a day were appropriated for the mobilisation. The disbursement was being made by an advance of 15 millions from the National Bank of Greece, which had the authority to provide the government with early payment or issue banknotes against the value

119 Price, G. W. (1918). The Story of the Salonica Army. London: Hodder & Stoughton, p. 208.
120 Venizelos to Alexander, 15 June 1915, V.A. 173/267; Elliot to Grey, 20 May 1916, F.O. 371/2621.
121 'A Note to Sir E. Grey for the Use of the Cabinet', 12 Oct. 1915, F.O. 371/2271.
122 Elliot to Grey, 4 Nov. 1915, tel. no. 1180, F.O. 371/2278.

of pledged foreign credits.[123] So heavy was the pressure to reimburse floating internal debts and secure far more funds that Venizelos had requested of the Allies cash advances of 100 millions in monthly instalments; of which the first to the amount of 12 millions should be granted immediately and the other instalments of eight millions at the end of each subsequent month.[124] Not accidentally, the *Entente* made Greek military support to Serbia a condition of their further financial assistance and hastened to obtain a fresh sanction of their landing. Constantine vouchsafed his consent but without taking the pledge to march with them.[125] The result was that, of the required sums, the Allies disposed just 30 millions in instalments.[126]

Despite Greece's waning ability to withstand growing military burdens through its own resources, Constantine did not bend to allied will. He was determined to stand firm on the line of non-engagement and seize a share of the spoils after the war; having secured from Berlin guarantees of Greek territory, he was reluctant to fight against Bulgaria or take sides by virtue of his fear of German armies and allied fleets.[127] To this should be added the stance of the general staff, who were actively involved in forming Greece's attitude towards the war.[128] As the Austrian, German, and Bulgarian forces launched an offensive against Serbia and the agreement of Bulgaria with Turkey and the Triple Alliance was syndicated in Greek newspapers, they convinced their political leadership that it would be a catastrophe for Greece to go to the help of Serbia, who was destined for humiliation no matter what reinforcements the Allies might dispatch.[129] Clearly, Constantine's and his military retinue's ultimate strategic aim was to defend the *status quo* in terms of territorial integrity. They were concerned to preserve Greek acquisitions by avoiding provocation and military commitments, and to lean towards the camp more likely to win the war and contain Bulgarian revisionist designs against Greece. The constituent objective of their military strategy was to keep the services mobilised for the purposes of deterrence, or of defence in case of need, against the Bulgarian threat. And their diplomacy was intended to display equal treatment to the belligerents until the final alignment decision was taken.

Thus, Zaimis set out to pursue a 'policy of armed neutrality with a benevolent attitude towards *Entente*'. He spelled out that although they were willing to provide port and railway facilities to the Allies, he was not obliged to side with Serbia because the Greek-Serbian treaty was designed for aggression by one power in the event of a Balkan imbroglio, not for a combined attack by two powers entangled in a European war.[130] But on 13 October, at a moment when allied troops were landing in Thessaloniki, and Zaimis presented Belgrade with a refusal of assistance, the *Entente* assured Athens of its territory and substantial gains at the end of hostilities.[131] As enticing bait, three days later the British offered Cyprus to Greece

123 Elliot to Grey, 25 Sep. 1915, tel. no. 874, F.O. 371/2267.
124 Elliot to Grey, 20 Sep. 1915, tel. no. 844, F.O. 371/2268.
125 Grey to Elliot, 6 Oct. 1915, tel. no. 851, F.O. 371/2269; Elliot to Grey, 7 Oct. 1915, tel. no. 996, F.O. 371/2270.
126 Grey to Elliot, 27 Oct. 1915, tel. no. 955, F.O. 371/2269.
127 Elliot to Grey, 9 Oct. 1915, tel. no. 1014, F.O. 371/2271; Elliot to Grey, 31 Oct. 1915, tel. no. 1146, F.O. 371/2271.
128 Dousmanis to G.M.F.A., 'Memorandum: Forming Greece's Demands in the event of alignment with the Entente', 8 Mar. 1915, G.M.F.A. A/5(23); 'Memorandum by Lord E. Perry Respecting Negotiations with Greece', 22 Oct. 1915, F.O. 371/2278.
129 Elliot to Grey, 10 Oct. 1915, F.O. 371/2271; 21 Oct. 1915, tel. no. 1413, F.O. 371/2273.
130 Elliot to Grey, 12 Oct. 1915, F.O. 371/2271.
131 W.O. to F.O., 13 Oct. 1915, F.O. 371/2271; Grey to Elliot, 13 Oct. 1915, tel. no. 886, F.O. 371/2273.

in return for its immediate armed support to Serbia.[132] Also, they were disposed to contemplate compensations on the coast of Thrace should the Greeks first march with the Allies and then stake a claim to the area.[133] Zaimis however, bearing in mind the objections of the general staff, refused to take up with the scheme of the acquisition of Cyprus and the Thracian littoral.[134] After London received the rebuff, it declared that it regarded the offer of Cyprus as having lapsed.[135]

On 1 November the *Entente* decided to go to the rescue of Belgrade and reinforce their detachments in the Balkan theatre to a total of 150,000 men.[136] At that time, Dousmanis tried to accommodate the British. He intimated to them the feeling among the officer corps against the Allies' efforts to entice Bulgaria onto their side by the bait of Kavala and concurrently buy Greece into the war by offers which amounted to nothing as Smyrna was not in their possession and Cyprus was little to its liking. He reasoned that it was not in Greece's interest to challenge the Allies. It was instead in its interest to crush Bulgaria, but it could not bear the brunt of the venture alone, owing to lack of human and material resources.[137] Truly, the senior staff officers mistrusted Britain's pro-Bulgarian stance.[138] And *entente* landing in Thessaloniki set them and Constantine before an awkward predicament, as it complicated relations with the Triple Alliance and paved the way for further encroachments on Greek sovereignty.

Political developments, too, played their part in reshaping and concurrently undermining the line of non-engagement with an equal benevolent treatment to the belligerents. On 4 November the parliament refused Zaimis a vote of confidence. Stefanos Skouloudis was sworn into office and elections were decreed for 19 December. As Venizelos called for a boycott, almost two thirds of the electorate abstained. Not only did Skouloudis renew his term. The old parties dominated the parliament under the veneer of a royalist alignment and established an ephemeral political hegemony in the form of one-party system of government. But the Liberals' abstention from the polls acted as a catalyst for triggering three events, which in the course of their development were destined to sufficient disposing structural forces for Greek grand strategy to attain the ends in view.

The first was the collapse of the consensus achieved in Greek politics since Venizelos's rise to power. Venizelos denounced the newly elected parliament as unconstitutional. He was resolute to settle accounts with Constantine over the constitutional issue but without bringing about a change of dynasty or overthrowing the ruling system.[139] He only sought to institute the principle that the crown should accomplish its duties according to modern standards of an advanced parliamentary regime and abide by the people's sovereign right to demand a government of their choice. On the other hand, Constantine was determined to command the government. As the old parties and oligarchies came down on his side to win back lost spoils of office, party polarisation rekindled. This had the consequence of dragging the Greek

132 Grey to Elliot, 16 Oct. 1915, tel. no. 902, F.O. 371/2273; Stavridis, S. (1996). Greek-Cypriot Enosis of October 1915: 'A Lost Opportunity'. Balkan Studies, 37 (2), p. 298.
133 Grey to Elliot, 19 Oct. 1915, tel. no. 922, F.O. 371/2273; Grey to Elliot, 20 Oct. 1915, tel. no. 926, F.O. 371/2273.
134 Elliot to Grey, 20 Oct. 1915, tel. no. 1073, F.O. 371/2273.
135 Grey to Elliot, 24 Oct. 1915, tel. no. 946, F.O. 371/2273.
136 Grey to Rodd, 1 Nov. 1915, tel. no. 1992, F.O. 371/2270.
137 Elliot to Grey, 1 Nov. 1915, tel. no. 1156, F.O. 371/2271.
138 W.O. to F.O., 3 Nov. 1915, F.O. 371/2271.
139 Elliot to Grey, 25 Feb. 1916, F.O. 371/2613; Venizelos to Ractivan, 26 Oct. (9 Nov.) 1916, V.A. 173/266.

governing coalition into a political and ideological conflict between two blocs, the Venizelists and the Royalists or anti-Venizelists.

The second event was that political rivalries within the services intensified. With the staff officers out of politics but actively engaged in the question of Greek participation, politics permeated more than ever before the forces through the traditionalist practices of favouritism and factionalism. Both Venizelos and Constantine joined hands with loyal politicians and elements of the ruling oligarchies to manipulate top officers in order to thrust aside each other and maintain freedom of manoeuvre. This turned the military again into a mechanism that mediated internally administered state authority. Allegiances of Venizelist and royalist colour among the officer corps were so polarised and patronised that they evolved into parochial autonomies, which meshed with the power competition for control over the state. The potential danger was that the force of circumstances might induce the military to wean away from their political patrons and step into the forefront as an independent actor to direct state affairs or take office.

The third event, finally, was that Greece evolved into a stage for the checkerboard game of both the belligerents in the international system. Foreign intervention and patronage reverted to its old, commanding character. Unlike the Triple Alliance, who counted on its kinship ties with members of the royal family, the *Entente* set about establishing controls on Greek territory and administration. With the country formally out of the war, they had already infringed its independence by building up a front in Thessaloniki. Also, they had lost no opportunity to voice to Venizelos their desire to remain in office, although, when he resigned for the first time, they had assured Constantine of their resolve not to 'procure his return'.[140] But after Venizelos was again driven out of power, they began to act forcibly to bend the royalist leadership to their will by invoking their right of interference as protecting powers of the constitutional regime.[141] The key aspect was that Britain allowed the French to have the leading role in Athens because its attitude towards Sofia stirred up feelings of suspicion.[142] France took on the job because it counted on a 'strong and friendly Greece' to act as a bulwark against Italian aggressiveness in the Near East, after the war brought the Ottoman Empire tumbling down in ruin.[143]

In this context of structural conditions, Skouloudis was committed to continue the policy of benevolent neutrality towards the *Entente*. But in order to retain impartiality, he made overtures to Berlin and Sofia for the establishment of a neutral zone, in which the defeated Serbians should be assembled in safety. He declared that if the Serbian and allied divisions fled back into Greece, he would intern and disarm them. The Allies were irritated by this position. By suspending export licenses and money advances, they warned Athens that they would deem disarmament an act of hostility. Not only did they ask guarantees of security, freedom of movement, and transport facilities, but also on 26 November they demanded the retirement of Greek troops from Thessaloniki and its neighbourhood; the construction of forts as far as the outskirts of Chalcidici; and the right to control roads and railways, search ships, and destroy enemy submarines or naval bases in Greek waters. Two days later, Metaxas, who

140 Grey to Elliot, 11 Sep. 1914, tel. no. 193, F.O. 371/1901; Elliot to Grey, 4 May 1915, tel. no. 269, F.O. 371/2255; Grey to Elliot, 22 Sep. 1915, tel. no. 769, F.O. 371/2266.

141 Elliot to Grey, 21 Jan. 1916, tel. no. 111, F.O. 371/2611; Elliot to Grey, 5 June 1916, tel. no. 839, F.O. 371/2611.

142 Grey to Elliot, 22 Nov. 1915, tel. no. 1073, F.O. 371/2278.

meanwhile had been recalled to the general staff to take over the post of the second chief, made an offer to the Allies to the effect that if they withdrew their forces, Greece would undertake to protect their departure and maintain a benevolent neutrality towards them from then onwards. To this was added a declaration that inasmuch as hostilities were to result in a stalemate and the *Entente* could not defend it against Bulgaria and Germany, it would stand apart from either belligerent. Eventually, Athens acquiesced in allied claims. Constantine undertook not to order disarmament and Skouloudis to issue a protest in case the allied contingents in Serbia fell back on Greek territory.[144]

In fact, the Royalists tried to play off one set of powers against the other so as to use the Triple Alliance in a way to make up for allied infringements of Greek territory. Germany and Bulgaria agreed with Skouloudis not to invade Greece on condition that Greek divisions would remain in Thessaloniki. Otherwise, and if the *Entente* refused to withdraw from there, they would take Greek Macedonia as enemy territory. Also, the Greek general staff spelled out that they reserved the freedom to inform Berlin of their plan to give up Thessaloniki, if the Allies embarked on works of fortification before an official agreement was made.[145] And Constantine declared that *entente* military preparations violated Greek sovereignty. As he was aware of the resolve of the Triple Alliance to pursue the allied troops in retreat from Serbia should they enter and remain in Greek territory, he sought the departure of Allies from Thessaloniki under the cover of the Greek army, a request that was in keeping with Metaxas's initiative.[146]

At that time, Skouloudis was ready to arrange with the *Entente* for a formula of military facilities that would be compatible with Greek neutrality.[147] He consented to withdraw all Greek divisions but one from Thessaloniki and refrain from making a stand against the Allies proceeding with defence organisation at their discretion.[148] No sooner had he acted in compliance with these demands than the Germans, who initially lodged modest complaints against *entente* encroachments on Greek independence, began to bring pressure to bear not only on him for similar privileges but also on Bulgaria to launch an offensive against Greece, a hint of which Athens seemed to have received.[149] Nevertheless, this did little to incite a feeling of revulsion against Germany. Instead, convinced that the Thessaloniki front was defenceless to repulse the enemy's attack, the staff officers were disposed to allow the German-Bulgarian forces to cross the frontier and pursue the allied men on condition that the Bulgarians would retire as soon as the mission was completed.[150]

Paradoxically, Venizelos, who had from his first term in office devoted energy to arresting military intervention in politics, manoeuvred serving officers of his following into extra-parliamentary opposition, and hence opened the Pandora box of meddling the military with the political world in the domestic power game. That the Liberals had extended rather than dislodged clientelism, by forming their own patronage networks within the military and

143 Dutton, D. (1998). The Politics of Diplomacy: Britain and France in the Balkans in the First World War. London: I. B. Tauris, pp. 151-156.
144 Correspondence, in 1915, F.O. 371/2278.
145 Elliot to Grey, 2 Dec. 1915, tel. no. 1354, F.O. 371/2280.
146 'A Note to Sir Edward Grey', 2 Dec. 1915, F.O. 371/2278.
147 Skouloudis, 'Memorandum', 27 Nov. (10 Dec.) 1915, G.M.F.A. A/4.5.
148 Elliot to Grey, 16 Dec. 1915, F.O. 371/2280.
149 Leon, pp. 272, 297; Elliot to Grey, 21 Dec. 1915, tel. no. 1457, F.O. 371/2280.
150 Elliot to Grey, 17 Dec. 1915, tel. no. 1435, F.O. 371/2280; Rodd to Grey, 23 Dec. 1915, tel. no. 1365, F.O. 371/2280.

administration, proved effective in fomenting a sense of exclusive attachment. Capitalising on this, Venizelos encouraged ardent Venizelist civilians and senior officers to establish a pro-*entente* secret association, the *Ethniki Amyna* (national defence), and prepare the ground for an armed insurrection in Thessaloniki.[151] It was no coincidence that thanks to the clash between Venizelos and Constantine, the five Greek army corps had since the start of the mobilisation aggregated only 150,000 men, assembled in Thessaloniki and its hinterland along a line from Nigrita to Orfano.[152] By year's end, Venizelos's subversive activity aggravated polarisation and made the division within the officer corps unbridgeable.

In early January 1916, the Allies presented Athens with a warning against a proclamation of martial law, and captured Corfu to help the Serbian government and remnants of their armies, who had been pushed into Albania, find refuge on the island.[153] Further friction developed until after Skouloudis allowed the Serbians to embark from Corfu and reach Thessaloniki by sea to join the allied front in the first days of April.[154] To the tension with the *Entente* and the clash between Constantine and Venizelos was added economic constraints. Together with significant losses in revenues and an unprecedented rise in debt, Greece's financial plight was made intolerable by a drastic reduction in trade and the dislocation of business relations.[155]

Throughout these months, Venizelos tried to implicate the *Entente* in his extra-parliamentary struggle.[156] He suggested London that the Allies should use their financial aid as a leverage for forcing Constantine to appoint a government to their liking and order demobilisation.[157] Later, he informed London again that he would launch a campaign of propaganda in favour of the *entente* cause and head a demonstration with a demand that Greece should declare war on Bulgaria.[158] For his part, Constantine was determined to forestall participation on the side of the Allies by virtue of his belief that the latter were unable to thwart an attack against Thessaloniki and unwilling to spare further forces for large-scale operations therein.[159] As the Allies had already established a base in Greece, Greek military strategy aimed, in that regard, at mobilisation, not so much to ward off a new allied incursion or an assault by the Triple Alliance, as to pave the way 'for intervention towards the concluding stages of the war'.[160] Insofar as Constantine stood apart, Germany, who had warned him against an attack on Bulgaria, was committed to prevent the latter from taking a portion of Greek territory. He could acquire the freedom to manipulate the belligerents' exhaustion as they might think fit in order to crush the Bulgarian threat after the end of hostilities.[161] In parallel, the daily cost of mobilisation amounted to 200 million drachmas, of which only one-fourth was met by the budget.[162] Hence, despite the strain that it

151 Veremis. Military, pp. 52-54.
152 Kitchener to Prime Minister, 17 Nov. 1915, F.O. 371/2278; Elliot to Grey, 18 Dec. 1915, tel. no. 1434, F.O. 371/2271.
153 Correspondence, in 1916, F.O. 371/2604 and F.O. 371/2609; Elliot to Grey, 10 Jan. 1916, tel. no. 67, F.O. 371/2611.
154 Correspondence, in 1916, F.O. 371/2617; Elliot to Grey, 10 Apr. 1916, tel. no. 567, F.O. 371/2618.
155 Erskine to Grey, 25 Apr. 1916, in Elliot to Grey, 10 May 1916, F.O. 371/2680.
156 Bertie to Grey, 21 Jan. 1916, tel. no. 99, F.O. 371/2613.
157 Elliot to Grey, 29 Feb. 1916, tel. no. 365, F.O. 371/2608.
158 Talbot to Cecil, 6 Apr. 1916, F.O. 371/2613.
159 Elliot to Grey, 20 Jan. 1916, tel. no. 106, F.O. 371/2613.
160 Cuninghame to Elliot, 'Report Position of the Greek Army and Proposal for Action', 29 Jan. 1916, in Elliot to Grey, 29 Jan. 1916, F.O. 371/2614.
161 W.C. to Grey, 21 Feb. 1916, F.O. 371/2603.
162 Elliot to Grey, 24 Feb. 1916, tel. no. 332, F.O. 371/2608.

imposed on public finances, the Royalists held firm to the task of keeping their army on a war footing.[163] Britain was content with this attitude because it could count on Greek military cooperation to reduce its formations in the Balkans.[164]

Furthermore, signs of dispute had surfaced within the general staff. Dousmanis, who behind the scenes advocated the coercion of the allied expeditionary force, held out that unless the *Entente* sent reinforcements and gave guarantees for Kavala, Skouloudis would withdraw Greek armies from Macedonia to south Greece and abstain from action against the Triple Alliance. However, Metaxas and officers of the divisions in Macedonia appeared ready to side with the Allies should the latter drive the Germans and Bulgarians out of the Balkans.[165] Metaxas declared that if the Allies assured the protection of Greek supply services, Athens would concentrate its troops along a line around Kavala to resist a German-Bulgarian attack. The Allies rejected the proposal fearing that this might risk their defence lines and leave Thessaloniki open to the enemy.[166] A month later, Metaxas advised his government to march against Bulgaria, provided opportunity presented itself.[167]

This dissension involved tactical matters of proportion rather than differences of strategic outlook. It reflected an attempt at manipulating the belligerents to the Greek benefit. While Metaxas was talking about the possibility of cooperation with the Allies, he looked for a deal in another direction. He requested Berlin to mediate for a Greek-Turkish alignment on condition that Turkey would recognise Greece's sovereignty over the islands of the eastern Aegean and cease outrages on Ottoman Greeks. He urged Constantine to take a hard line, even to march with the Triple Alliance, should the Allies refuse to end their acts of violence. And he negotiated the guarantees under which the German-Bulgarian divisions would grasp, if need be, the fort of Rupel, located at the Greek-Bulgarian frontier in Macedonia.[168]

Clearly, Skouloudis would never move against Germany; the only war he might fight was against Bulgaria.[169] As Dousmanis recapitulated their concerns, Constantine and his military retinue trusted that their interests ran parallel to those of Britain. But they questioned its ability and commitment to defend Greece's territory and prevent Bulgaria's expansion. That the Allies refrained from engaging in large-scale operations in the Balkans, coupled with their offers of Kavala and slices of Macedonia to Bulgaria, showed that they might at any time cast their favour to Sofia and desert Athens. In contrast, Germany, with whom the Royalists asserted that they never sought to side, inspired confidence thanks to its assurances against Bulgarian aggression during and after the war.[170] Dousmanis himself contended that the staff were neither *Ententists* nor pro-Germans, and protested that the *Entente* reinforced Bulgaria in leaving Greece in the lurch without armaments and supplies.[171]

It was the capture by the Allies, in mid-April, of the ports of Argostoli in Cephalonia and of Suda in Crete that incurred the odium of the Royalists. While Constantine feared that it impinged so strikingly on Greek sovereignty that it might provoke a German declaration of

163 Elliot to Grey, 20 Mar. 1916, tel. no. 473, F.O. 371/2608.
164 W.O. to F.O., 4 Mar. 1916, F.O. 371/2608; 'Minutes', 20 Apr. 1916, F.O. 371/2613.
165 Elliot to Grey, 9 Jan. 1916, tel. no. 57, F.O. 371/2611; Elliot to Grey, 1 Feb. 1916, tel. no. 187, F.O. 371/2614.
166 Elliot to Grey, 25 Jan. 1916, tel. no. 143, F.O. 371/2614; Elliot to Grey, 30 Jan. 1916, tel. no. 180, F.O. 371/2614.
167 Elliot to Grey, 22 Feb. 1916, tel. no. 322, F.O. 371/2603.
168 Leon, pp. 347-350.
169 Fairholme, 'Notes on a Conversation with General Dousmanis, Chief of the Staff of the Greek Army', 1 Apr. 1916, in Elliot to Grey, 6 Apr. 1916, F.O. 371/2613.
170 W.O. to F.O., 4 Apr. 1916, F.O. 371/2613.
171 Fairholme to Grey, 8 May 1916, in Elliot to Grey, 9 May 1916, F.O. 371/2613.

war, Skouloudis saw in it an intolerable act of violence that necessitated a halt to Greece's conciliatory attitude.[172] Royalist officers were brought into a league called 'Chronos', calling on the people to resist Venizelos and his foreign intruders.[173] The general staff, too, reasoned that Greece could not enter the war at a time when it was short of money and *entente* detachments in Macedonia lagged behind the other camp's by 200,000 men. The tables could be turned only if Bucharest marched against the Triple Alliance or the *Entente* stood decisively against, or obtain numerical superiority over, or at least a balance on, the latter in the Balkans.[174] To contain exasperation, therefore, the Allies undertook on Greek request to restore the anchorages when no longer required.[175]

Despite this pledge, Skouloudis exploited the breach as a pretext to display the same attachment to the Triple Alliance as to the Allies. On 26 May, when a German-Bulgarian force crossed the frontier into the fort of Rupel and the Demir-Hissar railway station, he ordered Greek garrisons to retreat.[176] He professed that he had received written assurances from Germany that the advance would be provisional.[177] In fact, the campaign was long before planned. It was Constantine who, seeking to retrieve Greece's neutrality by driving the Allies out of Greek Macedonia, had since past November dropped hints to Germany of a move to this effect and gone through Metaxas's negotiations to obtain the guarantees.[178]

By then Venizelos had confidentially communicated to London and Paris a program of action designed to induce the country to march with the *Entente* by appealing to the people but without proclaiming an anti-dynastic revolt or an armed uprising against Constantine. He sought to set up a provisional government and convene the late chamber in Thessaloniki, provided he was assured of the British and the French approval and the support of five to six regiments of Greek formations in Macedonia and of the Greek navy.[179] Having concurred in the view that the dispossession of the government was an internal affair of the Greeks, Britain and France refused to lend credence to machinations of this kind.[180] Nevertheless, this did little to prevent a hardening of attitude on the part of the Allies. They warned the Royalists against further enemy invasion of Macedonia and levied a blockade of coasts and islands. Also, in a demonstration of gunboat diplomacy the French occupied Thasos, an island south of Kavala.[181]

Entente coercion forced Skouloudis to decree the dismissal of twelve classes.[182] In effect, Greek military strategy gave up the objective of mobilisation and rendered itself void of *raison d'etre*. Likewise, Greek diplomacy boiled down to assuming a conciliatory character. On 21 June the Allies presented a note demanding of Athens to appoint a new government; dissolve the parliament and call for elections; reduce the forces to a peace footing; and dismiss the chief of police and certain secret officers.[183] No sooner had

172 Elliot to Grey, 10 Apr. 1916, tel. no. 563, F.O. 371/2618; Elliot to Grey, 10 April 1916, tel. 566, F.O. 371/2618.
173 Elliot to Grey, 28 Apr. 1916, tel. no. 669, F.O. 371/2617; W.T.I.D. to F.O., 26 May 1916, F.O. 371/2619.
174 Fairholme to Elliot, 19 May 1916, in Elliot to Grey, 20 May 1916, F.O. 371/2613.
175 Grey to Bertie, 3 May 1916, tel. no. 980, F.O. 371/2618; Elliot to Grey, 23 May 1916, tel. no. 779, F.O. 371/2618.
176 Correspondence, in 1916, G.M.F.A. A/4/χ(κ).
177 Elliot to Grey, 31 May 1916, tel. no. 806, F.O. 371/2620.
178 Leon, pp. 339-356.
179 Elliot to Grey, 30 May 1916, tel. unnumbered, F.O. 371/2621.
180 Crewe to Bertie, 2 June 1916, tel. no. 402, F.O. 371/2621.
181 Elliot to Grey, 1 June 1916, tel. no. 817, F.O. 371/2620; Admiralty to F.O., 8 June 1916, F.O. 371/2622.
182 Elliot to Grey, 9 June 1916, tel. no. 871, F.O. 371/2614.
183 Elliot to Grey, 22 June 1916, F.O. 371/2620.

Constantine re-summoned Zaimis to power than the latter accepted their demands unconditionally.[184] But things were to become worse. Royalist reserve officers whose units were reduced to a peace footing formed the 'League of Reservists' under the leadership of Metaxas; an action that their Venizelist counterparts promptly matched on Danglis's initiative.[185] Several weeks later, after the German-Bulgarian troops moved across eastern Macedonia to the suburbs of Thessaloniki encountering little resistance, a British-French squadron was sent to Salamis to enforce blockade still further and seize hold of the postal, telegraph, and telephone services.[186] This capitulation in turn provided Italy with the opportunity to get a footing in northern Epirus and push Greek armies to withdraw from the area, which they had been controlling since November 1914.[187]

For the sake of balancing out *entente* violations of Greek territory, in short, the royalist leadership offered no resistance to the advance of the German-Bulgarian troops into Greece. It was through this choice that structural imperatives degenerated the policy of equal benevolent treatment into successive compromises of neutrality and stripped the country of any autonomy of action in defending the *status quo* in terms of its territorial integrity. The grand strategy that the royalist leadership pursued became the medium through which Greece was driven, counting on German assurances of its sovereignty, to allow Bulgaria to march into Greek Macedonia and proved unable to stem new rounds of incursion by the belligerents. As Grey had by then stated:

> the allies have no…intention to interfere….Their aim is to see that the Greek constitution…is observed. It is for the Greek people to express at the polls their free preference…. But if such a government…adopts an attitude of hostility to the Allies the latter will…take…steps…to protect themselves from the effects of such a policy.[188]

Under the weight of foreign acts of violence, fuelled as they were by the Venizelists' and the Royalists' paramilitary and extra-parliamentary activity, Greece fell prey to the vortex of a national schism, a *dichasmos* that brought with it proximate domestic conditions for Greek grand strategy to suffer the loss of its unity and consistency.

184 Elliot to Grey, 23 June 1916, F.O. 371/2620.
185 Dakin, pp. 212-213.
186 Correspondence, in 1916, F.O. 371/2621 and 371/2625.
187 Correspondence, in 1916, F.O. 371/2623; Kondis, B. (1989). The Northern Epirus Question During the First World War. Balkan Studies, 30 (2), pp. 338-340.
188 Grey to Bertie, 27 July 1916, tel. no. 1659, F.O. 371/2620.

Chapter 9

THE *DICHASMOS*

Late in August Romania swung round and declared war on Austria-Hungary. This, along with foreign interference and Zaimis's efforts at accommodating the *Entente*, precipitated developments in Greek politics. To begin with, Dousmanis and Metaxas were dismissed. General Moschopoulos, the new chief of the staff, believed that Constantine agreed to the removal in the knowledge that Romania's cooperation could hardly scale up Greek freedom of evading commitment alongside the Allies.[1]

Also, the *Amyna* launched an armed uprising in Thessaloniki and appealed to the people and military to compel Constantine to return to the constitutional path.[2] Venizelos was irritated at the step because his compatriots took the initiative to rebel at a moment when the demobilisation of the Greek divisions in Macedonia, the cooperation of which he sought to enlist, had made him adjust his designs.[3] Some days later, a revolt was proclaimed in Crete. Venizelos again withheld involvement, but he was determined to lead a national movement and establish a provisional government with the help of his two high-ranking military comrades, Admiral Coudouriotis and General Danglis, unless Constantine moved with the *Entente*.[4] The Royalists' reaction to the disturbance was to detain and intimidate officers and soldiers who tried to join the *Amyna*.[5]

Meanwhile, Zaimis, who was convinced that Constantine was bluffing with his hints of cooperation with the Allies, had resigned.[6] On 17 September Nicolaos Kalogeropoulos took office, an act that violated the terms of the June allied note.[7] The Allies requested a government willing to fix the day of intervention.[8] After the Greek reply was little to their liking, they asked for guarantees of good faith and a declaration of war on Bulgaria.[9] In this claim Athens was slow to acquiesce. By then, only 70,000 men were under arms, of whom

1 Elliot to F.O., 29 Aug. 1916, tel. no. 1233, F.O. 371/2624; Elliot to F.O., 30 Aug. 1916, tel. no. 1242, F.O. 371/2624.
2 Elliot to Grey, 8 Sep. 1916, F.O. 371/2624.
3 Veremis. Military, p. 57.
4 Elliot to Grey, 12 Sep. 1916, tel. no. 1347, F.O. 371/2625; Venizelos to Coudouriotis, 30 Aug. (13 Sep.) 1916, V.A. 173/313.
5 Elliot to F.O., 21 Sep. 1916, tel. no. 1404, F.O. 371/2625.
6 Elliot to F.O., 17 Sep. 1916, tel. no. 1384, F.O. 371/2626.
7 Elliot to F.O., 17 Sep. 1916, tel. no. 1383, F.O. 371/2625.
8 Grey to Bertie, 19 Sep. 1916, tel. no. 2055, F.O. 371/2621.
9 Grey to Bertie, 21 Sep. 1916, tel. no. 627, F.O. 371/2625; Grey to Elliot, 26 Sep. 1916, tel. no. 1135, F.O. 371/2621; Grey to Elliot, 27 Sep. 1916, tel. no. 1137, F.O. 371/2621.

30,000 were recruits; the general staff were unready 'to work out a mobilisation scheme appropriate to the new situation'.[10]

However, Zaimis's resignation and the surrender of Kavala to the German and Bulgarian troops induced Venizelos to take action.[11] The decision was bound to ignite the spark of the rupture and divide Greece into two distinct states, one commanded by the Athens royalist government and the other by Venizelos's Thessaloniki government. With the collapse of territorial unity and the state apparatus, Greek military strategy and diplomacy fell to pieces and merely acquired a discernible royalist and Venizelist flavour. The Royalists were eager to prevent the Venizelists from taking a formal grip on power. They made their commitment to one or the other camp contingent on the maintenance of their state's international recognition and domestic power and security. The Venizelists, instead, sought to be recognised as the official government of Greece and march with the allied and Serbian armies in the Balkan front. The common denominator of the Royalists' and Venizelists' moves was that they came down to using force and foreign patronage as arbiters of domestic scores. This was to determine which side would win over the other in restoring and controlling a single process of state ruling and building. In this respect, it acted as a catalyst for the interplay of the international system and domestic structure to afford Venizelos's Greece partnership value and autonomy of action in pursuing the ends in view. It was through this response to structural imperatives that Greek grand strategy was, in a sense, bereft momentarily of *raison d'être* but eventually mattered to Greece in achieving the recovery of its pre-war territorial integrity and territorial over-expansion.

On the night of 24 to 25 September, therefore, Venizelos and Coudouriotis, who had resigned as *aide-de-camp* to Constantine but retained his post as commander-in-chief of the navy, left for Crete, escorted by a French destroyer. There, along with Danglis, they set themselves up as heads of a provisional cabinet, who invited the Greeks to rally round the *entente* flag.[12] Unlike France, Britain refrained from casting favour to these acts.[13] It feared that they might drive Constantine into union with the Triple Alliance.

On 4 October Kalogeropoulos, having failed to persuade Constantine that he should side with the *Entente*, resigned.[14] After France laid claim to the Greek fleet, Athens was pressed into talks with the Allies to oust from the services pro-German officers, remove contingents and artillery stores from Thessaly, disarm the arsenal of Salamis of weapons, discharge the larger warships of ammunitions, and relinquish the control of the port of Piraeus and railways.[15] On 9 October Professor Lambros, a Royalist that was reputed as germanophile, was sworn into office.[16] The same day Venizelos and his compatriots disembarked in Thessaloniki, where they combined forces with the deserted, armed units of the *Amyna* and proclaimed a national movement by establishing their own general staff and the seat of their provisional, so-called Thessaloniki government. However, the Allies recognised the Lambros

10 Elliot to F.O., 23 Sep. 1916, tel. no. 1411, F.O. 371/2624.
11 Leon, p. 409.
12 Brown, 'An Intelligence Report-No 17', 15 Oct. 1916, in Elliot to Grey, 25 Oct. 1916, F.O. 371/2625; Brown, 'Report on Proceedings During Nationalist Movement in Crete in Favour of Venizelos' Policy', 8 Oct. 1916, in 4 Nov. 1916, F.O. 371/2625.
13 Elliot to Hardinge, 1 Oct. 1916, tel. unnumbered, F.O. 371/2625.
14 Elliot to F.O., 4 Oct. 1916, tel. no. 1480, F.O. 371/2625.
15 Elliot to Grey, 7 Oct. 1916, F.O. 371/2621; Elliot to Grey, 14 Oct. 1916, F.O. 371/2621; Elliot to Grey, 20 Oct. 1916, F.O. 371/2621.
16 Elliot to F.O., 9 Oct. 1916, tel. no. 1509, F.O. 371/2625.

government, demanding of them to expel the German agents and pull their army back to southern Greece.[17] Ultimately, Lambros agreed to surrender the fleet.[18]

On 16 October the Thessaloniki government addressed a note to the Allies declaring that they instigated an insurrection in Macedonia and the Aegean islands because Constantine had violated the constitution in dismissing the government resulting from the elections of June 1915. They asked for supplies to build up three divisions, in order to extend their authority to districts in which the majority of the population leaned to them but were under the rule of the Athens government, drive the Bulgarians out of Greece, and assist Serbia militarily.[19] It was not until the next day that Britain warned Venizelos that his movement should not acquire an anti-dynastic character.[20] At the same time, Constantine notified London of his intention to reduce his forces to a peace footing, leaving 9,000 men in continental Greece.[21] But Athens was slow to meet allied terms in their entirety. As a result, it was presented with the demand to fully demobilise the Greek army.[22] Only when Constantine obtained a promise that the *Entente* would neither break off diplomatic relations with Lambros nor allow Venizelos to dethrone him, did he adopt a more yielding attitude.[23] Within a matter of days, certain units were disbanded and two army corps were ordered to retire from Macedonia to Peloponnese.[24]

The *Entente*, nevertheless, took the step to assure Venizelos of their unreserved support short of recognition as they sought to keep alive the likelihood of reconciling Venizelos with Constantine. Not only did they enter into relations with Venizelos. They also offered him assistance to organise his army, leaving no shred of independence to Constantine's Greece. Moreover, they undertook, in addition to guaranteeing a loan from a Greek bank of ten million drachmas to maintain administration and feed the population of regions under his authority, to pledge credits to his provisional government to meet the cost of mobilisation.[25]

Early in November, the situation reached a stage short of civil war. Britain held firm to its policy of allowing France to direct Greek affairs.[26] The latter long before assured the former that it would not stir a finger to establish a republic. It wished to see Constantine abdicate in favour of his eldest son.[27] Equally, the Venizelists were reluctant to raise the banner of an anti-dynastic revolution or provoke an internecine strife. Their objective was not so much to fight out the constitutional question by force of arms as to concert Greek steps with the Allies, the coalition of powers who commanded the Mediterranean and targeted

17 Grey to Elliot, 11 Oct. 1916, tel. no. 1197, F.O. 371/2625; Elliot to F.O., 13 Oct. 1916, tel. no. 1535, F.O. 371/2625.
18 Elliot to F.O., 12 Oct. 1916, tel. no. 1528, F.O 371/2628.
19 Elliot to Grey, 26 Oct. 1916, F.O. 371/2625.
20 Grey to Elliot, 17 Oct. 1916, tel. no. 1225, F.O. 371/2628.
21 Elliot to F.O., 17 Oct. 1916, tel. no. 1555, F.O. 371/2625.
22 Elliot to Grey, 21 Oct. 1916, F.O. 371/2614.
23 Elliot to Grey, 24 Oct. 1916, tel. no. 1594, F.O. 371/2614; Elliot to Grey, 25 Oct. 1916, tel. no. 1596, F.O. 371/2614.
24 Elliot to Grey, 27 Oct. 1916, tel. no. 1609, F.O. 371/2614.
25 Grey to Elliot, 24 Oct. 1916, tel. no. 1245, F.O. 371/2627; Grey to Elliot, 31 Oct. 1916, tel. no. 1275, F.O. 371/2629.
26 Grey to Bertie, 9 Nov. 1916, tel. no. unnumbered, F.O. 371/2627.
27 Bertie to Crewe, 4 Sep. 1916, tel. unnumbered, F.O. 371/2624; Bertie to F.O., 5 Sep. 1916, tel. no. 921, F.O. 371/2624.

Greece's main enemy, Bulgaria.[28] Convinced that the country could not indulge in the luxury of abolishing the monarchy, Venizelos denied that his movement was directed against it.[29] He spelled out that he sought to convoke a constituent assembly in order to enact better constitutional guarantees for the people's sovereignty and representation. Otherwise, unless Constantine was pressed into dethronement, he appeared ready to abandon politics.[30]

Once Venizelos, too, urged protection against royalist aggression and the demarcation of a border, the Allies fixed with Lambros's consent a neutral zone in Thessaly to protect their forces in Thessaloniki and avert a civil war.[31] On 21 November the French seized vessels of the Greek flotilla, and the *Entente* forced the German and Austrian envoys to deport from Greece and put Greek posts, railways, and police under their control.[32] But despite threats, Lambros refused to hand over armaments and war materials to the Allies.[33] This led to an armed clash. On 1 December, after Constantine rejected a warning of coercion, allied marines marched into Athens to enforce compliance. Greek garrisons resisted the incursion and the battle of Athens ensued. Ultimately, Constantine was reconciled to a ceasefire.[34]

Venizelos grasped the opportunity to request the Allies to recognise the Thessaloniki government as the official government of Greece. By then, France and Britain were contemplating the step, along with that of the deposition of Constantine on the condition that the royal regime would remain intact.[35] It was estimated that 25,000 men were attached to the Athens government and within easy reach of Thessaly; a force that could be mobilised to a total strength of 80,000, with 100 machine guns, 32 field guns, and 54 mountain artillery.[36] To this was added that the reservists' paramilitary activities and the arrests of Venizelists, especially of the officers, intensified.[37] This owed much to the Thessaloniki government's decision to resort to the help of the Allies and build three divisions with a separate general staff. Not only did it disrupt the hierarchy and unity of military authority by establishing a parallel, competitive chain of command. It also presented every serving individual with a dilemma of loyalty to either side in the clash. The choice of defection and allegiance determined the terms in which promotion and ranks were granted in the years to come.

Under the circumstances, the *Entente* declared the establishment of a blockade of the whole of Greece.[38] Although Lambros offered to suspend the movement of men from Peloponnese to northern Greece and reduce his troops in Thessaly to a peace footing, he

28 Elliot to Grey, 5 Nov. 1916, F.O. 371/2627; Elliot to Montgomery, 18 Nov. 1916, tel. unnumbered, F.O. 371/2632.
29 Elliot to Grey, 6 Nov. 1916, F.O. 371/2627; Veremis, T., & Gardikas-Katsiadakis, H. (2006). Protagonist in Politics, 1912-20. In Kitromilides (Ed.), p. 125.
30 'A Translation of a Letter Written by Venizelos to Dr. R. Burrows, King's College, Strand', 17/30 Nov. 1916, F.O. 371/2633.
31 Correspondence, in 1916, F.O. 371/2629.
32 Grey to Bertie, 21 Nov. 1916, tel. no. 2684, F.O. 371/2632; Elliot to F.O., 21 Nov. 1916, tel. no. 1773, F.O. 371/2629.
33 Elliot to Grey, 25 Nov. 1916, F.O. 371/2630.
34 Thomson, 'Copy of a Report of the Fighting at Athens on December 1st', in A.W.S to F.O., 29 Dec. 1916, F.O. 371/2633.
35 Grey to Bertie, 4 Dec. 1916, F.O. 371/2630; Wratislaw to F.O., 6 Dec. 1916, tel. no. 38, F.O. 371/2627.
36 W.O to F.O., 6 Dec. 1916, F.O. 371/2630; Elliot to F.O., 6 Dec. 1916, tel. no. 1930, F.O. 371/2630.
37 Elliot to F.O., 4 Dec. 1916, tel. no. 1907, F.O. 371/2630.
38 Elliot to F.O., 7 Dec. 1916, tel. no. 1947, F.O. 371/2633.

failed to abide by the obligations promptly.[39] On 14 December the Allies communicated an ultimatum to him. The whole of Greek forces should be withdrawn from continental Greece to Peloponnese; military transport should be ceased; and unless reparation was granted for casualties and damages, blockade would be maintained.[40] Two days later, Lambros was pushed to submit to their claims.[41] It was 31 December before the Allies addressed a new ultimatum demanding the immediate retirement of Greek troops and war materials to Peloponnese, the dissolution of reservist leagues, the liberation of political prisoners, and the establishment of controls.[42]

The *Entente* had meanwhile received the diplomatic agents appointed by Venizelos, and the British accredited their own representative to Thessaloniki.[43] It was this gesture of giving the Thessaloniki government some sort of recognition that sealed the *dichasmos*. The Athens royalist government came down to ruling only half of mainland Greece, lying south of Thessaly as far as Peloponnese. Venizelos's Thessaloniki government held sway over the lands north of the neutral zone up to the northern Greek boundary, except those occupied by German-Bulgarian troops, and over Crete, Hydra, all the Cyclades but Milos, and the islands of the eastern Aegean. From then onwards, the purge of Venizelists from the machinery of state verged on paranoia. The Metropolitan of Athens pronounced the anathema against Venizelos, an act that royalist reservist leagues were reported to have in large measure forced.[44] Moreover, the hostility between the Royalists and the Allies grew worse. The main implication was that e*ntente* pressure and patronage exacerbated political passions and dictated the terms in which the Venizelists resolved the schism out by overthrowing the Royalists.

In particular, on 6 January 1917 Lambros informed the *Entente* of his readiness to accept their claims in return for assurances against Venizelos's national movement.[45] The Allies insisted on Lambros's unconditional surrender; only if he evacuated northern Greece of his army and guaranteed not to outflank their forces in Thessaloniki, were they disposed to lift part of the blockade and prevent the Venizelist armies from crossing the neutral zone into territories under his rule.[46] They warned that satisfaction should be given to the whole of the conditions of their ultimatum.[47] Eager to restore confidence with the *Entente*, Lambros bent to their will. His divisions, which then amounted to about 80,000, retreated to Peloponnese, utterly demobilised.[48] The intimidation of Venizelists, nevertheless, persisted unabated and associations of officers and armed civilians were still active in fostering a reign of terror. Although the Allies relaxed or abolished controls and allowed supplies of wheat to reach the 'old Greece' to relieve famine and hardship, they refused to raise the blockade until

39 Elliot to F.O., 7 Dec. 1916, tel. no. 1942, F.O. 371/2630; Elliot to F.O., 9 Dec. 1916, tel. no. 1971, F.O. 371/2630.
40 Grey to Elliot, 9 Dec. 1916, tel. no. 1465, F.O. 371/2630; Elliot to F.O., 14 Dec. 1916, tel. no. 2032, F.O. 371/2631.
41 Elliot to F.O., 16 Dec. 1916, tel. no. 2037, F.O. 371/2631.
42 Elliot to Balfour, 31 Dec. 1917, F.O. 371/2865.
43 Grey to Bertie, 13 Dec. 1916, tel. no. 2979, F.O. 371/2633; Grey to Wratislaw, 31 Dec. 1916, tel. no. 75, F.O. 371/2634.
44 Elliot to Balfour, 26 Dec. 1916, in 1917, F.O. 371/2871; Elliot to Balfour, 29 Dec. 1916, in 1917, F.O. 371/2871.
45 Erskine to Balfour, 6 Jan. 1917, F.O. 371/2865.
46 Erskine to F.O., 8 Jan. 1917, F.O. 371/2865.
47 Erskine to Balfour, 13 Jan. 1917, F.O. 371/2865.
48 Erskine to F.O., 5 Jan. 1917, tel. no. 44, F.O. 371/2868; Elliot to F.O., 27 Jan. 1917, tel. no. 254, F.O. 371/2876.

all demands were carried out completely.[49] Also, Greece's borrowing requirements were so enormous that it lost no opportunity to press for a loan or more advances by the *Entente*. But the latter, in the light of Constantine's ambivalent stance, merely supplied a joint book credit of 40 million francs against which the National Bank circulated drachmas.[50]

On 20 February Elliot was given intimation of Constantine's desire to dismiss Lambros and form a new government in cooperation with the Allies. Elliot refused to propose a person of his liking, but he was ready to voice his opinion about nominees.[51] It was not until 18 April that the *Entente* addressed a note to Athens asking for the re-establishment of controls. The claim led Lambros to resign. Constantine, persuaded by the Russian tsar's abdication in the wake of the 'February Revolution' that he should accommodate the Allies in order to secure his throne but without coming to grips with Venizelos, agreed with Elliot upon Zaimis to resume power.[52] Despite these signs of the Royalists' good will, the Allies assisted local Venizelists in Skopelos, Corfu, Zante, Ithaca, and Cephalonia, and enabled the Thessaloniki government to extend their command to these islands, a move that was regarded by Athens as a breach of faith.[53] Not accidentally, thanks to allied support, Venizelos had raised 10,000 troops by then, the mobilised strength of which was designed to reach 40,000 active men and 20,000 in reserve.[54]

Nonetheless, the British representative in Thessaloniki had been instructed, after he reported Constantine's hazy intention to patch up his quarrel with Venizelos, to sound the latter about the possibility of reconciliation.[55] Britain was alarmed by France's eagerness to press the deposition of Constantine. It wondered whether the French aimed to engineer the establishment of a protectorate in Greece and a scheme of hegemony in the Near East. It doubted their practice of taking coercive steps in disharmony with prior consultations, and its policy of giving them a free hand in dealing with Greek affairs.[56]

The British sought to ensure both the national unity of Greece, under 'a representative government' and 'a constitutional king', and its cooperation rather through 'its own efforts' and 'its own free will' than by their direct interference in domestic politics. In an allied conference held at Saint Jean-de-Maurienne on 19 April, they took the initiative to bring France round to a cohesive line of policy, that is, not to bolster up anti-dynastic or republican uprisings. In fact, the Lloyd George government, summoned in power since December 1916, were presented with the dilemma of throwing in their lot with Venizelos or giving Constantine yet another opportunity to settle the political crisis and march with them. The choice of departing from Thessaloniki or assuming the leadership in the region involved the risk of souring the partnership with France, while the outcome of the war was still

49 Correspondence, in 1917, F.O. 371/2865 and F.O. 371/2876.

50 Treasury to F.O., 25 Jan. 1917, F.O. 371/2871; Briand to Bertie, 23 Feb. 1917, in Bertie to F.O., 24 Feb. 1917, F.O. 371/2871.

51 Elliot to F.O., 20 Feb. 1917, tel. no. 451, F.O. 371/2882.

52 Elliot to F.O., 17 Apr. 1917, tel. no. 851, F.O. 371/2865; Elliot to F.O., 18 Apr. 1917, tel. no. 861, F.O. 371/2882; Elliot to F.O., 18 Apr. 1917, tel. no. 862, F.O. 371/2882; Elliot to Balfour, 5 May 1917, F.O. 371/2874.

53 Elliot to F.O., 19 Apr. 1917, tel. no. 876, F.O. 371/2865; Correspondence, in 1917, G.M.F.A. A/χ(9).

54 Granville to F.O., 1 Mar. 1917, tel. no. 108, F.O. 371/2883; Granville to F.O., 21 Mar. 1917, tel. no. 145, F.O. 371/2883.

55 Granville to F.O., 13 Apr. 1917, tel. no. 174, F.O. 371/2865; F.O. to Granville, 16 Apr. 1917, tel. no. 127, F.O. 371/2865.

56 Mackenzie, 'A Confidential Memorandum on French Policy in the Near East', 5 Mar. 1917, in Elliot to Hardinge, 11 Mar. 1917, F.O. 371/2865; 'Minutes', 31 Mar. 1917, F.O. 371/2865; Nicolson, 'Memorandum on Greece', 12 Apr. 1917, F.O. 371/2884.

uncertain.[57] The difficulty, in addition to Constantine's reluctance to send for Venizelos, was the latter's determination to uphold his view against the king. He argued that the people had the right to decide their own destiny. Unless Constantine left Greece and was succeeded by his eldest son, or ideally by an English prince, and unless the new crowned head paid heed to the people's will, the declaration of a republic would be the only way out. He went further to advocate coercion: the Allies should take action to expel Constantine by force either on their own or through him.[58] If the USA then came in alongside the *Entente*, a step that was destined to tip the scale in favour of the allied cause, this potentially scaled up his freedom of manoeuvre.

At the time, indeed, the Venizelists, after they wielded authority in much of Greece and joined the 1917 Spring offensive pushing the German and Bulgarian troops to flee back to a point at the Lake Prespa-Strumnitsa valley line, were ready to back allied efforts to force Constantine to resign the throne and resume office in a united country. But while London assured the French's upper hand in directing allied policy in Greece and its commitment to refrain from unilateral acts of violence, it kept working to reconcile the Venizelists and the Royalists. Venizelos ruled out this prospect and the French military mission in Athens stood out for the extension of allied occupation and Constantine's dethronement. No sooner had Zaimis been sworn into office on 4 May and acquiesced in claims related to controls than Venizelos declined to lend credence to an attempt made by Britain to push the two statesmen to cooperate.[59]

Besides structural imperatives, complicated as they were by Zaimis's inability to smooth out domestic perplexities, it was the intransigence both of Constantine and Venizelos that reproduced the *dichasmos*. Constantine, who was neither '*Ententophil* nor *Ententophobe*', continued to identify his standing and 'the safety of the dynasty' with the 'interests of Greece'.[60] He might be said to have found justification for this attitude in *entente* blockade, which, depriving 'old Greece' of foodstuffs and raw resources, caused much suffering and brought about uncontrollable exasperation of the Royalists.[61] Venizelos aimed to enlist Greek participation in the allied struggle. He argued that 'Greece must fight in order to redeem her honour which was pledged in the treaty with Serbia'. And he believed that 'if he had the government of all Greece', the *Entente* would draw on Greek reinforcements to 'get to Sofia and cut communications between Germany and Turkey', or 'to withdraw their forces for other fronts, leaving Greeks and Serbs to hold their present lines'.[62]

Eventually, as Venizelos and Paris hastened to force their hand, Britain threw its weight against Constantine and consented to his removal.[63] Developments were heralded in the first days of June by Italy's action to proclaim the independence of Albania under its protection and march through Jannina to the confines of Preveza on the north-western coastline of mainland Greece. On 11 June, after the French captured Thessaly and the Isthmus

57 Nicolson, 'Minutes', 27 Apr. 1917, F.O. 371/2878; Cecil, 'Draft Despatch to Lord Bertie', May 1917, F.O. 371/2878.

58 Granville to Balfour, 4 Apr. 1917, F.O. 371/2878; Granville to Balfour, 21 Apr. 1917, F.O. 371/2878.

59 'Summary of the Proceedings of the Anglo-French Conference Held at Paris on May 4 and 5', 16 May 1917, F.O. 371/2885; F.O. to Elliot, 17 May 1917, tel. no. 752, F.O. 371/2885; Elliot to Balfour, 28 May 1917, F.O. 371/2874.

60 I.B., 'Weekly Report on Greece', 17 May 1917, in W.D. to F.O., 17 May 1917, F.O. 371/2884.

61 Elliot to Balfour, 21 May 1917, F.O. 371/2876.

62 Granville to F.O., 26 May 1917, tel. no. 255, F.O. 371/2866.

63 Elliot to F.O., 25 May 1917, tel. no. 1139, F.O. 371/2885; F.O. to Elliot, 4 June 1917, tel. no. 847, F.O. 371/2886.

of Corinth in Peloponnese, the Allies invoked their status as guarantors of the Greek constitution and communicated an ultimatum demanding the abdication of Constantine in favour of an heir of shared choosing within twenty-four hours. In the light of the threat and Venizelos's political and military pre-eminence, the Royalists' Greece had no choice but to bow to the *entente* will. Thus, Constantine left for Switzerland, nominating his second son Alexander, instead of Crown Prince George, to ascend the throne.[64]

The story of how Greece was driven into a national schism comes full circle here. Venizelos's effort to capitalise on Greek military engagement with the Allies, in order to consolidate the *status quo* in terms of the Balkan balance of power, met with fierce domestic opposition. Constantine sought to defend the *status quo* in terms of Greece's territorial integrity. Having pushed Venizelos to resign twice, he constituted Greek grand strategy along the line of non-engagement with an equal benevolent treatment to the opposing coalitions, with a view to aligning with the winner towards the last stages of the war. But making similar concessions in the name of impartiality to both sides was reduced to redressing one's breach of neutrality by the other's. It was through this line that the belligerents' acts of violence and the extra-parliamentary and paramilitary conflict between Venizelists and Royalists led to *ethnicos dichasmos*, which culminated in the battle of Athens and the coercion of Constantine to step down from the throne. Foreign interference, reproduced and filtered as it was by the *dichasmos*, infringed Greece's sovereign rights so blatantly that it stripped its strategies and neutrality of any important part of their value. In a sense, Constantine's dethronement might be said to have done justice to Venizelos's moves. Not only did it open the way for him to unite Greece and reinstall himself in power. Also, it removed domestic restraints of the past and, along with other enabling structural forces, set the stage for Greek grand strategy to retrieve its *raison d'être* by restoring Greek pre-war acquisitions and achieving over-expansion.

64 Rodd to F.O., 4 June 1917, tel. no. 487, F.O. 371/2881; 'Summary of Events in Greece 5th to 16th June 1917', 17 June 1917, in W.O. to F.O., 26 June 1917, F.O. 371/2887.

Chapter 10

COOPERATION WITH THE *ENTENTE*

1. REUNION AND PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR

Immediately after the collapse of Constantine's regime, the *Entente* raised the blockade. Venizelos was disposed to accept Zaimis to head a service cabinet until an agreement to unite the country and revise the constitution was arranged and the new king entrusted him with power. In fact, Venizelos set out to re-assemble the parliament of 13 June 1915 and cleanse the state of his opponents. He rejected a proposal for elections by virtue of his fear that unless Constantine's entourage were imprisoned or exiled and the royalist opposition was eliminated, the Liberal Party was unlikely to return victorious at the polls.[1] Soon, too, he lost confidence in the course of restoring national unity with Zaimis. Talks foundered when Alexander, on the occasion of his accession, pronounced his intention to reign by obeying his father's orders. Zaimis, whom the Allies asked to recall the chamber of 13 June, resigned and Venizelos took office on 27 June. The next day Venizelos addressed a crowd and pledged himself not only to bring Greece into the war on the side of the Allies but also to banish leading Royalists, summon the parliament of 13 June, and convene a constituent assembly to strengthen the people's representation and sovereign rights.[2]

Political changes, in that regard, moulded sufficient domestic conditions that, through their interaction with *entente* assistance and the engagement in the war, could enable Greece to recover its pre-war territorial gains and advance expansionist claims, only if its new leadership took the step of rearticulating its ultimate strategic aim. Venizelos, indeed, made this choice. He adopted strategies, which, being the objectified product of the dialectical interplay of the international system and domestic structure, became the medium through which the Greeks created a greater Greece of 'the five continents and the two seas'.

On 2 July 1917, thus, Venizelos, having the control of the government and military of all of Greece, declared war on the Triple Alliance.[3] As the military of 'old' Greece was in a state of disbandment and its hierarchy dominated by Royalists, he decided to transform, with allied financial and military aid, the contingents of the Thessaloniki government into a force

1 Granville to F.O., 13 June 1917, tel. no. 277, F.O. 371/2886; Granville to F.O. 16 June, tel. no. 285, F.O. 371/2882.

2 Crackanthorpe to F.O., 30 June 1917, F.O. 371/2887.

3 Leontaritis, G. B. (1990). Greece and the First World War: From Neutrality to Intervention, 1917-1918. New York: Columbia University Press.

of 12 to 15 divisions. He reasoned that the 'utilisation' of this reconstructed force would lie in the fact that 'it could fight with more efficiency on the Strumna front where, owing to its mobility and its adaptability of mountain fighting, it could threaten the Bulgarian capital'.[4] Alongside this, he refrained from laying 'claim to the eventual compensation to be obtained'. Priority was attached to what he regarded as the country's double duty of fulfilling its 'treaty obligation towards Serbia' and its 'debt of gratitude towards the protecting powers'.[5] Also, he strove to arrest *entente* infringements of Greek sovereignty. Within a matter of months, after the Allies were allowed to exercise exclusive authority in a military zone and passport and port supervision throughout the country for the duration of operations, he proved able to evacuate Preveza and Jannina of Italian troops and abolish all controls.[6] It was from this perception of the circumstances and the national interest to be served that Venizelos made up his mind that Athens should re-establish first its pre-war territory and the Balkan balance of power.

The priorities of Greek military strategy and diplomacy were reset. The common task was to resist Bulgaria's and Turkey's revisionist designs by serving the allied cause by force of arms. The constituent objective that ordered military strategy until the end of the war was that the Greek army should do its share of allied campaigns in the Balkan battlefield. This was liable to facilitate diplomacy to achieve its own objective, which was to retrieve Greece's national image and partnership value within the allied camp, in order to balance out its belated engagement, obtain *entente* support, and legitimise its right to a share of the spoils. In shaping the strategic goals, however, constraints like the huge public debt, the weakness of the treasury to meet the cost of the war, and the bitter cleavages of the *dichasmos* would play their negative part, unless Venizelos made moves to strengthen the state's ability to centralise its decision-making power and extract power resources from Greek society, and thereby sustain its authority and legitimacy. This created additional enabling forces for Greek grand strategy to attain the ends in view.

In particular, Venizelos's primary concern as head of government was to consolidate his grip on power. One of his first measures had been to issue a decree, which suspended the job permanence of judicial authorities, an article of the constitution that was to come into effect again eight months later.[7] Another act was to purify the Holy Synod and remove or punish bishops and clerics of royalist sympathies.[8] Yet another act was to raise from the dead the chamber of 13 June, known as the 'Lazarus parliament'.[9] Also, Venizelos decreed his government as successors of the Thessaloniki government.[10] He proclaimed martial law.[11] And he published in a White Book all those documents that confirmed Constantine's germanophile attitude, charging his opponents with predilection for the Triple Alliance.[12]

Clearly, the resurrection of the Lazarus parliament symbolised the Venizelists' resolve to settle political scores with the establishment. Royalist politicians and top staff officers were

4 'Telegram from Mons. Venizelos to Mr. J.J. Stavridis', 12 July 1917, in 18 July 1917, F.O. 371/2890.
5 'A Telegram from Venizelos Communicated by Greek Minister in London', 13 July 1917, in 14 July 1917, F.O. 371/2887.
6 Romanos to G.M.F.A., 14/27 July 1917, G.M.F.A. A/5ii; Correspondence, in 1917, F.O. 371/2874, F.O. 371/2875, F.O. 371/2879.
7 Crackanthorpe to F.O., 27 June 1917, tel. no. 1395, F.O. 371/2887; Granville to F.O., 1 Feb. 1918, F.O. 371/3152.
8 Crackanthorpe to Balfour, 28 July 1917, F.O. 371/2885.
9 Crackanthorpe to Balfour, 29 July 1917, F.O. 371/2887.
10 Crackanthorpe to F.O., 11 Aug. 1917, tel. no. 1635, F.O. 371/2887.
11 Crackanthorpe to F.O., 16 Aug. 1917, tel. no. 1656, F.O. 371/2887.
12 I.B., 'Report on the Greek White Book', in D.I. to F.O., 18 Sep. 1917, F.O. 371/2888.

interned in Corcica or impeached. Public servants, who had been hostile to the *entente* cause and showed signs of anti-Venizelist leanings, were dismissed, or placed under surveillance.[13] Although Venizelos urged moderation, he was indifferent to the rising tide of repression against Constantine's devotees. Instead, he dismissed fears of injudiciousness by declaring that 'it was absolutely necessary to remove officials and officers who were known for their Constantinist opinions.'[14] In some respect, it was the turn of those who had been made subject to humiliation of purge by the Royalists to get revenge. Reprisals and atrocities could be justified by passions of the past and the efforts of ardent Royalists to stage plots against Venizelos's life and incite anti-Venizelist feeling among the people.[15] Constantine gave good reason for suspicions owing to his contacts with Germany, who, as it was then known to Athens, placed at his disposal credits to foment military conspiracies, in addition to a promise to lead the Bulgarian army in an attack against allied forces in Thessaloniki.[16] The result was that reconciliation and the task of merging two rival governments with parallel bureaucracies into one was never really pursued. Rather, one state hierarchy hit back and devoured the other. This might enable the Venizelists to eradicate the ruins of the royalist administration and command the state from within, but the problem was that it fed rather than remedied the *dichasmos*.

Furthermore, restoring the Venizelist clientele networks among the officer corps to ensure that the military was ruled effectively was given priority. Venizelos tried not so much to rebuild a united military authority as to dislocate royalist loyalties and dominate the services. That he took over the ministry of war strengthened his hands to nominate General Haralambis as the new chief of the general staff; remove from their commands senior officers who were considered germanophiles or supporters of Constantine; request the French mission to return from Thessaloniki, where it had moved to assist his movement; merge the two armies into one but in such a way that the army of the Thessaloniki government formed a distinct army corps named after their original heading, the National Defence Army Corps; and schedule the mobilisation of ten divisions in three months totalling to 15 in six months.[17]

Generally, the Venizelists exiled leading figures of Constantine's staff retinue and put on the reserve list, dismissed or imprisoned officers of known royalist conviction. They reinstated to their commissions Venizelist officers who had been humiliated. They adopted policies that disrupted grade scales and procedures for professional advancement. They invoked, for instance, the criterion of heroism in the field, enacted by an act of the Thessaloniki government, to grant mass promotions to their followers.

Also, they passed the Law 927 of 1917 to add an extra ten months' war service to the seniority of the *Amyna* officers. Those, therefore, who had enlisted their support to the movement moved higher up the hierarchy and occupied top positions in less than the normal years of service in a rank.[18]

13 Granville to Balfour, 24 Oct. 1917, F.O. 371/2888; Russell to Curzon, 3 July 1919, F.O. 371/3598.
14 Granville to Balfour, 27 Oct. 1917, F.O. 371/2888.
15 Granville to F.O., 26 Nov. 1919, F.O. 371/3593; Correspondence, in 1919, F.O. 371/3607.
16 Beak to Balfour, 16 Nov. 1917, F.O. 371/2888; Rumbold to Balfour, 3 May 1918, F.O. 371/3152.
17 Crackanthorpe to F.O., 2 July 1917, tel. no. 1431, F.O. 371/2887; Granville to F.O., 13 Nov. 1917, tel. no. 2043, F.O. 371/2883.
18 Veremis. Military, pp. 61-63.

Scarcely surprising, patronage and reprisals rekindled hard feeling and military scores. As much as the relations between Alexander and Venizelos were distressed and royalist secret military associations instigated mutinies, so discrimination and repression, with Britain's blessing, intensified.[19] However, the purge of royalist officers from the military served to arrest the general staff's continual involvement in the formulation of Greek war attitude and concentrate the functions of decision-making power in the hands of the government. At that time, by directing the tasks of military ruling, Venizelos proved able not simply to sway over the officer corps, but also to overhaul the Greek army and marshal its human and material resources to the *entente* cause.

The reorganisation of the services was yet again assigned to French and British missions. The French, who handed over to Athens the warships they had requisitioned, undertook to make plans for a mobilised strength of 12 divisions. Venizelos felt that this force would grow out of 6,000 officers and 300,000 men. Ultimately, within a year, three army corps of three divisions each and one independent division were formed.[20] Britain had terminated the service of its mission since allied coercion against the Royalists gained momentum in January 1917.[21] But by year's end, after they declined a Greek request for the appointment of junior officers, the British resumed their naval commissions. They sent Admiral Brown as head of high-ranking mission to improve the fighting efficiency of the Greek fleet, the mobilised manpower of which was estimated by the Greek staff at a minimum of 8,000 men.[22]

Last but not least, Venizelos applied to the USA for a loan of 100 million francs and to the *Entente* for loan of similar sum to cover arrears of all kinds, including budget deficits and the war expenditure.[23] At a moment when statistics showed that there were only nine million francs in the treasury, the costs involved in financing a mobilised army of 6,000 officers and 300,000 men, and the navy, amounted to 534,488,140 drachmas, about half the total estimated revenue of the 1917 budget.[24] As Athens could not afford to meet mounting military and civilian commitments from public regular revenues and the advances of money made by lenders at home and abroad, Britain, France, and the USA opened, during the years 1918 and 1919, new book credits of 850 million drachmas.[25] Unless further external borrowing was secured, the Greek economy would be unable to sustain the financial burden of the participation in the war. Only after the *Entente* made loans and delivered military supplies, were Greek divisions formed and equipped. In mid-August 1918, indeed, their mobilised manpower amounted to 245,000 officers and men. Of them, about 135,000 were concentrated, making up ten divisions, in the Thessaloniki region. These numbers were expected, by the end of December, to stand at 320,000 and 220,000 respectively.[26]

19 Crackanthorpe to F.O., 16 July 1917, F.O. 371/2887; Granville to Balfour, 25 Nov. 1917, F.O. 371/2888; F.O to Granville, 14 Feb. 1918, tel. no. 160, F.O. 371/3150.

20 Crackanthorpe to F.O., 9 July 1917, tel. no. 1477, F.O. 371/2889; Fairholme to Crackanthorpe, 5 Oct. 1917, in Granville to Balfour, 8 Oct. 1917, F.O. 371/2890; Fairholme to Granville, 'Note on the Greek Army', 20 Aug. 1918, in Granville to Balfour, 26 Aug. 1918, F.O. 371/3150.

21 Admiralty to F.O., 13 Mar. 1917, F.O. 371/2943; Elliot to Balfour, 21 Apr. 1917, F.O. 371/2943.

22 Crackanthorpe to F.O., 30 July 1917, tel. no. 1588, F.O. 371/2889; Crackanthorpe to F.O., 15 Aug. 1917, tel. no. 1652, F.O. 371/2889; Granville to Balfour, 2 Jan. 1918, F.O. 371/3149.

23 Crackanthorpe to F.O., 14 Aug. 1917, tel. no. 1644, F.O. 371/2891.

24 Block to Clerk, 11 Sep. 1917, F.O. 371/2891; Granville to F.O., 21 Nov. 1917, tel. no. 2067, F.O. 371/2890.

25 F.O. to Russell, 20 June 1919, tel. no. 341, F.O. 371/3567.

26 Fairholme to Granville, 15 Aug. 1918, in Granville to Balfour, 19 Aug. 1918, F.O. 371/3150; Granville to F.O., 10 Sep. 1918, tel. no. 832, F.O. 371/3150.

Meanwhile, the establishment by the 1917 'October Revolution' of the Bolshevik regime in Russia had driven Romania to put out peace feelers. It was not until the Bolsheviks concluded the armistice of Brest-Litovsk of March 1918 that in May it signed a treaty of surrender. The withdrawal of Russia and Romania, however, were not events on a scale to prejudice the final result of the war. In the spring of 1918, when a German offensive in separate stages along the western front pushed the Allies back to a point short of Paris, it was the American engagement that enabled them to repulse the advance and, by the July counterattack, to force the enemy into retreat to the trenches it had held at the start of its attack. No sooner had this campaign run its course than early in September the combined British, French, Serbian and Greek armies launched an offensive from Thessaloniki that led to the collapse of the Balkan front and the end of the war. Venizelos considered that the Allies should carry the campaign to a point of destroying the Bulgarian army and imposing terms of unconditional surrender to Sofia, a goal that was achieved.[27] Within a matter of days Bulgaria left the fighting on the verge of total defeat. In October Turkey signed the Mudros armistice. And in the first week of November, Germany and Austria-Hungary sued for peace.

Of the Greek divisions that participated in the final offensive, three were deployed in the vanguard of the attack in the Strumnitsa valley, two in the flanks of the Serbian advance, and two in support of the British operations in the Lake Doiran. Also, a division was on a state of preparation in the rear, and another one in reserve. The share that the divisions had in winning the allied victory was meaningful and fully appreciated.[28] In December, too, Venizelos, holding firm to the aim of placing his services at the disposal of the Allies, committed two divisions to an expeditionary force, mainly French, marching into Ukraine against the Bolsheviks.[29] From this angle, Greek military strategy acquired the form of limited war. It purported to assist on the spot and carry out *entente* missions rather than to sweep the field on its own and gain alone a foothold in 'unredeemed' lands.

In parallel, Venizelos had reconstituted Greek diplomacy along the firm-but-flexible form. He intertwined moderation with the advance of demands. Despite its armed cooperation with, and financial and military dependence on, the *Entente*, Athens refused to consent to territorial concessions to Bulgaria and renounce the redemption of Greeks under foreign rule. Apart from the recovery of its pre-war acquisitions, it lost no opportunity to press forward with irredentist designs so as to prepare the ground for a possible territorial enlargement.

Specifically, in July 1917 Venizelos spelled out that the Dodecanese are Greek by 'origin, sentiment and culture'; even though he intended, without departing from 'the principle of nationality', to allow Italy to keep some islands of strategic concern for it, in the name of good relations.[30] In August he assured Greek interest in northern Epirus.[31] For the sake of peace, in January 1918 he agreed to the Ottomans maintaining Asia Minor on

27 Venizelos, 'Note', undated, in G.M.F.A., 14 (27) Sep. 1918, G.M.F.A. A/12(4); Venizelos to G.M.F.A., 16/29 Sep. 1918, tel. unnumbered, G.M.F.A. A/12(4).

28 Γ.Ε.Σ/Δ.Ι.Σ. Παγκόσμιο Πόλεμο, pp. 303-306; Granville to F.O., 20 Sep. 1918, tel. no. 861, F.O. 371/3150; Chatzimichalis, 'The Contribution of the Greek Army to the Allied Victory in the Macedonian Front', in 3 (15) Oct. 1918, G.M.F.A. A/4/i(2); Danglis, 'Report on the Action of the Greek Army During the Last Victorious Offensive', in Danglis to G.M.F.A, 12 (25 Oct.) 1918, G.M.F.A. A/4/i(2).

29 Granville to Balfour, 5 Oct. 1918, F.O. 371/3159.

30 Crackanthorpe to F.O., 12 July 1917, F.O. 371/2887.

31 Crackanthorpe to F.O., 7 August 1917, F.O. 371/2879.

condition that guarantees would be obtained to enable those who had been deported from it to return to their homeland and repossess their property; otherwise, if they rejected the proposal, he would lay claim to the area.[32] Also, he secured assurances of the restitution of eastern Macedonia to Greece and urged the *Entente* that the small states that participated in the war should be entitled to attend the peace conference.[33]

Some months later, Venizelos tried to set forth solutions for the Ottoman settlement to the Greek benefit. He dropped hints to Italy of entering into preliminary talks as to the status of northern Epirus and the Dodecanese. He was disposed to let it retain, with the approval of London and Paris, certain ports in the Dodecanese, in exchange for retaking the slice of northern Epirus that Greek troops occupied in October 1914. He advocated the inception of Albania as an independent state under international tutelage. Likewise, Venizelos believed that the preservation of the Ottoman Empire was a possibility that could not be ruled out. But he suggested that if it fell apart, Constantinople should be internationalised and an impartial governor should assume the administration of Asia Minor until its nationalities were brought to a stage of being capable of self-government.[34] He reasoned that while Greek aspirations for Constantinople and Thrace were justified 'on racial grounds', he would abate them 'for the present and at all events' because 'he was a practical politician and no fanatic imperialist'.[35] Late in July, finally, he declined hints of ceding territories that Bulgaria had in the course of the war wrested from Greece.[36]

On the eve of the end of hostilities, therefore, the Allies were aware that apart from the restoration of its pre-war territorial *status quo*, Greece's claims, albeit not yet formally presented, included the whole of 'unredeemed' lands which were 'purely Greek', or in which the majority of their population were Greek.[37] Only the area of Pontus in the Black Sea coast did not figure in the irredentist agenda. Athens long before stated that it did not consent to the 'Pontike' Greeks to establishing an independent Greek republic of the Pontus, as 'the last thing' it wished was a 'future extension of Greek sovereignty in those regions'.[38] Cyprus was another case in point. As Venizelos was concerned not to incur British resentment, he never put forward a demand, counting on that 'at the end of the war, His Majesty's Government, after all their declarations in favour of government in accordance with the nationality and consent of the governed, could not but cede the island to Greece'.[39] From this viewpoint, Venizelos pronounced himself against union in spite of a resurgence of agitation for it.[40]

With Constantine's dethronement and retirement from the political scene, in sum, it was through Venizelos's response to structural imperatives that Greek strategies mattered to Greece in siding with the winners of W.W.I and consolidating the *status quo* in terms both of Greece's pre-war territory and the Balkan balance of power. Of the enabling structural forces that made way for the success, allied assistance and the fighting efficiency of the Greek army seemed most determining. And the reconstructed material reality of Greek statehood, along

32 Granville to F.O., 10 Jan. 1918, tel. no. 30, F.O. 371/3146.
33 Granville to F.O., 15 Jan. 1918, tel. no. 48, F.O. 371/3146.
34 Granville to Balfour, 9 June 1918, F.O. 371/3156.
35 Granville to F.O., 26 June 1918, F.O. 371/3147.
36 Balfour to Granville, 30 July 1918, F.O. 371/3146.
37 W.D., 'Memorandum', 16 Sep. 1918, in 17 Sep. 1918, F.O. 371/3147.
38 Granville to F.O., 15 Nov. 1917, F.O. 371/2895.
39 Granville to Balfour, 10 Jan. 1918, F.O. 371/3145.
40 Correspondence, in 1918, G.M.F.A. A/5(7); Granville to Balfour, 25 Jan. 1918, F.O. 371/3145.

with structural conditions of the then 'present' were destined, through Venizelos's new strategic priorities, to afford Greece partnership value and autonomy of action in staking out irredentist claims at the Paris peace-making conference.

2. THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Rivalries between two coalitions of the great powers of the time had mounted to a Great War that eventually placed the USA in the international arena and accelerated the finale of Europe's mastery in world politics.[41] After the Triple Alliance gave up arms, the 'Big Four' Allies convened in Paris, in January 1919, to make peace. Amid ethnic and social upheavals unleashed by the break-up of Austria-Hungary and the ferment of Bolshevism, they were called to arrange the new European political and territorial order seemingly in line with the principles of self-determination and collective security, as promulgated by Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points.

In this systemic context, Venizelos set out to reap the rewards of Greece's contribution to the *entente* victory. He articulated the territorial expansion as his ultimate strategic aim. That the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire lay ahead and the Allies were prepared to carve out new spheres of influence in the Near East threw up a critical systemic opportunity. Also, the increase in irredentist ferment across public opinion for the annexation of Asia Minor and Thrace, reinforced as it was by the question of the fate of Ottoman Greeks, was a considerable domestic opportunity.[42] It was these enabling structural forces, coupled with Greece's enhanced prestige and the Liberals' dominance over the parliament and military that shaped Greek strategic choices; putting nevertheless a veneer on the heavy borrowing and indebtedness, the detrimental repercussions of the *dichasmos*, and the ensuing state's weakness to underpin grandiose ambitions. But unless Venizelos used the Greek army as a 'peace-keeping' task force in the *entente* service and pursued a far more firm-but-flexible diplomacy, the extension of the Greek frontier to the outer reaches of the Constantinople area and the Smyrna hinterland could hardly happen.

In anticipation of post-war arrangements, the priority of Greek diplomacy was to redeem and incorporate in the motherland most of the lands in which the Greeks were the preponderant ethnic kin by initiative and coalition building. Acquiring compensations nonetheless impinged on the fact that unlike the period of the Balkan wars, this time it should bargain for territories that Greek forces had never captured, or were possessing in cooperation with *entente* detachments. The hurdle was complicated by the determination of the Allies to maintain a small Ottoman Turkey and the balance of power among the Balkan states. Notably, London seemed to wish not merely the internationalisation of the Straits, but also the acquisition by Bulgaria of eastern Thrace with commercial privileges in the port of Kavala.[43] To this were added the obligations that Britain and France had undertaken

41 Taylor, p. 568.

42 Granville to Balfour, 8 Nov. 1918, F.O. 371/3147; Granville to Balfour, 17 Nov. 1918, F.O. 371/3147.

43 'The Balance of Power in the Near East', in 8 June 1917, F.O. 371/2889; 'Memorandum on the Broad Lines of a Balkan Settlement', 2 Aug. 1918, F.O. 371/3146; W.O., 'Notes on the Claims of Bulgaria to an Outlet on the Aegean Sea', 1 Oct. 1918, in 21 Dec. 1918, F.O. 371/3147.

towards Italy. Apart from the gains laid down in the April 1915 Treaty of London, the Italians were able, at the Saint Jean-de-Maurienne conference in April 1917, to reassure and extend their accession in the south-western littoral of Asiatic Turkey up to the northern confines of the Smyrna region; in return for their recognition of the February 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement, which partitioned Syria and other slices of the Middle East into British and French spheres of influence.

To overturn disposing and strengthen enabling structural forces, Venizelos, prior to the Paris peace conference, set out that several constituent objectives should direct Greek diplomacy. One was to exploit the past achievements and the potential possibilities of Greek military strategy, in order to assist the Allies and credit Greece with partnership value. The decision to dispatch divisions to the Allies' Ukrainian campaign served this task. The same went for the success of securing Greece's right to contribute naval units to an allied flotilla in case it occupied ports in Asia Minor and the Straits.[44] Another objective was to avoid holding unyielding positions or displaying nationalist intransigence. Venizelos refrained from hinting publicly at demands that were to cause international complications or deprive him of allied sympathy. After Greek contingents captured Kavala, he refused to subscribe to the belief that 'to implant a Greek flag in St. Sophia' was feasible, and to raise the 'sensitive' issues of the Dodecanese and Cyprus.[45] Also, he reassured Britain and France that 'all territorial questions must be settled by peace conference and that occupation by armed forces can have no useful effort'.[46]

Yet another objective was to win the Allies to the support of the Greek cause. Before he formulated the formal statement of Greek claims, Venizelos spent two months making trips to all European quarters concerned to sound their opinion and initiate negotiations. Although he was cautious not to lean openly upon one or play off each against the other, the outcome of his consultations was indecisive. As much of the spoils were up for grabs, the Allies were reluctant to tie their hands in advance.

In London and Paris, thus, Venizelos bought credits and war supplies with the pledge of his participation in the allied expedition in Ukraine. In return, he obtained the promise

of the French President Clemenceau to back his claim to Thrace, but with regard to Smyrna only if Britain or the USA took the lead in working for this award to Greece. This attitude made Venizelos recur to his old plan of assigning the administration of the Smyrna area to an international personality. For his part, Lloyd George showed warm interest. Nonetheless, he was committed to nothing binding. It was then that Venizelos communicated in a memo to Lloyd George his view on Ottoman affairs. He took for granted the demise of the Porte's rule and the partition of its domains in the Middle and Near East among the Allies. From this angle, he argued for a settlement that would involve: the establishment of Armenia on the south-eastern flank of the Black Sea; the creation under international control or a League of Nations of an independent state of Constantinople and the Straits; the incorporation of western Asia Minor into Greece; and the reduction of the Ottoman Empire to territories lying in between Greece and Armenia. Venizelos, too, grasped the opportunity to inspire the

44 Venizelos to G.M.F.A., 5 (18) Oct. 1918, tel. unnumbered, G.M.F.A. A/12(5); Venizelos to G.M.F.A., 20 Oct. (3 Nov.) 1918, tel. unnumbered, G.M.F.A. A/12(5).
45 Granville to Balfour, 11 Oct. 1918, F.O. 371/3159.
46 Granville to F.O., 20 Dec. 1918, tel. no. 1208, F.O. 371/3160.

British with the idea of using Greek forces for allied missions in Asiatic Turkey.[47] He reasoned that, on the basis of the principle of nationality, Greek aspirations included eastern Thrace, 'where the Greek element predominated over the Bulgarian', and the Black Sea and the 'northern shore of the Sea of Marmara'. However, he elucidated that

> if her Thracian aspirations were not entirely fulfilled, Greece should…be assigned the western portion of Asia Minor, where the Greek population largely outnumbered any other, amounting to 1,600,000 [….] if Greece were accorded this territory, his policy would be to promote a scheme under which Turks be bought out and removed to Turkish territory proper and Greeks put in their place.[48]

In Rome, afterwards, Venizelos met with the Prime-minister Orlando and the minister for foreign affairs Sonnino. He was disposed to reach an 'agreement on principle' over northern Epirus and the Dodecanese, and subject it to 'the subsequent approval of the Peace Conference'. He was concerned to resolve bilateral disputes and not questions of international concern, like that of Smyrna, in which other powers were embroiled. But eager to secure the acquisitions envisaged in their treaties with Britain and France, the Italians turned deaf ears to his hints. As Sonnino intimated to Venizelos, they sought to keep 'the two matters in suspense for use as two additional pawns', in order to raise bids and advance demands at the impending peace conference.[49] Venizelos was reported to have declared that some progress was made.[50] Italy's and Greece's interests could not be reconciled. This scaled down Venizelos's autonomy of action, at a moment when British and French dispositions were encouraging but fluid, and thereby carried little weight by themselves. Worse, the potential implications of a Greek-Italian clash might turn the scale against the Greek momentum and negate such strong assets as the partnership value which in reality acted as an arbiter of the most determining, if not singular, opportunity with which the international system presented Athens that is, the impotence of Ottoman Turkey.

Under the circumstances, Venizelos decided to speak at the peace-negotiating table with all his cards open and play for high stakes. Standing firm on the objectives of his post-war diplomacy, he intertwined magnitude of claims with signs of intention for cooperation on vital international questions, in order to get give-and-take compromises. The crucial aspect was that he counted overwhelmingly on Greek military possibilities and attached priority more than ever to Britain. It was through this strategic decision that structural conditions eventually afforded the Greeks partnership value and autonomy of action in achieving their territorial over-expansion.

Venizelos arrived in Paris for the peace conference on 12 December.[51] He believed that he had enlisted Britain and France on his side, although he tended to put too much faith in the

47 Petsalis-Diomidis, pp. 71-75; Venizelos to G.M.F.A., 3 (16) Oct. 1918, tel. no. 5, G.M.F.A. A/15; Venizelos to G.M.F.A., 15 (28) Oct. 1918, tel. no. 1821, G.M.F.A. A/15.

48 F.O. to Granville, 25 Nov. 1918, tel. no. 155, F.O. 371/3147.

49 Talbot to Hall, 14 Dec. 1918, F.O. 371/3146.

50 Rodd to F.O., 11 Dec. 1918, F.O. 371/3156.

51 The sources for the discussion are Petsalis-Diomidis, chaps. III-IV; Smith. Vision, chaps. 4-6; Talbot to Granville, 'Report on Greek Negotiations at the Paris Conference, 1919', 13 Dec. 1919, in Granville to Curzon, 17 Dec. 1919, F.O. 371/3599; Correspondence, in 1919, G.M.F.A. A/4, A/5/vi(6)-A/5/vi(15), A/AAK5.

British. As Italy's obstruction was expected to act as a stumbling block, he tried to throw the weight of the American President Wilson in favour of his designs. By blessing Wilson's Points for self-determination and the creation of a League of Nations, he obtained his sympathy. By month's end, he had composed, on Wilson's request, the pamphlet *Greece before the Peace Congress*, which made up his formal exposition of Greek claims a month later.[52]

In this pamphlet, Venizelos proclaimed the emancipation of almost the whole of Hellenism from foreign domination. Based on Greek statistics, he wrote that the aim was to acquire all the 'unredeemed' territories that remained in the Balkan Peninsula, Asia Minor and the Dodecanese, and integrate with the motherland about 1,676,000 Greeks out of 3,956,000 living outside it. He excluded only the 350,000 Greeks of the vilayet of Trebizond in Pontus and the 364,459 of Constantinople, who were to be attached to Armenia and the international state of Constantinople respectively. Unless the state of Constantinople was established, 'the natural solution would be to adjudge Constantinople and its vilayet to Greece', with the freedom of the Straits preserved by international guarantees. However, Venizelos avoided reverting to this matter in his subsequent presentation of the Greek case. Paradoxically, he did not display the same consistency in the question of Cyprus. While he made no reference in the pamphlet, in his presentation he laid claim to it. This, probably, was due to his impulsive belief in a presumed British favour to the demand, although thereafter he never staked it out.

The pamphlet took for given the restoration of eastern Macedonia along the frontier delimited by the Treaty of Bucharest and the recognition of the islands of the eastern Aegean, still effectively in Greek possession. In northern Epirus, it claimed a strip of territory that, extending over Premeti, Korytsa and Argyrokastro, included 120,000 Greeks, out of 151,000 being dispersed in Albania, and 80,000 Albanians or Albanian-speaking Muslims. In Thrace, it claimed the Bulgarian and Turkish slices, an area lying west of a line starting at the north from a hilltop on the Greek-Bulgarian north-eastern frontier and ending in the northeast at the Cape Indiana on the Black Sea. This region, in which Bulgaria was to obtain commercial access through the port of Dedeagatch in the Aegean, comprised approximately 367,000 Greeks and 69,000 Bulgarians as against the majority of Muslims, mainly of Turkish origin. In western Asia Minor, also, the pamphlet claimed a zone stretching from the mouth of Marmara in the north through most of the Smyrna hinterland to a point inland not beyond the offshore Dodecanese in the south. To the zone were accorded the islands of Imbros, Tenedos, Mitylene, Chios, Samos, Ikaria, and the Dodecanese on grounds that they formed part of the Asia Minor seaboard, a unified geographical entity that was distinct from central Asiatic Turkey in economic terms. Incorporating the islands, in which the Greek population amounted to 370,138, served the purpose of making the Greeks appear to outnumber the Turks by 1,188,359 to 1,042,000. There remained out of the zone 922,545 Greeks, a section of whom should be included in the states of Armenia and Constantinople, and the rest be subject to voluntary exchange with the Turks from within it.

Moreover, Venizelos resumed talks with Italy. On 19 January 1919, the day after the conference opened, Sonnino conferred with Venizelos on a secret agreement: the former was to cede Korytsa to Greece and recognise its claims to the Dodecanese and Smyrna, should the latter abandon for Rome the shore of northern Epirus up to Cape Stylos with a hinterland as

52 'Greece Before the Peace Congress', in 1919, G.M.F.A. A/5/xi(4).

far as Chimara. Having consulted London, Venizelos gave priority to the prize of Asia Minor and accepted the proposal. On 23 January he made his way to strike a deal with Sonnino, who nevertheless refused to offer definite compensations in return for Greek concessions.[53]

Venizelos's attempt to buy off an irreconcilable power was a failure. To this was added Lloyd George's and Clemenceau's unsettled backing and Wilson's cool reception. In this respect, Venizelos might be said to have gone through Italy's uncompromising position and the conditional support of the other three Allies by playing the two ends against the middle through the manoeuvre of pushing Greek ambitions to the maximum. But he displayed a spirit of moderation and conciliation in negotiating the final terms of the peace treaty. Clearly, he was resolute to take advantage of the force of the structural opportunities, in order to attain the ends in view.

On 4-5 February Venizelos presented the Greek demands nearly to the full before the supreme council. Invoking the principle of nationality, he claimed northern Epirus, the whole of Thrace, the islands 'in eastern Mediterranean, including Cyprus', and the western littoral of Asia Minor as far north as near the Dardanelles, with a large portion of the vilayets of Brussa and Aydin (Smyrna) and the islands opposite this coast-line. Turkey should be limited to the interior of Anatolia, with a new capital established in Konia or Brussa. Constantinople and the Straits should be internationalised under the aegis, if established, of the League of Nations; and Armenia should be inaugurated.[54] Not only did Venizelos state the Greek case with unprecedented fervour, winning the admiration for his statesmanship of the Big Four statesmen. He came out of the hearing with the conviction that Smyrna with its hinterland, the Dodecanese, and Cyprus had almost been secured at the cost of some islands and half of northern Epirus, which was the necessary sacrifice for accommodating Italy.

After Venizelos's testimony, an expert territorial committee was assigned to examine Greece's claims independently of the Turkish and Bulgarian questions. The final report it submitted to the coordinating central territorial committee at the end of March failed to give a definite settlement of Greek ambitions. The British and French delegates cast their favour on almost every Greek demand. The Americans were reserved about the claims to Asia Minor and Thrace. The Italians were utterly averse. Nor did the central committee bring allied interests round to a line to the Greek liking, unable to solve the problem before the supreme council reached a decision over the fate of Turkey. In fact, the Greek affair remained in the periphery of the allied deliberations. Britain and France were concerned to address primarily the issues of the Rhine and reparations, the containment of Germany, the partition of Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire, and the allocation of mandates in the Middle and Near East. It was Italy's eagerness for greatness and Venizelos's opportune steps to exploit the other Allies' uncontrollable exasperation that led to allied decisions benefiting the Greeks.

The Italians stood firm not only for the gains that the treaties they had signed with the British and French stipulated, but also for the immediate acquisition of Fiume in the Adriatic. That they were determined to realise their goals found everyday confirmation in their control of Albania. Another indication was that in mid-March they established in the Dodecanese a

53 Talbot to Granville, 'Recent Secret Negotiations Between Greece and Italy', 3 Feb. 1919, in Granville to Curzon, 21 Feb. 1919, F.O. 371/3585.

54 Romanos to G.M.F.A., 21 Jan. (4 Feb.) 1919, tel. no. 520, G.M.F.A. A/4; 4 Feb. 1919, tel. no. 216, F.O. 371/3577.

'naval station command' with 'coastal jurisdiction' over the islands and the southern shoreline of Asia Minor from the gulf of Scala-nova to the 'south of Smyrna as far as Adalia and beyond'.[55] Further convincing proof was given two weeks later when the outbreak of violence in Adalia provided Italian marines with a pretext to disembark, a move that on 10 April was followed by a landing in Makri and an advance northeastwards up to the Konia area. The crisis culminated on 24 April, when Italy left the conference thanks to its agitation over Wilson's strong objections to their claim to Fiume and Britain's and France's aloofness. An irreversible revulsion of feeling against the Italians ensued, after they were reported to have made massacres against the Greeks of Rhodes struggling for union with Greece and sent battle-cruisers to Fiume and Smyrna.

On 5 May Lloyd George took the matter to the sitting of the supreme council to accuse Italy of colonialist designs in the eastern Mediterranean. He asserted that unless the three Allies dispatched detachments to Smyrna, they would be presented with an Italian *fait accompli* in Asia Minor. Simultaneously, he dropped hints to Greece of taking on the task until the question of mandates was settled. The next day news that the Italians were on their way back to the session precipitated the decision to give the Greeks the mandate to police the Smyrna-Ayvali region. As they were reluctant to ship their own contingents, Clemenceau and Wilson consented to this temporary solution so as to prevent an Italian landing.

Venizelos saw in Britain's initiative a unique window of opportunity for Greek interests. He had somewhat engineered the bid. Before the conference launched, he had informed the British that Greek armies were at its disposal to serve the *entente* cause in Turkey. Although he had issued a decree reducing the total strength of the army to about 200,000 men, in March he suspended demobilisation in order to 'maintain considerable forces to occupy territories which may be accorded by peace conference'.[56] In April, too, in the light of Italy's aggressiveness, he offered the British eight divisions for allied campaigns in the Near East.[57] Hence, Venizelos capitalised on Greece's partnership value and military strategy to take the mandate for Smyrna by diplomacy. This was granted because the only troops available at the time to be shipped to contain Italian expansionism were Greek. The heart of the matter was that Venizelos grasped the allied offer to let the Greeks be given their greatest chance. He was reassured by Lloyd George that 'he was not being asked to send troops merely to do police work for the powers as in the case of South Russia…he was asked to do so because the supreme council definitely intended to allot Smyrna to Greece'.[58]

The assignment of Smyrna to Greece was not intended to prejudice the final settlement of the Turkish question, nonetheless. Caused by Italian expansionism, it was designed to assume 'the form of military occupation in the absence of a political administration'.[59] Despite precautions, it resulted in atrocities and disturbances. This incited the hostility of local Turks, who launched, with Italy's aid, a guerrilla war. While Greek military strategy was still figured by the form of limited war, Greek forces were pushed to engage in fierce attrition fighting within and across the prescribed lines.[60] Venizelos's negotiating position began to be undermined by the nationalist ferment stirred up by the efforts of Mustapha Kemal (Atatürk),

55 Admiralty to F.O., 29 July 1919, F.O. 371/3601.
56 Correspondence, in 1919, F.O. 371/3570.
57 Petsalis-Diomidis, p. 199.
58 Granville to Curzon, 3 Dec. 1919, F.O. 371/3593.
59 Venizelos to G.M.F.A., 24 Apr. 1919, tel. no. 4226, G.M.F.A., A/5/vi(6).

a distinguished general of the Ottoman army, to organise military resistance. From late August, as the strength of 'Kemalism' grew rapidly, Kemal embarked on driving the Greek and foreign intruders out of Asiatic Turkey and Thrace. As a result, Greece's image as a small state capable of guaranteeing stability was to spoil.

Meanwhile, as the German question attracted the most attention, the Treaty of Versailles between the Big Four and Germany had been the first to be signed on 28 June. Greece's claims remained unsettled, bound to await the outcome of the entire peacemaking. At the time, there was a strong British-French support for an American mandate over the Straits and Constantinople. But Wilson, who had already left for home, was reluctant to commit his country to the responsibility before he carried the ratification of the treaty through the US Senate. This aggravated the deadlock reached in the matter of Smyrna.

The situation was further complicated by the conflict between Greece and Italy over the boundaries of their zones in the south of Smyrna. At the supreme council, the new Italian minister of foreign affairs, Tommaso Tittoni, was given to understand that he should come to terms with Venizelos. Ultimately, on 29 July, Venizelos and Tittoni concluded a secret accord, which was to come into force with the ratification of the impending peace treaty with Turkey. Italy agreed to recognise Greek claims as declared in the peace conference, including all the Dodecanese but Rhodes, which would remain under Italian rule until after Britain ceded Cyprus to Greece. In return, Athens would give up its demand to the Meander valley in Asia Minor and support Italy to take the mandate for Albania.[61] But the agreement did little to bring about the settlement of Greek claims. The treaty making a peace with Turkey was still contingent on whether or not the USA would undertake a mission in the Near East. In fact, the outstanding Turkish question took the longest to be resolved. This might be said to reflect a measure of Greece's smallness and weakness and indicated how great power arrangements constrained Greek strategies.

In November the US Senate rejected the Treaty of Versailles. With Washington entering a new era of isolation, the rest of the Allies negotiated the peace treaties with each one of Germany's wartime allies: the Saint-Germain Treaty with Austria on 10 September, the Neuilly Treaty with Bulgaria on 27 November, the Trianon Treaty with Hungary on 4 June 1920, and the Sèvres Treaty with the Ottoman Empire on 10 August. Essentially, the final peace settlement served the Allies' strategic purpose of containing any future German aggressiveness and the communist threat of the fledgling Soviet Union.[62] Of the small Balkan states that played their part in the victory, Serbia was summoned to incorporate the Balkan domains of Austria-Hungary in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, known as Yugoslavia. Romania acquired Bucovina, Transylvania and a slice of the Banat area. As for Greece, it was the last partner of the *entente* coalition that was awarded its gains, most of which were decided in London and San Remo, from February to April 1920, long after the Paris conference drew to its close on 21 January.

60 Γ.Ε.Σ./Δ.Ι.Σ. (1987). Επίτομος Ιστορία Εκστρατείας Μικράς Ασίας, 1919-1922 (An Epitomised History of the Asia Minor Campaign, 1919-1922). Athens.

61 Venizelos to G.M.F.A., 15/26 July 1919, in 1920, G.M.F.A., 37.1; Venizelos to G.M.F.A., 16/29 July 1919, in 1920, G.M.F.A. 37.1.

62 Merriman, J. (1996). A History of Modern Europe: From the Renaissance to the Present. New York: N. N. Norton, pp. 1144-1154; Mayer, A. J. (1968). Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918-1919. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, pp. 9-21.

3. THE SEVRES TREATY

The Paris territorial rearrangements barely achieved any of Greece's irredentist claims. The only compensation that Venizelos proved able to secure was to take Smyrna on a mandate to restore law and order until the Near East question was settled; even though the Allies's motive was to control Italian ambitions in the area, and the zone under Greek authority was smaller than that he staked out. Greek fortunes were also on the turn thanks to Kemal's growing resistance to the Sultan's nominal government and the Allies in the interior of Anatolia.

To this international setback was added an array of domestic hurdles. War weariness and corruption were reported to have stirred up feeling against the government.[63] Not accidentally, in September 1919 recruits of old classes were granted unlimited leave with a view to keeping a manpower of 150,000, of whom 90,000 were to stay in Asia Minor.[64] In March 1920, Greek men in the area amounted to 90,000.[65] Also, Venizelos had adopted measures that mounted to considerable breach of the constitutional rules and caused much outcry. In early June 1919, when elections were due to take place, he prolonged the sitting of the Lazarus chamber by six months.[66] In December he extended this by further four months until the peace treaty with Turkey was signed.[67]

The borrowing, finally, had the consequence of bringing the public debt, in March 1919, up to 2,421,132,960 drachmas, an amount that was increased by one-fifth to 2,936,871,960 a year later as a result of the Asia Minor expedition. The budget of 1919-1920 estimated additional loans at the value of 741,250,000 drachmas, which were to make up about two-thirds of revenue of 1,147,000,000; and military expenses at 960,978,489 out of a total expenditure of 1,542,300,749. Regardless of the huge increase in indebtedness and the current budget deficit of roughly 400 million, Miltiades Negropontis, the minister of finance, was optimistic that Greek finances 'were strong enough to come in aid for the realisation of national restoration'. He counted on the fact that the new territories were to bring in fresh tax proceeds, measures were to be taken to arrest tax evasion, and credits were to be disposed for productive investments.[68] Clearly, the vision of a greater Greece and the vortex of military success misconstrued the material reality of Greek statehood and papered over the real scale of the structural constraints in the eyes of Greek leadership.

But with the royalist opposition intensifying and the elections approaching, Venizelos's domestic standing depended on what he would bring back as the final rewards of the peacemaking; only if he returned to Athens with tangible gains in Thrace and Asia Minor would he re-obtain a popular majority.[69] This calculation weighed heavily on Lloyd George, who tried hard to win France's and Italy's reluctant consent to the attribution of the Smyrna zone to Greece. In February, when the French army in Cilicia suffered a humiliating

63 'Greece: The Political Situation', 20 May 1919, in 21 June 1920, F.O. 371/3593.
64 Nairne, 'Note', 30 Sep. 1919, in Granville to Curzon, 1 Oct. 1919, F.O. 371/3570; Nairne to Granville, 19 Nov. 1919, in Granville to Curzon, 19 Nov. 1919, F.O. 371/3570.
65 Paraskeuopoulos to Venizelos, 10 (23) Mar. 1920, V.A. 173/86.
66 Russell to Curzon, 27 June 1919, F.O. 371/3598.
67 Granville to Curzon, 9 Dec. 1919, F.O. 371/3593.
68 'Presentation of the Budget for the Year 1st April 1919 to 30 March 1920 by the Minister of Finance Mr. M. Negropontis to the Parliament at their Meeting of the 12/25 December 1919', in Granville to Curzon, 31 Mar. 1920, F.O. 371/3568.
69 Granville to F.O., 1 Oct. 1919, F.O. 371/3593; Granville to F.O., 4 Nov. 1919, F.O. 371/3593.

defeat by the Kemalists and the Allies retaliated by the seizure of Constantinople, Paris and Rome suggested that the whole of Thrace should be given to the Greeks in return for their evacuation of Smyrna. The opinion of the allied military experts was that 27 divisions were required to thwart Kemal's movement, a force that Athens was unable to field. Lloyd George refuted the inference. As it was agreed to restore Constantinople to Turkey and Thrace to Greece, he was reconciled to a five-year Greek mandate over the Smyrna hinterland, under the Sultan's nominal sovereignty, with the possibility of incorporation at the end of the period.[70] Venizelos's stance played its part in stimulating Lloyd George to stick with this attitude.

Venizelos, indeed, refused to exchange the acquisition of Thrace for a withdrawal from Smyrna because he 'attached more importance' to the latter. He declared that although the Greeks 'were keener on Thrace', surrendering Smyrna 'would be a terrible blow to their prestige…and raise a storm of indignation…in Greece'.[71] Despite warnings to the contrary, Venizelos assured the British of Greece's power and will to impose the treaty on Turkey without allied help. He reasoned that the quicker the settlement, the quicker Turkish irregular raids across the Greek zone would cease, and the less severe the strains of war-weariness and mobilisation would be on Greece. He believed that the peace, even after the Porte signed a treaty, could hardly be consolidated, unless the Greeks advanced into the interior to annihilate Kemal's nationalist bands.[72] It was Venizelos's commitment to the task of holding together an arrangement by force of arms on his own that shelved pressing disposing structural forces and paved the way for a treaty sanctioning the Greek presence in Asia Minor and Thrace. Unless this strategic choice was made, the treaty that sealed the territorial over-expansion of the small Greek state would never be signed.

Throughout the months prior to the conclusion of the Sèvres treaty, Venizelos devoted energy to overcoming Italy's and France's reservations about the ability of Greek armies to enforce peace terms.[73] He was convinced that apart from the two divisions in Thrace, the six divisions in Asia Minor, outnumbering the Kemalists by 90,000 to 60,000, were capable of crushing Kemal's movement alone, should the supreme council authorise him to take action.[74] In May 1920, the Greeks were allowed to move into and replace allied detachments in western Thrace, which had been awarded by the Treaty of Neuilly to an inter-allied commission. In June the general staff reported that the strength and morale of their troops were splendid and Kemal's Turkish mobilisation fell short of expectations.[75] By then, too, the Kemalists attacked British garrisons in Ismid. Venizelos seized the opportunity to reassure Lloyd George that he was resolute to impose, in political concert with Britain and France, the decisions of the peace conference.[76] He offered the Allies one division for the

70 Γ.Ε.Σ./Δ.Ι.Σ. Μικράς Ασίας, p. 52; Montgomery, A. E. (1972). The Making of the Treaty of Sèvres of 10 August 1920. Historical Journal, XV (4), pp. 783-786.
71 Granville to Curzon, 2 Feb. 1920, in 1919, F.O. 371/3593.
72 Smith. Vision, pp. 109-123.
73 Correspondence, in 1920, G.M.F.A., 37.3.
74 Venizelos to Ractivan, 2/15 Mar. 1920, G.M.F.A., 37.2.
75 Correspondence, in 1920, G.M.F.A., 40.2; G.S.A., 'Report on Asia Minor (up to 5 June 1920)', in Paraskeuopoulos to Venizelos, 11 June 1920, V.A. 173/86.
76 Venizelos to G.M.F.A., 2/15 June 1920, G.M.F.A., 37.2.

defence of the Straits. In return, he obtained their approval to order a limited advance into the Asia Minor northeast littoral to thwart the Turkish irregulars harassing the Greek lines.[77]

Within a matter of two weeks, Greek divisions occupied eastern Thrace, helped the British safeguard Ismid, and extended the Greek frontier in Anatolia as far as the Bursa-Alashehir line. General Paraskevopoulos, the commander-in-chief of the Greek army, had warned that unless this campaign was conducted, every day that would pass would help the enemy to Greek disadvantage.[78] Venizelos, contrary to the view of Paraskevopoulos who was prepared to pursue and destroy Kemal, ordered Greek troops to station in their new positions until the treaty with Turkey was signed.[79] He was contemplating a further advance up to Eski Schehir and Afyon Karahisar in case 'the occupation of Thrace had not been a sufficient lesson to the Turks', or they would not sign the treaty.[80] He sought however to resume the offensive with Britain's permission and cooperation.[81]

On 10 August, eventually, while Kemal's nationalist forces were in rebellion in Anatolia, the Sultan signed the Treaty of Sèvres.[82] Ottoman Turkey was reduced to its Anatolian domains and a small European strip extending from Constantinople and its surrounding area west of the Straits to the Chatalja lines. It relinquished eastern Thrace, Tenedos, and Imbros to Greece and a portion of its eastern Asiatic lands to an independent Armenia. It also granted local autonomy to the Kurdish regions in eastern Anatolia. Furthermore, the treaty provided for a nominal Turkish sovereignty over Smyrna and its hinterland. This zone Greece was to administer, with the authority of a local parliament, for five years, at the end of which period it would be eligible to apply for annexation to the League of Nations, should the parliament or a plebiscite so vote. The Straits would be placed under an international commission, which would guarantee their freedom. As for the islands of the eastern Aegean, they were definitely acquired by Greece. Finally, a Tripartite Pact between the three Allies attached to the treaty gave a zone of economic exploitation in Cilicia to France and in Adalia to Italy.

In short, Venizelos adopted strategies that, capitalising on some structural opportunities, made Greek over-expansion a reality. Apart from the significant rewards of the Treaty of Sèvres, three further treaties of the same day set the stage, at least on paper, for turning Greece into a small regional power of 'the two continents and the five seas'. The first, concerning the protection of the minorities in the new territories, laid down that Britain and France would waive their right as protecting powers.[83] The second, negotiated after Italy renounced the Tittoni-Venizelos agreement, provided for the immediate acquisition of the Dodecanese except for Rhodes, the future of which was associated with that of Cyprus. The last sanctioned the transfer of western Thrace. Of the claims which Venizelos laid down at the peace conference, only those relating to northern Epirus, Cyprus, and small parts of Asia Minor were not given satisfaction.

The Turkish peace settlement was frail, nevertheless. In the first place, it was dictated by the need of filling the power vacuum arising from the crumbling of the Ottoman Empire. The victorious great powers of W.W.I hastened to partition the Middle and the Near East into

77 Γ.Ε.Σ./Δ.Ι.Σ. Μικράς Ασίας, pp. 52-53; Smith. Vision, pp. 123-126.
78 Paraskevopoulos to Venizelos, 19 June 1920, V.A. 173/315.
79 Smith. Vision, p.127.
80 Wilson to Stavridis, 30 July 1920, V.A. 173/354.
81 Venizelos to Stavridis, 2 Aug. 1920, G.M.F.A., 37.3.
82 Γ.Ε.Σ./Δ.Ι.Σ. Μικράς Ασίας, p. 62-63.
83 Svolopoulos, C. (1997). Η Ελληνική Εξωτερική Πολιτική 1900-1945 (The Greek Foreign Policy 1900-1945) (fourth edition). Athens: Estia, p. 155.

spheres of influence so as to ensure their greatness and keep the balance of power among them. In the second place, the implementation of the settlement depended on several 'elusive variables': the continued commitment of the Allies; the continuation of the 'successful collaboration' between Lloyd George and Venizelos; and the ability of Greece to maintain effective and sufficient forces in the field, despite the poverty of its resources.[84]

Specifically, Britain's support for a greater Greece, as its 'chief ally' or 'regional proxy' in the eastern Mediterranean, was 'closely tied to Venizelos'.[85] Paradoxically, the political fortune of Venizelos took an unexpected turn, largely because he failed to arrest his government's authoritarianism and contain popular resentment. Early in May, he had been committed before the parliament to raise extraordinary prohibitions immediately, grant general amnesty, and hold elections within the normal period of 45 days of the electoral campaign as soon as the Turkish treaty was ratified.[86] Two weeks later, nonetheless, he strengthened repression and put off the abolition of moratorium up to mid-October, as the laxity of martial law afforded the Royalists the chance to intensify their opposition.[87] Domestic turmoil was driven to extremes when, after the conclusion of the treaty with Turkey, the murder of the Royalist Dragoumis provoked an attempt against Venizelos's life.[88] It was the end of September before the parliament ratified the Treaty of Sèvres, sanctioned the lifting of extra-constitutional powers, winded up its sessions, and decreed for a general election to be held on 14 November. Venizelos, having created a greater Greece, felt confident of obtaining a large majority.[89] But on 25 October, Alexander died of blood poisoning from a monkey's bite. The Royalists, whose electoral campaign put its finger on the problems of corruption and war-weariness seized the day to play up the questions of demobilisation and the return of Constantine. Eventually, Venizelos suffered an astonishing defeat at the polls, and Constantine was restored to the throne by a plebiscite held on 5 December.

Moreover, it was left to Greece to stem the Kemalist tide beyond its Anatolian frontier and put the Treaty of Sèvres into effect by force. The task of enforcing the treaty could not be achieved without mobilisation and an extension of war aims. By September the number of men was again brought up to 203,978, of whom 115,000 were in Asia Minor, 24,000 in Thrace, and 21,689 in Macedonia.[90] Venizelos agreed with Paraskevopoulos that Greek armies should move into the interior to capture Ankara and strike a decisive victory against Kemal. Before his requests for allied consent evoked response, he had fallen from power.[91]

Holding firm to his firm-but-flexible diplomacy, therefore, Venizelos was prepared to transform the until-then military strategy of limited war into a strategy of annihilation. Constantine and his royalist government were destined to make the decision, however. They went for the crushing blow by fighting a campaign to occupy Ankara, but they proved unable

84 Dockrill, M. L., & Goold, J. D. (1981). Peace Without Promise: Britain and the Peace Conferences, 1919-23. London: Batsford Academic, p. 214.
85 Goldstein, E. (1989). Great Britain and Greater Greece 1917-1920. Historical Journal, 32 (2), pp. 339, 345, 356.
86 Granville to Curzon, 7 May 1920, F.O. 371/3593.
87 Cumberbatch to D.O.T., 24 May 1920, F.O. 371/3593; Granville to Curzon, 1 June 1920, F.O. 371/3593.
88 Granville to Curzon, 20 Aug. 1920, F.O. 371/4698.
89 Russell to Curzon, 30 Sep. 1920, F.O. 371/4668.
90 'Note', 19/1 Sep. 1920, G.M.F.A. 40.1.
91 Smith. Vision, pp. 129-134.

to deal with the mess of Kemal's guerrilla war.[92] As France and Italy evaded their attachment to the Sèvres territorial arrangements, Athens was dragged into the trap of strategic overextension, diplomatic isolation, and borrowing deprivation. This, coupled with the emergence of the domestic security and state-strength dilemmas, resulted in the Greek evacuation of Smyrna in September 1922 and the expulsion of nearly one million and a half Ottoman Greeks from the 'lost' fatherland of the East. Essentially, the Greek strategic response to international and domestic imperatives created by the Turkish peace stood in disharmony with powerful disposing structural forces, which afforded Greece little partnership value and autonomy of action in defending the new *status quo* in Asia Minor.

92 Gawrych, G. W. (1988). Kemal Atatürk's Politico-Military Strategy in the Turkish War of Independence, 1919-1922: From Guerrilla Warfare to the Decisive Battle. Journal of Strategic Studies, 11 (3), pp. 318-341.

Chapter 11

CONCLUSION: OVER-EXPANSION AND THE COMPONENTS OF GREEK GRAND STRATEGY

W.W.I and the ensuing peace-making arrangements 'marked a "coming of age" for small states'.[1] For Greece, indeed, it was an immense watershed. With the Treaty of Sèvres, the small Greek state reached its largest territorial extent, which covered 'two continents and five seas'. Post-war additions included the whole of Thrace, Tenedos, Imbros, and all the Dodecanese but Rhodes. The islands of the eastern Aegean definitely passed under Greek sovereignty and a considerable slice of the Asia Minor littoral was made subject to Greek administration, with the prospect of annexation after five years. Greek forces, too, were involved under allied command in the defence of Constantinople, a fact that scaled up the country's regional prestige.

In the light of the *dichasmos* and belated engagement in the war, Greek over-expansion was a paradox. This owed much to Constantine's dethronement, Venizelos's control over the state, Greece's contribution to the victory, the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, and Britain's commitment to the Greek cause. But these enabling forces were a sufficient cause of over-expansion. Unless Venizelos used the tools of force and diplomacy, systemic and domestic conditions could hardly create a greater Greece. It was through the strategies by which he responded to structural forces that the dialectical interplay of the international system and domestic structure afforded Greece partnership value and autonomy of action in attaining the aggrandizement of its territorially ordered rule. Greek grand strategy, in that regard, was the necessary cause of over-expansion.

In the aftermath of the Balkan wars, Greek leadership sealed its determination to retain the peace settlement of the Treaty of Bucharest. Venizelos was recorded to have stated that 'we have enough with what we have won…. we need…peace to consolidate and organise our new provinces'.[2] However, he refrained from renouncing the designs and rhetoric of the Great Idea, although his ultimate strategic aim was to preserve the *status quo* as based both on Greek territorial integrity and the balance of power in the Balkans. The polarisation of the international system, Bulgaria's and Turkey's revisionism, the burden on public finances of

1 MacGinty, R. (1997). War Cause and Peace Aim? Small States and the First World War. European History Quarterly, 27 (1), p. 51.
2 Kerofilas, p. 165.

mobilisation and of the repayment of the heavy debt, political and social consensus, all these were the main structural forces that shaped this strategic choice.

Venizelos believed that Bulgaria was the most dangerous adversary. To balance against it and avoid concurrent exposition to two predominant threats, he tried to contain the less aggressive Ottomans, but without acquiescing in unwelcome demands. He was disposed to resolve, on grounds of give-and-take compromises, the disputes over the future of the islands of the eastern Aegean and the expatriation of Ottoman Greeks. He was even ready to agree to the exchange of Greeks and Turks in the two countries, a move that was to shatter Greek irredentism to a large degree. In this respect, Greek grand strategy was constituted along the pattern of consolidation, which took its alignment category. Alignment rested on a mixture of accommodation and balancing. The types of strategy that directed accommodation and balancing were constructive accommodation and diplomatic balancing respectively. In defending the *status quo*, therefore, Venizelos's primary concern was to establish forms of cooperation with Turkey and check the more threatening Bulgaria. Yet again, he aspired, through the performance of these partnership roles, to make Greece a reliable and effective partner in the Balkans.

The outbreak of W.W.I set the Greek governing coalition before a strategic dilemma: was Greece likely to suffer more by standing aside than it was by going into the war and against whom belligerent? Both the king and the government filtered the international threat of the great power confrontation through the most direct regional threats posed by Turkey and Bulgaria. Obsessed by the predominant Bulgarian and Ottoman threats, Constantine and Venizelos held firm to the ultimate strategic aim of the consolidation of the *status quo*. In fact, they differed from one another in the perception of the structural conditions and the way strategic ends should be related to means. Unlike Constantine, Venizelos considered that the strategy of alignment, in particular with the *Entente*, was to serve better the goal of consolidation.

In the first days of the war, the solution was 'forced' by the *Entente*'s reluctance to enlist Venizelos's unconditional cooperation and Constantine's refusal to side with the Triple Alliance. By sheer necessity, the grand strategy of consolidation was pursued by non-alignment, of which forms Athens chose neutrality. No sooner had Turkey aligned with Germany and the Allies tried, by the offer of Smyrna, to lure Greece to assist Serbia and contribute forces to the Dardanelles campaign, than the dilemma of alignment or non-alignment resurrected. Constantine proved able to take the upper hand, but he consented to moves that violated Greek impartiality. In February 1915, for instance, he allowed the first breach of 'internal' neutrality. The Allies obtained permission to utilise Mitylene and Lemnos as naval bases, on the understanding that as these islands were formally neither annexed by Greece nor ceded by Turkey, they could be regarded as enemy territory.[3] In April Constantine lodged no protest against Britain who, in return for a promise to build two destroyers as a replacement, requisitioned four Greek torpedo-boats and two light cruisers then being constructed by a British firm.[4] It was, too, Constantine who twice agreed to the renewal of the commission of the British naval mission.[5] Likewise, the French military mission was allowed to stay in the country.

3 Elliot to Grey, 13 Feb. 1915, tel. unnumbered, F.O. 371/2254; Grey to Elliot, 9 Mar. 1915, tel. no. 12, F.O. 371/2254.

4 Admiralty to F.O., 28 April 1915, F.O. 371/2257; Admiralty to F.O., 16 May 1915, F.O. 371/2257.

5 Elliot to Grey, 19 Sep. 1915, F.O. 371/2368; Elliot to Grey, 14 June 1916, F.O. 371/2681.

This benevolent attitude was contrary to the spirit and obligations of neutrality. It led to the infringement of 'external' neutrality through the occupation of portions of Greek territory by both sets of powers. In effect, the strategy of neutrality degenerated into a line of non-engagement with equal treatment to the belligerents. This, after Bulgaria sided with the Triple Alliance and entered Greek Macedonia, was definitely stripped of its value. The result was that foreign intervention, along with the extra-parliamentary and paramilitary power competition between Constantine and Venizelos, opened the Pandora box of *ethnicos dichasmos* and state separatism. Authority controversies and competing calculations deprived Greek grand strategy of its unity of purpose and coherence.

Broadly speaking, Venizelos perceived the war as posing an imminent threat to Greek security through the predominant regional threats, because he was convinced that Germany was more favourably inclined to Bulgaria and Turkey and less willing to support Greece. Simultaneously, he viewed Britain as unrivalled in the Mediterranean and most willing to back Greek interests. Hence, systemic forces dictated that Greece should take the side of the least hostile and unreceptive camp that was most likely to win and happened to be its long-time protecting powers. It was from this perception of the strategic arrangements that after the outbreak of the war, Venizelos stood out for a military balancing response to the Bulgarian and the Turkish threat, long before this manifested itself in the field. He tried to establish forms of cooperation and check the revisionist designs of Bulgaria and Turkey. Essentially, he aimed for Greece to play these partnership roles and through them reinforce its state struggle for power and security in its region.

Venizelos was steadily swayed by the vision of Greece evolving into a reliable and effective partner in the East. Although he was committed to the maintenance of the *status quo*, he did not adhere inflexibly to the grand strategy of consolidation. He intertwined it with moderate and expansionist elements. One aspect of this flexibility was that he was intent on accepting *entente* overtures for assistance in an attack on Turkey should assurances against Bulgarian aggression be obtained. He reasoned that 'if Germany won, Turkey would be revived and hopes of Greece for ever shattered, while if Allies won, they would not give any share of the spoils to Greece if she had done nothing to help them'.[6] The other aspect was that Venizelos laid stress on the balance of power rather than on territorial integrity. For the sake of making Greece a pillar of future allied designs, and of securing gains in Asia Minor, he tried to come to terms with Bulgaria. He was ready to bargain for a new territorial arrangement in the Balkans, even at the expense of recent Greek acquisitions and to the Bulgarian benefit, on condition that the reconstituted *status quo* would be based on the balance of power. Besides the constructive accommodation towards Bulgaria, the price was that Athens should intervene in support of Belgrade. In any case however, Venizelos was determined to march with Serbia should it fall victim to Bulgarian aggression. He sensed that if Bulgaria annihilated Serbia, it would try to prevail over Greece and establish its hegemony in the region; thereby, whether or not the Greek-Serbian treaty had lapsed, it was in Greece's interest to help Serbia ward off a Bulgarian strike.

In short, Venizelos professed publicly that Greece was unable to 'exist without friends and allies', which it could 'only find among the Western powers'.[7] He was recorded to have declared that 'Great Britain always wins the last battle'. Similarly, once Germany attempted

6 Elliot to Grey, 7 Mar. 1915, tel. no. 119, F.O. 371/2255.
7 Elliot to Grey, 17 July 1916, F.O. 371/2623.

to entice him, through territorial compensations in Macedonia, to leave Serbia in the lurch, he stated that 'Greece is too small a country to commit such a great infamy'.[8] He spoke out that 'Germanism was the principal enemy of Hellenism in Asia Minor', while if Greece 'proved as vigorous as it was during the two previous wars, then Britain would be willing to make it a powerful Mediterranean state'.[9] In enlisting Greece in the ranks of the Allies, Venizelos thus aspired not only to contain the Bulgarian threat and thwart the Ottoman threat from a position of added strength; but also to render the Allies a partnership service and through it to legitimise a right to advance demands in the peacemaking.

Constantine, on the other hand, held out against an early and unconditional engagement. Although he believed that Germany was invincible on land and Britain on sea, he did not perceive threats from the opposing coalitions. Instead, he viewed the war as a threat only if Greece incurred the hostility of the belligerents and provoked Bulgaria and Turkey to combine forces with one of them against it. He felt that alignment would cause this anti-balancing response and lay the country isolated and exposed to the predominant regional threats. He feared that Bulgaria might turn against his exhausted armies and seize recent Greek acquisitions in Macedonia should he go to the assistance of Serbia. It was from this perception of the systemic forces that he attached priority to the preservation of Greece's territorial integrity, and advocated neutrality.

Constantine was most anxious about Bulgaria, the 'one and greatest enemy'.[10] He was concerned to resist the Bulgarian threat and crush the Turkish threat but without entering the war or breaking off relations with the belligerents before he obtained firm guarantees against Bulgarian aggression for a span of time after the end of hostilities. In fact, he set out not to 'burn his boats' unless he 'saw a reasonable chance of success'.[11] He declared that he was 'not pro-German nor anti-*Entente*…only Greek'.[12] He contended that Greek interests dictated that the Allies 'should win this war'. Convinced however that Germany 'was willing on all points', he reasoned that because 'there were only two…endings to the European war, either that Germany would be…victorious or…the war would end in a stalemate largely in favour of Germany', Greece should remain neutral and join in the peace conference as 'a free agent'.[13] He contemplated moving neither against the Allies nor with the Triple Alliance.[14] Rather, he sought to organise 'a Greek movement against Bulgaria alone', but he did not 'see how'.[15] Hence, whether or not Constantine was pretending to his intention to commit his forces to the Dardanelles campaign or to his proposal for an alliance with the Allies is a point open to dispute. What is certain is that at a moment when Germany warned him against intervention and refused to assure him of Greek territory, he tried to trade neutrality with an offer of cooperation by the *Entente* that would secure Greece from a Bulgarian attack and ensure a share of the spoils.

8 Caclamanos, D. (1942). Greece in Peace and War. London: Percy Lund Humphries, p. 33.
9 'Minutes of Crown Council Under Presidency of King Constantine', 18 and 19 Feb (4 and 5 Mar.) 1915, G.M.F.A. A/5(23).
10 'Extracts of Letters from Prince Nicholas to Mr. Crawfurd Price', in 21 Oct. 1915, F.O. 371/2274.
11 Elliot to Grey, 7 Oct. 1915, tel. no. 988, F.O. 371/2271.
12 Elliot to Grey, 18 Nov. 1915, tel. no. 1269, F.O. 371/2278.
13 'Report of a Visit to Greece by Mr. J. J. Stavridi', 26 Nov. 1915, F.O. 371/2278.
14 Elliot to Grey, 25 Jan. 1916, tel. no. 144, F.O. 371/2613; Elliot to Grey, 20 May 1916, tel. no. 763, F.O. 371/2619; Dakin, p. 215.
15 Grey to Granville, 30 Oct. 1916, tel. no. 2439, F.O. 371/2614.

Not only did neutrality purport to deter a Bulgarian incursion on Greek territory. It also served to pave the way for Greece to pursue a blend of constructive accommodation and diplomatic balancing towards the final stages of hostilities; that is, to win time until after the scales of war determined the winner, to the side of whom Greece would defect in order to resist Bulgaria by co-binding political moves and to stake a claim to the rewards of victory. Basically, Constantine sought to achieve all with one strike. His choice might be said to have raised bids, once Germany guaranteed Greece's territorial integrity and gains in return for non-engagement. Nonetheless, in his risky effort to strike a balance between better terms of participation and equal benevolent attachment to both the belligerents, he boiled down to staging compromises of neutrality and bandwagonning on Bulgaria. The problem was that Constantine had an exaggerated sense of his ability to perform the role of free rider. He had a clear objective, but he lacked coherent strategies for attaining it. To the extent that he dealt inefficiently with Venizelos's opposition and *entente* coercion, his statesmanship was an inhibitory factor in harmonising enabling and disposing forces; it did not fulfil the bridging function between the structural conditions and the making of grand strategy. Hence, the strategy of neutrality was doomed to failure.

After Venizelos gained control of all of Greece, he committed the whole of its forces to the *entente* cause, in order to re-establish forms of cooperation with the Allies and check Bulgaria's and Turkey's armed revisionism. He intended by this partnership service, first, to make Athens a reliable and effective partner and then, through this course, to pursue the ends in view. Throughout allied Balkan campaigns, his ultimate strategic aim was to consolidate the *status quo*, in the sense of restoring both Greece's pre-war territory and the regional balance of power. Greek grand strategy was equally constituted along the patterns of consolidation and expansion. The category of strategies that directed these patterns was alignment, which took its balancing form, structured as it was around the types of military and diplomatic balancing. The mixture of the military strategy of limited war and the firm-but-flexible diplomacy brought the types into effect. It was through these moves that such enabling structural conditions as allied aid, the Liberals' parliamentary dominance, the reconstruction of the services, and fighting efficiency in the field afforded Athens partnership value and autonomy of action in achieving its goals: to recover its pre-war acquisitions, thwart the Bulgarian and Ottoman threats, and advance irredentist demands.

During the peace-making process, Venizelos took advantage of the new material conditions. Of the conditions, Greece's enhanced military partnership value and the Allies' will to partition the Ottoman Empire seemed most critical in stimulating him to constitute Greek grand strategy purely along the pattern of expansion. In order to extend the Greek motherland into the 'lost' fatherland of the East, he pursued again military and diplomatic balancing, which rested on a blend of limited war and firm-but-flexible diplomacy. These strategies mattered to Greece not only in attaining over-expansion, but also in dealing with its vulnerabilities. From this angle, Venizelos was able to get more than the country's smallness and weakness might dictate by exploiting the card of 'peace-builder-and-keeper' and going through the opportunity opened by Italy's eagerness for greatness and Britain's strong support. In harmonising structural pulls and pushes, his statesmanship efficiently acted as a bridge between them and the making of the grand strategy of expansion. The Treaty of Sèvres was his great accomplishment, the landmark of which was the assignment of the 'peace-keeping' mandate of Smyrna to Greece. This was to accrue the seeds of a national catastrophe, however. A war had been won but peace lost for greater Greece.

The grand strategy that Venizelos pursued was the objectified product of the interplay of the international system and domestic structure. Simultaneously, it became the medium of the constitution of the territorially over-enlarged material reality of Greek statehood. The latter, coupled with the concurrent impact of structural forces of the 'then' present, made the strategies that led to the 1922 Asia Minor disaster, filtered and fulfilled as this process was by the Greek leadership of the time. In this sense, Venizelos's choices did matter to his successors for the context in which they perceived structural imperatives and related military and diplomatic ends to means in a way that they could not escape the disaster. Why?

Venizelos might be said to have borne 'primary responsibility' because his 'Ionian vision' overestimated Greece's ability to take up the scheme of its expansion in Asia Minor. He sought Greece to expand 'so as to include as many as possible of the Greek people' and evolve into 'an important Mediterranean power', which 'in the place of the crumbling Ottoman Empire…would be the pillar of Britain's policies and the protector of British imperial communications: the Suez Canal; the routes to India'.[16] But in fact, Venizelos might hardly be accused of pursuing these goals at a time when London recognised that:

> the idea which prompted our support of Greece was…the natural expression of our historical policy: the protection of India and the Suez Canal… we had supported Turkey as the first line of defence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey had proved a broken reed and we fell back on the second line, the line from Salamis to Smyrna. Geographically the position of Greece was unique…politically she was strong enough to save us expense in peace, and weak enough to be completely subservient in war. The Treaty of Sèvres was…an immense asset had it succeeded.[17]

By then Britain had established a sphere of influence in the Middle and the Near East. To hold this sphere, it created 'a patch-work of client states', which included, among others, a greater Greece intended for acting as a bulwark against a resurgence of Turkish nationalism and Russian imperialism.[18] Lloyd George regarded Greece as a significant 'British proxy in the eastern Mediterranean and western Asia' because he believed that it provided 'the key to upholding the Treaty of Sèvres'.[19] The circumstances gave Athens a strategic importance that it had never previously held. In addition to establishing forms of cooperation and checking the balance of power, it was summoned to act as a regional-scale guardian of security. This fitted in well with Venizelos's vision of making Greece a reliable and effective partner in the East. Venizelos intimated to Lloyd George that

> The best way of giving practical evidence of our gratitude is to prove worthy of your trust…your expectations as regards Greater Greece…. Greece will become a factor of progress…peace, and…order in the Near East, and will…prove that you have not given her your invaluable support in vain.[20]

16 Smith. Vision, pp. xii-xiii, xvii, 37.
17 Nicolson, 'Future Policy Towards King Constantine', 20 Dec. 1920, F.O. 371/4685.
18 Darwin, J. (1999). An Undeclared Empire: The British in the Middle East, 1918-39. Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 27 (2), pp. 163-165.
19 Holland, R. (1991). The Pursuit of Greatness: Britain and the World Role, 1900-1970. London: Fontana Press, p. 100.
20 Venizelos to Lloyd George, undated, V.A. 173/267.

From this viewpoint, Venizelos might not be held responsible because his vision guided the aim of expansion and the decision to go to Smyrna.[21] As a leader of a small state called on to play partnership roles, he could not overlook British backing and let the unique, double-edged opportunity of redeeming Greek aspirations and making Greece a major presence in the Near East go unexploited. Venizelos might be criticized for overestimating Greece's preparedness to provide security and deal with the scale of the task without international and domestic friction. He miscalculated or disregarded the strategic implications of certain disposing structural forces and their far-reaching detrimental influence on the effectiveness of Greek grand strategy.

In particular, from the outbreak of the war onwards, Greece was short of money and in streets for want of credits. Mobilisation, blockade, and the *dichasmos* brought with them a disruption of production and trade and depletion of state revenue. Although yields and proceeds from exports of basic agricultural commodities suffered a sharp drop, recession did not befall Greek industry. Mounting needs for consumer goods and military supplies, coupled with the increase of import tariffs, benefited home manufacturers involved in mercantile marine, distillery, textile, ammunition, and food-processing, and pushed them to reinvest their enormous profits in manufacturing. Paradoxically, this expansion enabled merchants and ship-owners to pile up more capital rather than augmented state receipts from direct taxation. Only the high sums of emigrant remittances, which stood at a peak of 22 million pounds in 1920, compared to 1,7 in 1914, were left to bring in returns. The result was that two-thirds of government spending came from borrowing, two-thirds of which went for military expenditures.[22]

Unless loans were acquired, the Greek economy would hardly finance from its earnings the costs of W.W.I and the Asia Minor campaign. It was thanks to Venizelos's strategic choices and statesmanship to secure allied aid that Greece proved itself able to underpin the military effort without declaring bankruptcy. Nevertheless, this added much complexity to the management of Greek strategies. One aspect was that it activated the state-strength dilemma because the attempt at building, by borrowing, economic strength aggravated further the heavy public debt and financial weaknesses. The other aspect was that without *entente* help in credits and weapons, there was little hope of doing anything effective to keep the army mobilised and hold the Anatolian frontier.

Moreover, after Venizelos reinstalled himself in power, Greek forces won the admiration for their military abilities and contribution to the allied victory.[23] This was made feasible because he manipulated *entente* patronage and the allegiance of fervent officers to eliminate the royalist opposition, showing undue tolerance to extreme acts of violence. He, too, enmeshed politics and paternalism with the services to command the hierarchy of military authority and muster its loyalty. Once again, the military was rendered a chief auxiliary of state building and ruling. It was entrusted to keep domestic order and pursue expansion, a task that, being beyond the state's strength, activated the domestic security dilemma. Not accidentally, the mobilisation that Venizelos had ordered was implemented piecemeal because it met with adverse public opinion.[24] Reports attributed the royalist officers' defiance to war-weariness, since they could not 'understand why a large Greek force was kept

21 Compare to Smith. Venizelos, pp. 161-166, 176-178; Smith. Vision, pp. xv-xviii, 77-85.
22 Mazower, M. (1991). Greece and the Inter-War Economic Crisis. Oxford: Clarendon Press, chap. 3.
23 Granville to F.O., 6 Oct. 1918, tel. no. 925, F.O. 371/3150.
24 Granville to F.O., 22 Dec. 1917, tel. no. 2178, F.O. 371/2890.

mobilised in Asia Minor, which might…not be given to Greece'.[25] Clientelism and factionalism enabled Venizelos to direct the military to serve his war aims. But they permeated it so deeply that potentially they undermined its fighting efficiency.

Finally, the *dichasmos* destroyed the political consensus and popular support upon which the Liberals had built their political hegemony instantiated in the semblance of one-party system of government. Obviously, the clash between Venizelos and Constantine emerged from a lack of lucidity in the Greek constitution about the extent of their decision-making power in the realm of foreign policy. As both argued that they were acting in good faith, each dismissed the terms in which the other viewed constitutional legitimacy. This had the consequence of entangling the governing coalition in a fierce power competition for the spoils of office, which culminated in the collapse of state authority. Divided into two political entities, the Greek state was plagued by large-scale violence and deprived of its vertical and horizontal legitimacy.

The determining dimension, however, was that the pre-Venizelist parties and oligarchies aligned themselves in a common royalist front against Venizelos. This rekindled the intra-bourgeois struggle for control over the state and transformed the party polarisation into a national cleavage between the Venizelists and the Royalists; which intermingled with and reproduced rather than overwhelmed the enduring division between modernizers and traditionalists. The elections of December 1915, in which two-thirds of the electorate tuned their political behaviour with Venizelos's call for a boycott, showed that the petty bourgeoisie remained his stronghold. But 'against the…dangers of war…(the) hardships of direct foreign intervention…(and) the long-term threat of capitalist modernization', it deserted him 'under slogans in which church-steeple patriotism, chauvinism and xenophobia, religious bigotry, romanticism, and anti-capitalist resentment were inextricably linked'.[26] Domestic developments discredited in the eyes of the petty bourgeoisie the momentum of Venizelism as the driving force behind its social ascendancy. It was the realignment of the petty bourgeoisie that turned the tables against Venizelism. In a sense, the *dichasmos* marked the revenge of the old ruling oligarchies, whose interests were circumscribed by the *Goudi* revolt.[27] It sealed the comeback of the upper state bourgeoisie, especially the rise of its military-bureaucratic stratum, who recaptured from the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie the lead in the management of state affairs. In fact, it represented the failure of Venizelos and his fellows to rise to 'organic' hegemonic national leadership, to shape and socialise the Greek people in a clear and coherent vision of statehood.

One effect was that Venizelos could no longer count on his parliamentary predominance to contain the opposition of the Royalists. It was ironic that his pre-war reforms, which instituted rules of an advanced bourgeois regime, did not challenge the fundamentals of royal authority. Although he made the grade as creating conditions for modernisation, he never articulated his preferred core national doctrine designed to foster a modern identity between rulers and ruled or merge the forces of power centralisation and fragmentation into a new ideal of polity. The result was that as Venizelos's charisma, the Balkan wars victories, and government and party clientelism proved ineffective, the Venizelists were pushed to resort to force to bolster their grip on power.

25 G.S.I., 'Royalist Movement in the Greek Army', 3 Nov. 1919, in Granville to Curzon, 14 Nov. 1919, F.O. 371/3593.
26 Mavrogordatos, pp. 127-130, 136-137.
27 Ventiris, p. 203.

Unable to win Constantine over to his view by political means, Venizelos instigated a military conspiracy to re-command the state. He restored Greece's political unity and a single process of state building and ruling thanks to the use of force and allied patronage. The cost was a territorially unified country but one nationally marred by a bitter *dichasmos*. Also, after Constantine resigned the throne, the Venizelists proceeded with a wholesale purge of his followers from the administration and services, a repression that was carried to the point of extremism. They extended the life of the Lazarus parliament beyond the legal term of four years to bring the peace negotiations to a successful settlement of the Greek claims before they went through the test of elections, displaying an attitude that was arbitrary by liberal standards.

In some respects, eradicating the 'roots of the old regime' might find justification in the need to make the state effectively ruled, with a view to pursuing the strategic aims of consolidation and expansion. Indeed, the Greek state was engaged in an intense struggle for domestic power and security. The persecution of leading royalist figures and acts of domestic violence might be said to have intended to re-establish the state's vertical and horizontal legitimacy. This strengthened the state's ability to sustain authority, centralise decision-making power and marshal human and material resources, which in turn created sufficient domestic conditions for Venizelos to achieve the ends in view. Nonetheless, the problem was that the process of rebuilding state strength was implemented by coercion, not by persuasion and consent. As compulsion was made all the more necessary for state building and ruling, Venizelos's domestic governance exacerbated rather than remedied the *dichasmos* and held in equilibrium the scale of the state's and the society's autonomy. And so the margins of freedom in inspiring the cooperation of elites and masses and rallying them round the flag were narrowed. Therefore, with the domestic security and state-strength dilemmas ready to surface, the Greek state did not appear as if it was strong, or thought to be, in the light of its territorial over-expansion.

Another effect was that Venizelos neither challenged the imperial vision of the national confines of Hellenism nor articulated clearly his vision of a greater Greece. At the peace conference, for instance, he presented Greece's territorial demands in conformity with the rhetoric of the irredentism of the Great Idea. He projected the Greek historical space as vaguely imprinted on Greek national consciousness with its nationalist, imperialist, and religious overtones. Regardless of its tactical expediency, the choice had the consequence of cultivating extravagant 'expansionist' expectations among the Greek governing coalition and society. These, albeit in congruence with the state's legitimising ideology, did not correspond with his aspiration of making Greece a reliable and effective partner. This means that the expectations misconstrued his image of nationhood and strategic moves, a contradiction that evolved into the Achilles heel of the grand strategy he pursued.

Venizelos put Greece to play partnership roles and then proved able to reap the fruits of their good performance, to achieve expansion through them. The problem was that he did little to detail the vision that guided his ultimate strategic aim of territorial expansion. This was due to his reluctance or fear of political cost to reshape and adjust to his vision the narrative of the 'Hellenic-Christian' nation. Not accidentally, while he reasoned that the territorial space of the Greek state should be extended to northern Epirus, Thrace, and Asia Minor, he did not define it definitely and depict the boundaries of the 'lost' Greek fatherland of the East accordingly. It was indicative too that although he did not stake a claim to Constantinople, he was recorded to have stated to Alexander: 'I do not forget the promise I

have made you. We shall take the City'.[28] Whether Venizelos pointed to his expected top reward of Greece's partnership service or manoeuvred to enlist support, the heart of the matter was that he manipulated symbols of Greek identity, based on the hybrid co-existence of modernity and tradition and the old myth of ethnic mission related to the restoration of the Byzantine homeland. To maintain consensus, he deployed the predominant frame of reference of Greek nationalism, which reproduced the national and imperial bases of the irredentist creed. Thus, Venizelos might be held responsible for this inconsistency. At a moment when his strategies mirrored a national, partnership attitude, he misled the Greek people as to his vision by using as a tool for legitimising his strategic choices the imperialist tenets of the discourse of Greek identity.

The result was that what Venizelos might regard as a measure of Greece's partnership ability to act as a security provider, such as the award of Smyrna, was perceived as a legitimate acquisition of an 'unredeemed' territory and a triumph of national vindication from the perspective of the Greek people. The latter continued to be socialised in a standard of self-image and identity, which misread as mere irredentism the effort of Venizelos to render to Greece the role of the guardian of security in the East and through this course to make it greater. This misconception complicated the state's struggle for domestic power and security and acted as a catalyst for the fall of Venizelos from power. Also, it bore much of the blame that the royalist leadership never grasped the gist of Venizelos's strategies. It might be said to have misperceived British support to him as a commitment to Greece; it did not realise that only Venizelos's pro-British Greece was a reliable regional ally for Lloyd George's Britain.[29] Constantine, himself, could hardly believe that the Allies had given to Greece 'new territory merely because of Venizelos'.[30] To this was added the conviction of the people that Britain was 'the friend and protector of Greece' and 'in the end' would 'come to their assistance'.[31]

However, even if it was assumed that Venizelos had upgraded the patron-client relations between Britain and Greece into a special relationship in the form of a regional Greek partnership in global British leadership, Constantine and his royalist governments saw in it a privileged alliance bound to enable them to defend the new *status quo*. They viewed Greece's presence in the region as part of its just and inalienable 'irredentist right', not as a function of its partnership service. From the outset, they were determined to enforce the Treaty of Sèvres without allied assistance.[32] They refused to negotiate a compromise from a position of strength. They rejected all British offers of mediation on grounds that they would not allow 'redeemed' lands to be placed again under Ottoman rule.[33] Having raised an army of 200.000 men, 'the most formidable force that nation had ever put in the field', they launched into the interior of Anatolia to capture Ankara and annihilate the Kemalist armies.[34] The offensive met with no success, in terms of decisive victory.

28 As quoted in Alexandris, p. 140.

29 Goldstein, E. (1991). Holy Wisdom and British Foreign Policy, 1918-1922: The St. Sophia Redemption Agitation. Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, 15, p. 39; Gerolymatos, A. (1988). Lloyd George and Eleftherios Venizelos 1912-1917. Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, XV (3-4), p. 49.

30 Patrick to Curzon, 10 Dec. 1920, F.O. 371/4684.

31 Nicolson, 'Memorandum: Greek Situation', 8 Jan. 1921, F.O. 371/6077.

32 Granville to F.O., 6 Dec. 1920, tel. no. 326, F.O. 371/4684; Granville to Curzon, 22 Jan. 1921, F.O. 371/6078; Granville to F.O., 8 Feb. 1921, tel. no. 65, F.O. 371/6078.

33 Lindley to Curzon, 'Annual Report, 1921', 10 Feb. 1922, F.O. 371/7603.

34 Lindley to Curzon, 'Annual Report-Military Chapter', 28 Mar. 1922, F.O. 371/7603.

Only when they could not preserve militarily what they sought to retain politically, did the Royalists accept an armistice in March 1922 and make overtures for accommodation. But in the light of Kemal's intransigence and Britain's detachment, talks led to nothing, and Greece was driven to a national disaster within a matter of months.[35] Fighting alone, as a category of strategy, was ordered by its offence form, which took the annihilation type. Soon, as this strategy was pursued concurrently by the bullying diplomacy and the military strategy of annihilation, it degenerated into appeasement. The latter, in turn, was based on a blend of conciliatory diplomacy and attrition. All these strategies proved self-defeating.

Clearly, it was not the size of Greek forces that constituted the crux of the problem. The scale of the task taken up and imposed upon these forces by the lack of allies, the over-extended lines of communication, and Kemal's guerrilla war partly accounted for it. The heart of the matter was that the royalist leadership failed to perceive the partnership roles it was called on to play: to foster peace and guard security in the Smyrna hinterland. When Constantine was to restore the throne, London contemplated, 'if owing to the failure of Greece to fulfil her obligations…the Treaty is broken or crumbled at any point, to seize the occasion to make better terms with the Turks'.[36] The Royalists did not understand that Britain would support them so long as they were capable of keeping order on their own. This did not necessarily imply the annihilation of Kemal. Nevertheless, much of their responsibility lay with the omission of Venizelos to socialise the Greek elites and people in his vision of a greater Greece.

By way of conclusion, a greater Greece of the 'two continents and the five seas' would hardly have been created unless Venizelos had pursued strategies to capitalise to the fullest on certain enabling international and domestic forces. The chapters of this part have tried to elucidate how the interplay of the international system and domestic structure made these strategies and reconstituted through them Greece's over-expanded territory, filtered and fulfilled as this process was by Greek leadership. The analysis argues that Greek grand strategy mattered through the response to structural imperatives to Greece in achieving the ends in view. This suggests that Greece's grand strategy and territorial over-expansion were a function of human interaction and consent, not the product of predetermined or 'blind' historical forces. In the context of material conditions of the 'then' past and present, the Greeks, through Venizelos's strategic choices and moves, reshaped and territorially enlarged the material reality of their statehood. At the same time, the reconstructed reality prefigured the circumstances under which they perceived it and articulated the strategies through which structural conditions afforded them little partnership value and autonomy of action in consolidating the new *status quo*. This in turn implies that within a particular historical setting, Greek grand strategy was the art that Greek leadership and people exercised to create power and produce effects, through which they made their history of territorial enlargement but not ultimately as they pleased.

Also, as the fall of Venizelos from power and the Asia Minor disaster demonstrated, the effectiveness of grand strategy is not only a matter of structural opportunities and constraints. It is also a matter of statesmanship, the leaders' ability to harmonise them. Alongside it goes the ability to mobilise resources and muster loyalty through cooperation with society, not by repression. In remedying weakness or making domestic conditions compatible with the goals

35 Lindley to Curzon, 'Annual Report, 1922', 2 July 1923, F.O. 371/8832.
36 Curzon, 'Note on the Greek Position', 27 Nov. 1920, F.O. 371/4683.

of expansion and consolidation, the leaders should avoid provoking the domestic security and state-strength dilemmas. Otherwise, they may redress vulnerabilities by creating a semblance of state strength, and hence fall into the trap of confusing semblance with reality and making commitments beyond the state's actual means. Finally, the manipulation of symbols and images for framing and legitimising the leaders' strategies is of paramount importance. State leadership should provide guidance about their strategic designs and adjust them to the national identity formation. Should a clear vision of statehood and nationhood be missing and the people not be rallied round the flag, the best grand strategy and statecraft are doomed to failure in the long run.

CONCLUSION

This book examined small states through the neglected lenses of the grand strategy and the external-internal synthesis scholarship. It questioned the conventional wisdom that a small state is a mere public relations auxiliary or puppet of the great powers in their struggle for mastery in world politics, thus it has no freedom to pursue any other strategy than compliance with their claims. I suggested that structural imperatives might afford it a broader range of alternatives, which include the choice to expand and defend the *status quo* by its means, even by using force. By invoking the conceptual analysis and insights from the agency-structure theory, I constructed a theoretical framework that establishes the rationale that systemic and domestic structural conditions make grand strategy and constitute through it state behaviour and the material reality of statehood, while state leadership filters and fulfils this process.

From this perspective, my central argument was that grand strategy matters to small states in achieving ends in view. The 'historical-tracing', 'heuristic' investigation of the Greek 'military and territorial expansion paradox' in the years between 1909 and 1920 provided convincing support. It was through the grand strategy that the interplay of the international system and the state's domestic structure afforded Greece much partnership value and autonomy of action in pursuing and attaining the enlargement of its territorially ordered rule.

The evidence confirms the reciprocal relationship of structural imperatives with grand strategy and expansion. Systemic and domestic conditions set the stage for a choice of action to come into effect, but they do not determine the distinctive way of acting, the way state leadership perceives and articulates responses to them. Unless Greek leaders had related means to ends to harmonise enabling and disposing forces, the interplay of the international system and domestic structure would have hardly brought into being Greek expansion. Greek leadership was the driving force behind this interplay. This means that it regulated, stimulated and prevented, through its perceptions and by its decisions, the impact of structural conditions on the making of Greek strategies. Essentially, the interaction of structural opportunities and constraints was the sufficient cause and Greek grand strategy the necessary cause of Greece's territorial enlargement, while Greek leadership acted as a bridge between them.

Furthermore, the case study shows that when small states act as partners rather than as puppets, they are likely to extend their territory and consolidate the *status quo* without being reduced to capitulation or annihilation. They can obtain international power and security by performing three main partnership roles in their region: establishing forms of cooperation, checking powerful and threatening states, and providing security. Greece was able to expand

on its own when it made its strategies part of a partnership service and subject to the task of alignment.

In the Balkan wars and W.W.I, therefore, Greece secured territorial gains and legitimated a right to the spoils respectively through the accretion of its effort to preserve peace and control the balance of power in the Balkans. At the Paris peace conference, it took the mandate of Smyrna, and later signed the Treaty of Sèvres, by playing the role of the guardian of security in the East. Throughout this period, Greek grand strategy, which happened to be led by Venizelos, always intertwined the military strategy of limited war with the firm-but-flexible diplomacy. These strategies were used to pursue either military and diplomatic balancing or a mixture of constructive accommodation and military and diplomatic balancing, made up of balancing or a blend of balancing and accommodation respectively. The choices served the strategy of alignment, which as a sum of constituent strategies proved effective for the purposes of expansion and consolidation. It was no accident that after Greek grand strategy stripped itself of its partnership service and was reduced to the strategy of fighting alone, based on a blend of the military strategy of annihilation and bullying diplomacy, the Asia Minor disaster ensued.

Also, the Greek experience in the years concerned indicates that the stronger a small state is, the more able it is to resist unwelcome demands and play for high stakes; and vice versa the weaker a small state is, the less able it is to shoulder the burden of its struggle for expansion and consolidation without causing domestic security and state-strength dilemmas. Although Venizelos from his first term of office initiated reforms to remedy weakness, Greece remained a fundamentally weak state. It appeared as if it was strong only when the scale of the state's and the society's autonomy were held in balance. It had the domestic power and security so as to mobilise human and material resources and muster loyalty without domestic complications, every time that this condition was met, and state building and ruling was processed mainly by consensual means. This, fitting in as it did well with the strategies pursued by Venizelos, created sufficient domestic opportunities for territorial expansion. Instead, at the time when repression intensified to build state strength, Greece was getting too weak to underpin its strategies. Scarcely surprising, it suffered a national catastrophe, after its leaders decided to fight alone by combining the military strategy of annihilation with bullying diplomacy. It was the worst strategic choice for a small and weak state to achieve its aims.

To these findings should be added the importance of the manipulation of a coherent vision of statehood and nationhood to the effectiveness of small state grand strategy. Power limits dictate that small states cannot indulge in the luxury of not rallying their people round the flag. This means that they must articulate national identity and self- image in such a way that it corresponds with their designs. Otherwise, as the case presented in this study demonstrates, the latter are likely to fail. The burden of responsibility for the collapse of the Treaty of Sèvres rested also with Venizelos, insofar as he did little to deploy and socialise the Greeks in a frame of reference compatible with his vision of a greater Greece and the grand strategy he pursued.

My analysis, however, might encounter opposition. One possible criticism is that I used theories and concepts of the present as a lens through which I viewed the past. I tried to deal with this limitation by doing archival research. I looked for evidence to establish the argument in original documents, which recorded the unfolding of the events with which I was concerned at the 'then present' time of the past. This may raise the point that I focused on

sources that only enrich, not discredit, my insights. I broke out from this trap by not hypothesising in advance particular strategies and outcomes. But a comprehensive historical treatment of the subject is beyond the scope of the book. The aim is to stimulate, through a theoretically informed and historically oriented perspective, reflections on small state grand strategy. As Carr ventured, facts do not speak for themselves; they need interpretation.

Another criticism may be that by integrating categories of analysis from different theories to construct a theoretical framework, I may combine contradictory schools of thought, ontologies, and epistemologies. Alongside it goes the criticism that the elaboration of the theme is based on only one case study. I would argue, however, that I do not try to turn the tale of Greece as an expansionist small state into a paradigm, being true of all small states at all times. Hence, it is not the minimalism of the variables involved or the pluralism of cases that makes an inquiry worthwhile and an argument strong or not. It is how the question addressed merits attention, how well informed the study of the case is, and how consistent the argument is. A book of the present purpose and scope, too, is not the place to go into all details or solve all problems related to methodology. If this research effort proves itself able to avoid oversimplification or overgeneralization and shed fresh light on the relationship between structural forces and the making of small state grand strategy, its aims will have been achieved.

On a final note, I envisage three aspects of the future research relevance of this study. The first is to break away from the conventional wisdom expressed in the literature on Greek affairs about the irredentism of the Great Idea. I saw it as a disposing rather than an enabling force of Greece's territorial enlargement. This position has numerous implications because in today's Greece 'the problem for modernity is that it must… find a way of accommodating the past, if only in order to legitimize the present, and this, over the years, has given the nativists an ever-increasing purchase on the politics of identity'.[1] The second aspect is to make the argument advanced here take the form of a theory, a set of hypotheses that relate forms of strategies to outcomes of small state behaviour.

The third aspect is to challenge the traditional argument still widely held that strategy should continue to be conceived and practiced as 'a plan for the employment of military forces in pursuit of political objectives';[2] and that, by extension, strategic studies 'explores the issues surrounding the use of force as an instrument of policy'.[3] My analysis cast doubt on this view. I depart from the line of reasoning that strategy is the art of creating power in the sense of producing effects in war and peace. What is more, strategy is the medium through which human beings as social forces direct their social practices and constitute the material order of human life in the context of the dialectical interplay of the international system and the state's domestic structure. A promising theoretical exercise, therefore, is to refine the approach and develop a historical materialist theory of grand strategy through the agency-structure perspective, which attributes explanatory power not so much to the relations of production as to the historically and socially constituted human action. But this is another story.

1 Herzfeld, M. (2001). Towards an Ethnographic Phenomenology of the Greek Spirit. Mediterranean Historical Review, 16 (1), p. 22.

2 Stephens, A., & Baker, N. (2006). Making Sense of War: Strategy for the 21st Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. xi.

3 Mahnken, T. G. (2003). The Future of Strategic Studies. Journal of Strategic Studies, 26 (1), p. x.

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Greece 1912: F.O. 371/1380, 1381 *(371/1380-1381)*.
Greece 1913: F.O. 371/1654, 1655, 1656 *(371/1654-1656)*.
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Balkans 1918: F.O. 371/3145, 3146, 3147, 3149, 3150, 3152, 3156, 3158, 3159, 3160 *(371/3140-3160)*.

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